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A TRG President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society was formally launched as a special
interest group at the 7 'h Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our membership base
has expanded rapidly, and includes nearly 600 active transportation researchers, policy-makers, industry
executives, major corporations and research institutes from 28 countries. Our broad base of membership
and their strong enthusiasm have pushed the group forward, to continuously initiate new events and
projects which will benefit aviation industry and research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG holds an international conference at least once per year. As
you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers, panel discussions and
invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a consecutive stream of 14 aviation
sessions at the 8th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17: Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the
ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of
the University College of Dublin.
In 1999, the City University of Hong Kong has hosted the 3 rdAnnual ATRG Conference. Despite
the delay in starting our conference sessions because of Typhoon Maggie, we were able to complete the
two-day conference sessions and presentation of all of the papers. On behalf of the ATRG membership, I
would like to thank Dr. Anming Zhang who organized the conference and his associates and assistants for
their effort which were essential for the success of the conference. Our special thanks go to Professor
Richard Ho, Dean of the School of Business and Economics of the University for the generous support
for the conference. Many of us also enjoyed the technical visit to the new Hong Kong International
Airport (Chep Lok Kok).
As you know, Professor Jaap de Wit and I look forward to welcoming you to University of
Amsterdam on July 2-4, 2000 for the 4 th Annual ATRG Conference.
AS in the past, the Aviation Institute of the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent Bowen,
Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the 1999 ATRG Hong Kong
Conference (being co-edited by Dr. Anming Zhang and Professor Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG
members, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen, Mary M. Schaffart
and the staff of the Aviation Institute of University of Nebraska at Omaha for the effort to publish these
ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to thank and congratulate all authors of the papers for their fine
contribution to the conferences and the Proceedings. Our special thanks are extended to Boeing
Commercial Aviation - Marketing Group for the partial support for publication of this proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG website
(www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrg/) which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations and forthcoming
events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would appreciate it very much if you could
suggest others to sign up the ATRG membership. Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z2Canada
E-mail: Atrg(__commerce.ubc.ca
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The ATRG held its 3 rJ Annual Conference at the City
University of Hong Kong Campus in June 1999.
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these titles are listed on the ATRG website
(http://www.commerce.u bc.ca/atrg/).
The Proceedings
Once again, on behalf of the Air Transport Research
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ATRG Conference in a four-volume monograph set.
Proceedings Order Information
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monograph volume to cover the costs of printing,
shipping, and handling. Allow 4-6 weeks for delivery.
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A MODEL FOR MEASURING ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION
David Gillen, Richard Harris, and Tae Hoon Oum
ABSTRACT
Inthispaper,we developa model withwhich allowsus tomeasurenotonlythechanges
in equilibriumoutcomes and welfareconsequencesof liberalizinga bilateralairtransport
agreement,but alsothe distributionf thegainsand lossesto carriersand consumersof each
bilateralcountryand thoseof thethirdforeigncountries.Our model alsoallowstomeasurethe
effectsofchangesina bilateralgreementon theamount oftrafficdiversionbetweenthedirect
bilateralroutesand theindirectroutesviaa thirdcountry.We alsoprovidean extensionofour
model toacaseofoligopolymarketoutcome (Coumot Nash equilibrium).Inourmodel,quality
aspectsaretreatedinthe frameworkofhedonicpricetheoryby specifyingthequality-adjusted
price(quantity)as a multiplicationf theobservedprice(quantity)by thereciprocalquality
indexfunction(thequalityindexfunction).
Numerical simulations were conducted to measure the effects of changing the following
major policy levers in a bilateral air transport agreement:
• Removing price regulation while retaining frequency and entry restrictions
* Removing price and entry regulation while retaining frequency restrictions
• Removing frequency regulations while retaining price and entry regulations
• Removing frequency and entry regulations while retaining price regulation
• Removing price and frequency regulations while retaining entry restriction
. Removing all price, frequency and entry regulations (de facto, open skies)
The application to the case of the Canada-Japan bilateral agreement show the following
results:
• Frequency competition without freeing entry or price regulation neither increase airline
profits nor improve consumer welfare. Frequency competition with entry freedom increases
the welfare of the nation whose carrier enters the market, i.e., the nation with lower cost
carriers.
Pricing freedom with frequency regulation increases the welfare of the nation with a larger
share of passengers on the bilateral markets more than other countries. The benefits of price
competition becomes more than doubled if entry is also freed.
Overall, allowing entry of new carriers increase the overall welfare the most, followed by the
price freedom. Just the removal of frequency restrictions has the least effect on consumer
welfare.
The complete liberalization of pricing, frequency and entry leads to the welfare maximizing
market outcome. Oligopoly solution (Coumot Nash equilibrium) increase carrier profits
while reducing consumer surplus substantially.
The effects of liberalization of price and frequency regulations on O-D traffic volume,
cartier profits and consumer surpluses are greater when the model takes into account of the
third country routing possibilities.
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A MODEL FOR MEASURING ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT LIBERALIZATION
1. Introduction
Although telecommunications, financial and maritime services have been incorporated in
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) being governed by the World Trade
Organization (WTO), most of the commercial air transport issues are not incorporated in
the GATS. For more than 50 years, the issues involving commercial rights on
international air transport have been governed by the bilateral agreements between each
pair of countries involved. The bilateral framework for negotiating commercial aviation
rights was adopted at the 1944 Chicago Convention. The Bermuda Agreement, the first
bilateral air treaty signed between the United States and the U.K. in 1946 (Bermuda I) has
served as the legal framework for the future bilateral agreements to follow. Bermuda I
introduced capacity regulation, designation of carriers and routes, and system
requirements for fair and equal opportunity for carriers involved. This complex system of
regulation of commercial air transport has come under increasing criticism and pressure
during the last two decades.
Soon after the deregulation of their domestic air transport markets in 1978, the U.S.
government turned their attention to liberalize the bilateral agreements with foreign
countries t. By virtue of the sheer size of their domestic market and the strength of its
carriers, the U.S. was able to impart a pro-competitive approach on a large number of
nations. The U.S. government used the new liberal bilaterals as a means of putting
pressure on some reluctant governments. The UK and Germany were pressured by
expansion of air service between the U.S. and Belgium and The Netherlands. A new
liberal agreement with South Korea put pressure on Japan. Also, the U.S. took advantage
of 5th freedom rights in certain countries to circumvent restrictions in neighboring
nations with more restrictive bilaterals. This liberal bilateral approach was successful.
The "Open Skies" campaign which the U.S. government began in 1992 was stimulated by
strong criticism of the restrictive terms of Bermuda II.'- Although these U.S. initiatives
and the general movements towards freer goods and services trade have been successful
for liberalizing air transport system to and from the U.S., the system of bilateral
agreements between countries remain entrenched in the international air transport system.
For a nearly comprehensive measurement of the effects of the U.S. domestic deregulation on air carriers
and travelers, please refer to Morrison and Winston (1986).
-"In 1977, the UK renounced the Bermuda Agreement. The Bermuda II Agreement was accepted by the
US and the UK and was aimed at restructuring the air relationship5 that had developed after 1945. This
agreement was, in man,,"ways more restrictive than the agreement that preceded it and was never a model
for US bilateral air transport agreements.
For the next decadeor two, liberalizationof internationalair transportmarketswill
dependnearlyentirelyonbilateralnegotiationsbetweencountriesinvolved.
In anybilateralnegotiation,includinggeneraltradenegotiations,partiesto a bilateral
negotiationson air transportareconcernedverymuchwith who gains,who losesand
whatimpacttheproposedchangein thebilateralmighthaveon traffic diversionto third
country routings. Both of the countriesinvolved need to better understandthe
consequenceson the consumersandcarriersof eachbilateralpartnerand of anythird
party foreignnationsof theproposedchangesto therulesandrestrictionsgoverningthe
air transportbilateral. Althoughbilateralnegotiatorswouldlike to takeaccountof these
complexeffectsin makingdecisions,airtransportresearchershavenot directedsufficient
effort to developmodelswhichallowoneto measurethesecomplexconsequencesof the
bilateralair transportliberalization.
Twopreviousstudieshavedevelopedmeasuresof thewelfaregainsfrom internationalair
transportliberalization.Street,SmithandSavage(1994)measureboth the gainsin cost
efficiency and improvementsin servicequality that would be causedby introducing
greatercompetitionin theAustralia'sinternationalair transportmarkets.This paperis
closeto thecurrentpaperin thatit attemptedto measuregainsandlossesfi'ombilateral
liberalizationto theAustraliancarriersandconsumers.Theyuseconventional"triangle"
analysisvia perfectcompetitionmodelwhiledoingsomead hoc adjustments for quality
of services including flight frequency. The equilibrium outcomes are computed without
full iteration of the interactive nature of demand and supply functions. They show that
liberalization does not always yield a net welfare gain to Australian economy although,
by definition, it will increase the world's welfare.
In another study, Findlay, Hufbauer and Jaggi (1996) measured the potential cost savings
to users from the Asia-Pacific regional open skies regime. They assumed that the gains
are all in the form of airlines' cost savings, all of which are transferred to consumers
through competition. On the basis of this coarse calculation they show that the cost
savings to users of seven countries (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia and Singapore) alone is $21.7 billion in 2010.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model with which to assess the effects of
changes in a bilateral air transport agreement governing the supply of air transport
services on the distribution of benefits and costs to bilateral partner nations' carriers,
consumers and foreign carriers and consumers. Our approach differs from the traditional
benefit-cost analysis of policy alternatives. Our focus is in the distribution of benefits and
costs to various stakeholders: consumers and carriers of each bilateral partners and of
third countries 3 while cost-benefit methodology focus on measuring aggregate economic
benefits and costs for a given nation or region. Since trade policy researchers have
concentrated on the distribution of the impacts of change in trading rules across nations
and on identifying the winners and losers, methodologically we borrow significantly from
J Governments are also a major gainer or loser through changes in net tax/subsidy revenues particularly as
indirect taxation is an important t)ature or the tax framework or industrial or subsidy policies are in place.
4
theliteratureon tradepolicy analysis.In particular,ourmainmodelis themonopolistic
competitionmodeladoptedfrom Spence(1976),Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),Krugman(1980),andHarris(1984). Wealsoextendourmodelto obtaintheeffectsof adifferent
marketstructure(i.e.,oligopoly)onthedistributionof thegainsandlossesof bilateralair
transportliberalization.
2. Key Policy Levers in Bilateral Air Transport Liberalization
The key commercial rights to be negotiated in a bilateral air agreement are pricing,
capacity (new entry, frequency and aircraft: size), and carrier and route designations.
Carrier and route designation form a barrier to competition in several ways. First,
bilateral air treaties normally limit the number of carriers who can serve the bilateral
markets. For example, most bilateral agreements allow one carrier from each country to
serve markets between the two countries: e.g., Korean Air and Air Canada in the Canada-
Korea bilateral markets. Second, the cities and/or airports a designated foreign carrier
can serve are normally specified. For example, Air Canada can serve Kansai
International Airport only from Vancouver or Toronto while Canadian is allowed to serve
only Tokyo's Narita Airport and Nagoya. Third, most bilaterals do not allow the fifth
freedom rights (beyond right) to foreign carriers. 4 Clearly, removal or relaxation of the
carrier/route designation clause is likely to induce competitive entry by new carriers as
well as encourage entry into new routes and/or airports by the existing carriers.
Pricing regulations in bilateral agreements usually take one of the following forms. First,
all carriers may be required to use the IATA set fares. Second, when only one carrier
from each country serves the market the bilateral agreement may require the two carriers
to agree on a uniform price. The third option is the so-called "single-disapproval"
pricing regime that allows for one of the two governments to disapprove a carrier's fare
proposal. In this case, a carrier's proposed fares are usually disapproved by the foreign
government. The fourth option is the "double disapproval" regime. Under this regime,
both governments are required to agree in order to disapprove a carrier's proposed fares.
Airlines will have nearly complete pricing freedom under the double disapproval regime.
Naturally, removal or relaxation of the pricing regulation increases competition.
The seat capacity that the carriers of a country can offer in aggregate are usually restricted
in bilateral agreements. 5 Although many bilateral agreements allow the tradeoffbetween
frequency of services and aircraft size used, in many bilateral routes the cost
Fifth Freedom rights must be negotiated separately and must include the third count3,.
5The nature of the capacity controls to either carrier in a bilateral is important. Restrictive regimes require
agreement between designated carriers and approval by both authorities. Canada has very restrictive
capacity regimes in all areas except with the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. In its largest
twelve international markets, Canadian government has the right to designate more than one carrier in
eleven of them. This multiple designation benefit could be negated with overall cap on capacity in the case
ofHong Kong, Japan and Australia, white in France and Italy there would need to be an agreement
bet_ een the incumbent carriers. Canada has the right to designate additional carriers, without capacity
restrictions for 3rd and 4th freedom ser','izes to the United Kingdom. Germany. Netherlands, Jamaica,
Y,lexico and Trinidad.
characteristicsandtheneedto offer neardaily flights limit theaircraftchoicepractically
to only oneor two aircraft types. Therefore, for simplicity of our analysis we will
analyze the effects of allowing frequency competition only. We choose the optimal
aircraft type for each route based on the unit cost per passenger.
Although other factors including access to airport slots and facilities could influence
competitive outcomes significantly in bilateral air transport markets, in this study we will
examine only the effects of removing or relaxing the pricing, capacity and entry
regulations on consumers and carriers of each country and for each nation.
3. Model Development and Estimation
Our model uses a two-stage approach. In the first stage, the analytic foundations are laid by
specifying demand and cost functions, market cleating conditions for demand and supply,
and the equilibrium quantities and prices. In the second stage, numerical simulation is used
to f'md each carrier's equilibrium traffic volume, price, and frequency.
Since air transport services are supplied in a network, the model must integrate aU of the
routing possibilities for each Origin-Destination (OD) market for all OD markets in the
network. The starting point is to identify all of the OD market in the region, and then,
map out the alternative routings for each of the OD pairs. In Figure 1, we illustrate a
simplified version of such a network in the North Pacific. It is simplified to include only
the OD traffic between Vancouver (YVR), Tokyo (NRT), Seattle (SEA) and Seoul (SEL).
In this international network there are four countries., each country with a single airport,
and three (3) potential OD markets in each country. For example, in Vancouver all
originating traffic is assumed to be Vancouver based and destined for one of the three
alternative destinations. Several alternative routes with several carriers serving a
particular route can serve each OD market. Each route has one or more segments where a
segment is a flight between two airports. Each carrier will carry passengers traveling on
YVR-NRT, as well as passengers to YVR from other cities in Canada (Toronto-YYZ for
example) and passengers traveling beyond NRT (to Seoul, for example). This means that
passenger volume data must be captured separately by trip purpose, nationality,
destination, fare class, route and carrier used.
An important question is what will happen to the characteristics of this network in
response to a bilateral liberalization between Canada and Japan. While this liberalization
will occur only to Japanese and Canada carriers and the network segments connecting
Vancouver (YVR) and Tokyo (Narita or NRT), the evaluation of these effects will
depend on the network wide demand and supply responses. For example, what portion of
the traffic between Seoul (SEL) and YVR (or SEA and NRT) might be diverted through
either NRT or YVR in response to the liberalization. Both the demand and supply
specifications attempt to take into account these system wide interaction effects.
Figure 1
Illustrating Four Country North Pacific Air Transportation Network and Canada-Japan
Liberalization
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3.1 Characterization of Demand Model
The demand for air travel depends upon fares, frequencies, other service attributes , and
choice of carriers. Current bilaterals place restrictions on some or all of these variables.
As bilaterals are liberalized, consumers will be given increased choices of new and
different carriers. The demand model must be capable of incorporating differentiated
products to correctly capture changes in the level and quality of air services delivered by
incumbent as well as new entrant carriers. One way of introducing preferences for
differentiated services and products is to treat each of them as a different variety of
services (imperfect substitutes). This stems from the idea that there are more products
than characteristics, and re-bundling characteristics results in another product. Car, stereo,
vacation, restaurant, wine and air trips are well-defined products. However, each of these
products can and does have many varieties; American, Australian, Canadian and German
wines, for example. The way in which one can handle this 'many varieties' for a product
canbe handledby placingstructureon the underlyingpreferencefunctionsthereby
yieldingmanageabledemandfunctions.
Armington(1969)introducedthisideaof varietyandnationallydifferentiatedproducts
into the tradeliterature.Our demandmodel follows this idea to derivedemandsfor
"differentiated"services(imperfectsubstitutes).Thisapproachwaschosenfor a number
of reasons.Whenanewcarrierentersthemarketit representsanew'variety'of analready
tradedservice. This approachalsoallowsfor marketsizeas well ascarrier sharesto
change. In the air travel liberalizationmodel,theservicesarealternativeroute-carrier
combinationsservinga givenorigin-destinationpair. The basicmodel is amendedto
incorporatenon-price(includingquality) factorswhich can vary acrossroute-cartier
altematives. This "Armington" specificationof demandis chosenwith the goal of
measuringall of thebenefitsof changingtherulesaffectingthesupplyof internationalair
travelservices.Weneedtomeasureall of thechangesto consumerbenefitsat thelevelof
theroute-carrierchoice,aggregateflightsegment,routeaggregate,andO-Dmarket.
The demandside distinguishesbetweenaggregateOD demand,and demandfor
individualroutesconnectinganOD pair. For everyOD pair thereis a home demand
aggregator at each end of the route (e.g., Canadian residents traveling to Japan) for each
fare class. Each OD group can thus be thought of as an individual consumer with a
[Marshallian] demand curve given by
Q=f(P) Equation 1
Q is an index of total passenger demand over the 'particular OD market, served by a
number of route-carrier combinations indexed r=l ....... R. For simplicity, we refer to any
given r simply as a route. P is the real price index for this route and is a function of the
individual prices p, for the route-carrier combination r.
Q is referred to as the real quantity index of demand. It can also be interpreted as being
measured in "utile" of aggregate real air service. Let q, be the individual route demand
measured in conventional passenger unit terms and let p, be the route price. If we assume
that the utility function generating Q is positive linear homogenous so that:
Q=U(q, ..... q,) Equation 2
Then there exists an exact price index function P(p, ....... p_), which is dual to U(.). It is
convenient to work with the price index flmction rather than the utility or quantity index
function.
Adopting the "Armington" assumption, in our model the route-carrier combinations
(different variety of air services serving an OD pair) are regarded as imperfect substitutes
as reflected in the following CES price index function P(*):
[- R "I-ll°"
Equation 3
Here the ,Y, are the weights on individual routes r and cr is the Allen-Uzawa common
elasticity of substitution between any two route pairs. Demand for route r given the level
of aggregate Q, is given via Shephard's Lemma so that¢
q,= Q Equation 4
In consumer equilibrium total consumer expenditure in this OD market is given by:
E = _" P, qr Equation 5
r-I
By construction E=PQ; actual expenditure on all routes is equal to the product of the
price index and the aggregate real quantity index.
In our multi-country demand analysis, welfare as well as market shares are dependent on
quality differences. This would include the effect of national preferences on their flag
carriers. In order to accommodate differences across routes in quality characteristics, the
linear quality model is used (which is closely related to the hedonic price approach to
quality adjustment)] The quality index for route 1; with a vector of characteristics 'x'
could be represented by quality function as a,(f,,trconnections, national preference
variable) where a, is an increasing function in all variables corresponding to an increase
in quality attributes such as frequency (£). Our quality function, a_ (.), is specified as an
iso-elastic function.
The basic model starts with a definition of quality adjusted units of real service with the
quality function a,(.).
q," = a/x,)q, Equation 6
The number q, is referred to as the "unadjusted demand" or observed demand. In
measurement terms it corresponds to the observable quantity of service r purchased by
the consumer. In this case it corresponds to the number of passengers on a route in the
relevant OD market. Higher a, coefficients correspond to higher quality. Corresponding
to the quality adjusted demand q" there is a price p'; i.e., the price per unit ofq'.
6 Given a list of prices p, on all routes, demand on route r is calculated in the following manner: compute
the value of the aggregate price index P using equation 7; calculate the aggregate real quantity index Q
using the aggregate demand curve (using equation 5); calculate individual route demands using equation 8.
7 See Chapter 2, Tirole, Jean. Theory of Industrial Organization, for a complete exposition of this model.
Giventhelinearityof q,* in qrit followsthat:
p,'=(1/a,.(x_))p,. Equation 7
The quality units are chosen such that for a service with quality level a_=l, p,=p,'. As the
quality level rises for given p,, the real price per unit of quality, p," falls. Consumers
actually buy the physical quantity q, at price p,, but from a utility point of view purchase
q,* at price p,* per unit of quality-adjusted demand. This is the figure that affects the
calculation of consumer surplus, our measure of benefits. Depending on the nature of the
supply side of the model, consumers take bothp, and p," as given and choose q_" and thus
qr-
If we apply the same approach for deriving unadjusted route demand functions to the case
of quality-adjusted traffic volume, then the following expressions can be obtained.
Q" = f(P') Equation 8
[" R "1-1/°"P. Equation 9
q_ = 8, Q" Equation 10
To empirically implement such a procedure it is necessary to have information on the
quality coefficients a, so that the real quality adjusted prices p," can be calculated and
substituted into the price index and demand functions. Having derived a quality-adjusted
individual route demand via the same process outlined earlier, demand in observable
units (passenger volumes) is given by:
=cY'IP_I-"Q" Equation 11
q" a,\P)
One of the benefits of this particular demand specification is that it allows explicitly for
calculating consumers' welfare and demand consequences of adding new routes or
reducing route choices in a given OD market and for quality changes on those routes. In
effect any changes in quality or in the number of carriers in the market (the variety effect)
are represented in terms of changes in real prices.
In equation 11 it is impossible to empirically distinguish be_veen shifts in demand due to
changes in 5 r and changes in aT. In order to identify the model we set all 5r equal to 1. The
implication of this assumption is that if all routes offer the same quality and prices, then
by assumption, the demand would be equal on all routes Demand differences therefore
must be attributed in the benchmark and counterfactuals to either quality or price
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differencesacrossroutes. As asimpleillustration,supposethereis amarketwherethere
areonly two routes,so R = 2 and both quality adjusted prices are equal to 1.0; thus
demand on both routes is equal. Under these market conditions, the aggregate price index
is given by:
P'(2) = (on-" + al-') = (za-') -''" Equation 12
Now suppose a new route is introduced that offers the same characteristics (price and
non-price characteristics) as the previous routes so that its hedonic price is also unity, but
now R = 3. In this case the new aggregate price index is given by:
P'(3) = (6"(1)-" + 5(1) -0. + 5(1)-°) -''' = (36'-") -'/_" Equation 13
We see in comparing these two equations that the real price index falls if _ > 1; i.e. the
elasticity of substitution between route/carriers exceeds unity. If o" = 2, P'(3)/P'(2) =
0.81; an increase from 2 to 3 route-carrier combinations is equivalent to a 19 percent
reduction in the real price of aggregate travel. When substituted into the demand function
the increase in real quality adjusted demand is approximately rl d • AP'. In the case of
exit of a carrier from the market, the adjustment would be in the opposite direction. We
can think of there being a taste for variety; more variety even if not every one consumes,
makes people better off. In effect, variety will be valued in its own right, (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977).
This demand model is also explicitly structured to deal with the issue of inter-route
substitution in a network context such as that outlined in the previous section. In Figure
1, for example, changes to the bilateral between Canada and Japan and liberalization of
the of YVR-NRT market is likely to induce substitution beV.veen alternative routes
connecting Japan and Canada, but passing through third countries. For example, a route
such as SEA-NRT would be serviced by a U.S. carrier but with the liberalization the
route SEA-YVR-NRT would draw some traffic. The extent of inter-route substitution in
response to liberalization and its welfare consequences for consumers will depend on key
parameters such as the carrier and route substitution elasticities and the relevant quality
characteristics of competing routes.
3.2 Characterization of Supply Model
Our supply model captures changes in the carrier costs in the market that could be
influenced by restrictions imposed by the bilateral agreements. Airlines may respond to
changes in those restrictions (e.g., flight frequency) by supplying more or less and/or new
services. To the extent that economies of traffic density exists, the changes in service
frequency and traffic volumes will change the unit cost
In the demand model, an,,' OD market may be served by a number of routes and each
route is composed of one or more segments. In a network of multiple OD's, it is probable
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thatchanges in one OD will affect passenger demands over the other OD's. For example,
if higher frequencies are allowed between Canada and Japan not only will this OD market
expand, but additional traffic may be garnered from passengers who are traveling to
Korea via Japan. The flight segment YVR-NRT will carry more than simply the O-D
traffic and this will affect costs through economies of traffic density. The base unit for
the cost function will therefore be the flight segment. Once the segment costs are
calculated it is possible to construct a route cost by aggregating the relevant segment
costs. The total cartier costs are calculated as the sum of all passenger costs and segment
costs.
In describing a carrier's costs we distinguish costs which vary by segment and those
which vary by route. In many cases the source of cost differences will be in the airline
system or station costs. For example, if carrier i were to extend its operation from point
B to point C, when it was already in an AB market, the additional costs would include the
increase in flight operating costs and passenger costs. However, since it is already
serving airport B, the cost of adding an operation will be low. This is quite different from
a case of entering an entirely new market. Clearly, both volume of passenger and flight
frequency are important.
Therefore, we define a carrier's total cost for a segment as follows:
TC =vQ+ wF Equation 14
where F is segment frequency and Q is segment passenger demand, v and w are unit cost
per passenger and unit cost per flight, respectively. Cartier load factors are calculated as
z = (Q/F)/G where G is seats per plane. Average per-passenger segment cost, u, can be
computed by dividing the total segment cost by the number of passengers. The
approximate average cost per passenger is obtained by dividing the total block hour costs
(flight costs) for the segment plus the total passenger costs by the number of segment
passengers. Therefore, the (total) unit cost per passenger on flight segment can be written
as follows:
u = TC/Q = wF/Q+v = (w/Gz)+v Equation 15
The unit cost per passenger will change as the volume of passengers, flight frequency or
load factors change.
The per-flight operating cost per segment (w) was computed using the block-hour
operating cost (for each aircraft type) for the U.S. carriers available using FORM 41
data. 8 Since the block-hour costs on non-U.S, carriers were not available by aircraft type,
the costs for American Airlines (AA) are adjusted for estimating the block-hour costs for
foreign carriers. This involved taking account of the differential total factor productivity
s The cost data are taken from Aviation Daily, various issues. These figures are based on the information
contained in the FORM 41 data series.
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(TFP) and the aggregate input price index between AA and the carrier under our
consideration. Table 1 lists the differential TFP and input price indices between the
American Airlines and other carriers computed by Oum and Yu (1995). This information
is used to estimate the block-hour costs for the carriers under consideration in this paper.
Table 1: Productivity Index Table for Cost Calculations
Productivity and Price Indices - 1993
American = 1.00
Numeric Code Airline TFP Price Index
1 American 1.000 1.000
2 United 1.045 1.035
3 Delta 1.069 1.075
4 Northwest 1.124 1.036
5 US Airways 0.832 1.034
6 Continental 1.005 0.891
7 Air Canada 0.807 0.881
8 Canadian 0.860 0.911
9 Japan Air Lines 0.851 1.421
10 All Nippon 0.777 1.432
11 Singapore Airlines 0.958 0.813
12 Korean Air 0.988 0.781
13 Cathay Pacific 0.969 0.926
14 Qantas 0.875 0.897
15 Thai 0.647 0.520
16 Lufthansa 0.956 1.190
17 British Air 0.893 0.974
18 Air France 0.875 1.089
19 Alitalia 0.840 1.250
20 SAS 0.838 1.289
21 KLM 0.946 1.098"
22 Swissair 0.950 1.360"
The indirect cost per passenger (v) was computed as follows. The total indirect cost for
an airline was computed by subtracting the total flight costs from its total cost. The total
indirect cost for a flight segment was estimated by allocating the carrier's total indirect
costs in proportion to the revenue generated from that particular route segment. Then, the
per-passenger indirect cost for a flight segment (v) was computed by dividing the
segment indirect cost by the segment passenger volume (Q).
For the case of a _vo-segment route, the unit cost is obtained by adding the two
segments' unit costs per passenger. The carrier profit from a route is then obtained by
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taking the difference between the fare and the route's unit cost, and multiplying it by the
route demand volume. In this way, load factors are endogenized in the model. This has
important implications for dynamic efficiency effects. Entry affects costs in two ways.
First, entry of a low cost carrier affects incumbents _ costs by putting pressure on input
prices and productivity. Second, it changes incumbents ' passenger volume, which, in
turn, changes their per-passenger segment costs by being at a different point on the
economies of density curve.
4. Alternative Scenarios and Construction of the Base Case
The model was applied to the cases of Canada-Japan (Vancouver-Tokyo market),
Canada-Germany (Toronto-Frankfurt market) and Canada-Australia market. This paper
reports only the empirical results for the Canada-Japan case.
For each case, the following alternative scenarios are simulated and the equilibrium
results are compared:
(a) Base Case: price and capacity (fi'equeney) regulated
(b) Price regulation/capacity competition (with/without new entry)
(c) Price competition/capacity regulation
(d) Full competition (no restrictions on price, capacity or entry)
At first, the simulation results were obtained for each of the above scenarios under the
assumptions of differentiated monopolistic competition and closed bilateral trade (no
alternative routing via third countries). Later, the selected simulation experiments were
conducted to examine the effects of an alternative market structure: oligopoly vs.
monopolistic competition and with and without explicitly accounting for traffic diversion
to third country routes.
The Base Case: Price, Entry and Capacity Regulated
The key variables to describe the base case in an OD market are the airlines serving the
market, type of aircraft being used, the passenger volume by airline, fares by airline,
frequency by airline, travel time by airline and a carrier specific preference (nationality)
factor. Most of these data are collected from a variety of sources such as Transport
Canada and US Department of Transportation, ICAO, Official Airline Guide (OAG),
travel agents and the airlines themselves.
The carrier specific preference factor is computed by calibrating the demand model to the
base case data. The difference between the observed passenger volume for a route-cartier
combination and the predicted demand, i.e., proportion of the traffic volume that cannot
be explained by the route-cartier characteristics, is regarded as the carrier specific
preference factor. Table 2 illustrates the type of input variables needed for calibration of
demand.
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Table 2: Example Input Table for CALM Model
BASE CASE ROUTE/CARRIER CHARACTERISTICS
Carrier Plane Type PAX Fare Frequency Travel National
Code Code Code _ Time preference
1 1 63,875 434.30 10 7.50 1.00
7 1 63,875 434.30 10 7.50 1.50
Based on the review of empirical studies and surveys on demand elasticities, 9 the demand
parameters assumed to range between the upper and lower bound values listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Demand Parameters Used
Demand Parameters
Probability Range*
Lower Median Upper
10% Value 10%
Value Value
Elasticity of Substitution 1.5 2.0 2.5
Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Frequency 0.05 0.10 0.20
Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Own Price -.075 -1.35 -2.0
*This probability range corresponds to an eighty percent confidence interval.
5. Canada-Japan Results
The Canada-Japan market was and is still being tightly regulated by the current bilateral
agreement. This agreement controls cartier and route designation (including point of
origin and point of access), seat capacity of aircraft used, and prices (single disapproval).
In 1993, Canadian Airlines International (Canadian) and Japan Airlines (JAL) served
Canada-Japan market. Canadian operated 8 flights per week between Vancouver (YVR)
and Tokyo's Narita airport while JAL operated 7 passenger flights. Both carriers charged
the median discount fare of C$680 per one-way passenger. Canadian and JAL carried
99,720 and 88,050 passengers, respectively, in 1993. Based on our model Canadian
made a profit of C$24 million on this route while JAL made only about CS2 million) °
9 See Oum, Veaters and Yong (I 992) for a sun'ey of transport demand elasticities, Oum, Gillen and Noble
(1986) for estimates of elasticities of substitution, and .Morrison and Winston for estimates of frequency
elasticity of demand.
1o Although an additional routing sen'ed by Canadian (Toronto - Narita) was included m our simulation,
this paper reports the results on the Vancouver-Tokyo market only.
15
Effects of Removiug Frequency Regulation:
The market equilibrium results for the case of frequency competition (while regulating
price and entry) are reported in Table 4, Column 2 (Without Entry). Under this scenario
both carriers maintain profitability, and total route demand is expected to increase by only
1 percent. However, relative to the base case this market outcome is less profitable for
Canadian and slightly more profitable for JAL. The welfare gain to Japan is
approximately $2 million dollars while the welfare loss to Canada is approximately $6
million dollars, making a combined net welfare loss of $4 million. For Canadian, the
reduction in profitability occurs because the bilateral change increases capacity at a rate
that exceeds demand, pushing the segment load factor below 60 percent. This in turn has
a negative impact on carrier costs and hence profitability. Canadian's position is further
eroded by the observed carrier preference for Japanese carriers in the market.
Table 4, Column 3 (With Entry) reports the equilibrium results for the case of removing
both frequency and entry regulations while maintaining price regulation. In this scenario,
a new carrier, namely, Air Canada enters the market with six flights per week. At
equilibrium, each incumbent carrier offers six flights per week. The relative cost
efficiency of these carriers places Canadian Airlines International (CA.I) as the most cost
competitive (and thus most profitable), followed closely by Air Canada and Japan
Airlines. The entry of a new carrier in this market has a significant impact on route
traffic volume - a 37 percent increase over the ease of frequency competition without
entry. This scenario also produces positive welfare impacts relative to the no entry ease.
The gain in aggregate profits for carriers is combined with the gain in consumer benefits
of approximately $30 million to produce a total net welfare gain of $61 million dollars.
Since the Japanese passengers dominate the market, non-Canadians capture the majority
of the gain in consumer benefits while Canada captures a majority of the carrier profits
due to the entry of Air Canada.
Effects of Removing Price Regulation:
Table 5 exhibits the equilibrium results of price competition with frequency regulation.
The results with and without entry regulation are contained in the table. The results with
entry regulation, Column 2, show that CAI reduces price by more than 27 percent while
JAL reduces it by 19 percent. JAL can attract an almost equal number of passengers
while charging a substantially higher fare than CAI because Japanese passengers prefer to
fly with JAL (a positive carrier specific factor). Consumers now, in part, capture the
economic rents previously captured by the carriers. The net welfare effect is positive,
with the consumer benefits slightly outweighing the reduction in carrier profits.
Column 3 (With Entry) of Table 5 reports the (equilibrium) results for the case of
removing both price and entry regulations while keeping frequency regulation. The
results show that the entry of a new carrier (Air Canada) is important not only for
stimulating market demand, but also because it offers consumers a wider range of choice.
Consumer benefits are far in excess of the scenario where frequency competition takes
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placein theabsenceof pricecompetition.It is alsotruethatconsumerbenefitsincrease
largelyviaatransferof carrierprofits;netwelfarehasmorethandoubledascomparedto
thecaseof pricecompetitionwithout removingfrequencyandentryregulations.Unlike
thepreviousscenario,thedistributionof benefitsfalls moreheavily in favorof Canada
becauseaCanadiancarrierentersaprofitablemarket.This is in starkcontrasto theno
entrycase,wheretheCanadiancarriersuffersandCanadianconsumerbenefitsaremuch
smaller.
Effects of Removing Regulations on Price, Frequency and Entry:
This scenario is essentially the bilateral open-skies agreement that does not involve
opening of the 5_ freedom traffic rights. The simulation results are reported in Table 6.
In this scenario, Air Canada enters the Vancouver- Tokyo market, and each of the three
carriers would serve flights per week. The entry of a new carrier (Air Canada) makes the
market significantly more competitive, and as a result, the equilibrium prices are
significantly lower than the case with entry regulation. As a result of both entry and lower
prices traffic volume would increase by about 50%. Furthermore, there would be a five-
fold increase in the welfare gain to Canada because of the entry of Air Canada while
Japan's welfare gain is limited to an increase from $23 million to $38 million.
Canada-Japan Outconte under an Oligopoly Market Structure
Oligopoly firms can exercise market power by erecting entry barriers and charging
substantial market-up over marginal cost. Oum, Zhang and Zhang (1993) have found that
most airlines play a Cournot game in their markets. At the Cournot-Nash equilibrium an
airline with a large market share can charge a substantial mark-up over and above their
marginal costs.
Table 7 compares the equilibrium outcomes of the base case and the two cases of the
price and frequency competition case (the case of monopolistic competition and the case
of Cournot oligopoly). In these simulations we assume that the incumbents are
successful in blocking entry of potential competitors. The aggregate gain to consumers is
approximately $32.7 million for the case of price and frequency competition without any
oligopoly markup. With the imposition of the mark-up the consumer gain is reduced to
$13.0 million because of the increased prices and reduced volumes. The carriers' total
profits increase over the no-mark-up case by $9.33 million. The aggregate net welfare
shrinks from $38 million for the no-mark-up case to $28.3 million for the oligopoly
markup case.
Incorporation of the Aspects of Traffic Diversion to Third Country Routes: _
As we discussed previously, a bilateral liberalization not only increases competition in
the direct routes, but also induce those who are traveling via foreign cities to return to the
_ In a closely related work, Dresner and Oum (1998) investigates the effects of Canada's "facilitating" and
US liberal bilateral air agreements on the share of visitors travelling directly to Canada, as opposed to
n'ansiting through the United States.
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directroutes.Theliberalizationcanimprovetherelativeattractivenessof thedirectflight
as comparedto travel via a third countrypoint. For example,the liberalizationof
Canada-JapanbilateralagreementwouldinducethepassengerstravelingbetweenCanada
andJapanvia a U.S.point to usethedirectroute. Furthermore,it wouldcausesomeof
the U.S. and Japanese passengers traveling between the U.S. and Japan to route their
travel via Canadian points. Intuitively, the effects of accounting for such traffic diversion
in the model is expected to increase both carriers' and consumers' benefits. These added
passengers benefit the airlines in two ways. First, they increase traffic density on the
Vancouver - Tokyo route, and thus, reduce per-passenger cost. Second, the added
demand increases the market clearing price slightly, further increasing revenue and profit
margins.
Table 8 reports the simulation results for the case involving third country routing. For
the Vancouver - Tokyo market, traffic diversion occurs when passengers who now fly
between Vancouver and Narita through US gateways may consider a direct Vancouver
routing. Our results show that the removal of price and frequency regulation in the
Canada-Japan bilateral is likely to reduce the passengers who travel via Vancouver-
Seattle-Tokyo (via Northwest) from 11,300 to 8,950 persons. Likewise, it will reduce
those who travel via Vancouver-San Francisco-Tokyo (via United) from 7,520 to 5,520
persons. These translate into additional consumer benefits of approximately $1 million
dollars or 3 percent of the original benefits estimate. Similarly, both Canadian's and
JAL's profit increases.
Summary Results on the Canada-Japan Case
The simulation results on the Canada-Japan case can be summarized as follows:
When price is regulated, frequency competition benefits both countries only if entry
regulation is also removed. Frequency competition without freeing the entry neither
increase airline profits nor improve consumer welfare.
For the Canada-Japan case, frequency competition with entry freedom (when price is
regulated) increases Canada's welfare more than Japan's because the new entrant is a
Canadian cartier, Air Canada.
When price regulation is removed while keeping frequency regulation intact, both
carrier profits and consumer benefits increase substantially when frequency is
regulated at reasonable level. The total consumer surplus increases more to Japanese
passengers than to Canadian passengers because a large majority of the passengers on
Vancouver-Tokyo segment are Japanese nationals. Needless to say, both consumer
surplus and carrier profits would be significantly affected if frequency is regulated at
wrong value.
• The benefits of price competition get more than doubled if entry, is also freed.
Although Air Canada is the only carrier expected to enter the market, .the overall
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welfaregain is greaterfor Japanthan for Canadabecauseof the dominanceof
JapanesepassengersonVancouver-Tokyomarket.
The completeliberalizationof pricing, frequencyand entry leadsto the welfare
maximizingmarketoutcome.
Oligopolysolution(CoumotNashequilibrium)increasecarrierprofits substantially
whilereducingconsumersurplus.
Theeffectsof liberalizationof priceandfrequencyregulationsonO-Dtraffic volume,
carrierprofitsandconsumersurplusesaregreaterwhenthemodeltakesinto account
of thethirdcountryroutingpossibilities.
6. Summary and Conclusion
In this study, we attempted to develop a model with which to measure the economic
effects of liberalizing bilateral air agreements between two countries. Our model allows
us to measure not only the changes in equilibrium outcomes and welfare consequences of
liberalizing a bilateral air transport agreement, but also the distribution of the gains and
losses to carriers and consumers of each bilateral country and those of the third foreign
countries. In particular, our model allows to measure the effects of changes in a bilateral
agreement on the amount of traffic diversion between the direct bilateral routes and the
indirect routes via a third country. We also provide an extension of our model to a case
of oligopoly market outcome (Coumot Nash equilibrium).
Since quality of services is important for determining air transport demands, costs and
consumer welfare, our main model is developed by adapting the monopolistic
competition model of Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to the air transport
situation. This allowed us to incorporate the attributes of service quality such as
frequency of service, travel time, number of connections required to complete a travel,
and national flag carrier preference factor in the demand model. We adopted the
"Armington" assumption by specifying our Origin-Destination specific demand model in
the CES form and thereby treating the 'route-carrier' combinations serving an Origin-
Destination market as imperfect substitutes to each others. Quality aspects are treated in
the framework of hedonic price theory by specifying the quality-adjusted price (quantity)
as a multiplication of the observed price (quantity) by the reciprocal quality index
function (the quality index function).
The total cost of a flight segment consists of the costs that vary with flight frequency and
those that vary with number of passengers carried. This implies that our model allows
the carriers to adjust their unit costs dynamically with the traffic density on the route
segrnent.
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Since it was not possible to obtain closed form expression for equilibrium solutions,
numerical simulations were conducted to measure the effects of changing the following
major policy levers in a bilateral air transport agreement:
• Removing price regulation while retaining frequency and entry restrictions
• Removing price and entry regulation while retaining frequency restrictions
• Removing frequency regulations while retaining price and entry regulations
• Removing frequency and entry regulations while retaining price regulation
• Removing price and frequency regulations while retaining entry restriction
• Removing all price, frequency and entry regulations (de facto, open skies)
Our model was applied to the cases of Canada-Japan, Canada-Germany, and Canada-
Australia bilateral agreements. Although this paper reports the empirical results on the
Canada-Japan bilateral case only, they are by and large consistent with those of the
Canada-Germany and Canada-Australia cases.
Our key results can be summarized as follows:
• Frequency competition without freeing entry or price regulation neither increase
airline profits nor improve consumer welfare. Frequency competition with entry
freedom increases the welfare of the nation whose carrier enters the market, i.e., the
nation with lower cost carriers
Pricing freedom with frequency regulation increases the welfare of the nation with a
larger share of passengers on the bilateral markets more than other countries. The
benefits of pricing freedom are significantly aff_ected by the regulated frequency of
services. The benefits of price competition becomes more than doubled if entry is
also freed.
Overall, allowing entry of new carriers increase the overall welfare the most, followed
by the price freedom. Just the removal of frequency restrictions has the least effect on
consumer welfare.
• The complete liberalization of pricing, frequency and entry leads to the welfare
maximizing market outcome.
• Oligopoly solution (Coumot Nash equilibrium) increase cartier profits while reducing
consumer surplus substantially.
The effects of liberalization of price and frequency regulations on O-D traffic volume,
cartier profits and consumer surpluses are greater when the model takes into account
of the third country routing possibilities.
2O
Our current researchattemptedto measurethe effectsof liberalizing the bilateral
agreementwith a singlecountry. Wehavenot attemptedto measuretheeffectswhena
countryliberalizesits bilateralagreementswith manycountriesastheU.S.governmentis
pursuing. Extendingour modelto handlesucha situationwouldnot straightforward,
but it isaninterestingavenuefor futureresearch.
Ouranalysisis alsolimited to measuringtheeffectsontheproducersandconsumersof
air transportservicesonly, ignoringotherbenefitsof bilateralair liberalizationincluding
thebenefitsto tourismsector. Certainly,thereis a needto incorporateseveralrelated
sectorsincludingtourismin theanalysisof air transportmatters.However,useof a full
generalequilibriummodel for air transportanalysismaynot be aneffectiveavenueto
pursue. Sinceair transportsector,especiallyeachbilateralair transportmarket,is small
relativeto othersectorsof theeconomy,it wouldbe difficult to identify theeffectsof
liberalizationof a smallnumberof bilateralagreementswithin afull generalequilibrium
modelbecausethosesmalleffectsarelikely beburiedin the changesin largereconomic
sectors.
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Table 4" Vancouver - Tokyo: Frequency Competition/Price Regulation
Base Case* No Entry With Entry
Median Discount Fare (One Way in $)
Canadian 680 680 680
Japan Air Lines 680 680 680
Air Canada 680
Average Weekly Frequency
Canadian 8 8 6
Japan Air Lines 7 8 6
Air Canada 6
Demand (Thousands of One Way Passengers)
Canadian 99.7 87.6 80.5
Japan Air Lines 88.1 102.2 89.2
Air Canada 89.2
Total Demand 187.8 189.8 258.9
Profits (Millions of $)
Canadian 23.9 17.9 21.8
Japan Air Lines 2.0 3.2 10.4
Air Canada 30.2
Total Profit 25.9 21.1 62.4
Welfare Impacts*
Consumer Benefits - aggregate (Millions of $)
Consumer Benefits to Canada (Millions of $)
Consumer Benefits to others (Millions of $
Producer Benefits (Millions of $)
Chg. in Canadian Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Japan Airlines Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. m Air Canada Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Total Profit
Aggregate Welfare Gain (Millions of $)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Canada (Millions of $)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to others (Millions of $)
1.1
0.3
0.8
-6.1
1.2
-4.9
-3.7
-5.7
2.0
29.9
8.9
20.7
-4.5
5.4
30.1
31.0
60.6
34.5
26.1
*All results reported in 1993 Canadian dollars.
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Table5: Price Competition/Frequency Regulation
Vancouver - Tokyo
(Frequency regulated at 7 flights per week)
Median Discount Fare (One Way in $)
Base Case* No Entry With Entry
Canadian 680
Japan Air Lines 680
Air Canada
546
601
505
560
513
Demand (Thousands of One Way Passengers)
Canadian 99.7 115.6 115.5
Japan Air Lines 88.1 115.7 115.4
Air Canada 115.5
Total Demand 187.8 231.3 346.5
Profits (Millions of $)
Canadian 23.9 25.6 19.5
Japan Air Lines 2.0 13.3 5.8
Air Canada 19.0
Total Profit 25.9 38.9 44.3
Welfare Impacts*
Consumer Benefits - aggregate (Millions of $)
Consumer Benefits to Canada (Millions of $)
Consumer Benefits to others (Millions of $
Producer Benefits (Millions of $)
Chg. in Canadian Profit (MiUions of $)
Chg. in Japan Airlines Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Air Canada Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Total Profit
21.8
6.6
15.3
-0.7
8.4
7.8
29.7
5.9
23.8
Aggregate Welfare Gain (Millions of $)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Canada (Millions of $)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to others (Millions of $)
50.3
15.4
34.5
-4.4
3.8
19.0
18.0
68.2
30.0
38.3
*All results reported in 1993 Canadian dollars.
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Table 6: Price and Frequency Competition
(Vancouver - Tokyo)
Final Equilibrium Base Case Without With Entry
Median Discount Fare (One Way in $) Entry Freedom
Canadian 680 494 505
Japan Air Lines 680 549 560
Air Canada
513
Frequency
Canadian 8 8 7
Japan Airlines 7 8 7
AirCanada
7
Demand (Thousands of One Way Passengers)
Canadian 99.7 13 I. 9 115.5
Japan Air Lines 88.1 131.9 115.4
Air Canada
115.5
Total Demand 187.8 263.8 346.5
Profits (Millions of $)
Canadian 23.9 23.3 19.5
Japan Air Lines 2.0 8.5 5.8
Air Canada
19.6
Total Profit "25.9 31.8 44.2
Welfare Impacts
Consumer Benefits - aggregate (Millions of $) 32.7 50.3
Consumer Benefits to Canada (Millions of $) 9.8 15.4
Consumer Benefits to others (Millions of $) 22.9 34.5
Producer Benefits (Millions of $)
Chg. in Canadian Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Japan Airlines Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Air Canada Profit (Millions of $)
Chg. in Total Profit
-0.6 -4.4
6.6 3.8
19.0
5.9 18.0
Aggregate Welfare Gain (Millions of $)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Canada (Millions of $)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to others (Millions of $)
*All results reported in 1993 Canadian dollars.
38.6 68.2
9.2 30.0
28.8 38.3
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Table 7: Price/Frequency Competition with and without Oligopoly Markup
(Vancouver-Tokyo)
Base Case without With Oligopoly
oligopoly mark- Mark-Up
Median Discount Fare (One Way in $) up
Canadian 680 494 523
Japan Air Lines 680 549 575
Average Weekly Frequency
Canadian 8 8 7
Japan Air Lines 7 8 7
Demand (Thousands of One Way Passengers)
Canadian 100.0 131.9
Japan Air Lines 88.1 131.9
Total Demand 187.8 263.8
120.2
123.3
243.4
Profits (Millions of $)
Canadian 23.9 23.3 26.3
Japan Air Lines 2.0 8.5 14.9
Total Profit 25.9 31.8 41.1
Welfare Impacts
Consumer Benefits - Aggregate ($M)
Consumer Benefits - Canada ($M)
Consumer Benefits - Others ($M)
Producer Benefits
Chg. in Canadian Profits
Chg. in JAL Profits
Change in Total Profits ($M)
Aggregate Welfare Gain ($M)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Canada ($M)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Others ($M)
32.7
9.8
22.9
-0.6
6.6
5.9
38.6
9.2
28.8
13.0
3.9
9.1
2.4
12.9
15.2
28.3
6.3
22.0
27
Table 8: Price and Frequency Competition with Third Country Routings
(Vancouver - Tokyo)
Base Case without with
Diversion Diversion
Median Discount Fare (One Way in $)
Canadian 680 494 500
JapanAirLines 680 549 554
NorthwestviaSeattle 550 NC* NC*
UnitedviaSan Francisco 550 NC* NC*
Average Weekly Frequency
Canadian 8 8 8
Japan Air Lines 7 8 8
Northwest via Seattle 7 NC* NC*
United via San Francisco 7 NC* NC*
Demand (Thousands of One Way Passengers)
Canadian 100.0 131.9 133.8
Japan Air Lines 88.1 131.9 134.5
Northwest via Seattle 11.3 NC* 9.0
United via San Francisco 7.5 NC* 5.5
Total Demand 206.6 263.8 282.8
Profits (Millions of $)
Canadian 23.9 23.3 24.9
Japan Air Lines _2.0 8.5 11.2
Total Profit 25.9 31.8 36.1
Welfare Impacts
Consumer Benefits - Aggregate ($M) 32.7 33.5
Consumer Benefits - Canada ($M) 9.8 10.1
Consumer Benefits - Others ($M) 22.9 23.5
Producer Benefits
Chg. in Canadian Profits
Chg. m JAL Profits
Change in Total Profits (SM)
Aggregate Welfare Gain ($M)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Canada ($M)
Aggregate Welfare Gain to Others ($M)
-0.6 1.0
6.6 9.2
5.9 10.3
38.6 43.8
9.2 11.1
28.8 32.7
* no change
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Hubbing and hub-bypassing
Introduction
Most European national airlines were operating radial networks already decades before the
U.S. domestic airline market was deregulated and hubbing became the major trend in this
market. However, this radial network structure in Europe resulted from international market
regulation, i.e. third and fourth freedom routes between the national home base and points
abroad. Since at that time most European airlines hardly provided any connectivity between
these third and fourth freedom routes, most national airports in Europe hardly functioned as
hubs t during the pre liberalisation stage.
An exception can be made for a few carriers, like for example KLM, Swissair and SAS, which
only had small domestic markets. These carriers needed additional European feed from outside
their own domestic market for their long-haul wide-body operations. Therefore in addition to
their domestic O&D market airlines generated a transfer market through a scheduled
connectivity between long-haul intercontinental and short-haul European/domestic flights.
However the relatively limited number of ICA destinations hardly generated any network
multiplier effect. The so-called gateway system usually focused on only two banks: for ICA
arrivals and ICA departures, respectively.
During the stepwise liberalisation of the EU air transport market various European airlines also
started a hubbing system at their national home base next to this gateway function. At several
national airports the connectivity between European arrivals and departures substantially
improved through an increasing number of daily connection banks which can serve more
destinations at higher frequencies. Short-haul to short-haul hubbing apparently took off inside
Europe after the liberalisation of route and market entry. Compared to the U.S. domestic
market the scale of hubbing has remained limited until now. The limited average travel distance
inside Europe and the higher density of public transport and road networks mainly explain this
difference.
It can be expected that an increasing number of European hubs will get involved in the next
stage of network developments, i.e. multiple Euro hubbing through alliances between
European carriers, like Lufthansa and SAS, Swissair and Sabena, BA and Iberia, KLM and
Alitalia.
As a result of these hubbing developments and the extra transfer demand generated by it,
congestion has exacerbated at most major airports in Europe. This growing congestion and the
related noise problems at hub airports evokes a new discussion about the utility of providing
substantial airport and noise capacity to foreign transfer passengers, thereby depositing the
external noise effects of their travelling on the neighbouring area around the airport. Especially
in the Netherlands hubbing is increasingly questioned nowadays by public interest groups in the
context of long-term airport planning. Environmentalists increasingly characterise hub&spoke
systems as inefficient systems by referring to the superfluous diversion within these networks
compared to point to point connections. This seems to be a sufficient argument to announce
the end of the hubbing era. The new era would bring a plethora of hub-bypassing routes
between smaller uncongested airports that replace the indirect routes through the hub.
Although the consequences of a decentralised point to point system in Europe seems to be
rather unfavourable to the environment, this prophecy seems also to be rather unlikely from a
A hub is defined as an airport where the dominant and usually home-based carrier schedules it departing and
arriving flights in short consecutive periods (banks or waves), and a transfer system proyides an acceptable
connectivity between arriving and departing flights.
network-operational point of view. Theoretical arguments against this prophecy are clear and
can be based on generalised costs of diversion time, extra transfer time, reduced waiting time
and lower fares, compared to the alternative of a direct route, if available anyway. (See also
Tretheway and Oum, 1992). However the discussion is also a little complicated by the fact that
hubbing and hub-bypassing are two simultaneous network characteristics, which can be
explained by the same arguments. Geographical characteristics (route length) as well as the
actual route densities and cost competitiveness 2 determine whether new entrants are able to
provide a direct connection between two spoke points. All in all however, the general
arguments point in the direction that the future picture of network developments in Europe
will be increasingly dominated by hub and spoke systems.
As a contribution to the debate on hubbing versus hub-bypassing we have analysed actual
network developments between categories of airports in Europe during the last two decades.
In this analysis we used the unique collection of ABC/OAG-data for the years 1984, 1990,
1993 and 1997, available in the database of the Dutch Civil Aviation Department. This paper
contains the findings of our analysis.
Hypotheses regarding network developments within the European airport system
First of all we describe a classification of airport categories and route types. This classification
provides the basic data for determining whether the hub&spoke phenomenon or the hub-
bypassing phenomenon was the dominating trend in the period from 1984 until 1997. More
explicitly, the following hypotheses with respect to the hub-bypassing and the hub&spoke
phenomenon respectively, were examined.
If the hub-bypassing phenomenon had been the dominating trend, then:
• the percentage of connections between European regional airports would have increased;
and/or
• the percentage of frequencies offered between European regional airports would have
increased; and/or
• the percentage of seats offered between European/egional airports would have increased.
In reverse, if the hub&spoke phenomenon had been the dominating trend, then:
• the percentage of connections between European regional airports and the hub airports
would have increased; and/or;
• the percentage of frequencies offered between European regional airports and the hub
airports should have increased; and/or
• the percentage of seats offered between European regional airports and the hub airports
would have increased.
Classification of European Airports
All in all, five different airport size categories have been defined a little arbitrarily. Each
category allows a minimum and maximum numbers of available seats offered on both intra- and
intercontinental routes to and from the airport involved. The classes were calibrated on the
data for the reference year 1990. For the other years, viz.1984, 1993 and 1997, the various
classes were scaled according to the average market growth. As a result, Tablel provides an
overview of the comparable airport size classes for each of the four years. Data used in the
classification were derived from the OAG/ABC timetables for a representative week in July
: Price discrmfination through revenue management is an important tool for the recumbent carrier to counter
this new competition.
To transposetheseweeklyfiguresintocomparableyearlyfigures,therule of thumbwasused
thatanannualtotal is roughly48timestherepresentativeweekinJuly.
Table I: Classification of European airports according to seat capacity offered on scheduled passenger fligh_
Category
Very Large >-"
Large >-
Medium >-
Small >-
Very Small <
cap/week cap/year
1984 1984
175.000 8,4 mill
70.000 3,4mill
7.000 340_d
1.750 84 _d
1.750 84 md
cap/week cap/year
1990 1990
250.000 12,0mill
100.000 4,8mill
10.000 480thd
2.500 120flad
2.500 120thd
cap/week cap/year
1993 1993
281.250 13,5mill
!12.500 5,4mill
11.250 540_d
2.813 135 _d
2.813 135thd
cap/week cap/year
1997 1997
350.000 16,S mill
140.000 6,7mill
14.000 670_d
3.500 170 _d
3.500 170_d
Table 2 shows the number of European airports assigned to each of the five categories in each
of the four years. The conclusion seems to be justified that the number of European airports in
the various categories has remained rather stable during the period analysed. However, the
exceptional case is the number of European airports in the category _ery small". Between
1984 and 1990, this number increased by more than a 100, a relative growth of about one
third. This significant increase is probably correlated with the gradual liberalisation of
European aviation. Cross-border interregional aviation within the EU had already been
liberalised in 1983. From this moment on, regional airlines were free to start interregional
services between secondary and/or tertiary airports with a maximum aircraft size of 70 seats.
As a consequence an increasing number of smaller general aviation airports were served by
cross-border scheduled passenger services. From 1987 on, all aviation in the EU has gradually
been liberalised in three consecutive steps. In 1997 the liberalisation of the EU air transport
market was completed when cabotage was fully allowed.
Table 2: Number of European airports according to seat- capacity class for scheduled passenger services
Catego_
Very Large
Large
Medium
Small
Very Small
Total
1984
>- 5
>- 12
>- 97
>- 151
< 289
554
%
0.9 %
2,2 %
17,5 %
27,3 %
52.2 %
I00 %
1990 %
4 0,6 %
15 2,3 %i
95 14.4 % !
140 21,2%.
405 61,5 %
659 100%
1993 %
5 0,7%
13 1,9%
96 14,3%
152 22.7%
405 60.4%
671 100%
1997 %
5 0,8%
15 2,3%
99 15,0 %
133 20,1%
408 61,8%
660 100%
Souree:OAG/ABC
Based on the aforementioned classification of European airports,
• the number ofintra-European scheduled passenger routes,
• the number of frequencies offered on these intra-European routes, as well as
• the seat capacity offered on these intra-European routes,
were selected from the OAG/ABC time schedules for the respective years in the analysis.
Classification of route types
To analyse network developments between the different
route types can be distinguished among European airports:
airport categories, three differem
• interregional connections, i.e. connections offered between or within the airport categories
very small, small and medium;
• interhub connections, i.e. connections offered between or within the airport categories large
and very large;
• hub&spoke connections, i.e. connections offered between the airport categories very small,
small and medium on the one hand and the airport categories large and very large on the
other.
Historical developments in numbers of connections
Table 3 shows that the number of interregional routes was slightly below the average market
growth rate for the period of 1984-1990 and slightly above the average market growth rate for
the period of 1990-1997. All in all, there has not been a significant shift in the distribution of
intra-European connections over the route types interregional, interhub and hub&spoke. On
average one may conclude that the distribution according to route type has been fairly stable.
The development of the number of intra-European connections does not render any convincing
evidence for either the hypothesis that there has been an intensification of interregional traffic
in Europe or the hypothesis that there has been a strong development towards a hub&spoke
network structure in Europe.
Table 3: Number of intra-European scheduled passenger connections according to route type
Categor_
Interhub connections
Average annual growth e/,
Hub&Spoke connections
Average annual 8revah "/,
lnterregional connections
Average annual growth "/,
Total
Average annual growth "/.
1984 % 1990 % 1993 % 1997 %
116 5,7%
790 39,0%
1117 55,2%
2023 100,0% _
154 5,6%
4.8% 198_1990
1078 39,4%
5,3% 198_1990
1503 55,0%
5.1% 198_1990
2753 100,0%
5.2% 198_1990
123 4,1%
-7.2% 1990-1993
1170 39.3%
2.8 % 1990-1993
1687 56.6%
3,9°/o 1990-1993
2980 100,0%
2._/* 199_1993
172 4.8%
8.7=/. 1993-1997
1,6% 199,0-1997
1403 38.8%
4,6% 1_3.1997
3.8% 1990-1_7
2039 56°4%
4.9*/* 1_3-1_7
4,5% 1990-1_7
3614 100,0%
4.9% 1993.1997
4.1'/* 1990_1997
Source: OAG/ABC
Historical developments in frequency levels and seat capacity
Tables 4 and 5, on the contrary, show a major shift in the distribution of both frequencies and
seat capacity offered on interregional, interhub and hub&spoke connections. The share of
interregional traffic in overall totals has dropped significantly, both in frequencies and in seat
capacity. This highlights the fact that interregional traffic is losing ground especially to
hub&spoke traffic. The share of interhub traffic is fairly stable, in terms of frequencies as well
as in terms of seat capacity.
We therefore conclude that the findings for the period of 1984 - 1997 show an increased hub-
orientation of the regional airports, instead of an increased orientation towards each other. In
other words, hubbing has substantially increased in the European market, whereas the contrary'
is true for hub-bypassing in the EU during the period analysed.
Table 4: Number of weekly Intra-European scheduled frequen les for the vaHoua route types
Categor _
[nterhub connections
Average annual growth %
tiub&Spoke connections
Average annual growth "/.
lnterregional connections
Average annual growth "/.
Total
Average annual growth %
1984 % 1990 % 1993 % 1997 %
3120 13,4%
9923 42,5%
10285 44,1%
23328 100,0%
4832 14,1%
7,6% 19g4-1990
15445 45,1%
7."P/. 1984-1990
13938 40,7%
5,2'4 1984-1990
34215 100,0%
6,6%% 1984-1990
5044 13,1%
1.4% 1990-1993
18042 46,9%
5.3% 1990-1993
15362 40,0%
3.3% 1990-1993
38448 100,0%
4,0% 199o.1993
7021 14,5%
8.6% 1993-1997
5.5% 1990-1997
23833 49,2%
7.2% 1993-1997
6.4"/, 1990-1997
17630 36,4%
3.5% 1993-1997
3.4% t 990-1997
48484 100,0%
6._ 1993-1997
5.1% 1990-1997
1) Frequency: a return flight, I.e. an outgoing end an incoming aircraft movement
Source: OAG/ABC
Table 5: Total seat capacity 1) offered on a weekly basis for the variouJ route types in [ntra-European scheduled passenger trame
Category
Interhub connections
Average annual growth %
Hub&Spoke connections
Average annual growth %
Interregional connections
Average annual growth %
Total
Average annual growth %
1984 %
914 thd 20,5%
2073 thd 46,4%
1479 thd 33,1%
4466 thd 100,0%
1990 %J
1430 thd 20,7% !
7.7% 1984-1990
3365 thd 48.7%
g.4% 1984.-1990
2121 thd 30,7%;
6,2% 1984.-1990
6916 thd 100,0% i
7.6% 1984-1990
1993 % 1997 %
1446 thd 18,5%
0.4% 1990-1993
4071_d 52,1%
6.6% 1990-1993
22911hd 29,3%
_6% 1990-1993
7008 thd 100,0%
4.1% 1990-1993
1990 thd 20,3%
8.3% 1993-1997
4.8% 1990-1997
5328 thd 54,4%
7.0% 1993-1997
6.8% 1990-1997
2469 thd 25,2%
1.9% 1993-1997
Z2% 1990-1997
9787 thd 100,0%
5.8% 1993-1997
5.1% 199o-1997
2) Seat capacity: Number of senti on both the outgoing and the incoming flights
Source: OAG/ABC
This conclusion is confirmed by the growth in transfer figures at several European airports
collected by Kuehne (1999) for the last few years. (See appendix)
Two indicators for hub developments in the EU
The probability of increased hub&spoke connections as indicated by Tables 4 and 5 requires a
more detailed analysis on the actual hub developments initiated by a limited number of
European national carriers at their respective home bases.
Two important indicators can be used to analyse these hub developments in more detail.
• Increasing numbers of spokes as well as increased frequencies provided on these spokes
should be reflected by a higher frequency growth of the home-based carrier when
compared to the frequencies of other carriers at the airport involved. Therefore we first pay
attention to this plausible increase of the frequency share as an indicator for the growing
hub dominance during the period 1984-1997.
• Furthermore an analysis of the daily waves pattern at the hub airport can reveal in more
detail the actual type of hubbing. Numbers of waves (or connecting banks) as well as
categories of connecting traffic (long haul and/or short haul) have to be taken into account.
Hub dominance
We analysed seventeen European airports mainly in the categories very large and large. (See
also Tables 1 and 2).
Table 6: llub dominance
Airports Home-based carrier i Huh_e: t990_ ::H(]bdominan¢¢ : :i :_ category 1990 category 1997
!i_i¢_ :!!!! i! !i!ii!iilliiiii_:¢quenei_,): !iii _i i: :._: :
.............................................................................................. ._..-..,____ ¢. < ._ ....o. • , .... ° .................................
London Heathrow British Airways 39!i i !_::_: !_i very large very large
P=_sCharJesdeG_u,e Ai,r,=_ce ii_iill iiilii iii!iii!iiii!ii::iiiiii:i:.iiiiiii_ili!ii illii :i::ii ::ill:.iii::iiii_ iii _=-y=arge _ t,,,ge
Rome Alitalia iiii_311i!i:!i::!ii iiii::iii::iiiil ! i::iii::i!:._2 iii!i iiii! i :: ! i i _i_ i: very large very large
Amsterdam Schiphol KLM ilii_[iiii::i:ii!::ii::iii:i!il ili:::.ii!::ii i::i!ii:.i!:i::i_ iii ii:.iiii :-i:iiii i iiiilii::::i]iii ii::_i'_I ! large very large
London Gatwick British Airways ii _::iiiiii!i!iiiiiiiiiiiii::::iiiii::i ::ii !ig_::i}iii!ii:!!iiiiiii!iiilliiiiii!iiiilili!iiiii:.::i:]_ i i large large
Zurich Swissair ili_iiii::i::::i:: iiiiiiii:.iiiiii:-::::::i ii:.i:-i_i ii!i:. ::::i :.iii:. !:-::!i!i :::i_l il large large
B .els s he° large largo
Paris Orty Air Inter i)_i2_ii_i_i!_i_i_!i_iii_!i!_.i_ii!!_i!ii!ii_!i_ii_._ii_i i : : ! _7i large large
Munich Lut'thansa large large
M,,dnd I_"r, !iii_i!i!iii:: !iii!ii::iiiiiii!iiiii::i!::iii::i!:. ::!!::i::ii::iii ;_::. - _ ::::_ii ii! :!.!_i!::!::ii_i ::i_ii_arge large
Barcelona Iberia large large
Copenhagen SAS ii)4_ :-iii!i!::ii!iiiii::!iii ii iii::iili iii ;i;: i:_2 ::?:i::ii:.::ili!:: ::ii ii :.i:.i::::!:.i!!_5:.i: large large
Milan Linate Alitalia i143 iiiiiiiiii !iii! ::iiiiiiiiiiilii:.!iiiii::i!iiii!i_iiiiiiii!i::ili!!!i!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!!iiii:iiiiiii!ii_ 21 i large large
Vienna Austrian Airlines iii_ t i:iiiiii::iiiiii:iiii!ii:.:.i_iii:'iiiii::ili::ii::Jii::i::ii:ili:.i_ii i ! i:.i:i :.i::i:.::i!:.iii! :;7:::iii i medium medium
Milan Ma!pensa Alitalia ::iii2ff:-i:.:i::iii!ii!i::i!ii::i::!i::ii::iii:i:.ii:.:.i:.ii : i!ii::iiii_ !i!ii::-i!:.ii!::iiii::iiii i!il::f-:.!_ 7:ii medium medium
Frequency shares for dominant carriers at major domestic hubs are usually higher (50-70%)
than the U.S. gateways (less than 40%), where a larger share belongs to foreign carriers. Table
6 indicates that most home-based carriers have consolidated their position at their home bases
in Europe. Especially British Airways at London Gatwick, Air Inter at Paris Orly and Alitalia
at Rome Fiumicino have substantially increased their frequency share) One has to be careful to
use these figures as a single indicator for hub developments. The example of British Airways at
London Gatwick illustrates the dangers of misinterpretation. A co-ordinated wave structure is
missing in 1997 despite an increase of the frequency share by 46 % in the period 1990-1997.
(See diagram 1).
Diagram 1: Traffic patterns of Britbh Airways at London Gatwick
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The other way around, notorious hubbing carriers do not always demonstrate a substantial
increase in their frequency share This is mainly a consequence of our selectively focusing on
3 A Hill value, reflecting tile frequenc? shares of the _anous airlines, is intentionalh not used here, since fl_e
separate share of tile dominant carrier as such can ]_o longer be recognised
the national carrier alone, without taking account of the impacts of alliances and stakes in other
carriers, which also operate at the home base of the alliance partner. For example, KLM alone
shows a frequency share at Amsterdam Airport of 45%. However, if the frequencies of the
alliance partners and subsidiaries are also included, the frequency share rises to 69%. Even a
stagnant frequency share during the period of1990-1997 can go hand in hand with a strong
restructuring of the traffic pattern towards a hubbing system. Sabena, for example, was able to
reorganise the daily frequency pattern as an Euro hubbing system without any substantial
change in its frequency share at Brussels as diagram 2 demonstrates.
Diagram 2: Traffic patterns of $abenm at Brussels airport Zaventem
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Wave structures
As indicated by Bootsma (1998) hub systems at an airport can be classified from the
operational point of view by the triple (N,H,S), in which N = the number of waves, H= hub
repeat cycle, and S = the stabling system'(home based or not, or mixed). From a functional
point of view the type of connection waves completes this triple: combined long-haul/short-
haul waves or simple short-haul waves.
The daily frequency patterns of the airports analysed indicate that in 1997 six out of seventeen
airports demonstrated co-ordinated wave structures according to table 7. It is plausible that in
the near future also Malpensa will rapidly change its position within table 7: the hub dominance
of Alitalia strongly increases in 1999 after the opening of the renovated airport and Alitalia is
now developing a wave system at this airport.
The impact of liberalisation can be derived from the differences between Table 7 and Table 8.
Before the liberalisation the hubbing phenomenon was non existent. Since the liberalisation
however, hubbing has become a prerequisite for airlines to enable the new network
competition.
['ablt' 7 : '_, a_c st rascturt._ 1997
i_'.i::_i!_}::!i_::_?i::!ii::_)::_ili_}}::i}._}!!::i)::i_._;_i_i}_#:ii Frankfurt (4) Copenhagen MadridBarcelona
::_i_::_ii}::i}::i::iii::iiF:ii_!iiii!::::_iii::::::ii_iiiii_ii_iii::i Rome Fiundcino
_:_:_!:_:!:_:_:_:_:!:_:_:_:_i_:_;i_i_:_:_! Milan Llnate
Brussels (3)
Paris Charles de Gaulle (5)
Amsterdam (3,5)
Vienna London Heathrow
Paris Oriy
Milan Malpema
Table 8: Wave structures 1990
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Frankfurt Copenhagen
Vienna
Amsterdam
London Heathrow
Brussels
Parts Charles de Gaulle
Milan Llnate
Rome Flundcino
London Gatwick
Paris Orly
Milan Nlalpensa
In 1990, only Frankfurt airport demonstrated a clear daily peak pattern. Five other airports also
showed a rudimentary wave structure. From this column only Amsterdam airport has been able
to move to a fully-fledged hub airport. Paris Charles de Gaulle however, shows the largest
change within a very short throughput time: from a non-hubbing airport to a complete
hub&spoke system.
All in all it can be concluded that hubbing is a clear phenomenon in Europe nowadays, be it at a
slowly increasing number of airports: Munich, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Frankfurt Brussels and
Amsterdam, and Copenhagen, Vienna arid Zurich in the second range.
In the context of airline alliances it can be expected that more airports will develop a clear
hubbing pattern in the near future. The geographical concentration of the currently operating
hubs indicates a rapidly intensifying competition between the airline networks rooted at these
hubs.
Hub categories
From a functional point of view hubbing can be further categorised by looking at the mixture
of long-haul and short-haul operations. Following this approach, five hub types are relevant:
* the ICA gateway hub which connects short haul Euro destinations/origins and long haul
ICA origins/destinations as well as a limited number of ICA-ICA transfers;
n the Ettro hub which focuses on the connectivity between European origins and destinations;
. the Combi hub which integrates the ICA gateway function and the Euro hub function;
• the Rein,lore hub which provides a high random connectivity due to the large volume of
_:rriving and departing flights so that waiting time intervals remain within acceptable limits
kh_b dominance of a home-based career is strong if the frequency share is larger than 50% and low ffthe
I_,:qudnC} share is smaller than 30%
in the perception of the consumer; and
• the Non hub, which does not provide any useful connectivity to the transfer passenger.
Table 9 contains the classification of a number of major European airports according to these
five concepts.
Table 9: hub-airport types
hub catego .ry..1.990".........h.u.b.ca,t.ego..ry..1.997"....
Combi-hub Combi-hub
Non-hub Eurohub
Non-hub Combi-hub
Non-hub Eurohub
Gateway Combi-hub
Non-Hub Euro-hub
Random hub Random hub
Non-hub Non-hub
Non-hub Non-hub
........ ,,,, , ........................ Gateway Gateway
Concluding remarks
The foregoing analysis indicates that the liberalisation of the EU airline industry went hand in
hand with an ongoing transformation of national EU airports into different hub types.
The assumption that congestion at the major European airports would be a sufficient reason to
counter this development into a point to point network system is not sustained by the figures
derived from the ABC/OAG database, available at the Dutch Civil Aviation Department.
On the contrary, the process towards a more sophisticated hubbing system in Europe is well
under way. Not only more airports are getting involved in this process, also a hierarchy of hub
airports within alliances may be plausible as a next step in this hubbing process. However, the
volatility of cross border airline alliances dictates the relative (in)stability of these hub airport
systems during the next few years. Whether the currently emerging multiple hub relationship
will hold, is an unanswered question. For example, this question relates to Copenhagen and
Frankfiart in the Star alliance, Milan Malpensa and Amsterdam in the Wings alliance, Zurich
and Brussels in the Qualiflyer alliance and London Heathrow and Madrid in the One World
alliance.
Changes in airline alliances can have tremendous impacts on airport planning in the EU during
the next decade. If for example Air France is incorporated in the Wings alliance through its
close connections with Continental (the carrier partly owned by KLM's partner NorthWest),
Paris Charles de Gaulle might become the primary European hub in an AF-AZ-KLM system.
The near future probably clarifies whether the number of primary hubs in Europe will be
limited to London, Paris and Frankfurt and followed by a number of secondary hubs like
Munich, Copenhagen and Brussels The alternative would be a more decentralised multiple hub
system will emerge due to increasing congestion problems at these primary hubs.
Finally, with regard to the European airport system we can conclude that the crucial question is
not _ubbing versus hub-bypassing" but _ingle layer hubbing versus multi layer hubbing".
Airline co-operation and alliances will ultimately determine the answer on this question.
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Introduction
The general aim of this paper is to discuss the principal tensions that exist between
policies for air transport liberalization in the European Union (EU) and those directed at
environmental sustainability, conflicts which come together in the nexus of airport
capacity. While concentrating on one particular transport mode, the discussion is more
widely informed by the mounting recognition that present and projected trends in
mobility in Europe cannot be sustained and that, more generally, 'the belief in the
desirability of perpetual growth in mobility and transport has started to fade' (Greene
and Wegener, 1997, p. 177). As Black (1998, p. ) argues, 'history would suggest
that it is not the transport vehicle .... [but its] .... excessive use .... that creates the
problem'.
At least four interested parties or stakeholders can be identified in the
relationships between environmental sustainability, airport capacity and European air
transport liberalization. The airlines themselves, transformed by liberalization into a
resolutely free-market industry, can often express unreconstructed attitudes to
environmental issues, which are perceived to interfere in their primary goal of making
money. Secondly, environmental objections originate in the concerns of wider society,
although these may range from empirically verifiable complaints about air transport
noise and atmospheric pollution to the actions of an idealistic lobby prepared to sacrifice
economic growth to its perceptions of environmental needs. Demands for
environmental quality increase with standard of living (Maddison, 1996), and it is the
experience of airport operators that the maximum number of complaints regarding
aviation originate from high-income residents in their immediate hinterlands.
Ironically, the demand for air transport also increases with income and those members
of society complaining most vociferously may also be those flying most frequently. As
airline customers, they want maximum mobility, combined with cost or status
advantages. Thirdly, if it is accepted that unconstrained mobility is no longer a feasible
goal for society, then regulators are required to somehow ration demand for airport
capacity and reduce the environmental externalities of air transport. Finally, the airport
operators occupy the interface between this conflicting mesh of interests.
The essential assumption that underpins the paper's argument is that - at an
aggregate level - the EU lacks sufficient airport capacity - however defined - to
accomlnodate projected growth trends in air transport, and that the provision of
extensive additional infrastructure is extremely unlikely because of environmental
constraints. More specifically, the paper has three objectives. Initially, we address the
concept of environmental sustainability and its relationship to capacity issues in EU air
transport. Secondly, the problems of European airport capacity are assessed, as is the
potential for modal shift. Finally, the bulk of the discussion is given over to the ways
in which the often incompatible interests and goals of the various stakeholders outlined
above define complex tensions that immensely complicate any resolution of the
relationships between enviromnental sustainability, airport capacity and liberalization.
The concept o1" environmental sustainability and its relationship to
capacity issues in European air transport
Transport irt general constitute:,, the most important negative en\ironment:tI externality
of the Single European Market (SEXl). creating nob, e. atmospheric pollution and
cor_sttlning largc areas of land. while being dependent, on nor>renewable energy
resources.Althoughits aggregateimpactisminorcomparedto roadtraffic,air
transportaccountsaround10%of alltransportenergyconstunptionin theEUandis
responsibletot approximately 15% of all CO2 emissions (Stanners and Bourdeau,
1995). However, the technological returns on reducing air transport's negative
environmental externalities are diminishing so the sector's very growth seems likely to
ensure that this impact will increase in the furore. In addressing the relationships
between air transport infl'astructural provision and the environment, two key terms -
sustainability and capacity - require definition.
Sttstaimtbilit_'
The meaning of sustainability to transport has occasioned widespread discussions in
recent years, not least because it is a qualitative rather than operational term (see, for
example, Pearce, 1993; Black, 1996; Nijkamp and van Geenhuizen, 1997). The
common thread in these debates is provided by the dual invocation of sustainability put
forward in the 1992 Rio Declaration, which attempted to reconcile the needs, especially
those of the world's poor, with protecting the environment's capacity to meet present
and future needs. Thus Black (1996, p. 151) defines sustainable transport as
'satisfying current transport and mobility needs without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet these needs'. According to the Aviation Environment
Federation (1997), sustainability describes integrated transport systems and
infrastructure, which enable the socio-economic needs for movement of goods and
people to be met within the long-troTh carrying capacity of the planet's ecological
systems. Greene and Wegener (1997) argue that sustainability as applied to transport
has three basic conditions: that: the rates of use of renewable resources do not exceed
their rates of generation; the rates of use of non-renewable resources do not exceed the
rate at which sustainable renewable substitutes are developed; the rates of pollution
emission do not exceed the assimilative capacity of the environment. Air transport fails
outright to satisfy the first two conditions and probably also the third. In the longer
term (perhaps 2050+), global air transport is not sustainable on any basis because there
is, its yet, no feasible substitute fuel for oil, hydrogen-based fuels being the only
apparent possibility.
It must be emphasized that in addition to concerns with environmental carrying
capacity, sustainability also invokes connotations of social needs and equity. The
problem is that tactics aimed at achieving social equity also encourage mobility.
'Modern transport affords mobility, facilitates post-Fordist production and allows
political cohesion. Degrees of access to transport networks affect social patterns at all
levels of spatial agglegation (Button and Nijkamp, 1997, p. 215). The equity
implications of mobility creation are central to the social economy model that underpins
the ideological construction of the EU and its concern that geographical location should
not be the primary determinant of the life chances of the Union's 370 million
population. The European Commission in general tends to refer to 'sustainable
mobility', which is unfortunate as there are strong grounds for believing that mobility
as currently practiced in developed countries is itself unsustainable (Fergusson et al.,
1994); infinite mobility is not infinitely desirable (Bleijenberg. 1995). It is access, not
mobility per se, which is the critical issue in social needs and the enhancement of
accessibility is a key process in Commission policies aimed at alleviating regional
disparities in wealth in the EU. An efficient transpott system is _lso vital to the
integrtltion nnd efficient functioning of the SEM. Ine\_tablv, howevei, the provision of
transport infrasttucture aimed ztt these gozd also encourages mobility. In sustainability
terms, therefore, the EU requires a transport strategy, which ieconciles a curb on
mol_ilitv with competing clemancls for accessibility related to: the need for competitive
efficiency: the EU commitment to geographical accessibility and .,,octal equity for all its
citizens: anti envilonrnentall\ sustainable de\'elopment (Buttoll zmd Ni.ikamp. 1997).
Ama or difficulty ira :tchieviI>_, any such resolution, laowcx e_. i:, that the
ic,,pol>ibility fol polic\-nazkkin,_" _xitlam tile EL_' i_,dix ided bctxveen the vzuious
Dilectorate>-Genetzd oi" tile Commi_,sion. no le>s than foul - DGs IV. VII. XI at_d XVI
{dealing _cspcctivel._ with competition, ttzu>polt, cnvi_onment and tci:ion:_l
dcveh)pment ) - being ditectlv invt_lved in i_,_,ue_,tclnted t{_aix Ll:.ttqs,i)olt itnd the
envi,'onment.Alreadyatoddsovertheregulationof competitionwithinEUair
transpo,t,DGsIV andVII areconcernedprimarilywiththemarketefficiencyof the
industryandtheimplementationof theSingleAviationMarket,effectivelycreatedby
theThreePackagesof airlineliberalizationmeasures,introducedprogressivelybetween
1988and1997.Thispolicy initiative,whichoriginatedfrom DGVII,isconcerned
directlywithpromotingcompetitioninair transportandremovingbarriersto market
entry. However,itsisacharacteristicof all transportmodes,suchpoliciesdonot
encourageindividualrestraintonthepartof anyoneairline,becausesuchactions
wouldnotbe'compatiblewith rationalself-interest,notleastwhileanyother
[company]reservestherighttousetheresource[airportcapacity]asmuchasthey
choose'(Maddison,1996,p. 10).DGIVclearlyregardsairportcapacityasmorethan
astraightforwardresource.It seemsintent,for example,onusingregulationof
runwayslots- themostobviousandcontentiousmanifestationof capacity- to promote
intra-EUmarketentry,particularlyby low-costairlines.Theslot isastrategicweapon
inacompetitivemarket-place,themajorEuropeanairlineshavingavestedinterestin
ensuringshortagesat theirprincipalhubs(solongastheythemselveshavesufficient)
inordertodetermarketentryandcontrolcompetition.TheAssociationof European
Airlines(AEA)estimatesthatarunwayisatsaturationpointif 70%of itsslotsare
beingused;peak-timeslotswouldhavebeenusedfully longbeforethat. In attempting
to regulatetheanti-competitivecormotationsof theconsolidationof EUairlinesinto
internalalliancesandmoreextensiveglobalcoalitions,DGIVopposestheconceptof
airlineownershipof- andtradein - slotsandisdemandingthatBritishAirways(BA)
andLufthansa surrender significant numbers at Heathrow and Frankfurt, respectively,
in return for regulatory approval of their separate global alliances.
More widely, DGVII is responsible for the Common Transport Policy and its
principal modus operandi, the multi-modal Trans-European Transport Network
(TETN). Its role is to enhance accessibility and integration, while harmonizing national
networks into a macro-network for the EU as a whole, not least by, providing missing
connections (often at border locations) and the attempted elimination of bottlenecks
(CEC, 1994; Banister et al., 1995). While the TETN focuses on High Speed Trains
(HSTs) rather then air transport for inter-city public transport within the EU, its
commitment to competitive efficiency also includes inter-modal complementarity. Thus
an essential element of the network lies in the development of the most important EU
airports as multi-modal high-speed interchanges.
The TETN is also linked to other EU policies and objectives being articulated by
DGXVI through the Regional Development and Structural Funds, and aimed at
operationalizing the conmlitments to social solidarity, cohesion and convergence that lie
it the heart of European integration. In particular, this requires investment in transport
links to rural and peripheral areas, the assumption being that long-term cohesion-
oriented policies demand a coherent and efficient transport system _uaranteeing
continuity of service (CEC, 1996a). In DGXVI's terms, the notion of'sustainable
mobility' (not only in the sense of e_TfiSsions and noise but also of the social equity
connotations that underpin the integrated spatial plannirtg ethos of the TETN) has
become the 'central goal of transport policy' (CEC, 1996a, p.76). In reality, however,
convergence and cohesion policy may simply ensure the construction of transport
infrastructure that otherwise would not have been built, under-utilization of expensive
resources providing another dimension to the airport capacity debate.
It is required of EU transport and cohesion policies that the,,' be environmentally
sustainable, but it can be argued that both enhance the demand for mobility (without
necessarily improving accessibility), whereas environmental policy - the remit of DGXI
- tends to assume that present and projected demand for mobility is unsustainable and
nll.tst therefore be reduced. In the EU's Fifth Environmental Action Proeramme,
endorsed in 1993 and sul_titled. 'Towards Sustainabilitv'. transport is identified as one
{ r I "i x I c target sectors in recognition or the point that it can never t_e en\ ironmentally
_cup.a,l. The Progrunltlle argues tlla, present trend.,, in .ttil _;.tlld ro:tdl trunsport are
lcadine toward_ greater enviromuental costs -congestion. pollutitm, wastage of time
:rod xdluc. d;m_age to he;dth, and d;,.neer to life (CE('. 19_)6h 1.
Themostrecentassessmentof the Programme, and Agenda 21, the general and
politically compromised strategy for sustainable developrnent set up after the 1992
Earth Summit (and reaffirmed at Kyoto in 1998), concludes that the transport sector is
displaying an increased awareness of the unsustainability of present trends (CEC,
1997a). Traffic growth, however, is eroding attempts to move towards a sustainable
system, air transport having a higher growth rate than any other transport mode. One
stark conclusion is apparent; transport policy must be designed to reduce demand for
mobility, a demand which is derived and can therefore be altered. But as Greene and
Wegener warn (1997, p. 180), transport demand policies to mitigate the environmental
impacts of transport 'are frequently dwarfed by countervailing market developments'.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the EU's air transport industry.
Airport capaciO' and its em,ironmental context
Airport capacity takes several forms. It includes: airspace and the role of Air Traffic
Control (ATC) techniques in the maximization of air transport movements (ATMs):
airport infrastructure - runways, aprons, piers, and terminals: and terminals for
terrestrial transport as airports (particularly the most important) are multi-modal
interchanges. Above all, however, it is essentially the case in the EU that airport
capacity is - or is soon to become - environmental capacity, with environmental criteria,
rather than those related directly to physical infrastructure capacity increasingly
determining the magnitude of ATMs. Airports are increasingly left fiee to plan
operations, provided that the sum total of the environmental impacts of their activities
do not exceed a pre-determined level.
Environmental capacity invokes a wide range of concerns, which include: noise
from aircraft and surface transport; atmospheric emissions from aircraft engines;
surface access congestion at airports; land-use severance effects of airports and their
impact on visual amenity; effluents; and waste management. Noise in particular
remains critical to environmental capacity because it is the principal source of
complaints and the most likely cause of political involvement in restricting the use of
existing - and further development of- infrastructure. Commercial jet transports,
currently in operation, are divided into Stage II and III types, classifications that relate
to Chapters 2 and 3 of Annexe 16 to the Chicago Convention. All new aircraft must
meet Chapter 3 requirements, although these were laid down as long ago as 1976. In
1990, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed to phase out all
Chapter 2 aircraft. If these are to remain in service beyond 2002, the EU target date for
final Chapter 3 compliance, they will either have to be hush-kitted to those standards,
or re-engined.
The enforcement of these requirements will not, however, remove the problem
of aircraft noise. New aircraft are quiet, only when compared to their predecessors.
Although the spatial extent of noise footprints around airports has been reduced, the
problem of attral pollution will remain. The high-by-pass turbo-fan engines used in
modern aircraft are probably aheady as quiet as is technically feasible although the
possibility exists that. assuming the necessary investment in research, further gains
might accrue from the development of prop-fans. More immediate reductions will most
likely accrue fl'om reductions in airframe noise, which may account for around 50% of
total aircraft noise on airport approaches. Serious concerns exist, however, that
increased ATMs are comprornising noise reductions, while larger aircraft create more
noise, even if they do comply with Chapter 3 limits. In these contexts, any
enhancements to airport capacity - whatever their form - depencl on a proactive
enxironmental policy on the part of airport operators, addressing not only noise but the
entire suite ot environmental externalities engendered by the air transport industry.
Although expenditure on environmental issues may not be justified in terms of direct
economic costs and benefits, any future enhancement of capacity is predicated on a
visible and effective environmental policy
4
The problenl of European airport capacity
The ai;port capacity problem
European airports have long been perceived as having capacity problems although these
have been offset by innovations in air traffic management and control. In reality, the
picture is rendered more complex by three important factors, which, in turn, create a
geography of airport capacity restrictions. These are: variations in the form of airport
infrastructure itself; the growth in demand for air transport; and the distribution of that
demand for air transport.
First, as Table 1 shows, runway capacity is a function of an airport's layout,
parallel runways unsurprisingly supporting larger capacities than converging or single
runways. The data also indicate that irrespective of geometry, only marginal increases
in runway capacity can now be achieved without the construction of additional
infrastructure. There remains some potential in EU harmonization of ATC, and in
innovations such as 'mixed mode' runway operations in which the same runway is
used for hmdings and take-offs.
Secondly, aggregate demand for air transpo,'t ,emains driven by GDP growth,
although changes in industrial organization (especially just-in-time delivery) and
lifestyle (particularly enhanced consumption of holidays, a market driven by increased
real incomes) also contribute significantly. In addition, European air transport
liberalization has helped grow the air transport market through price competition
(Graham, 1997a; CEC, 1997b), as have the strategic actions of the major airlines in this
reformed market-place - a point to which we return later. Growth rates for air transport
in Europe have been rising consistently since the global slump in air travel induced by
the Gulf War in 1991. In 1997, for example, AEA airlines ca,'ried 164.4m passengers
on international routes, a 10.7% increase over 1996 (AEA, 1998). Future projections
vary but the 'predict and provide' scenarios of the aircraft manufacturers offer some
(rare) agreement. Airbtts Industrie estimates an average annual growth rate in traffic of
5.3% up to 2001, and a more conservative 4.6% between 2002-2011. Boeing (1998)
is predicting an average 5% growth in air travel over the next ten years. Because such
growth is exponential, these annual increments are equivalent to a doubling in demand
every 12 years. Airbtts estimates that the global population of passenger aircraft will
double from 9,700 in 1998 to 17,900 in 2018, flights increasing by 88% over the same
period. The number of rum,vav movements is expected to increase at rather lesser rates
(Table 2), an imbalance whicl_ implies that at least some traffic growth is - and will be -
accomnaodated by larger aircraft. One major imponderable in such predictions is the
future impact of information technology on the demand for air travel.
Thirdly, both the denmnd for air transport in the EU and congestion are spatially
concentrated. Demand is heavily biased towards Europe's most dynamic and urbanized
vital axis. stretching from Manchester in the north-west and Helsinki in the north-east
to Rome, Barcelona and Madrid in the south. This axis contains virtually all the EU
regions with above-average.GDP/capita and the most important airport l{ub systems
(Graham, 1998). Airport capacity problems - and the congestion and pollution created
by terrestrial transport modes - are also concentrated in this central vital axis, although a
secondary nucleus comprises certain of the leisu,e-oriented airports of southern
Europe. In essence, Europe is running out of airport capacity - however defined - in
the regions in which demand for air travel is most heavily' concentrated. Although more
than 450 European airports receive scheduled service, the 20 busiest - largely
concentrated in the EU's dominant axis - account for about 55% of all scheduled seats
and vittuallv all long-haul traffic (Figttre I ) (Boeing. 1998). While capacities have
increased markedly at some of these airports, a now slightly dated survey of the 29
Eut'opcan airports "handling more than 5 million passengers pet anrmm in 1994,
estimated that b\' 2005.25 will have runway, ztncl 26 terminal, capacity shortages
respectively fAI_A. 1996 I. ,411 will be congested by 2010. \Vhile the m:tximum hourly
movenaents at most mzOor airpoFts will increase by 2 115. the extrz_ capacity is
insufficient to meet projected g_oxvtla in almo>t evctv, h>tancc ( T¢thA' 2 a. Conversely.
ztsubstantial number of aiip.orts capable of handling more than immediz_tel\ local or
legiomtl traffic have :.tdCqtl/.ttC capacity For the lore_,eeab!e future {[:'ik'tl;'c 2 I. imd while
Ill;.II1V O[ these serve either scc()lld_.tl\ c'itiC5 t}l the 111oic peripheral regions of the present
andfutureEU,someareactuallylocatedwithinthevitalaxis,thc,ebyprovidingsome
limitedpotentialfor trafficdiversion.
Coping with growth
In comparison with the projected growth rates for air transport, the plans for
constructing new airport infl'astructure in the EU are modest. Munich Franz Josef
Strauss - the last major greenfield airport to be built in Europe - and the reconstructed
facilities at Milan Malpensa and Oslo Gardermoen, both completed in late 1998, largely
replaced existing capacity, although obviously they also added some. The same is true
of those airports currently in the planning stage - Berlin, Lisbon and Athens Spata.
Terminal capacity is being increased at a number of airports although many of these are
not capacity restricted anyway. While it is easier to get permission for terminals than
runways, by late 1998 the planning inquiry into Heathrow's proposed Terminal 5 (T5)
had sat longer than any other inquiry in UK planning history; even if approved, the
terminal will not be fully operational until 2015-16. The construction of runways, or
even their lengthening, creates even more strenuous opposition. Consequently, one
recent survey listed 47 existing European airports at which terminal expansion is
projected or in progress, but could identify only 12 instances of new runways being
planned (Simon, 1998).
Thus it appears that an irreconcilable tensions exists between projected growth
figures for air transport in Europe and the provision of the infrastructure necessary to
cope with that growth. To put it more simply, the projected growth rates cannot be
sustained within current or projected air transport infrastructure capacity. It also seems
fair to assume that the lack of political ,,viii to build additional capacity - either at the EU
or Member State scale - owes much to the environmental opposition that such plans
encounter. Consequently, policy initiatives to cope with the growth in air transport -
most notably the TETN - have been directed as much at modal shift as at building new
airport infrastructure. Some short-haul air traffic could be diverted to HSTs, which
consume much less energy pet passenger km, allowing airlines to concentrate on their
unchallenged hegernony in intercontinental travel. For point-to-point business traffic,
HSTs can compete effectively with air transport on inter-city journeys of less than three
hours (approximately 500 kin); the threshold extends to 1,000 km for leisure traffic.
One leading EU regional airline, the German carrier, Eurowings, has admitted that
regional air services are no longer worth flying if the journey time by rail is less than
three [lottrs (Flight International, 1997).
The potential for HST modal shift was first demonstrated by France's TGV,
which reportedly captured as much as 90% of the Paris-Lyon market. Elsewhere, the
AVE service has over 80% of the Madrid-Seville market, compared to the 33% share
held by conventional rail in 1991 (CAA, 1998). In Germany, Lufthansa, which
ah'eady uses Inter-City Express (ICE) trains, wants to shut down domestic air services
fiom Frankfurt to Cologne, Diisseldorf and Stuttgart, but is facing difficulties in
guaranteeing passengers the equivalent level of service). Although early HST
development concentrated on city centre-city centre linkages, the most recent network
additions exploit the added value offered by this mode when it interfaces with other
high-speed systems (Thompson, 1995). The construction of TGV stations at Paris
Charles de Gaulle and Lyon Satolas originated the process now being pursued through
the TETN, in which the integration of road, conventional rail. HST anti air transport
modes ut mz\ior airports will produce it succession of sophisticated mainports across
Europe. allowing the seamless integration of intra-urban, regional, national,
international and global traffic flows (Graham. 1995). These will include Brussels
National. AmsteMam Schiphol. Dtisseldorf Rhein-Ruhr. Munich Franz Josef Strauss,
Frankfurt International and Milan ?,'lalpensu. although the TETN will not be cornpleted
until after 2010.
Despite tlae p{_teiati:li for mod:tl shift and the incre:tsitlg intcgrutiota of airline and
t-ISl- operations lund e_en uwne_slaip_ in the EU, thi_, is not in itself a comprehensive
st_lution to the problem of air transport cztpacity, partly because el the segmented nature
o( tile air tizmsport la/:trket. Scheduled passenger services - which place the greatest
t.iOlYIZLlld Oil i.tilpol1 C;.L[);.LCit.V - ;.tCCOtlilt IO_ oil[\' half the p:>senger m:ukct. The potential
for HSTmodalshift is largelyrestrictedto the EU's dominant axis where the dense,
juxtaposed city-pair markets necessary to support investment are concentrated. The
strategy is also irrelevant to the Inclusive Tour (IT) inclustry, which accounts for the
other half of the passenger market. Arguably, however, this sector is - inadvertently -
more compliant with sustainability requirements, its economics strongly encouraging
the employment of the most modern fuel-efficient aircraft types at very high load
factors, and often utilizing off-peak times or under-utilized (or capacity-rich) regional
airports. The freight market is distinctly problematical, however, given its dependence
on night flights and older aircraft (even if hush-kitted); also, much intra-European 'air
freight' is actually tracked, thereby adding to road congestion and pollution. In sum,
therefore, modal shift offers some contribution towards alleviating problems of airport
capacity but it is not remotely a comprehensive solution.
The stakeholders in the environmental sustainability- airport capacity
relationship
The regulators
The incompatibility of growth trends and projected infiastructure availability, combined
with the limited potential for modal shift, suggests that any resolution of the tension,
which exists between projected demand for air transport and airport capacity, lies in
regulatory rneasures to curb that growth altogether. It has lortg been accepted that
airport operations can be restricted for environmental reasons, night curfews or quotas,
and bans or restrictions on Chapter 2 aircraft being obvious examples. Again, political
factors can influence capacity limits, one notable example being the legally-binding
agreement preventing the construction or opening of a second runway at London
Gatwick (the busiest single-runway airport in Europe) before 2019. The slot-capacity
of the existing infrastructure at Di.isseldorf Rhein-Ruhr, for example, is constrained for
environmental reasons, while the Dutch government's attempt - albeit now revised - to
place growth limits on Amsterdam Schiphol are, most probably, a precursor of more
widely applied and increasingly rigorous interpretations of the meaning of
environmental capacity.
The execution of environmental policy is critically dependent on regulatory
intervention impacting both on demand for, and supply of, transport. Evidence
suggests that the implementation of environmental policy is driven by threat, 'the
dominant influence on a company's investment in environmental technology [being] the
need to comply with regulations' (Hitchens, 1997, p. 816). The tenor of such
regulation has changed, however, from a command/control to fiscal basis, which
ttssumes that demand - whatever the mode - is exaggerated because transport does not
meet its real costs (Stanners and Bourdeau, 1995). While not yet widely applied,
European Commission policy on the environmental repercussions is clearly expressed,
the 'polluter pays' principle being the common thread linking its various environmental
regulations (CEC, 1997a; Hitchens, 1997). In other words, fiscal instruments should
be employed in ensuring that transport users pay the full costs of their actions, the
objective being one 'of indirectly influencing the supply of transport or the demand for
it' by market mechanisms (Button, 1994, p. 128). The Aviation Environment
Federation (1995), for example, advocates pricing discrimination in favour of more
efficient and larger long-haul aircraft, a strategy which would optimize airport capacity
while exploiting air transport's incomparable advantages for intercontinental travel.
Again, the Conamission is considering a kerosene tax on aircraft fuel.
Any market-oriented initiative to aclch'ess the interaction between airport capacity
ztnct environmental issues in Europe is rendered mo,e complex, howeve,-, by the ways
in which policies and legislation emanate from - and interact at - u variet'v of scales and
agencies, ranging from globally-binding agreements, through tiae Commission and
indi\iclual Member State governments, clown to the micro-level or an individual airport
-I I r ' ,and its local planning authority {Fivttre ._I. Noise. tor example, i, u global issue
experienced ztt the scale of the immediate airport localit\, ztl>o the >tale at which
c_mapluints al_out the effects of aircraft engine emissions on health arc most frequently
c\ptcssed. A.t various sta_e_, in this regulatory hierarchy, lao_vc_c_. tlac_c ure:missing
qa,.z'es, which, in turn. open up increased opportunities l_)l uniklteIaI action lit the
supranational,national or local scales. For example, the failure of ICAO to agree
international post-2002 noise limits, when Chapter 2 aircraft will finally be banned at
EU airports, has encouraged the Commission, Member State governments and
individual airport operators to introduce their own noise rules and surcharges in
reaction to more localized pressures. Thus the Commission's consultation paper, Air
Transl)ort and the Em'iromnent (CEC, 1998), states bhmtly that further improvements
are required on noise and emissions to ensure the sustainable development of air
transport.
Such regional initiatives are inherently unfair to the airlines involved, subjecting
them to penalties which do not necessarily apply to their global competitors. Moreover,
their effect is compounded by individual local restrictions, for example on Chapter 2
aircraft, the incidence of which, in turn, may reflect factors such as the fleet
composition of an airport's major users. German airports tended to introduce stiff
penalties on older aircraft once Lufthansa had a Chapter 3 compliant fleet, whereas
Dublin, for example, continues to suffer Ryanair's hush-kitted Chapter 2 Boeing 737-
200 fleet. Freight airlines in particular have been targeted by locally devised noise
restrictions, as for example at Nuremberg and Li6ge (Flight blternational, 1998), partly
because they fly almost exclusively at night, often with older, hush-kitted aircraft that
are only marginally Chapter 3. Again, the lack of binding global agreements, and -
despite a lot of research - a failure to fully understand the effects of high-altitude
emissions and contrails on global warming and ozone depletion, may culminate in
unilateral action on Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) limits. In addition, and in common with
several Member State governments (including the UK), the Commission lacks an
integrated environmental management policy with regard to transport in general. Nor -
excepting DGIV's attempts to regulate slots and their contested ownership - has it
formulated any strategy to deal with airport capacity constraints, the principle of
subsidiarity, that competence be exercized at the lowest level - as near to citizens as
possible, thereby maximizing flexibility and local discretion, apparently applying to
airport capacity issues.
The ai,port operators and socien" at large
This mesh of different scales and the gaps in the regulato U hierarchy, combined with
the ineffectual nature of some legislation, the array of motives involved, and the
absence of centralized policies (the TETN excepted), which might reconcile the demand
for air transport, its capacity constraints and environmental concerns, ensure that
decisions on airport capacity are often made at the local level in agreements between an
individual airport operator and its inm_ediate planning authority. It is generally the case
that planning permission for capacity increases depends on operators providing an
integrated, locally-acceptable resolution to the entire suite of environmental externalities
associated with air transport. Compliance with environmental regulations alone is not a
sufficient strategy for an airport operating company. It has to design and implement a
proactive policy that addresses a raft of environmental concerns (Figure 4). These
include:
• effective monitoring and regulation of aircraft noise on the grouncl and in the air;
• fiscal penalties on noise offenders and best practice instruction for habitual
malefactors:
• night curfews or quotas:
• public transport surface access targets:
• monitoring of airside and landside emissions:
• the reduction of energy consumption in terminals and b\ airport vehicles:
• the recycling of airport v:aste:
• monitoring wuter quality and reclucing the impact o1 contaminunI,, - particularly de-
icine fh.lid und oil - on groundxvuter:
• mcu_,ures to limit the visual in'tp:tct o(tua airport and it,, t,ttld-u>c ,,c\ crnFlce effects.
[ncxitubl\, bccuuse the airport capncits-envitonmcntul ten,ion i_,>,) often
m?diated at the lc_cal scale, noise tends to be the predomin_tnt _,_)urcc of c_m-tplaint from
conamunitie:, in uirport hinterlands. LThim:ttel\, exen the large_,t intercontinental hub is
i_lte__.tctillff \vith _.t [oc;.t] COllllnunitv Lind the concerns oI"its inhabitunts, :t nexus of
conflictof interestsdominatedbyenvironmentalissues,primarilynoise.In 1997,the
DutchgovernmentproposedacaponmovementsatAmsterdamSchiphol,which
rankedfourthin Europeandtwentiethin theworldin 1996for passengert affic. The
airport,whichhasatheoreticalcapacityof around650,000 slots per annum, was
rest,icted to only 360,000 slots for 1998, compared to the 400,000 requested by the
airlines. At the time of writing, it has just been announced that these limits are to be
revised, the airport's capacity being allowed to grow in annual inc,'ements of 20,000
slots to a ceiling of 600,000. Environmental protests are likely to follow this decision,
even if future runway developments are designed to minimise noise externalities.
Schiphol will maintain its tight controls on night flights and also continue to operate its
noise 'budget' in which aircraft are given values according to the time of day and type
of aircraft (Cameron, 1998). The air-port is actively discouraging Chapter 2 aircraft
which 'cost' too much, while giving financial bonuses to the quietest aircraft. In this
context, it is important to remember that not all aircraft qualifying under Chapter 3
comply equally with those standards. The principal opposition to T5 at Heathrow (the
world's most important international airport) is from the surrounding local authorities,
who - not unsurprisingly - question the figures put forward by the operator, BAA, and
the principal airline user, BA, that, due to the use of IroNer aircraft, an additional 30
million passengers pet" annum could be accommodated through a marginal increase in
movements.
Local authorities, however, have no direct control over the negotiation of noise
standards, which are effectively global agreements (although they are concerned with
their effective implementation and monitoring), and thus may be exercized more directly
by other manifestations of the adverse impact of airports on their immediate
environments. Chief among these is the issue of surface access, and the contribution
made by airports to road traffic congestion and pollution. European airport operators
increasingly recognize the importance of modal shift to public transport, not only for
passengers who may use the airport only infrequently, but also for employees who
travel to and from it on a daily basis. All the major UK airports, for example, have
ambitious public transport access targets. Heathrow is aiming at 50% for all journeys
(compared to the present 34%), Gatwick has a 40% target for passengers by 2000
(now 31%), while Manchester is seeking to increase its current 15% to 25% of all
journeys by 2005.
Because capacity - however defined - is related so intimately to local concerns,
an airport business can grow, only if it minimizes the impact of its expanding activities
on that environment and its residents. The circular problem for the airport operator is
that having developed and implemented an environmental policy in order (possibly) to
be allowed to expand capacity, the externalities of the resultant growth in air traffic
created by that additional capacity may outstrip the benefits of the environmental policy.
Consequently, airports have had to develop effective and continuous methods of
communicating with those residents, who share Western expectations of an enhanced
quality of life. Local protests are also often conflated by concerns over property values
in urban areas adjacent to airports. One study of the vicinity of Manchester concluded
that noise effects on residential property values could not be separated fi'om a wide
spectrum of neighbourhood and environmental variables influencing property values.
Although house prices were lower in the noise-affected areas, these properties would
still have commanded lower prices, even if they had not been located under the tli_ht-
path _Pennington et etl., 1990). Subsequently, the Manchester data was re-worke[t by
Collins and Evans (1994) who did find a relatively minor noise component in house
values.
The _tirlillc.__
While the adoption of a dynamic environnlental strategy is ctearl\' a rational decision for
EU {a.uld c,thctl airport opernto>,, ztm.l is perh;.tps the n__]st impottimt l_.tctc)ldri,.'in,.,:_their
I)usincsscs. c,.en if it does not result irt :.m\ addition,il capacity, it is rcadit\ appar'-ent
that ;.ttlotltct ,.,ct c,f tensions exist between zurpotts and their principal custtin'ters, the
alllines, l=oI the Iztttet. the definitiola of _ l_ttional busitless sttnte_\ within the context
_HEulopcal't libetaiiz:.ttion include> pi;.tcticcs that exztcerbatc the _[lic_.tdv I'_en\v pressures
10
onairportcapacity,especiallyatthelargesthubairportsonwhichtilemajorcarriers'
networksarecentred.Forsomeairlines,thepreferredenvironmentalpolicyis
probablynottohaveone;atbest,acompanywill developanenvironmentalstrategy
only if it isbeneficialin profittermstodoso.
Thecurrentactionsof Europeanairlinesin responseto theliberalizedaviation
market-placearelargelyincompatiblewiththepreceptsof environmentalsustainability,
and1helikelihoodthatanyresolutionof thecapacity-growthensioncanbeachieved
withoutcurbsondemand.Fourfactorscanbeidentified,all - possiblyexceptingthe
last- impactingnegativelyoncapacity:
• thedevelopmentof hub-and-spokesystems;
• thedependenceonincreasedfrequencyof serviceastheprimarystrategyin
accommodatinggrowthandalsoitsroleastheprincipalcompetitiveweapon;
• thegrowthof low-cost airlines;
• the development of alliances and code-sharing.
I. Hub-and-spoke systems
Tile route networks of the largest EU airlines are being reconstructed from radial point-
to-point to hub-and-spoke systems. The latter involves a dominant carrier operating
synchronized banks - or waves - of flights in which the hub-arrival times of aircraft,
originating from cities at the ends of numerous spokes, are co-ordinated into a short
time period. After the minimum interval necessary to redistribute passengers and
baggage, an equally large number of aircraft departs to the spoke cities. This pattern,
which is repeated several times during the day, is essentially a supplier-driven strategy,
maximizing the on-line (same carrier or alliance) connections available to a particular
airline at the hub airport (Dennis, 1994; Graham, 1995). Hub dominance is a large
incumbent's most effective defensive tactic in a liberalized market because, especially
when combined with airport congestion and linked to an alliance strategy, it offers the
real possibility of pre-empting - or at least controlling - competition at a particular
airport. Its efficient operation is dependent upon available runway and terminal
capacity to handle the peaks, combined with extensive feeder connections, often
employing smaller aircraft operated by regional airlines.
The cumulative effect of EU hub-and-spoke operations is to concentrate traffic
at a few airports, inevitably those already most constrained by capacity shortages and
largely located in relatively close proximity within the dominant axis. The most
important are London Heathrow, Frankfurt, Amsterdam and Paris CDG. The US hub-
and-spoke model, with its dominant carrier and dedicated terminals and gates, cannot
be replicated fully in Europe, largely because of existing restrictions on airport capacity.
Heathrow, for example, has insufficient airport capacity for BA to mount a proper hub-
and-spoke system, the carrier depending instead on what might be termed random - or
continuous - hubbing, in which a high degree of connectivity is achieved through its
sheer volume of flights across the airport. KLM's operation at Schiphol is the most
fully developed example of a European hub-and-spoke system, having four major and
two lesser waves per day; the hub serves 120 European and 1 i0 long-haul destinations.
As 60% of the airline's business comes from transfers across this hub. its desire to
expand European market share and the capacity control policy proposed by the Dutch
government were obviously in conflict. Although the major European carriers are
being forced to develop secondal.'y hubs - BA at Gatwick, Air France at Lyon Satolas,
KLNI at Milan Malpensa anti Rome (through its Alitalia alliance) - because of
congestion at their primary buses, they still cannot afford to dilute feecl for high yielding
intercontinental routes - their most profitable services - which depend on rnaxilnizing
the incidence of potential transfers across that core hub. In order to achieve this goal,
all the major European carriers have established networks of feeder routes increasingly
operated b v groups of affiliate regional airlines, which have lower cost structures but
rarely operate aircraft larger than 120 seats (Graham. 1997b 1
Feeder routes usually link a secotactatv cit\' - which tna\ well be in a different
COLt,art'\ - tO the intercontinental hub Such service.,, are escalafing in itunlber, partly
bec;tu,,e the widespread introduction or regional .jets ha_created a fat more flexible
pioducl. Although hub-feed routes are the most \ah.lable _,elvices that regional airports
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canprovidetoconsumersin connectivityterms,theyalso increase movements,
particularly by smaller aircraft, and inevitably exacerbate airport capacity problems.
Although regional aircraft generally require only short runways, almost all major EU
airports lack such dedicated facilities, forcing inefficient use of main runways by small
aircraR, which also increases ATC problems with aircraft separation. Thus capacity
constrained airport operators will seek to rationalize demand for their scarce resource by
adopting pricing structures that militate against smaller aircraft. For example, regional
aircraft have largely been forced out of Heathrow. One way to obviate the difficulty of
hub access is the concept of tile airport system in which the feeder - or reliever - airport,
used for regional traffic, might be linked to the hub by dedicated train. One such
example is Diisseldorf Express (Moenchengladbach), which is being developed as a
reliever field for slot-constricted Dtisseldorf Rhein-Ruhr. Regional carriers may also
opt for (or be forced to use) secondary airports. KLM uk (formerly Air UK), for
example, has exploited spare capacity at London's Stansted and City airports, while,
more generally, capacity-rich secondary airports - especially those in downtown
locations and accessible only to small jets or turbo-props - can provide regionals with
competitive niche markets for point-to-point traffic.
The process of hub concentration is being accompanied by an apparently
contradictory trend towards dispersal as more secondary cities develop international
routes. The liberalization of transatlantic bilateral agreements has produced a
'fragmentation' of that market, in which the proliferation of gateways in North America
and Europe means that many more city-pair markets are served direct by smaller twin-
jets. This long-haul fi'agmentation is replicated at theregional scale by the rapid
expansion of hub-bypass routes, increasingly serviced by regional jets. Although this
dispersal may have beneficial effects for congestion at individual airports, the increased
ATMs generated by the additional services compound the negative effects of air
transport on global air quality.
2. Frequency as an airline strategic tool
As in the United States, it is apparent that the hub-and-spoke system evolving in
Europe, contradicts the argument that the projected growth of demand for air transport
can, at least in part, be accommodated by the use of larger aircraft. These have better
seat/mile costs and do offer a means of enhancing capacity at given airports without
increasing departures; they do, however, create more noise. But only one major
European carrier - BA - is pursuing this strategy, largely reconstructing its Heathrow-
based fleet around aircraft with a minimum capacity of around 180 seats. Heathrow
already has the highest number of passengers per ATM in Europe and the case for T5 is
that this rnomenmm can be maintained.
That BA is the exception to the rule is underlined by the statistic that almost
90% of the aircraft added to the fleet serving intra-European schedules since 1987 are
less than 170 seats: 'Airport congestion has had only a modest influence on airline fleet
tequirements' (Boeing, 1998, p. 28). The implications for airport capacity are
profound. It is readily apparent that the hypothetical use of larger aircraft conflicts with
the eviclence that 'airlines will continue to pursue strategies that accommodate growth
primarily through additional frequencies' (Boeing, 1997, p.3). Boeing estimates that
70% of aircraft deliveries over the next decade will be single-aisle models (mostly less
than 200 seats), which will account for 71% of the world fleet by 2006, dropping only'
marginally to 69.1% in 2016. Such projections underline the fragilit.v of any argument
that growth can be partly accommodated in large," aircraft. BA can pursue its strategy
of increasing aircraft size at Heathrow, only because routes incapable of supporting
larger aircraft at ;a sufficient frequency are being diverted to Gatwick. or even
Manchester ancl Birmingham. The Boeing 737s displ:lcecl from Heathrow have largely
,.:one I,, Gatwick hut. then. it too is dependent on incteasing ai,c_att size to meet its
p_ojected capacity tatgets.
The airline fixation with fxequenc 5' a_ the prim:wy means oi accommodating
,_'roxvth stems flom its mtc u> :: - it not ghc - p_imary ['O1"111 O( non-price competition.
The mi\ t>l aiicrntt in Etuopeu_a airline tloets is being dri\ell l_v the need to maximize
fiequcncy in the competitive mtuket-pltwe, mutket sh:uc t_eing m:Lximized by frequency
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share,whichessentiallydemandsmalleraircraft.Further,competitivemarketentry
demanclsamatchingof frequencywith that of the incumbent carrier(s). Thus British
Miclland Airways, which in early 1998 began service between Manchester and
Heathrow in competition with BA, is offering eight daily flequencies but using only
130 seat Boeing 737-500s. In one sense, this is an indefensible use of very scarce
capacity in one of the world's most congested airport systems on a city-pair that should
be served by HSTs. In another, however, it represents a rational business decision that
reflects the airline's integration as a feeder into the operations of Lufthansa and SAS.
Nor are long-haul services exempt from the frequency strategy, some airlines on the
North Atlantic, for example, having down-sized from Boeing 747s to smaller twin-jets
operating at higher frequency. The importance of frequency is compounded by
evidence that it is high-yield business-class passengers who are most sensitive to this
factor. Consequently, most European carriers have linked frequency and status
products, further reducing the capacity of their aircraft to install separate business-class
cabins and/or seating for those paying for premium tickets that maximize frequency
benefits, including the ability to switch flights. The problem is that this behaviour,
which constitutes rational behaviour for the individual airline, is incompatible with
wider notions of environmental sustainability.
Because frequency has evolved as such a key strategic weapon for airlines in
the competitive market-place, aircraft size has actually declined in certain markets.
Thus while Air France has radically enhanced frequency on the heavily contested
domestic trunk routes between Paris, and Marseille, Nice and Toulouse as its response
to competition fl'om AOM French Airlines and Air Libertd, it is doing so using aircraft
no larger than 180 seats. As late as the mid-1990s, the most common aircraft on these
routes were wide-bodied Airbus A300s of Air Inter, carrying over 300 passengers.
One result is that the average number of passengers pet aircraft movement at Paris Orly
(the principal French domestic airport) dropped from 126.8 in 1995 to 108.9 in 1996.
Although consumers benefit from more frequent services, the negative
environmental effects of the widespread use of relatively small aircraft (defined as the
sub-optimal use of scare capacity resources) are compounded by unimpressive load
factor statistics. Those of European Regions Airline Association members have
scarcely changed during the past decade, averaging only 53.1%. Again, although long-
haul statistics have improved, at around 64%, the short-haul cross-borcler passenger
load factors of AEA members are scarcely higher now than they were in the mid- 1980s
(AEA. 1998). The combination of frequency as a competitive weapon with relatively
rnodest load factors means that the 'slot productivity' of many major European airports
rarely exceeds 100 p'lssen_ers/commercial,o aircraft movement. Airlines. rnoreover, are
forced to try and sell surplus capacity through special fares and promotions. Such
tactics, of course, simply encourage increased mobility and the pressures on scarce
resources. The operation of Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFPs) has a similar effect in
that these encourage people to consume mobility which they believe to be free. Perhaps
its much as 10% of traffic on some airlines is accountecl for in this way. leading to
suggestions that FFPs should be taxed or even bannecl.
3. Low-cost airlines
While the ach'ent of aggressive US-style low cost/'low-no frills' airlines such as Dublin
anti Stansted basecl Ryanair. Virgin Express at Brussels. easy Jet at Luton anct the BA
subsidiarv. Go. at Stanstecl, has been hailed as one of the major benefits of European
liberalizn'tion (cle:uiy so for passengers), their aggregate effect hats again been to
increase mobility. Essentially low-fare, point-to-point operators, dependent on low
costs and high capacity, these airlines may. effectiveh' be competing with more
conventional transport modes - classic rail, ferry anct long-distance coach - ;.is much as
incumbent airlines. Their expansion demonstrates that price can create markets, albeit
tar gel3 located within the regions alreach most densely served by exi:,:ing carriers. For
access to cheaper and available c:tpacit.v, the Io_v-cost oper:ttor: tnax tt,,e lesser airports
clo,,e to m:uor cities, bklttheir ovet'_tll impact is to coiltliitclict principle:, of su:stainability
in tll:!.t the\ contl'ibtltc to :.Ill tramsport congestion in the EL, don_in::n: nxis. while
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encouraging growth in mobility and adding to aggregate air transport emissions and
noise.
4. Alliances and code-sharing
Hub dominance, especially when combined with airport congestion, offers the real
possibility of pre-empting - or at least controlling - competition. Moreover, it is a
strategy increasingly linked to another- the tactical airline alliance. The EU's hubs are
also becoming the European centres of the global alliances being orchestrated by the
world's most powerful airlines (Schiphol, for example, is the European base for the
KLM-Northwest Airlines grouping). Through acquisition, negotiation and the
increasingly widespread use of franchising, almost all the most powerful European
carriers have constructed intra-continental coalitions which, in turn, form part of wider
global agreements. There are very few small wholly independent airlines in the EU and
most entrants soon enter into code-sharing, franchising or other agreements with the
rnajors. While such strategies are aimed at subordinating the free market to the interests
of the largest airlines, there may be, perhaps, an inadvertent environmental bonus. By
their very nature, alliances curb capacity growth and, hypothetically, should allow more
efficient use of existing resources. This may not be good for competition but adopting
a different perspective, unconstrained competition in air transport is wasteful of
investment and resources, including non-renewable hydrocarbons and scarce airport
capacity. It also increases the externalities of air transport, particularly atmospheric
en-lissions, noise and terrestrial congestion. It remains to be seen if the rapidly
escalating incidence of alliances has a beneficial impact on airport capacity congestion
but this is the only current airline tactic in a competitive market-place which offers any
such potential.
Conclusions: environmental sustainability, airport capacity and
European air transport liberalization: towards a resolution?
The preceding discussion has demonstrated that the different players in the air transport
industry, making what they regard as the most feasible and judicious decisions
regarding their own business and consumer interests, are in conflict with each other.
As many as five sets of essentially irreconcilable tensions define the fault-lines in the
relationship between environmental sustainability and the air transport industry in
Eu,ope. First, any acknowledgement of the relevance of environmental sustainability
requires acceptance of the idea that 'infinite mobility is not infinitely good'
(Bleijenberg. 1995, p. 14), which is the very antithesis of the strategic policies adopted
by airlines in a deregulated market-place. Secondly, even though a mtmber of airports
will remain capacity-rich, the aggregate projected growth rates of air transport in
Europe cannot be accommodated within existing or planned aggregate airport capacity,
particularly when the demand for air transport is geographically concentrated in those
regions defined by the highest GDP/capita, a spatial pattern unlikely to alter
significantly. Thirdly, airport capacity is essentially being driven by' environmental
criteria, which irnplies - dej'?tcto - if not de./ttre - constraints on air traffic growth.
Fourthly, and in marked contrast, the business strategy of the European airline indust_ 3'
in its newly competitive ethos demands network and frequency characteristics, vchich
cxaced_ate the demand for airport capacity at a rate even greater than that required by
aggtegate growth in passenger traffic. In these respects, airlines ate not behaving with
due regard for environmental factors, but the corollary is that it would be commercially
suicidal for any one firm so to do. lf, hov,'ever, the purpose or competition is to
eradicate competitors in the longer-term, the processes of globalization in the airline
industry might be viewed as beneficial because their ultimate aim can be interpreted as
generating higher profits from capacity control. Finally, the liberalization policy for
European air transport is argtl_tb[v at odds with the commitment to 'sustaimlble
mt,bilit\' ,,upposedly _.ttthe heart oi Etuopean trnnsport policy.
In appaxent confirmation or _he ntgument that politic> tt, mitigate the :
cnx i_onmental impacts or mtnspo_t :ue subsumed by counterv:_iling mmket
dcvelopinent.< the El_: lacks an iateglated :tit trgmsport and envitonmcntal poiicy. The
-Ihird P_tckaec lniotitises competition at the expense or _mv ethel goab, el social
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soliclarity,cohesionorenvironmentalsustainnbility.Air transport policy is for air
transport alone, failing to address either the integrated nature of transport itself, or the
broacler concerns and demands of society. This failure to produce tin air transport
policy, which effectively addresses the wider implications of the mode's activities,
obviously opens up the possibility of other institutional actors becoming involved
through the application of piecemeal standards, which, ironically, undermine the
supposedly 'level playing-field' being sought through competition policy. It would be
foolish of the air transport industry to regard unilateral actions such as the capping of
Schiphol as isolated cases, for they are more likely to be exemplars that will be
followed elsewhere, albeit in a haphazard fashion because of the failure to agree post-
Chapter 3 environmental standards. Society is moving towards an aggregate
acceptance that infinite mobility cannot be sustained, even if individual people and
companies are not yet prepared to modify their behaviour accordingly. But the tenor of
EU environmental policy is explicit; the 'polluter pays' principle - if properly applied -
implies an internalization of environmental costs through increased direct and indirect
taxation on transport use and more stringent regulations on noise and emissions. The
environmental externalities of air transport are thus seen as a market failure to be
redressed through market mechanisms. The demand for mobility will be suppressed by
measures aimed at making air transport pay those 'real' costs. Against this, however,
is the important point that any pricing mechanism for reducing demand is inequitable in
that business travellers and the wealthy are penalised far less than the members of
society less able to pay.
Within that scenario, what actions can the stakeholders in the air transport
industry take? Some additional infrastructural capacity will be built but it will be
nowhere near sufficient to meet projected growth. In a rational world, that scarce
resource would be used more effectively through the deployment of larger aircraft and
high-capacity one-class cabins (in a very real sense, the European IT industry already
offers a sustainability model) although - as we have seen - that would flatly contradict
airline economics. Airport charge regimes can penalize small aircraft although this
actually discrirninates against accessibility to peripheral regions and regional airlines. A
more equitable solution might be to link airport charges to load factor.
Traffic diversion offers some potential, given that the impact of capacity
problems varies spatially and the large number of capacity-unrestricted airports in the
EU, not all of which are sited in remote locations. It is tin overstaternent to claim that
'the future is to fly from an airport that no-one wants to fly from to tin airport no-one
wants to fly to' (Air Trcmsport World, May 1996, p. 68). Many travellers are happy to
use secondary airports for point-to-point journeys, especially if price compensates for
any inconvenience. Airports such as Manchester and Lyon Satolas can develop
credible long-haul and connecting scheduled networks, while IT companies are
prepared to use any regional airports servicing sufficient demand. In addition, general
nviation activities could be concentrated tit reliever fields. However, neither traffic
diversion or modal shift to HSTs reduce aggregate levels of mobility.
Ultimately, however, none of these tactics - or even all of thern - can solve the
capacity versus growth equation. Eventually, EU policy-makers must address the
problem that aggregate mobility in Europe, air transport included, exceeds the
environmental optimum. It is unlikely that laissez-f_fire attitudes, which disregard the
need for an integrated environment-transport policy, will prevail, no matter how much
the airlines might want this. In many ways. the environnaentallv-driven strategies of
airport operators are tin exemplar of what is to come. The ethos of the times is also
against traditional command/control environmental policy. Instend. we have the
Schiphol scenario in which the airport business is allocated overall limits but then
organizes its own activities within those constraints. Its effectiveness does depend, as
Bleiienber," (I 9?5) ar,.z,ues. on airlines renouncine their apparent preferrect objective that
thorc should be no environmental policy tit kill. LTltiinatel\ . any resolution of the
mwaitc_,t tenqon_, between en\ ironment:_l sustairlabii{t\, airport capacity and European
air trailsp_)it liberalization, depends on the developmezit _md npplication ot" common
>,{atlIddl'd>. OIll\' thc(_, catn the behaviour of ;,lllindividu,tI airline be uommcnsurate with
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thewiderinterestsandgoalsof society,withoutthatcompanybeingpenalizedin terms
of competition.
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Table1 Declaredhourlyrunwaycapacitiesfor summerbusyperiods.Source:CAA(1998,p. 46).
Airport Capacities
1993 1995 1998 Median
1998
Single Runway
Gatwick 36-45 40-47 42-48
Manchester 41 42 45-47
Geneva 30 30 35
Dfisseldorf 30 30 34
MilanLinate 24 22 32
Athens 30 30 30
34.5
Converging Runways
StockholmArlanda 63 66 70
Zurich 60 60 66
Vienna 30 45 54
Madrid 35 35-50 50
Barcelona 28 30 47
Hamburg 40 42 45
52
Parallel Runways
Heathrow 77-79 77-81 75-84
ParisCDG 76 76 76-84
Copenhagen 74 76 81
Munich 68 70 80
Frankfurt 68 70 76
ParisOrly 70 70 70
Brussels 53 60 64
RomeFiumicino 50 56 63
MilanMalpensa 30 30 26
76
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Table2 MaximumhourlymovementsatsomeprincipalEUairports.I Source:Rolls-
Royce Market Outlook, 1997.
Airport 1996 2015 %age increase
Amsterdam 2 86 140 63
Athens 3 32 80 150
Barcelona 30 55 50
Brussels 60 80 33
Copenhagen 69 80 16
Dasseldor_ 36 65 81
Frankfurt 70 100 43
London Gatwick 43 48 12
London Heathrow 82 85 4
Madrid 43 50 16
Munich 70 110 57
Paris CDG 76 120 58
Paris Orly 70 80 14
Rome Fiumicino 56 70 25
Stockholm Arlanda 66 100 52
Zurich 60 100 67
Median 47.5
i Projections assume absence of environmentally-driven limits on movements.
" Theoretical projections; both have current caps on ATMs for environmental reasons.
3 Assumes completion of new airport at Spata.
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Abstract
Over the past two decades, demand for air transport in Taiwan has grown rapidly, partly in
response to the economic development of the country, but also as a result of the worsening
quality of the highway and rail transport systems. Since the deregulation of domestic airline
services in 1987, the number of routes operated has increased from 20 to 41 and the national
fleet from 75 to 186 aircraft. Over the period, domestic scheduled airline traffic has increased
at an average annual rate of 18.4%, whilst international scheduled airline traffic has grown at
10.3%. In 1997, the number of domestic air passengers reached 18.7 million and international
air passengers 17.1 million. These large increases in demand have resulted in a great impact on
the use and operation of airport facilities.
The area of Taiwan is slightly smaller than that of the Netherlands, being some 36,000 sq. km
(14,000 sq. miles). It is 394 km (245 miles) long and 144 km (89 miles) at its broadest point.
Seventeen airports serve civil aviation, ten of which are located on the mainland and seven on
off-shore islands. How is it that a country of this limited geographical area can generate over
35 million air passengers and 1.2 million tons of air cargo annually?
This paper reviews and analyses the existing airport facilities, provides a comprehensive
transport demand forecast and examines the progress and recent development of Taiwan's
airline industry. It is based on extensive research carried out by the authors and a team from
Institute of Transportation, Ministry of Transportation and Communication, Taiwan between
1995 and 1997. This included desk research, a passenger survey and interviews with the
airport authorities. It has been updated by the authors to take account of more recent
developments, especially the £)pen Skies" agreement with the US and the various airline
alliances that have occurred involving international and domestic carriers.
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Civil Aviation Development in the Taiwan Area
1. Introduction
1.1 Area
The area of Taiwan is slightly smaller than that of the Netherlands, being some 36,000 sq. km
(14,000 sq. miles). It is 394 km (245 miles) long and 144 km (89 miles) at its broadest point.
The eastern side of the island is dominated by a north-south mountain range rising to 13,100
feet. The western side of the island is a fertile plain through which the country's only
motorway links the capital Taipei in the north to Kaohsiung in the south. Surrounding Taiwan,
there are many small islands including the Penghu Islands, the Kinmen Islands, the Matsu
Islands, Orchid Island and Green Island. The need for fast links between major cities in
Taiwan and between these small islands and Taiwan creates opportunities for the air transport
industry.
1.2 Population
The population of Taiwan was a little over 21 million in 1997. It has increased at an average
annual growth rate of 1.2% since 1983, when it totalled 18.7 million. After 1995 however
population growth declined to less than 1.0% per annum, reflecting the fact that Taiwan is
reaching its saturation level in terms of people (see Figure 1-1).
1.3 GDP
Taiwan's economic structure has changed considerably since the mid-1980s. High-tech
products have constituted a sharply increasing percentage of exports. Over the same period,
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased sharply from US$52.4 billion in 1983 to
US$283.3 billion in 1997, with an average annual growth rate of 12.81%. Economic growth
between 1986-1989 was particularly high, averaging more than 20%, with a peak of 35%
achieved in 1987 (see Figure 1-2).
2. Air Transport in Taiwan
2.1 Airports
There are seventeen airports that serve civil aviation in the Taiwan Area, ten of which are
located on the mainland and seven on off-shore islands (see Figure 2-1).
Of the seventeen airports, two are international airports and fifteen domestic. Only CKS
International, Kaohsiung International and four off-shore island airports (Green Island, Orchid,
Wangan and Chimeiyu) are exclusively devoted to civil aviation, with the remaining eleven
domestic airports shared with the military (see Table 2.1).
2.2 Airlines
The first privately owned air carrier, Foshing Airlines, was established in 1951. FarEastem Air
Transport and China Airlines followed in 1957 and 1959 respectively. Taiwan Airlines,
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Formosa Airlines and Great China Airlines were set up in 1966. By the Mid-1980s, however,
there were only four air carriers actually operating in Taiwan. China Airlines and FarEastem
Air Transport operated on domestic trunk routes, while Formosa Airlines and Taiwan Airlines
focused on off-shore islands routes. Foshing Airlines by then had concentrated on the
profitable air catering business and also worked as general sales agent for foreign airlines.
After the proclamation of deregulation of Taiwan's air transport industry in 1987, more and
more new companies entered the market. Makung Airlines was set up in October 1988. It was
later renamed UNI air when 51% of its shares were sold to EVA Airways. After reorganization
of their Board members, Great China Airlines and Foshing Airlines resumed their domestic air
transport services in 1988. Aiming at international operations, Foshing Airlines changed its
identity and was renamed TransAsia Airways. China Asia Airlines was established in 1989
and renamed U-Land Airlines when the U-Land Construction Group took over the airline in
1994. EVA Airways was established in 1989 and entered into the domestic market in October
1994. Mandarin Airlines, a subsidiary of China Airlines, was formed to operate international
routes in 1991. Mandarin Airlines is the only airline that does not operate domestic route. A
summary of Taiwan airlines t fleets in 1995 is provided inTable 2.2.
2.3 Domestic Airline Market Supply
Table 2.3 shows how the supply has changed over the past eleven years.
i). Number of Airlines: domestic airlines have increased from 4 in 1987 to 9 in 1997.
ii). Destinations Served: between 1987 and 1997, these have increased from 13 to 16.
iii). Service Routes: between 1987 and 1997, these have increased from 20 to 41.
iv). Frequencies Operated: the total number of flights has increased from 76,580 in 1987 to
286,170 in 1997.
v). Seats Provided: these have increased from 4.2 million in 1987 to 28 million in 1997.
2.4 Domestic Air Transport Deregulation Policy
The Civil Aviation Industry Administration Rules announced in 1949 gave the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) of Taiwan the authority to:
i). Control entry into the industry,
ii). Control entry into new or existing routes,
iii). Control exit by requiring approval before cessation of service to a point or on a route,
iv). Regulate fares,
v). Control mergers and intercarrier agreements,
vi). Investigate deceptive trade practices and unfair methods of competition.
In October 1987, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC) proclaimed the
ripen sky' policy for the domestic air transport industry. The policy mainly focused on
providing a looser control on entry into the industry and of entry into new or existing routes.
The fare control rule was modified in 1989 to allow airlines to have more freedom to discount
rates.
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In 1990, the MOTC prevented further entry into the industry, because there were too many
domestic airlines operating in the market.
3. Demand for Air Transport
3.1 Competition with Surface Transport
The highway is the most popular transport mode in Taiwan due to the close proximity of the
cities. In 1980, 2,060 million passenger journeys were undertaken by road, accounting for
93.5% of total passenger traffic, while air transport carried only three million passengers,
equivalent to 0.14% of total traffic. However, the highway system has become saturated due to
the rapidly increasing use of private cars. The situation is at its worst when there is any public
holiday. People need to spend more than twice the amount of time on journeys during the peak
season. It is very crowded on the trains at this time as well, owing to capacity limitations of
the existing rail network. Any further development of the air transport industry would thus
have the obvious effect of easing the congestion on surface transport. As a consequence, the
air system increased its market share to 1.23% of total traffic in 1996, while the highway
market share declined to 87.53%. The changes in market share of domestic transport modes
are shown in Table 3.1.
3.2 Demand for Domestic Passenger Air Transport
The domestic air transport industry has experienced a growing trend since 1971 (see Figure 3-
1), when the number of passengers carried by airlines was just over one million. Between 1972
and 1978 the industry grew rapidly with an average annual growth rate of 25.35%. In 1978 the
number of passengers carded by airlines was nearly four million, about four times greater than
the figure of seven years earlier. However, after 1979 the demand for air transport declined
continuously for four years at an average rate of 8136%. This was mainly caused by
improvements in the ground transport system, including the completions of the first motorway,
northeast railroad and the electric powered railway system. The improvements in the ground
transport systems led passengers away from the airline industry. In 1980 the passengers carried
by airlines decreased by 19%, while those carried by the railway system increased by more
than 8%. The substitution effect of demand between air and ground transport in Taiwan was
thus apparent.
Between 1985 and 1986, the passenger demand again declined. The main reason for this was
that China Airlines had put most of its resources into expanding its international routes. For
the domestic market, the airline kept only three B737 to operate six domestic routes. The
capacity of these routes thus remained almost unchanged for many years. The other reason
was that FarEastem Air Transport had problems due to confusion among the main shareholders
which affected the operation of the airline. Most of the B737s operated by the company were
introduced about 20 years ago. As a result of the problems experienced in the 1980s, there was
no updating of the fleet. After 1987, the domestic air transport industry of Taiwan returned to
an era of rapid growth following deregulation. The demand for air transport increased sharply
from 1987 to 1997, with an average growth rate of 18.35%.
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3.3 Demand for and Supply of Domestic Passenger Air Transport
One of the major reasons for deregulation was to develop the capacity of domestic air transport
so as to ease the congested ground transport in Taiwan. This aim has been achieved in the
deregulation era. Under deregulation, airlines may easily enter into new markets and increase
the capacity of routes.
The demand for domestic air transport increased 27% in 1987, whilst the capacity of the
industry increased by only 17%. The gap between supply and demand resulted in a high seat
load factor, reaching more than 80% (see Figure 3-2). With such a high occupancy, passengers
frequently experienced difficulty in booking seats on their desired flights. During the peak
season, especially Chinese New Year, passengers had to queue for hours to buy tickets. It was
apparent that the industry's supply was far below the public Is demand. This was the main
reason behind the government rs decision to deregulate domestic air transport.
After the deregulation of domestic air transport, the growth rate of annual available seats
exceeded the growth rate of annual passenger demand. This was mainly due to the fact that
airlines started to introduce new larger size aircraft into the market. Total available seats
numbered 4 million in 1987, but by 1997 had increased to 28 million. The total increase in
annual available seats was near]y 700% over the ten-year period. The number of available
seats has boomed since 1991. The average growth rate of annual available seats has been
nearly 24% over the last six years. This rapid increase in supply resulted in excess capacity
and created a more competitive market environment in the industry.
3.4 Competition at the Route Level
In 1987, more than 95% of routes were operated by one or two carriers. Of the 20 routes
operated, eight were served by one carrier and eleven were operated by two carders (see Table
3.2). Since the new carriers entered into'the market the situation has changed. By 1996, the
routes served by one carrier had declined to 23% of the total number of routes served, whilst
the routes served by four or more carriers had increased to 20%. It is clear that the operation of
the air transport industry before deregulation was either monopolistic or duopolistic. The
domestic air transport industry after deregulation however is much more competitive. The
increased competition in the market may be explained by the increasing number of airlines.
The continued existence of monopoly in 1997 is mainly caused by the expansion of operations
to smaller airports. These small airports usually have only short runways, which require
airlines to operate aircraft with short takeoff and landing capabilities. This generates a certain
kind of natural barrier to other carriers who do not have such type of aircraft. For example,
Formosa Airlines is a monopolistic operator on the Taipei-Matsu route, because its Domier 228
is the only aircraft allowed to operate on such a short runway as that at Matsu. This "kind of
technical barrier cannot exist for long however. When the runway extension program is
completed, more airlines will enter the market.
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3.5 Market Share of Carriers
Prior to deregulation there were only four carriers operating domestic routes. China Airlines
and FarEastem Air Transport were the two major players operating the trunk routes in 1986,
carrying nearly 90% of the total passenger traffic. Formosa Airlines and Taiwan Airlines were
two minor operators who focused on the thin routes and carried the remaining 10% of traffic
(see Table 3.3).
FarEastern Air Transport was the most important domestic air carrier, with a market share of
over 50%. Confusion among its main shareholders adversely influenced the company _s fleet
update however, leading to a decline in its market share from 57% in 1986 to 29% in 1997.
As Formosa Airlines and Taiwan Airlines operated mainly on the thin routes linking small
islands with Taiwan, they avoided head on competition with the big two carriers. Small
propeller aircraft were widely used by both these airlines to suit the operational requirements of
the short runways on the islands. TransAsia Airways entered the market in 1988 and grew
rapidly. Its market share was only 1% in 1988, but by 1995 it had over 27%. Since then its
share of traffic has declined to around 22%. Great China Airlines and Makung Airlines were
the other two major airlines to enter the domestic air market in 1989. Each had their market
share increase from less than 5% in 1989 to more than 10% in 1997. U-Land Airline achieved
notoriety in Taiwan when in 1994 the U-Land Construction Group took over China Asia
Airlines, adopting a marketing strategy to fly Taipei-Kaohsiung route with one NT dollar".
The strategy proved very successful for U-Land Airline as it was able to increase its market
share from 0.057% in 1994 to 6.11% in 1997.
3.6 Market Shares by Route
The Taipei-Kaohsiung route is the busiest consistently accounting for more than 30% of the
domestic market over recent decades (see Table 3.4). Before 1992, the Kaohsiung-Makung
route was the second busiest route as a result of Makung, the largest off-shore island in the
Taiwan Area, being poorly served by ferry. After 1992, demand on the Taipei-Tainan route
increased sharply, raising it from being the fifth to the second busiest route in the domestic
market.
The Taipei-Kinmen route is the other one which has grown rapidly. After deregulation of
services to Kinmen Island in 1990, the demand for air transport increased sharply with the
route's overall market share rising from 0.52% in 1987 to 5.45% in 1995.
3.7 Air Fares
Air Fares remained under the CAA/s control after deregulation. Airlines had to get CAA
approval before issuing any new fare. Air Fares have been raised three times to cover
increased operational costs over the past ten years (see Table 3.5 and 3.6). Between 1990 and
1993 fares on most routes increased by around 12%, reflecting the effects of inflation, although
in certain cases there was no change in the rate changed. In the period 1993-1995, fare
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increases varied between 4% and 11%.
In December 1995, the CAA proclaimed a change to air fare policy to allow airlines to have
more freedom to adjust their fares freely within a maximum discount rate of 30%. On special
occasions, such as the inauguration of a new airline, the introduction of a new aircraft, the
operation of a new route or a company's anniversary, airlines have the right for special
promotions within a maximum discount rate of 50% for a two week period. Airlines need to
report to the CAA for such special promotions 30 days before the promotional date. This
became the first occasion that the CAA loosened its control on air fares since deregulation.
4. Supply of Airports
4.1 International Airport Facilities
Table 4.1 lists the major facilities of the two international airports in Taiwan. There are two
parallel runways at CKS International Airport, both of which are more than 3,300 meters in
length. Currently there are 22 in-contact and 8 remote parking stands available for passenger
aircraft, with 12 parking stands provided for the cargo terminal.
The other international airport at Kaohsiung operates with one runway. It has 12 in-contact
parking stands at its passenger terminal and 4 parking stands at the cargo terminal.
4.2 Airport Traffic Data
CKS International Airport is the most important international airport in Taiwan, handling
107,822 aircraft movements, 14 million international passengers and one million tons of
international cargo in 1997 (see Table 4.2).
Taipei Airport is the most important domestic airport in Taiwan, with 187,998 aircraft
movements, 15 million domestic passengers and 39,596 tons of domestic cargo handled in
1997.
Kaohsiung International Airport is the second most important airport for domestic services,
with more than 9 million passengers and 21,057 tons of cargo handled in 1997.
4.3 Changes in International Airport Operations
Between 1990 and 1997 traffic growth at CKS International Airport was moderate, with a
9.82% annual increase in aircraft movements, a 6.84% annual rise in international passengers
and a 9.19% annual increase in international cargo (see Table 4.3 to 4.5).
Traffic at Kaohsiung International Airport has risen sharply since 1990. The number of aircraft
movements was only 4,000 in 1990, but by 1997 this figure had increased to nearly 27,000.
International passenger traffic increased nearly four times between 1990 and 1997, with an
average gro_¢h rate of 21.33%. The average growth rate of international cargo was 18.95°.;
between the same years.
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4.4 Changes in Domestic Airport Operations
Most of the domestic routes serving Taipei are handled at Sung Shan Airport, located 5
kilometers north of the city centre. Sung Shan is a hub airport and is the busiest for domestic
routes, serving more than 15 million passengers in 1996.
Traffic at Taichung, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pindung Airports has increased rapidly due
to the congested ground transport. These five airports are located in the west corridor of
Taiwan, where most of the population is concentrated. Not surprisingly, these west corridor
routes have become the most popular in the domestic market. The average annual growth rate
of passenger traffic at these five airports was more than 20% from 1986 to 1996 (see Table
4.6).
Hualien and Taidung are located in eastern Taiwan. As there is no motorway in the east
corridor, railway and air became the main transport modes for these two cities. The average
annual growth rate of passenger traffic at these two airports was more than 10% from 1986 to
1996.
After the Kinmen route was deregulated, most tourists changed their destinations from Makung
to Kinmen. As a consequence, traffic at Kinmen Airport has increased sharply from 1993, with
an average annual growth rate of more than 45% from 1991 to 1996. With such a rapid
increase in traffic the new passenger terminal built in 1991 is now too small.
4.5 Air Transport Forecast
According to the IATA Air Transport Forecast of 1997 (see Table 4.7), total domestic
passenger traffic in Taiwan grew by 26% per annum onaverage between 1990 and 1995. The
strong growth experienced in the last five years in domestic travel was the result of the
development of services by several regional carriers following liberalization. The growth in
international traffic was much more moderate, with an 8.7% annual rate experienced between
1990 and 1995 (see Table 4.7).
IATA anticipated that domestic passenger traffic would grow faster than international traffic
between 1995 and 2000. While domestic passenger traffic is expected to grow by 12.7% per
annum between 1995 and 2000, international scheduled passenger traffic to and from Taiwan
should grow by 10.9% per annum between 1995 and 2000 and 7.1% per annum thereafter.
5. Recent Air Transport Developments in Taiwan
5.1 APROC Plan
The Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center Plan (APROC) is the key to Taiwan's economic
future. Whether Taiwan can respond to change, break through bottlenecks and occupy a
significant place in the global economy of the 21 st centu_' all largely depend on this plan. One
of the important APROC aims is the establishment of the Air Transport Centre, including
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express air-cargo transit hub and air-passenger transit hub.
5.1.1 Express Air-Cargo Transit Hub
A special area for express cargo operations will be planned and set up in the cargo terminal at
CKS international airport. International express-cargo operators will be allocated their own
exclusive operating areas within the airport. They will be permitted to install and operate their
own high-efficiency equipment. A policy of liberalizing commercial air-cargo operations will
be carried out. The ground services company at CKS international airport will be privatized
without delay and ground handling operations will be opened up to a second operator.
The second phase of the cargo-terminal extension project at CKS intemational airport will be
completed, a special zone for express cargo will be created and operating capacity will be
expanded.
Development of the airport as an international express cargo transport hub will be accompanied
by the full integration of storage, carriage, information technology, manufacturing and other
related activities.
5.1.2 Air-Passenger Transit Hub
In the short term, to make Taiwan more attractive to transit passengers:
i). The first phase of the plan to extend and improve the passenger terminal at CKS
international airport will be carried out. The space for resting and shopping will be
expanded and the quality of service will be raised.
ii). The issuance of visas on arrival and the privilege of visa-free entry will be extended and
custom clearance ",viii be made more rapid and efficient, so as to render it more
convenient for passengers to stop over in Taiwan. "
In the mid to long term, to build up the ph_,sical infrastructure and make every effort to expand
and develop passenger transit operations:
i). The second phase of the CKS international airport terminal extension and development
plan will be vigorously pressed ahead with. Commercial areas and rest facilities will be
greatly increased.
ii). The airport Is ground transport links will be improved. Long-distance bus services to and
from the airport will be opened up to a second operator. A rapid transit network will be
built to connect the airport to Taipei. Air routes will be opened for connecting flights to
central, southern and eastern Taiwan.
To strength management and organization:
i). In the short-term, corporate-management practices will be introduced. Changes will be
made to the organization and functions of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to
strengthen its operational efficiency.
ii). The second phase of the terminal project will be put under private-sector management.
iii). The airport's commercial operations, such as hotel accommodation, shops, restaurants.
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cafeterias, parking lots and the maintenance of the terminal facilities, will be assigned
to private-sector management.
5.2 Open Skies Agreement with the U.S.
In March 1997, Taiwan signed an Open Skies 'agreement with the U.S., Taiwan being the 16th
country to sign such an agreement with U.S.
After the signing of the Open Skies t agreement with the U.S., the two main international
airlines, EVA Airways and China Airlines, entered into alliances with Continental Airlines and
American Airlines respectively. EVA Airways began its codeshare agreement with Continental
Airlines in March 1998, with Continental Airlines codesharing on EVA Airways'flights from
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Newark and Honolulu to Taipei. In turn, EVA Airways
will codeshare on Continental's flights throughout the U.S. By linking flight schedules, the
two carriers will greatly reduce flight connection times between the U.S. and Asia. The
agreement also enables Continental and EVA to offer reciprocal frequent flier programs, shared
airport lounges and through check-in to final destinations.
China Airlines began its codeshare agreement with American Airlines in December 1997, with
China Airlines codesharing on American Airlines' services from Los Angeles and San
Francisco to Dallas, Chicago, Miami, New York and Washington D.C. In turn, American
Airlines will codeshare on China Airlines ' flights to Taiwan. The agreement also enables
China Airlines and American Airlines to offer reciprocal frequent flier programs, shared airport
lounges and through check-in to final destinations.
5.3 Domestic Airline Alliances
Airline Alliances have become popular in the domestic market of Taiwan in recent years. They
first appeared in the 1980s when China Airlines acquired 19% of FarEastern Air Transport Is
shares. With the benefit of alliances, airlines provide passengers with more flexible choices by
enabling them to take alliance partner airlines ' flights using the same tickets.
Recent alliance activities have occurred since the purchase of 24% of the shares of Great China
Airlines and 43% of the shares of Makung Airlines by EVA Airways in 1995. By purchasing
shares, EVA Airways has built up close alliance relationships with Great China Airlines and
Makung Airlines, which have benefited from receiving EVA's support on crew training,
maintenance, service, ticketing image. EVA benefited by rapidly expanding its domestic
network, acquiring a number of feeders for its international routes, increasing its domestic
market share and acquiring precious slots at some congested airports. All airlines benefited
from reduced operating costs through sharing facilities and by ordering the same type of
aircraft. Great China, Makung and EVA together have ordered the MD90, getting a much
better price in the process. EVA Airways ,,vent on to expand its alliance activity to include
Taiwan Airlines, purchasing 29.74% of its shares in 1996.
China Airlines followed the trend by forming an alliance with TransAsia Airways on the
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Taipei-Kaohsiung route in 1995. China Airlines further expanded its alliance activity by
purchasing 33% of the shares of Formosa Airlines in June 1996.
With the alliance benefit, the most competitive Taipei-Kaohsiung route has become closer to an
oligopoly market of three major groups instead of the original competitive market formed by
seven operators. China Airlines, TransAsia Airways and Formosa Airlines form one alliance,
which took 41% market share in 1995. EVA, UNI, Great China and Taiwan Airlines form
another alliance, taking 21% market share in 1995. FarEastern Air Transport, the dominant
carrier in the market, continues to operate independently and took 38% market share in 1995.
U-Land Airlines was the only small airline which did not join any alliance and took less than
0.2% market share in 1995.
6. The Current and Future Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region
6.1 Rank of Major Asian Airports
6.1.1 Air Passengers
In 1996, CKS International Airport ranked 8th of the selected major ten airports in Asia and
50th in ACI world airport statistics in terms of passenger traffic. If only international
passengers traffic is included, however, CKS International Airport was ranked 6th of the
selected ten major airports in Asia (see Table 6.1).
6.1.2 Air Cargo
In 1996, CKS International Airport's air cargo traffic ranked 5th of the selected major ten
airports in Asia and 18th in ACI airport ranking. Developing CKS International Airport into an
Air Cargo Transit Hub is therefore easier to accomplishthan the plan to develop it into an Air
Passenger Transit Hub (see Table 6.2).
6.2 Top Ten Asia-Pacific Domestic City-Pairs
The number of scheduled seats available on the Taipei-Kaohsiung route in 1996 was 8,525,804,
making it the busiest domestic city-pair in the Asia-Pacific region (see Figure 6-1).
6.3 Air Transport Forecast for the Asia-Pacific Region
Taiwan's total air passenger average annual growth rate was 15.4% between 1985-1995,
ranking it 3rd of the major Asia-Pacific countries. According to IATA's air transport forecast
of 1997, Taiwan's domestic passengers will reach 104.1 million in 2010 and its international
passengers 52.8 million. Total air passenger average annual growth rate is estimated to be
8.8% over the period 1995-2010 (see Table 6.3).
6.4 Composition of Asia-Pacific Region Traffic to and from Taiwan
Figure 6-2 shows the past and future composition of Asia-Pacific traffic to and from Taiwan. It
can be seen clearly that Northeast Asia will remain the most important region for traffic to and
from Taiwan, although its share will decline to 49% in 2010, compared to 56% in 1995 and
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80% in 1985.
Traffic between Taiwan and the Americas achieved particularly high rates of growth in the
recent past, with a 21% annual average rate achieved between 1985 and 1995. However, Asia-
Pacific was by far the most important world region for international traffic to and from Taiwan,
accounting for 87% of total international passengers in 1995.
6.5 International Air Traffic to and from Taiwan
In 1985, Japan was the most important country for international traffic to and from Taiwan,
followed by Hong Kong. But in 1995, Hong Kong became the most important market for
international traffic to and from Taiwan. This occurred because there is no direct service
between Taiwan and China (see Figure 6-3).
According to the IATA air traffic forecast of 1997, the assumed introduction of direct
scheduled services between Taiwan and China in 1998 will make the Taiwan-China route area
become the second most important route for Taiwan in 2010 after Hong Kong.
6.6 Top Ten Asia-Pacific Countries in terms of Domestic Passengers
In 1985, Japan was by far the most important Asia-Pacific domestic travel market, while
Taiwan was ranked fifth. By 1995, Japan remained the most important Asia-Pacific domestic
travel market, but domestic passenger traffic in China and Taiwan had grown rapidly and
ranked second and third respectively. According to the IATA air transport forecast of 1997, by
2010, China will be the major Asia-Pacific domestic travel market, followed by Japan and
Taiwan (see Figure 6-4).
7. Conclusion
The domestic air transport industry in Taiwan has experienced a growing trend since 1971 due
to the changed economic structure and the worsening quality of surface transport. In 1987, the
Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MOTC) proclaimed the dpen sky ' policy for
the domestic air transport industry. The policy provided a looser control on entry into the
industry and of entry into new or existing routes. As a result, the demand for domestic air
transport grew rapidly with an average annual growth rate of 18.35% between 1987 and 1997.
Over the past ten years, domestic airlines have increased from four in 1987 to nine in 1997,
destinations served have increased from 13 to 16, routes operated have risen from 20 to 41, the
total number of flights provided has increased from 76,580 to 286,170 and the total number of
seats offered has increased from 4.2 million to 28 million.
In 1987, 95% of the routes operated were served by one or two carriers, but by 1996, the routes
served by only one carrier had declined to 23% of the total number of routes served, whilst the
routes served by four or more carriers had increased to 20%. It is clear that the operation of the
air transport industry before deregulation was either monopolistic or duopolistic. Since
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deregulation however, the market is much more competitive. The increased competition in the
market may be explained by the larger number of airlines.
CKS International Airport is the most important international airport in Taiwan, handling
107,822 aircraft movements, 14 million international passengers and one million tons of
international cargo in 1997. Its air passenger and air cargo traffic ranked 8th and 5th
respectively of the selected major ten airports in Asia and 50th and 18th respectively in ACI
world airport rankings in 1996.
Taipei Sung Shan Airport is a hub airport and is the busiest for domestic routes, serving more
than 15 million passengers in 1996. The Taipei-Kaohsiung route is the busiest domestic city-
pair in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center Plan (APROC) is the key to Taiwan _seconomic
future. One of the important APROC aims is the establishment of the Air Transport Centre,
which will include an express air-cargo transit hub and an air-passenger transit hub. A special
area for express cargo operations will be planned and set up in the cargo terminal at CKS
international airport.
In March 1997, Taiwan signed an Open Skies _agreement with the U.S., Taiwan being the 16th
country to sign such an agreement with the U.S. After the signing of the Open Skies'
agreement, the two main international airlines, EVA Airways and China Airlines, entered into
alliances with Continental Airlines and American Airlines respectively.
Airline Alliances have become popular in the domestic market of Taiwan in recent years since
the purchase of 24% of the shares of Great China Airlines and 43% of the shares of Makung
Airlines by EVA Airways in 1995. China Airlines followed the trend by purchasing 33% of
the shares of Formosa Airlines in June 1996. With the benefit of alliances, airlines provide
passengers with more flexible choices by allowing them to take alliance partner airlines t flights
using the same tickets.
Taiwan's total air passenger average annual growth rate was 15.4% between 1985-1995,
ranking it 3rd of the major Asia-Pacific countries. According to the IATA Air Transport
Forecast of 1997, Taiwan's domestic passengers will reach 104.1 million in 2010 and its
international passengers 52.8 million. Total air passenger average annual growth rate is
estimated to be 8.8% over the period 1995-2010.
Northeast Asia will remain the most important region for traffic to and from Taiwan, although
its share will decline to 49% in 2010, against 56% in 1995 and 80% in 1985. In 1985, Japan
was the most important country for international traffic to and from Taiwan, followed by Hong
Kong. But in 1995, Hong Kong had become the most important country for international
traffic to and from Taiwan. According to IATA's assumed introduction of direct scheduled
services between Taiwan and China in 1998, the Taiwan-China market will become the second
most important route for Taiwan in 2010 after Hong Kong.
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Table 2.1 Categorization of Taiwan Airports Operating International and Domestic Services
Function Characteristic Airports Number
International CKS International, Kaohsiung
Airports Civil only International 2
Military and Civil Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung, Chiayi, Tainan,
Domestic Aviation Pingtung, Hualien, Taidung, Makung, ! 1
Airport Kinmen, Matzu
Civil only Green Island, Orchid, Wangan, Chimeiyu 4
Table 2.2 The Fleets of Taiwan _ Scheduled Airlines (1995)
Airline Aircraft Average Seating Fleet Total Fleet
Capacity Size Size Operating Routes
China Airlines MD-11 275 4 40 International and
A 300 254 12 Domestic
A 320 150 2
B 737 117 3
B 747 360 19
Madarin Airways B 747-409 411 1 1 International
EVA Airways B 767-300ER 238 9 25 International and
B 767-200 212 4 Domestic
B 747-400 386 6
MD- 11 275 6
TransAsia ATR-42 50 3 23 International and
Airways ATR-72 74 12 Domestic
A 320-231 162 6
A 321-131 194 2
Far East Air B 737 120 4 15 International and
Transport B 757 210 2 Domestic
MD-82 154 8
MD-83 165 1
Great China DHC-8-102 39 2 14 Domestic
Airlines DHC-8-311 56 12
UNI Airways HS-748 54 2 8 Domestic and
BAe- 146 112 5 International
B 757 210 1 Charter
Formosa SAAB-340 36 9 26 Domestic
Airlines Fokker-50 56 4
Fokker-100 109 1
Dornier-228 19 7
BN-Islander 16 2
UH-12E Helicopter 2/1 3
Taiwan BN-2A 9 4 5 Domestic
Airlines Dornier-228 l 9 1
U-Land MD-82 154 2 3 Domestic and
Airlines SHORTS 360 89 1 International
Charter
Source: CAA, MOTC, 1996.
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Table 2.3 Supply Changes in the Domestic Airline Market
No. of Destinations Routes Frequencies Seats
Airlines Served Operated Operated
Provided
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
4 13 20 76,580
5 13 21 80,266
7 13 22 107,492
8 13 23 110,163
8 13 24 132,782
8 13 25 148,051
8 14 27 176,815
9 14 29 215,663
9 16 33 237,458
9 16 35 284,749
9 16 41 286,170
Source: CAA, MOTC, 1998.
4,199,591
4,812,844
5,699,800
5,947,741
7,862,187
9,731,694
13,275,809
16,468,880
22,022,033
27,027,765
27,980,000
Table 3.1 Changes in Market Share of Domestic Transport Modes (%)
Year Highway Rail Air
1980 93.50 6.36 0.14
1981 93.70 6.16 0.13
1982 93.73 6.14 0.13
1983 93.73 6.14 0.13
1984 93.98 5.88 0.14
1985 94.03 5.83 0.13
1986 93.79 6.08 0.13
1987 93.43 6.40 0.16
1988 93.19 6.62 0.19
1989 92.89 6.86 0.25
1990 92.20 7.53 0.27
1991 91.99 7.70 0.32
1992 91.12 8.47 0.41
1993 90.56 8.93 0.51
1994 89.61 9.70 0.68
1995 88.56 10.51 0.93
1996 87.53 11.23 1.23
Source: Transport Data Analysis, lOT, MOTC, 1987-1997.
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Table3.2Competitioni City-PairRoutes
Four or MoreOne Carrier Two Carriers Three Carriers
Year Carriers Total
Routes
Routes % Routes % Routes % Routes %
1987 8 40.00 11 55.00 0 0.00 1 5.00 20
1988 8 38.10 9 42.86 1 4.76 3 14.29 21
1989 8 36.36 9 40.91 2 9.09 3 13.64 22
1990 8 34.78 9 39.13 3 13.04 3 13.04 23
1991 9 37.50 9 37.50 3 12.50 3 12.50 24
1992 8 32.00 12 48.00 1 4.00 4 16.00 25
1993 10 37.04 11 40.74 3 11.11 3 11.11 27
1994 9 31.03 11 37.93 6 20.69 3 10.34 29
1995 11 33.33 12 36.36 6 18.18 4 12.12 33
1996 8 22.86 17 48.57 3 8.57 7 20.00 35
1997 13 31.71 16 39.02 5 12.20 7 17.07 41
Source: CAA, MOTC, 1998.
Table 3.3 Changes in Market Shares (%) of Scheduled Airlines
Year
China FarEastern TransAsia Great Formosa Taiwan Makung
Airlines Air Airways China Airlines Airlines Airlines
Transport Airlines (UNI)
China Asia
Airlines
(U-Land)
EVA
Airways
1986 31.60 57.37 6.53 4.50 -
1987 36.09 52.41 7.41 4.09 -
1988 37.07 51.53 1.00 '7.64 2.76 -
1989 29.06 43.22 6.66 3.28 10.52 2.98 4.28
1990 20.13 44.52 11.01 6.06 10.06 2.91 5.18
1991 16.32 37.74 16.00 8.16 8.04 2.18 11.58
1992 11.04 43.08 18.69 8.74 6.95 1.48 9.82
1993 8.51 43.40 21.97 9.30 6.76 0.91 9.15
1994 6.48 40.17 26.26 9.60 7.98 0.63 8.53
1995 4.59 37.96 27.45 10.10 8.63 0.68 7.47
1996 4.30 30.39 25.08 9.87 10.75 0.85 9.95
1997 4.85 29.04 21.64 10.89 11.51 1.22 11.48
0.13
0.06
0.18
0.01
0.06
0.15
4.72
6.11
0.29
2.96
4.08
3.26
Source: CAA, MOTC, 1998.
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Route
Table 3.4 Changes in Market Share (%) by Route
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Taipei-Kaohsiung 32.01 32.76 33.54 34.63 37.07 39.61 39.07 37.52 37.18 40.94
Taipei-Tainan 6.24 5.99 6.3 7.38 9.05 10.19 11.4 12.02 11.49 11.84
Taipei-Hualien 13.54 13.22 1! .84 11.34 9.27 8.18 7.17 7.05 6.86 6.39
Kaohsiung-Makung 14.15 15.11 13.64 12.77 11.15 9.29 7.99 6.50 5.80 4.93
Taipei-Taidung 4.14 4.26 5.05 5.60 5.20 5.30 5.23 5.30 5.45 4.89
Taipei-Kinmen 0.52 2.09 2.32 2.64 2.66 3.25 5.12 5.71 4.95 3.85
Taipei-Makung 10.54 10.46 10.72 10.36 9.88 7.86 6.67 5.23 4.50 3.68
Kaohsiung-Hualien 3.53 3.53 3.18 3.10 2.66 2.39 1.84 1.73 1.85 1.86
Taichung-Makung 2.19 2.29 2.24 2.24 2.35 2.45 2.06 1.79 1.60 1.41
Tainan-Makung 2.16 1.92 2.46 2.32 2.31 2.01 1.74 1.52 1.30 1.00
Route
Table 3.5 Changes in Air
1990 1993
Fares (NT Dollars) of Inland Routes
1996 Increase % from
1990-1993
Increase % from
1993-1995
Taipei-Kaohsiung 1209 1323 1409 9.43
Taipei-Tainan 1110 1239 1325 11.62
Taipei-Chiayi 1050 1181 1272 12.48
Taipei-Taichung 840 945 1023 12.50
Taipei-Hualien 919 1028 1111 11.86
Kaohsiung-Hualien 1335 1428 1511 6.97
Taichung-Hualien 1820 1900 1975 4.40
Taipei-Taidung 1226 1323 1407 7.91
Kaohsiung-Taidung 1004 1130 1214 12.55
Taichung-Taidung 1960 1960 2036 0.00
Table 3.6 Changes in Air Fares (NT Dollars) of Off-shore Island Routes
6.50
6.94
7.71
825
8.07
5.81
3.95
6.35
7.43
3.88
Increase % fromRoute 1990 1993 1996
1990-1993
Increase % from
1993-1995
Taipei-Makung 1044 1 i 64 1252 11.49 7.56
Kaohsiung-Makung 736 821 909 11.55 10.72
Tainan-Makung 699 779 867 11.44 11.30
Taichung-Makung 1044 ! 051 1091 0.70 3.81
Chiayi-Makung 721 804 897 11.51 11.57
Taipei-Kinmen 1544 1544 1629 0.00 5.51
Kaohsiung-Kinmen 1234 1376 1461 11.51 6.18
Taidung-Orchid 990 1104 1154 11.52 4.53
Taidung-Green Island 495 552 602 11,52 9.06
Kaohsiung-Orchid 1395 1555 1607 11.47 3,34
Kaohsiung-Chimeiyu 1170 1305 1358 11.54 4.06
Chimeiyu-Makung 580 647 701 11.55 8.35
Kaohsiung-Wangan 1195 1332 1385 11.46 3.98
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Table4.1 MajorFacilitiesofTaiwan_InternationalAirports
Runway
Passenger
Terminal
Facilities CKS International
Airport
Kaohsiung
International Airport
Number 2 1
Main Runway 3660 x 60 3150 x 60
Length x Width (m)
3350 x 60
Number 1 1
Aided Runway
Length x Width (m) 2752 x 45 3050 x 45
Total Floor Area (m 2)
Stands
163,900
B747 x 10
Wide Body x12
In-contact
68,200
B747 x 4
Wide Body x 8
Remote B747 x 8
Bus 55 30
Parking Slots Car 2,098 1,140
Taxi 150 238
Total Floor Area( m2) 94,180 50,900
Cargo B747 x 4 B747 x 4
Stands
Terminal Wide Body x8
Truck I 15 36
Car
Parking Slots
520 215
Source: lOT, MOTC, 1998.
Table 4.2 Airport Traffic Data (1997)
Aircraft Movements Passengers Cargo (.tons)Airport
Domestic International Domestic International Domestic International
107,822 14,163,294
27,908 2,905,388
CKS 1,096 21,560 420 1,099,745
Kaohsiung 114,711 9,223,316 21,057 104,184
Taipei 187,998 15,394,038 39,596 -
Hualien 28,300 1,855,722 3,521 -
Taidung 39,870 1,398,643 3,691 -
Makung 51,044 2,124,330 13,692 -
Taichung 50,402 1,878,247 4,837
Tainan 26,790 2,496,419 4,397
Chiayi 22,771 1,043,695 2,134
Chimeiyu 5,583 43,861 424
Wangan 1,217 8,714 113
Orchid 5,433 66,719 326
Green Island 13,684 162,394 392
Kinmen 19,320 1,397,638 7,709
Matzu 7,141 103,008 821
Pingdung 4,755 181,255 - 521
Total 580,115 135,730 37,399,559 17,068,682 103,651 1,203,929
Source: CAA, MOTC, 1998.
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Year
Table 4.3 Changes in Aircraft Movements
CKS International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport
Movements Percentage Movements Percentage
Total
Movements
! 990 56,537 93% 4,154 7% 60,691
1991 62,080 91% 6,101 9% 68,181
1992 68,982 89% 8,560 11% 77,542
1993 74,451 85% 13,479 15% 87,930
1994 83,409 83% 16,974 17% 100,383
1995 92,195 82% 19,599 18% 111,794
1996 101,371 82% 22,560 18% 123,931
1997 108,918 80% 26,812 20% 135,730
Annual Ave.
Growth Rate
9.82% 30.53% 12.19%
Year
Table 4.4 Changes in International Passenger Traffic
CKS International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport
Passengers Percentage Passengers Percentage
Total
Passengers
1990 8,929,218 92% 750,701 8% 9,679,919
1991 9,356,836 90% 1,007,462 10% 10,364,298
1992 10,827,878 89% 1,289,395 11% 12,117,273
1993 1I, 153,612 87% 1,733,041 13% 12,886,653
1994 11,618,574 85% 2,054,325 15% 13,672,899
1995 12,585,798 84% 2,401,781 16% 14,987,579
1996 13,585,851 84% 2,570,947 16% 16,156,798
1997 14,184,854 83% 2,905,388 ! 7% 17,090,242
Annual Ave.
6.84% 21.33% 8.46%
Growth Rate
Table 4.5 Changes in International Air Cargo Traffic
Year CKS International Airport Kaohsiung International Airport Total
Tons Percentage Tons Percentage Tonnage
1990 594,642.8 95% 30,788 5% 625,430.5
1991 634,389.9 95% 35,737 5% 670,127.0
1992 723,490.1 95% 39,818 5% 763,307.8
1993 742,729.4 94% 50,534 6% 793,263.5
1994 746,781.6 92% 62,672 8% 809,453.4
1995 941,411.7 92o/o 78,385 8% 1,019,796.6
1996 986,640.4 92O/o 91,402 8% 1,078,042.3
1997 1,100,165.3 91% 103,763 9% 1,203,928.7
Annual Ave.
9.19% 18.95% 9.81%
Growth Rate
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Table4.6 DomesticAirPassengerTrafficbyAirport(Thousands)
Airport 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Ave
Growth
Rate
Taipei 1,839 2,347 2,794 3,326 3,430 4,191 5,929 7,438 9,609 11,802
Taichung 55 79 98 148 137 179 350 525 800 i,181
Chiayi 67 71 70 67 62 93 164 288 546 755
Tainan 260 294 313 403 450 644 884 1,198 1,565 1,830
Kaoshiung 1,385 1,779 2,057 2,388 2,445 3,039 3,903 4,726 5,675 6,989
Pingtung 16 224
Hualien 528 598 672 709 697 703 805 878 1,095 1,343
Taidung 290 399 364 456 472 492 613 846 885 1,102
Orchid 48 93 76 79 78
Green 48 108 125 148 162
Island
Makung 877 1,114 1,246 1,413 1,366 1,534 1,670 1,833 1,781 1,971
Chimeiyu 24 48 56 50 23
Wanan 10 18 18 14 17
Matzu 62 89
Kinmen 196 290 626 914 1,204
15,204 23.6%
1,596 40.0%
1,002 31.6%
2,356 24.7%
8,055 19.3%
246 292.1%
1,595 11.7%
1,173 15.0%
63 5.6%
131 22.2%
2,061 8.9%
45 13.4%
3 -22.4%
90 20.5%
1,279 45.5%
Total 5,300 6,680 7,610 8,910 9,060 11,200 14,880 18,640 23,240 28,770 34,896 20.7%
Source: Transport Data Analysis, lOT, MOTC, 1987-1997.
Table 4.7 Air Traffic Forecast for the Taiwan Area
Domestic Flights International Flights
Year
Passengers Growth Rate Passengers Growth Rate
(millions) (millions)
Total
Passengers Growth Rate
(millions)
1985 5.85 4.80 10.65
1990 9.04 9.1% 10.43 16.8% 19.47 12.8%
1995 28.74 26.0% 15.82 8.7% 44.56 18.0%
2000 52.20 12.7% 26.53 10.9% 78.74 12.1%
2010 104.13 7.1% 52.76 7.1% 156.89 7.1%
Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast 1980-2010", IATA, January 1997.
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Rank of
Asian
Airports
Table 6.1
ACI Airport
Ranking
Passenger Traffic at Major Asian Airports (1996)
Airport Total International Domestic
1 9 Seoul Kimpo 34,706,158 14,705,015 19,736,711
2 17 Kai Tak 30,212,327 29,542,500
3 24 Narita 25,408,779 22,665,870 794,729
4 26 Bangkok 24,992,738 16,380,434 6,530,554
5 27 Chang-I 24,514,248 23,129,802
6 42 Kansai 18,849,164 10,095,871 8,222,544
7 44 Beijing 16,383,225 3,909,970 12,473,255
8 50 CKS 15,613,624 13,585,851
9 Shanghai 12,344,826 * *
10 71 Manila 11,938,454 7,297,108 4,641,346
Source: Airport International July/August 1997.
Note: Total passengers includes arriving, departing and transit.
* The original data for Shanghai Airport was collected with total passengers and cannot be
separated into international and domestic passengers.
Rank. of Asian
Airports
Table 6.2 Air Cargo at Major Asian Airports (1996)
ACI Airport Airport Cargo (tons)
Ranking
1 5 Narita 1,625,840
2 6 Kai Tak 1,590,772
3 9 Seoul Kimpo 1,361,510
4 12 Chang-I 1,190,457
5 18 CKS 796,155
6 22 Bangkok 787,539
7 - Kansai 592,557
8 - Manila 393,344
9 Beijing 390,098
10 Shanghai 304,977
Note: - means the airport was not shown in the statistics of ACI.
Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast 1980-2010", IATA, January 1997.
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Table6.3 Asia-PacificRegionMajorCountriesAirTransportForecast(Millions)
Count_
1985-1995 2010
Average Annual Domestic International
Rates of Growth Passengers Passengers
Total
1995-2010
Average Annual
Rates of Growth
China 22.9% 229.1 62.3 291.4 10.9%
Japan 7.0% 134.0 91.6 225.6 4.4%
Taiwan 15.4% 104. I 52.8 156.9 8.8%
Korea 16.7% 54.0 54.9 108.9 7.8%
Australia 6.9% 61.4 32.5 93.9 6.5%
Thailand 12.6% 22.3 49.1 7 ! .4 8.1%
Hong Kong I 1.3% 0.0 70.8 70.8 6.5%
India 4.7% 38.3 22.1 60.4 7.2%
Singapore 9.6% 0.0 56.1 56.1 6.6%
Indonesia 12.0% 22.6 28.8 51.4 8.2%
Malaysia 10.1% 13.0 33.5 46.5 6.7%
Philippines 6.0% 17.4 18.3 35.7 7.9%
Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast 1980-2010", IATA, January 1997.
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Figure 1-1 Changes in Taiwan _ Population from 1983 to 1997
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Figure 1-2 Changes in Taiwan _ GDP from 1983 to 1997
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Figure 2-1 The Location of Airports and Airline Routes in the Taiwan Area
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Figure 3,1 Changes in Domestic Air Transport Passenger Demand
Passengers (millions) [m Passengers (million) -e-Growth Rate_ Growth Rate
20, 60%
18 [ 50%
I
16 I-
i 40%
"I 3O%
12
20%
10 L
' 10%
el-
6 L- 0%
i
4 I- -10%
I
2 _ -20%
I
0 i -30%
Year
Figure 3.2 Changes in Demand for and Supply of Domestic Passenger Air Transport
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Figure 6-1 Top Ten Asia-Pacific Domestic City-Pairs in 1996
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Cebu-Manila
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Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast 1980-2010", IATA, January 1997.
Figure 6-2 Past and Future Composition of Asia-Pacific Region Traffic to and from Taiwan
Percentage
80%'__'___
70%-_" r
30%_
Asia-Pacific Region Air Traffic to and from Taiwan
Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast 1980-2010", [ATA, January 1997.
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Figure 6-3 International Air Traffic to and from Taiwan
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Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast 1980-2010", IATA, January 1997.
Figure 6-4 Top Ten Asia-Pacific Countries in terms of Domestic Passengers in 1985, 1995 and 2010
Source: "Asia-Pacific Air Transport Forecast ]980-2010", ]ATA, January 1997.
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Abstract
Keywords
After discussing some background information of the aviation sector, a
strategic approach for the airport management is shown, which can be
embedded in the decision making process. Two modelling issues are
highlighted. The one concerns the non-linearity of consumer behaviour which
touches a major principle in modelling including the airport choice and the
other issue deals with competition in the aviation sector focusing on the
possibility of measuring it so that a quantification is possible.
The applied system approach ensures that effects based on the synergy of air
networks, the competition among air alternatives and between air and the land
based modes as well as the co-operation of modes are taken into account in the
simulation process. Therefor a consistent simulation instrument is available to
forecast effects of supply changes on travel demand.
The selected strategic analyses shown in the last section are based on
elasticities subject to the strategic simulation instrument VIA to forecast
effects of supply changes on travel demand. The non-linear approach uses
point as well as cross elasticities of the demand side with respect to supply
characteristics.
Air transport, strategic simulation, startegic supply changes, airport choice,
travel demand, discrete choice, consumer behaviour, non-linearity, asymmetry,
threshold, Box-Cox Logit, multimodality, competition of modes, intermo-
dality, co-operation of modes, intramodality, competition of airports or air
services, elasticity of demand, trip purposes, market shares, catchment-area,
location of airports, passenger charges, aircraft fees, airport pricing strategy,
access / egress choice, system approach, management strategies.
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1. BACKGROUND
The ongoing world wide process of liberalisation and deregulation is
accompanied by increasing privatisation in the air industry. Obviously this
new situation has fundamental impacts and needs consideration in strategic
planning. Hence, the necessity is given to know more about existing
competition and - in prospective context - possibilities to assess it so that
different market situations can be evaluated and incorporated into
management strategies.
While airlines faced the rules of competition already for some time the
airports were mostly excluded due to a number of reasons? Airlines react to
the new competitive situation with large productivity optimisation programs
to cut down costs and the lease of aircrafts to enlarge the short-term financial
flexibility. In parallel, they defend their markets by using marketing
strategies like frequent flyer programs, lounge membership schemes or in
future by the planned project 'virtual airline' as well as by establishing
international alliances (code sharing, cross-share holding, franchlsing).
The concentration of the supply side by the alliances reduces the
competition so that e.g. in Europe almost two thirds of the existing O-D's are
monopoly services, one quarter of the routes is served by two carriers (which
often belong to the same alliance) and only on the remaining routes there are
three and more competitors. In the last case - which covers a third of the
total passenger volume transported - the consumers benefited from a
significant drop in price in the past.
Further competition could be expected due to further liberalisation, new
entrants offering low-cost services, established 'national' airlines extending
their businesses to other European areas, increasing capacity constraints and
improved high speed services.
The situation at most airports is different because they are still owned by
the public and with some exceptions (hubs ,and privatised airports) the
necessity for competitive behaviour was not given. While the privatisation
process is going on, subsidies are cut down and productivity has to be
increased, secondary airports withdraw passengers from the major ones,
capacity constraints exist at a lot of airports and huge investments are
requested to solve existing problems. Furthermore airline alliances redirect
passenger flows to secondary hubs due to the higher prices and / or capacity
constraints at major hubs as well as based on the optimisation of the air
These includes restrictive bilateral air agreements, the lack of deregulation and privatisation,
the procedures to define aircraft fees and passenger charges, the available capacity
resources and the missing or small sensitivity of the public to environmental effects, etc.
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alliance supply in total. In addition various airports offer special services on
the non-aviation side.
The latter could be interpreted as airports are starting to act like private
companies in a competitive market. They have to fight for customers,
increase their attractivity for passengers as well as for airlines and cope with
competition at the airport itself (e.g. ground handling). Marketing and
market analysis becomes more important to be able to react fast and
precisely to market changes and to develop strategies for mid- and long-term
investments. If the management fails (e.g. with the pricing strategy or the
infrastructure investments) well established airports of today will be
downgraded by the consumers and airlines to second or third league airports
of tomorrow.
The European air market is facing additional policy interventions in form
of new deregulations and regulations. There is international pressure to
follow an open sky policy _ and to cut down subsidies rigorously to allow fair
competition. Further on politicians are approached by the public to
internalise external costs due to increasing environmental sensitivity.
Fees or taxes on aircraft emissions and demand-based aircraft fees as
well as passenger charges or quotas for air movements and noise are applied
or taken into consideration. Additional interventions are expected to
harmonise the market conditions with respect to airport cost structures, local
landing fees and passenger charges.
Demand and supply should be the only forces in a free market but the
existing access to the market conditions needs some additional rules to
transform e.g. the restrictive grandfather rights on the slot allocation side
into an open system where slots can be traded. The necessity to install such
rules is given in the light of the capacity constraints faced by nearly any big
airport and the slot blocking politics specially of home carriers at hubs,
which prevent new competitors from entering the market.
New regulations are welcomed by privatised airports as opportunities to
maximise their revenues by optimising resource management. Therefore
peak pricing could be used to cope with capacity constraints - but one has to
ensure by price caps that airports do not withdraw monopoly rents
extensively and that new entrants will have a fair chance. So scarce
resources at congested airports handled at market price will lead to shifts to
other airports or land-based modes. In parallel, aircraft fee structures can be
2 Non-European carriers should have 'unrestricted' access to the European air market.
Naturally such harmonisation issues have to be in-line with other actions, for example the
assignment of a landing point to a specific airport in a bilateral agreement discriminates all
other airports which are not considered.
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used as instruments to meet quotas of noise and aircraft movements?
Airlines and airports have to show great flexibility in adjusting their
supply to the changing demand and regulatory framework in order to survive
in the evolving market. Therefore the decisions for long- and mid-term
strategies become more and more difficult and decisive as they might
comprise costly investments in air-related infrastructure (including high
speed railway stations at airports), market oriented pricing to handle sparse
resources or to develop new markets, new services in the non-aviation sector
or the extension of hub & spoke versus point-to-point air schedules.
The resulting complexity in decision-making processes in the air industry
requires enhanced planning instruments to apply appropriate means from the
administrative side and to adjust supply structures that will enable the
carriers and airports to stand the increasing competition. The following
sections will direct towards a strategic planning instrument which helps to
face the complex problems stated, so that the managers can enrich their
knowledge by analyses and scenarios to reduce the entrepreneurial risk in
decision making. Enhanced econometric models which analyse and explain
possible consumer reactions on adjusted supply figures offer the opportunity
to study the interdependencies in the market structures, to anticipate future
changes and to evaluate the resulting effects on both - the microeconomic
and the macroeconomic level.
Being the public transport mode with the highest increase in demand
during the last years an appropriate instrument for analysing air services
impacts is therefore highly recommended. Unfortunately air traffic is a fairly
complicated mode to handle - from a modellers point of view.
The unimodal approaches to assess changing market situations are more
or less sophisticated extrapolations of the past and it turned out that they are
poor predictors. Forecast processes that take additionally into account other
alternatives which are accessible from a consumer's point of view will
predict in a better way. Hence, multimodal approaches which incorporate
inter- and intramodal as well as synergetic network effects are per se more
sufficient to cope with real life complexity.
Although the approach which will be shown is much richer, within this
paper it is not possible to deal with all possibilities and all problems. There-
fore the obvious ones like long term forecasting based on different socio-
economic, infrastructure and transport
the focus is on the consumer side
sensitivity where the business goes to.
section will indicate that the scope
wider.
policy scenarios will stand aside. Here
which at least decide due to their
Some of the results sho_vn in the final
of the underlying studies was much
Modified aircraft fees could force airlines also to increase their load factors above the
miracle barrier of 70 per cent.
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2. SYSTEM APPROACH
A consequent development of this scope leads to a systemic view of
transportation. It is therefore necessary to embed air transport forecasting in
a in framework of relevant relationships that include and take into account
the whole transport market as well as demographic, economic, political,
spatial and technical components. Figure 1 gives an idea of the considered
determinants.
i :i-Frnn/_ _v ._;:.""!I___.. ..., l InfraStriJd:0T'ei_
.... 7 "j,_ ._ "_. i ? .... ;." L._ :_.;._"----?.
Fig. 1. System Approach
A modelling process based on these interrelationships explains the
transport market by multimodal and multisectoral determinants. This
approach ensures the consistency of the whole model system in every step of
the simulation process. Considering detailed exogenous impact factors as
population, economic and political circumstances, technical development
and spatial structures the models always process balanced figures of all
endogenous measures. Hence, no transport activity appears Or disappears
unexplained within the system. Changes in the system's state are substitutive
or complementary and synergetic effects, as well as competition, lead to new
situations concerning diversion, accessibility or attractiveness. These effects
can be analysed with respect to modes (e.g. road, rail, sea, air) and/or trip
purposes (e.g. business, vacation, private).
In the light of the complex problems stated above it is obvious that the
airport choice model has to be embedded in some sort of model explaining
total trip making by all modes and a sort of model explaining the choice of
mode for a trip. It is convenient to postulate, for the sake of discussion, the
existence of an aggregate generation-distribution model: this corresponds to
frequent practice and the points that should be made about an ideal
specification also hold when disaggregate generation-distribution
specifications are used. In addition the existence of an disaggregate mode
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choice model based on a logistic function, say a logit-model, has to be
assumed so that the consumer elasticities with respect to the alternative
modes can be identified. Some additional models are needed to face the
problems of access/egress choice to the airports and slot choice to explain the
consumers selection of departure time. Last but not least, assignment
procedures are required to compute impedances which reflect the
attractiveness of each alternative based on the infrastructure networks of all
modes. Figure 2 shows the stages of air transport forecasts and the context of
the different models.
u.
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Scenario
Socioeconomic data
:-.._:__I
Fig. 2. Steps of air transport forecast
To encounter the effects from one decision level to the other, say from
mode choice to generation-distribution or from airport choice to mode
choice and fi.u-ther on to generation-distribution, one links the modelling
steps by the quasi-direct format using the representative utility function of
the lower level models in the upper ones as an additional explanatory
variable, which we call modal utility index U.
In addition at the level of the discrete choice models the explanatory
impedance variables used in the model specifications are computed
considering the probabilities of the lower level model as weights. The idea of
linking the models in the forecasting system is shown in Figure 3.
Applying this system approach, a consistent simulation instrument can be
constructed which reflects the impacts of supply changes through all
instances at any level. The effects of supply changes at an airport (e.g. a new
O-D service, increasing aircraft fees, low cost tariffs) can be analysed in
detail. No matter whether these are intramodal impacts, say the competition
of airports about market shares as well as the competition of different levels
of seeice (non-stop versus via connections), or multimodal impacts, say the
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substitution of air traffic by inter city high-speed trains or car but also the
vice versa case is possible due to the offers of low cost carriers, or
intermodal impacts, say the co-operation of air and rail services on the
access/egress side to/from the airport (like a lot of tourist companies already
include in their price offers in form of rail & fly tickets). Therefore the
interdependency of airport choice and travel demand can be analysed out of
different point of views.
Generation/Distribution
i ....Modal split u_i_ Ind==
_lndex, ' '
Airport choice rmp=d=na=
.1u . ..
I .
utilityIndex, ""
E Access/egress choice imped=_.__,,t
utilityindex,
_) Slot choice Imped=nces ;
Fig. 3. Linking the models in the forecasting system
Instead of extending this paper by the theory of all modelling steps used
in the system approach it is referred to various publications. A detailed
theoretical background of the modelling steps is given by the following
literature.
For the generation-distribution modelling it is referred to Gaudry-
Mandel-Rothengatter 1994a, 1994b, Sen-Smith 1995 and Last 1997 and for
the mode choice modelling see the publications of Mandel 1992, Mandel-
Gaudry-Rothengatter 1991-1994-1997 and Mandel et al. 1997. The more
general focus of discrete choice modelling you'll find in Domencich-
McFadden 1975, Manski-McFadden 1981 and Ben-Akiva-Lerman 1985.
The quasi-direct format is explained by Tran-Gaudry 1994. Concerning the
assignment procedures there is a lot of literature therefore it is referred to a
more general operations research summary by Neumann 1974 and a more
transport oriented publication by Gallo-Pallottino-Florian 1984. For details
of the assignment procedure used in the system approach see Last-Mandel
1997. As introduction an overview conceming all steps is given by Ortuzar-
Willumsen 1990. Specific information conceming air transport is found in
Doganis 1991-1992 and in several publications of the air industry and their
associations like ICAO, IATA, CAC and ECAC or national ones like ADV
in Germany.
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After having shed a light on the global approach we are going into some
modelling details which are of relevance for a sound and detailed analysis of
interdependencies in the air transport market as shown e. g. in the examples
of the final section.
Therefore we'll highlight the modelling aspects concerning two issues.
1. Non-linearity: to enable the models to capture existing thresholds where
consumers strongly react due to changes at the supply side caused by e.g.
infrastructure investments, pricing strategies or service changes.
2. Notions of competition: to explain the interdependencies of different
modelling steps as well as ways to measure it so that the consumers'
reaction on supply changes can be quantified and finally evaluated.
For a detailed discussion we'll refer to the papers (Mandel 1999) 'The
Interdependency of Airport Choice and Travel Demand' and 'Measuring
Competition in Air Transport'. In the following we'll withdraw parts of the
text.
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3. NON-LINEARITY AND THE CONSUMER'S CHOICE
On most flight journeys consumer have the opportunity to start their trip
from more than just one single airport. Just in Germany there are 16
international airports and several regional airports so that often a situation
appears where the consumer can choose out of a whole bunch of alternatives
all serving his needs in nearly the same way. It could happen that more than
four airports offer the same destination and in addition at each airport non-
stop as well as via services are available. After the consumer evaluated the
different opportunities, he selects only one out of the available set of
alternatives. This is a classical discrete choice problem. For details see the
suggested literature about mode choice and discrete choice modelling in
section 2.
Here the focus is on the differences between the chosen and the standard
approach and the resulting advantages. To understand the issues in an easy
way we will also refer to examples taken from the field of mode choice.
3.1 Properties of the linear standard model
The "classical" linear Logit model specification normally assumes
(Gaudry 1992):
(i) linearity in variables;
(ii) the exclusion of characteristics of other alternatives j e Cn from the
representative utility of the i-th one (i _ C_, i _:j);
(iii) equal "abstract" or "generic" coefficients for the network charac-
teristics, a constraint that is not necessary but is frequently imposed.
These assumptions lead to unrealistic properties. Because of (ii), the
standard model implies:
a) equal cross elasticities of demand: this means that setting up a bicycle
path between two cities will draw the same percentage of travellers from
the plane, car and train or in the sense of airport choice the same
percentage of travellers will be drawn from all considered air services.
Furthermore (iii) implies identical values of time across the alternatives:
this means that representative train and plane users (mode choice) or
non-stop and via flight passengers (airport choice) value time
identically;
b) the exclusion of complementarity among alternatives;
c) that only differences in the level of characteristics matter, or that the
function is not homogenous of degree 0: in consequence doubling all
fares and income will change the market shares.
Because of (i) the standard model further implies that:
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d) the effect of a given difference in transport conditions is independent of
the service level characteristics so that the response curve to changes in
service characteristics is symmetric with respect to its inflection point
(see figure 4). For instance, a 30 min rail travel time reduction has the
same impact on choice probabilities for the Hamburg-Hanover (180 kin)
origin-destination pair as for the Hamburg-Munich (823 kin) pair.
Similarly increasing the air tariffs by 50 DM (US$ 28) has the same
impact on choice probabilities for the Hamburg-Frankfurt (540 km)
origin-destination pair as for the Hamburg-Paris (1060 km) pair. Further
on adding an amount of 20 DM (US$ 11) to the price of travelling by
plane will have the same impact as adding 20 DM to the price of
travelling by train. The same holds if one directs this example to non-
stop and via-alternatives in the aviation sector.
Generally speaking, symmetry, with respect to the inflection point,
implies that potential asymmetry of behaviour, where consumers/travellers
suddenly start to react and then change their behaviour, can not be detected;
u
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Fig. 4. Linear Logit versus Box-Cox Logit
e) coefficients for the constants and for the variables common to all
alternatives are underidentified, which means that, for these variables,
only differences with respect to an arbitrarily chosen reference can be
identified.
We also note in passing that the logit form requires that
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f) the choice probabilities go to zero (one) when the representative utility
V_goes to -_ (+oo) so that (see figure 4) one cannot model thick tails due
to specification error, modeller ignorance, compulsive consumption or
captivity to alternatives. The latter case includes the situation of business
travellers which have to do a one day return trip and are therefore not
elastic to price.
3.2 The Box-Cox device
To bypass most of these constraints (generally speaking, only (c) and (f)
will remain), the Box-Cox transformation is used:
[(X_ -1)
X (_',,j.= _--7_- if A_ _ 0,
LlnX_, if 2_=0.
(1)
Hence, the choice model based on the logit function can be wfi'tten as:
K
exp (fl,X, + _ ./3kiX_.(a_))
k=l
= (2)P (i). ,
E exp (fljXj + E fl_ "X''_'_)_. )
j_C. k=l
where X,. = Xj = 1 are regression constants.
If A_- is equal to 1 (or zero), then the variable is entered in its linear (or
logarithmic) form. Since the transformation is continuous for all possible
values of the A-parameter, but defined only for a positive variable, it is
clearly understood that in above formulas some of the Xo-,'s cannot be
transformed: the constant, the dummies and the ordinary variables that
contain negative observations. Variables that cohtain positive and null values
can be transformed as long as a compensating dummy variable is created
(Gaudry et al. 1993).
3.3 Visual and economic significance
Figure 4 clearly shows the difference between the linearity and non-
linearity of a variable. The asymmetric curve (in respect to its infiexion
point) given by Box-Cox transformation (Box et al. 1964) of the strictly
positive variable Xt illustrates the error which will occur when a non-linear
Airport Choice & Competition - a Strategic Approach 15
variable is forced to be linear. For example, assume Xt denotes total travel
time: in the linear case, the value X, equal to 30 is associated to the
probability P equal to 0.25; in the non-linear case, the probability is higher if
2 < 1 and smaller if A > 1. Hence, if one forces a non-linear variable - or in
equality the utility function - to be linear, this will result in an over- or
underestimation of the probability related to this variable. In addition to
asymmetry of the response function (2 , 1), reaction thresholds can be
identified.
The Box-Cox transformation of the strictly positive variables of the linear
Logit model leads to the Box-Cox Logit model with an asymmetry of
response, as shown in figure 4, because the effect of a unit change in the
service will depend on the levels of the variables Xki for all values of 2kj not
equal 1. This can be seen by examining the partial derivatives of the
representative utility function Vj of thej-th mode. It is obvious that the effect
of additional service will be smaller at higher service levels than at lower
ones if 2kj is smaller than 1. These diminishing returns mean that given
absolute reductions in total travel time have more impact when total travel
times are low than high: a gain in travel time of 15 minutes means less on a
long trip than on a short one. The same effects appear in the case of an
increase of air tariffs. Conversely, increasing returns exist if 2_j.is larger than 1.
Clearly, if one is considering very small changes in the service levels of a
mode, the mathematical form used does not matter very much because one is
forecasting in the immediate neighbourhood of current sample values.
However, if one is considering significant changes in service levels, such as
increasing aircraft fees or decreasing air tariffs by a third or reducing train
travel time by one half with high-speed trains, then curvature is decisively.
3.4 Asymmetry
To illustrate the asymmetry of the response functions due to the inflexion
point of the curve and the threshold effect mentioned before, figure 4 shows
a general example of a response curve for an alternative with respect to the
variable travel time while all other conditions (characteristics and
alternatives) remain unchanged. On the x-axis the change in travel time is
displayed (t minutes decrease in travel time on the air service alternative)
and on the y-axis the change of the probability choosing this alternative is
given. Hence the interdependency of airport choice and travel demand is
obvious when the probability is multiplied with the total demand of the
origin-destination pair which will show you the demand for the alternative.
To describe asymmetry more formally one first has to define the
inflexion point of the curve. At this point the curvature changes its functional
shape from convex to concave and one can compute the value of the
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inflexion point (Pt., tn) by equating to zero the second derivative of the
alternative share in respect to the travel time. The response curve can be
called asymmetric with respect to its reflection point if equidistant reductions and
increments of travel time t. by M [that is,t; = t. - At and t; = t + At ] will give
different absolute values, namely zkP ÷= [Pt. - P;[ and A P'= _, - Pt; I" otherwise
the curve has to be called symmetric. More formally, one can define
asymmetry, as in Laferrirre and Gaudry (1993) in terms of the partial
correlation _ of P. and (I-P;): this yields an indicator that is necessarily
between 0 and 1.
Threshold. A threshold effect occurs when the travel time reaches a
critical value oft beyond which any further reduction of t to t = t + At provokes a
more substantial growth of the mode share Pt than an equidistant increment
of t to t÷= t - A t, so that the absolute difference of the mode shares ]Pt - P-] is
higher than ] Pt - P. [.
The word threshold implicitly involves an individual evaluation of the
perception of change; hence it is up to decision maker to define his threshold
by exploring the percentage of alternative share increment which he will
consider as a threshold i. e. which will satisfy his opinion about a threshold.
More formally a critical value r/has to be defined so that the absolute
difference of [Pt - P-[ = (l+r/)[Pt - P.[ • Alternatively, z_t_ = (1+;7) APt.and
hence ;7 = (,_,_ / z_,. 3 - 1. From a visual point of view, one would intuitively
expect to find the thresholds to be in the range given by the grey zone in
figure 4, where a reduction of one unit would increase the probability of
choosing the alternative by an additional 20% (r/ = 0.3), so th_A would
be equal to 6 timesP_t
It is obvious that the given results in figure 4 are based on a ceteris
paribus assumption: consequently a variation of other mode specific
characteristics like frequency and travel cost would imply a change of the
location of the response curve so that the threshold would have to be
relocated.
It has to be mentioned that in general by interpreting the results shown in
figure 4 one has to take into account that the travel time represents the time
of a door to door trip. Therefore a change of the access/egress services can
have an important impact on the choice of an alternative.
3.5 Other considerations
The purpose of the latter example is to visualise the asymmetry of the
response functions, the existence of the thresholds and the impact of travel
distance on consumer behaviour: it is clear that for a detaiied analysis of an
investment or planned action it would of course be necessary to consider in
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addition the impact of travel cost, frequency, access/egress characteristics,
etc.
The examination shown in figure 4 also can be done in reverse direction
where one first defines the probability of choosing the mode and then
computes the necessary characteristics which satisfy this condition. Different
kinds of services, which are related to different actions can be represented by
changes in the underlying characteristics. Implicitly there is the possibility to
verify the optimal investment by relating it to the alternative specific
characteristics that maximise revenue.
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4. COMPETITION CONCERNING AIR TRANSPORT
Before we go into some formal details we first have to state which forms of
competition appear and how they can be explained.' For this purpose it is
necessary to view the air market from the outside to identify all structural
components of competition. The following different types of competition in
the air market can be distinguished:
- competition on a single route,
- competition between networks,
- competition for infrastructure and
- competition between access/egress points.
The classical notion of competition is the rivalry between two carriers on
a certain route. This kind is usually expressed in market shares kept by the
competitors. The second one is measured in more aggregated market shares
and means the rivalry between two and more airlines as well as those
between airline alliances.
Competition for infrastructure comprises e.g. the fight for slots or
ground-handling capacities. In this case limited resources on airports _are the
reason for the conflict between the airlines. An often misinterpreted form of
competition is that between airports, mostly owing to a special view of the
air sector.
Out of a general transport point of view the supply side should be a result
of the offered O-D services which include the airports and land-based
access/egress modes while the demand side is given by the travellers with all
their needs and priorities for a trip.
An airports' attractiveness in a condensed air market depends strongly on
the capacities, the pricing structure, the land-sided accessibility and the non-
aviation supply. Those factors and the carrier-related supply based on them,
all together will finally attract customers, i.e. travellers and also shoppers.
Hence, besides infrastructural matters the potential of customers is the major
driving force for airlines to choose an airport. .
The competition of airports on the cost side (passenger charges, landing
fees, ground service) is already ongoing especially if one considers the non-
harmonised airport costs in context of the air alliance network optimisation.
Airports with 'bad' price structures, i.e. high costs for airlines (passed to the
travellers through the fares), are already facing the problem that clients -
' Naturally modellers prefer to explain the interdependencies instead of just describing
observed situations because their aim is to understand the underlying structure of a system.
Due to the fact that at least two airports are required for air routes, the constraints must not
necessarily exist on both airports because slots on unconstrained airports must fit to their
counterparts on the constrained ones.
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travellers and airlines - look for alternatives. Therefore airlines try to
combine their network synergies at 'better' airports.
While hubs are already working at this problem other airports still
hesitate and focus on O-D market services. That is the reason why they
estimate the influence of varied fees and charges on carrier decisions as
relatively small in contrary to routing optimisation. But airlines want to
satisfy the consumers needs as profitable as possible and consumers' try to
obtain their optimum from the supply offered.
Neglecting such obvious dependencies and standing at the side, waiting
what airlines and travellers do, is certainly an unconventional strategy which
might be applicable if the airport is in a monopolistic situation e.g. due to
bilateral agreements but will not suit those airport managers that view
travellers as their clients.
They will agree to the idea that persons intending to travel from an origin
to a certain destination have to be convinced to choose a route via their
airport. But this route competes with those through other airports and routes
that use only ground-based transport modes like (high speed) trains or
private cars. Hence, airports are in a very large competition that should be
considered as completely as possible in the decision-making processes.
Taking into account only the air transport system, as airlines often do, is
not sufficient, when one aims at the traveller as the final driving force. But
more crucial is the scope of airports when analysing the market. Neglecting
neighbouring airports and also those further away as competitors falsifies
any serious evaluation and in consequence any planning.
The planning and analysis instrument must therefore cover all main
modes - road, rail and air for the multi-modal competition. Further, the
corresponding access/egress systems have to be considered for inter-
modality beside detailed representations of the air transport system itself to
assess the intra-modal rivalry between airports and/or carriers.
Well-developed planning instruments based on a system approach
simulates the complete supply side a travelling individuaP is confronted with
and from which it has to choose its path from the origin to a desired
destination. Interpreting the different paths as alte/-natives in a choice
process, competition could be measured in terms of the various probabilities
to select one of the possible paths.
It is important to note that the traveller has to take a discrete decision
about the alternative to be used because he can only use one alternative at
each time. The choice among the set of available alternatives depends on
subjective preferences and/or on the alternatives' characteristics. Neglecting
individual preferences for the moment, the traveller compares the
6 We are focussing here on individuals who have just decided for a trip and do not cover those
which are still in the process of decision whether to travel at all.
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alternatives on the basis of their measurable characteristics like e.g. travel
cost, travel time, comfort and security.
The preferences come into the decision process when the travelling
person weights the 'objective' characteristics for each alternative due to its
personal rating. In economics the resulting measure is referred as 'utility',
i.e. the satisfaction one receives from choosing one alternative. It is obvious
that consumers evaluation varies between different individuals which for
example can be segmented according to their socio-economic situation
(income, age, gender) or their trip purpose (business, vacation, visiting
friends and relatives). More formally one can speak here of the consumer's
'elasticity' in respect to any alternative's characteristic.
The elasticity r/just measures the ratio of the percentage variation of a
dependent variable Y due to the percentage change of an independent
variable xk (k • {1 ..... KJ) given all other independent variables fixed at their
observed value. As dependent variable one can use e.g. the total flow or
market share - T,- or p_ - and assess the impact of passenger fare as an
independent variable, keeping all other independent variables like travel
time, frequency, service attributes, etc. unchanged.
The more general form for any elasticity is for the point measure is:
OY x k (3);70",xk) = --
Ox k Y
As we want to focus on individual aspects of consumer behaviour we
choose a disaggregate probability approach P(i). with underlying Logit
function (see section 3). Now the direct elasticity r/of the probability of a
consumer n choosing alternative i with respect to a change in the
characteristic xki, is given by:
) - ar'(i)n xa. (4)
OXkin P(i) n
In addition it is interesting to know how the changes of a characteristic
xkj,, effects the probability P(i)n. Therefore the cross elasticity of the selected
probability alternative i with respect to a variable of alternative j can be
computed. But in addition we want to bypass some problems caused by the
properties of the classical standard Logit approach and all the interpretative
problems such as equal cross elasticity's (see section 3). Equal cross
elasticity's of demand imply identical 'values of time' across all alternatives:
this means e.g. that non-stop and via flight passengers value time identically.
Therefore a non-linear transformation to strictly positive variables is applied
like stated in section 3 (see also Box-Cox (1964)).
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For the interpretation of elasticities one should be aware that the values
given are computed on the basis of a 1% change of the variable Xk. As the
formulas (4) and (5) show, the result is a share value and therefore the
interpretation always has to be put in context to the demand an alternative
attracts. If the elasticity is small but the attracted demand of that alternative
is high the demand effects could be bigger than in the reverse case. More
formally the own elasticity is:
(5)
- competition
- competition
- competition
- competition
- competition
where the elasticity increases with k and falls with the level of P(i).
As we noted in the beginning of this section there are various areas of
competition which have to be considered in total to reflect consumer
behaviour. Therefore based on the shown principle idea of elasticity one can
construct an equation which considers these elements. Instead of using just
one discrete choice part in the formula we can add the interesting fields of
airport choice, access/egress choice, time slice choice and airline choice in
the following way (with simplified notion).
(r/of alternative) = (r/of total flow) + (r/of mode) + (r/of airport) +
(r/of access/egress) + (r] of time slice) +
(r/of airline) (6)
This expression allows us to compute the elasticity of demand of an
alternative with respect to any variable Xk considering the impacts on the
following types of competitive situations:
of destinations (substitution, complementarity)
between the modes (air, rail and road),
between co-operating modes (air-rail, air-road),
between air services at airports,
of access/egress modes to/from the airports,
- competition for time slices at airports and
- competition of airlines.
As already mentioned above this formula should be used for any market
segment, for example business travellers tend to have a lower elasticity
concerning travel expenses than for travel time and the reverse holds for
holidazmakers.
Obviously to calculate such complex elasticity structures which allow
detailed analyses at any point, a system approach is needed. It has to be
assured that the interdependency of different models is reflected properly
and therefor models have to be linked so that the results are consistent. One
way of doing this is using the 'quasi-direct format' where the different
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model steps are linked by the representative utility function of preceding
models in the subsequent ones as additional explanatory variable. This
approach can be enriched by considering the probabilities of the preceding
models as weights when the explanatory impedance variables in subsequent
models are computed (see Mandel (1999)).
As experts expect that the main focus of interest will be on airport
competition in the coming years, we will present some strategic analyses
examples in the last section based on a restricted sequence of elasticities as
shown in equation (7).
•(Ti, xk) = .(T, xk) + "(P(mode)n, xk) + "(P(airport)n, xk) +
.(P(access/egress)n, xk) (7)
Finally it has to be stated that most of the strategic analyses shown in the
following section are aggregated concerning destinations and trip purposes
and that the elasticity's used are documented in Mandel et al (1994), Gaudry
et al (1994 a) and Mandel (1999).
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5. SELECTED STRATEGIC ANALYSES
To show the effects based on the approach outlined in the sections above
we are going to present the reader results on the microeconomic level (of
individual consumers) as well as on the macroeconomic level because the
evaluation of strategic scenarios has often to be done out of a global point of
view. Therefore all simulations are computed regarding the specific
consumers' elasticity but most of the results are aggregated and displayed on
the macroeconomic level. Despite the macroeconomic orientation of
strategic decisions where we focus on situations of competition and the
related consumer behaviour which can be influenced by strategic means, we
will show the underlying elasticity or response curves to clarify the
theoretical background.
For the sake of clarity, the results displayed will be restricted to the
geographic shape of Germany although consumer behaviour beyond the
German border is affected and of course considered in the computations.
Within this section some possibilities of strategic scenarios are shown. All of
them are focusing on consumers' reaction to supply changes. Thus the
results are reflecting the elasticities of consumers.
The first analyses will deal with the market situation showing the
different point of views, from the airport and from the region / consumer.
The second part will refer to the interdependencies of air transport and the
total transport sector by analysing the problem of airport location and the
access/egress systems. The last part will present some simulation scenarios
and analyse basic consumer behaviour to ceteris paribus supply variations.
In all scenarios the results reflect the interaction of multi-, inter- and
intramodal effects due to the applied system approach stated in section 2.
Obviously other strategic scenarios can be simulated and evaluated in the
same way or even in a more detailed manner depending on the client's
needs.
5.1. Market situation
Here we distinguish between two different point of views. Focussing a
certain airport because we might be in charge of managing it or regarding the
supply situation from a regional scope because we are planning to make a
journey or we are e.g. responsible for the regional accessibility of major
transport infrastructure.
Both locations are interesting because at the one hand the airport gets a
feeling of his market position and on the other hand decision makers will
understand more about consumers choice due to the displayed competing
alternatives.
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5.1.1. Catchment area
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If the scope of analyses is those of an air transport service supplier, we
might be interested in the question where our customers come from. If we
ask e.g. for the market dominance of the Frankfurt Airport in Germany, we
obtain the catchment-areas by aggregation over regional and trip purpose
specific transport flows using the considered airport. The resulting figures
show the realised market shares for this airport.
Figure 5 reflects the sphere of influence according to the intercontinental
market. Frankfurt as Germany's major hub is offering a large number of
long-haul connections, so its market dominance covers a larger area in this
market section than in total. Other international airports as Hamburg,
Munich, Stuttgart or Dusseldorf are able to claim significant market shares
in the domestic and charter segment as well as towards selected destinations
abroad.
+
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Fig. 5. Market shares of Franl_urt 1991." intercontinental destinations
It is obvious that the hinterland of an airport cannot be described by one
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or several concentric circles. The shape rather depends on specific
characteristics of the airport and its competitors, like number of destinations
and flights offered or the accessibility by earthbound feeder systems. So the
catchment area (to all destinations and with more than 10% share) of
Frankfurt extends to 600 km in the north-south direction, while in east-west
direction only to 300 kin. Of course the catchment area exceeds the German
borders but the main access lines by the land based modes are in north-south
direction. For the sake of understanding all figures are restricted to the shape
of the German borders.
Referring to the last subsection, you will find in the scenario 'route
inauguration' the catchment area of Frankfurt for the North American
Market (figure 18). Comparing these catchment areas it is obvious that they
vary according to the market, as they are an endogenous result of the system
approach which takes into account the market specific competition of
airports / air services.
SZG
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Fig. 6. Passengers at Frankfurt by origin for intercontinental destinations
1991
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If we substitute the regional market shares in figure 5 with the absolute
number of passengers the spatial demand pattern for Frankfurt Airport gives
deeper insight in the market potentials (figure 6).
Beside the extended area of Frankfurt and the densely populated counties
south of it, where most passengers are originating, a remarkable number of
people are withdrawn from other metropolitan areas in Germany, although
there are international airports in those counties (e. g. Cologne, Hanover).
In the next figure we compare the different spheres of influence of four
German airports situated quite close together in the high populated region
"Ruhrgebiet". Market shares shown are a forecast for the year 2004 to/from
all destinations. The first two airports Cologne (CGN) and Dusseldorf (DUS)
offer a huge number of destinations served by non-stop-flights, not only
inside Europe, but also to some intercontinental airports. In addition almost
every holiday destination throughout Europe as well as some of them in
other continents are connected to Dusseldorf and Cologne by non-stop or at
least direct flights. The other two airports Munster/Osnabrueck (FMO) and
Paderborn/Lippstadt (PAD), offer only a few international destinations to
selected hubs like London and Amsterdam. They focus on domestic air
transport and charter flights for holiday trips to destinations around the
Mediterranean Sea.
The market shares in the counties situated quite close to the airports are a
result of the available destinations offered. In case of Dusseldorf and
Cologne shares reached go up to a maximum of 80%, while
Munster/Osnabrueck and Paderborn/Lippstadt can realise only values up to
60% resp. 40%.
In addition, Cologne and Dusseldorf can be reached by urban mass transit
as well as by high speed trains, while the level of service in public transport
to Munster/Osnabrueck and especially to Paderbom is quite poor. Together
with the lack of destinations compared with DUS and CGN, this influences
the total size of the catchment area of an airport. So both, Dusseldorf and
Cologne have market shares of almost 40% in the Paderbom area and still
almost 20% in the Munster area, while in comparison to that
Munster/Osnabrueck and Paderborn/Lippstadt do not gather any passengers
from the Cologne or the Dusseldorf county.
Finally, from this catchment areas, one can see, how hard different
airports compete. In case of the Dusseldorf airport, market shares decreases
by more than 30% between adjoining counties towards the airport of
Cologne. The same holds for Cologne's sphere of influence towards DUS,
while to other directions the specific market shares decrease more moderate.
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Fig. 7. Market shares at four different Airports; forecast 2004
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5.I.2. Regional differences
Coming back to the question why airport choice has to be considered a
small example (from 1991) -,viii demonstrate the choice problem a consumer
faces and which even become more difficult in a liberalised air market with
capacity constraints at different airports.
Comparing _vo German business travellers - e.g. one living in famous
Heidelberg (county) and the other one in the neighbouring county of
Karlsruhe - their decisions concerning the chosen airport for a trip will vary.
If we neglect possible individual preferences a set of external factors
influences their choice bet_veen possible starting points for a flight. If we
study trips destined for e.g. North America (see fig. 8) we will find that the
probability to travel via Frankfurt-Main Airport for both travellers is around
ninety per cent. This is not very surprising due to the fact that Frankfurt
dominates the German market as the largest hub and being the homebase of
the national carrier Lufthansa.
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Fig. 8. Airport choice, destination: North America, trip purpose: business
Much more interesting are e.g. the probabilities to choose alternative
airport for business trips crossing the Atlantic. As described in the sections
above the choice of airports is determined by a set of factors including
accessibility, offered frequencies and destinations. The figures above shows
how the combination of these factors influences the probability to choose
one of the remaining alternatives for such a trip. While the airport
characteristics are equal in both cases the accessibility by private and public
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transport differs. In general it was found that business travellers prefer
strongly the airport, which offers the highest flight frequencies and the
shortest duration of the whole trip, including access and egress.
When analysing vacation trips one observes a completely different choice
structure for the travellers in the example above. Due to lower restrictions in
time but higher price sensitivity holiday-makers prefer the most convenient
kiss&fly-access to possible airports offering non-stop or via flights to start
their journeys but they are also open to choose other alternatives as long as
the price differs significantly. Figure 9 depicts the choice probabilities for
holiday travellers from Karlsruhe and Heidelberg, respectively, to an Italian
destination.
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Fig. 9. Airport choice, destination." Rome (Italy), trip purpose: vacation
Major differences rise from other characteristics, namely the distance
be_veen the origin and the airport or the availability, of a non-stop flight
(even if only once a week) or the accessibility by public transport. So
travellers from Karlsruhe prefer strongly Stuttgart Airport. Frankfurt, which
is situated additional 50 km away, can only attract a market share of 13%,
although much more flights are offered than in Stuttgart. Due to a missing
non-stop-flight to Rome, only 8°,/0 remain for Strasbourg Airport, despite the
fact that is it is the nearest one to the area of Karlsruhe county.
When starting a holiday trip from Heidelberg, Frankfurt is certainly the
best choice for two third of all vacation travellers. But the second best
alternative via Stuttgart gets still 30%, while choosing other airports as e.g.
Strasbourg or Basel will be an exception.
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For the sake of understanding only this small example of Heidelberg and
Karlsruhe was presented. By the way, in the meantime (1997) in the area of
Karlsruhe a regional airport (Baden-Airport) opened and already offers
interesting services to tourist centres which unfortunately could not be taken
into account for these examples based on 1991. Of course such examples can
be extended when one moves to areas where a lot of services and airports are
competing, like in the Rhein-Ruhr, Berlin, Paris or London area, and one
analyses all possible destinations and alternatives. Some analyses follow
below
After we saw, how people from to different counties chose their airport,
we now depict on a single area and compare differences in airport choice
depending on the passengers destination. Figure 10 shows the market shares
for some destinations, different airports can realise in the Hanover area. Here
consumers airport choice is shown for the trip purpose "vacation". Analysis
can be done as well for other trip purposes, destinations or regions.
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Fig. 10. Airport choice from the county of Hanover to different destinations
1991
This airport choice differs, strictly depending on
- availability of non-stop-flights to the specific destination at the airports,
- distance (travel-time) between the county and the different airports,
- price for the flight to the specific destination from the airport and the
costs of access/egress,
- total travel-time (access/egress, check-in/out, flight-time)
- frequency offered on the specific routes offered at the airports.
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So as an example people from the area of Hanover chose Hanover
Airport for holiday-trips to the Balearian Islands with a probability of more
than 70%, due to access/egress plays a major role on such a short-haul flight.
In addition non-stop-flights to that destination are offered at Hanover Airport
with high frequency.
On the other hand passengers from that area travelling towards North
America prefer the Frankfurt Airport (48%), as the prices offered there to
that destination in average bet the costs from starting at Hanover, including
the railway fare when using the available high-speed trains Hanover -
Frankfurt. Additionally in this case the consumers more accept an exceed of
time for access/egress to Frankfurt, due to the longer total travel-time on
such long-haul trips.
The next possibility to analyse the regional / consumers' point of view
concerns the competing alternatives considering the different transfer
locations. This analyses is based on the principle idea shown in the
beginning but allows in addition to show hub-potentials, if an aggregation
over all regions to one destination is computed. Anyhow to understand the
principle one example is selected which shows the competitive situation
from Bielefeld to Hong Kong in 1994. By the way Bielefeld is located south-
west of Hanover where the EXPO 2000 will take place.
AMS
Fig. 11. Airport choice from Bielefeld to Hong Kong, fidl fare business class,
1994
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The influence of pricing strategies (which will be shown in the last
subsection of this paper) upon the hub potential is obvious if one compares
Amsterdam and Hong Kong, whereby the situation of the latter changed due
to the new airport and the much higher fees / charges.
From Bielefeld towards the destination of Hong Kong, full fare business
class (NTP)-passengers in majority prefer flights from the two nearest
available airports (Hanover-HAJ and Munster/Osnabrueck-FMO) although
no non-stop or direct flights are offered there. Another third of all those
passengers take the route via Frankfurt (FRA), as it is equipped with non-
stop flights to Hong Kong and Frankfurt can be reached in almost adequate
time by rail or road. Amsterdam (AMS) can still realise a market share of
more than 5%, although it is quite far away, but can be reached by rail in a
good way and offers non-stop-flights as well as Frankfurt. The rest of the
shown alternatives are only rarely chosen, as they neither offer non-stop
flights nor those airports are situated very close to Bielefeld.
Table 1. Airport choice from Bielefeld to Hong Kong, full fare business
class, 1994
Alternatives origin fi'om
FRA
destinationvia 1 via 2 .share for full
fare business
HKG
........ HKG 34.5
2 AMS ....... HKG 5.4
3 HAJ CPH --- HKG 3.3
4 BRE CPH .... HKG 0.6
5 FMO FRA .... HKG 28.5
6 HAM CPH .... HKG 0.9
7 DUS CPH .... HKG 1.2
8 HAJ ZRH .... HKG 3.0
9 DUS ZRH .... HKG 2.4
I 0 HAJ FRA .... 20.1
In table 1, we can focus on the stop-over connections and the hubs people
change plains. Here the consumer prefers flights via Frankfurt, offering good
connecting times, due to the high frequency of'the feeder flights from FMO
and HAJ to that hub. This two alternatives already form 48.6% of the 54.9%
passengers using FMO and HAJ at all. Other hubs chosen are Zurich (ZRH)
and Copenhagen (CPH). As we regard the full fare market sector, other big
European hubs like London or Paris do not play any role, due to their
geographic situation according to the Germany - Hong Kong routes. It has to
be remarked that no alternative with two stopovers has been selected and we
just display ten alternatives which summed up to 100% although there are
plenty more possibilities. It is also obvious that the same analyses for
economy class will show another preference of alternatives, e.g. share
distribution.
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5.2. Interdependencies
This subsection will show the interdependencies of air transport with the
total transport sector. It will be obviously that decision makers have to
consider the overall framework to know all influencing factors to minimise
the risk in strategic planning. Based on an existing case study, choosing a
location for an airport, we analyse the total passenger demand, modal spilt
and access/egress effects. Finally two examples will analyse the public
access/egress mode.
5.2.1. Location of an airport
Mode choice, airport choice and access/egress choice as a part of a traffic
forecast can help to come to a decision where to place a new airport best.
The comparison of five locations for a new airport near Berlin on several
points of view will be shown in the following figures.
A set of locations has been evaluated with respect to different measures.
All considered alternatives are located in the south respectively south-west
of the German capital. The corresponding scenarios cover beneath the single
airports also two airport systems that are combinations of Tegel and
Schoenefeld as well as Jueterbog-W. and Schoenefeld. The figure 12 depicts
the five different locations considered.
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Fig. 12. Comparing locations for an international airport for Berlin
Various indicators could be assessed to evaluate the relevance of certain
airport locations. Regarding to economic aspects decision makers are forced
to compare the alternatives based on the number of passengers that are going
to choose the airport when doing a journey.
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As travellers are making their choice not only between different airports
but also are able to take a land-based transport mode the resulting demand
figures could not be evaluated in the unimodal context of the air service
system. Nevertheless the total passenger figures are essential indicators for
economic evaluation.
Figure 13 shows the number of passengers forecasted for the year 2010 in
seven scenarios. The highest number of passengers can be expected, when a
system of two airports ",viii be operated: One close to the city, serving
national short haul flights and routes to some important European capitals.
The other is situated up to 60 km from Berlin's city centre. It is more
assigned for long, especially intercontinental hauls which covers also pure
charter flights and direct flights to destinations, where the demand,
originated at Berlin, has to be fed by national commuter-flights to provide
satisfactory load factors (hubbing). At this stage we did not analyse the hub
potential in detail as shown in the last subsection because here it is more
important to ensure a 24 hour service and to avoid capacity restrictions at the
airport itself as well as in the air corridors.
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Fig. 13. Passengers Berlin 2010 depending on airport's location
From a macroeconomic point of view the modal split is also an important
measure. Infrastructure investments in Germany must be evaluated accor-
ding to well-defined evaluation schemes. Herein the investor must apply cost
benefit analyses beneath others. These processes require very detailed
figures to assess a set of related impacts. Figure 14 depicts as an example the
resulting mode choice pattern on the relation Berlin-Munich in the year 2010
for the set of potential locations.
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Fig.14. Modal split bet_ueen Berlin and Munich 2010
depending on the location ofan airport
Highest mode choice for air transport is given when there is an airport
near Berlin's City centre, like Tegel or Schoenefeld. Market shares up to
almost 40% can be expexted then. On the other hand, when Berlin's new
airport is situated about 50 kin, the share of travellers by plane between
Berlin and Munich decreases to about 20%. Obviously, the time needed to
access the airport plays a major role on such short haul route.
Regarding the environmental point of view decision makers will be also
interested in the impact on natural and cultural resources. Measures for this
field of interest could be derived e.g. from the modal split figures concerning
the access and egress modes. Especially in dense populated areas as well as
ecological sensitive areas the share of passengers using public" transport for
their ways from and to the airport are useful indicators. Pollution could be
directly derived from the absolute demand figures when applying distance
related emissions to it.
So when comparing several locations for a new airport regarding the
change of passengers mileage in comparison to the status quo situation is a
need. Separated by the different modes for access and egress as well as for
air transport, conclusions concerning energy consumption, vehicles
emissions and noise can be drawn. This allows to set up some basic data for
an environmental assessment concerning the different possible locations for
a planned airport. Here (figure 15), airport locations with a large distance to
the city of Berlin cause an increase of passengers-mileage up to 0.64 billion
passenger-kilometres, although passenger-mileage of air transport
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diminishes in this cases, as air transport will lose some passenger on short-
haul flights. On the other hand a new 'single' airport quite close to the city
will cause a slight decrease of passengers mileage when sum up all modes.
In this case passengers mileage of air transport rises up, while earthbound
feeder transport to the airport goes down. Airport systems with one airport
close to the city and a larger airport far off Berlin, have no remarkable
influence of passengers mileage.
Such an environmental analyses can be extended by computing the
aircraft movements according to starting/landing routes divided into aircraft
categories ( ICAO chapters). This allows to generate the noise distribution.
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Fig. 15. Change of passengers mileage depending on an airports location
5.2.2. Accessibility of an airport
In line with the Berlin example in the previous subsection the
access/egress diversions of the public and individual transport modes were
analysed.
Modal split and assignment to feeder links for the new planned airport
play a significant role when comparing several possible locations for a new
airport.
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So, in the tables below one can see the number of passengers expected at
the year 2010 on rail and road links to a new airport for Berlin, depending on
its location. Scope of such a study is,
- acceptance of airport-express-trains by the passengers, when the airport is
situated quite far from the city,
- additional capacity requirements on existing road links,
- necessity of additional roads to the airport,
- necessity of linking the airport to the forthcoming high-speed railway
network in Germany.
Table 2. Access egress choice road
Trips in mill. from the direction from from total
Scenario of Berlin West East each Airport
..R._f._._._.._..'r._.L.. .. ...................................................... .3.,7o......
and Schoenefeld 9,12
Schoenefeld South 10,93
M ichelsdorf 8,39 0,80 0,08 9,27
Borkheide 7,54 0,52 0,26 8,32
7,27 1,20 0,26 8,74
7,23 1,14 0,24 8,60
Jueterbog West
Jueterbog East
.Jueterbog.West..
and Schoenefeld
...... _2:_87_...... ....... 1:0..6....... ....... 0,.z)_...... ...... 4,.1.6......
8,33
Table 3. Access egress choice rail
Trips in mill.
Scenario
..R.q._._.,.._._-T. .g.J.
and Schoenefeld
Schoenefeld South
Michelsdorf
Borkheide
Jueterbo_ West
Jueterbo_ East
To/from Berlin
Airport-Express
Other directions
with IC/ICE
Other directions
with regional
trains
total
each Airport
....... b.9.0.......
4,05
6,69 0,17 0,10 6,96
6,44 0,20 0,07 6,71
6,86 0,18 7,04
6,86 0,45 0,18 7,48
6,74 0,42 0,17. 7,33
.J._._.t_.r.b.o._West......... 3:_47... .......... 9:._.............. 0,_._............. 4,0.8.. ....
and Schoenefeld 3,44
The main results were (with some differences between the specific
airport locations) the
- high acceptance of airport-express-trains, increasing with the distance to
the city,
- passengers flows to / from Berlin strictly dominate the total passenger
demand,
- connection to high-speed trains is useful when the airport is located in the
south of Berlin (towards the agglomeration of Leipzig / Halle,
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Of course to evaluate such results ira detail requires the necessary service
characteristics, e.g. the public service frequency, which would exceed the
limits of this paper.
Due to the linked models for access/e_ess, one can analyse the number
of passengers arriving at the airport by public transport. Compared to the
previous figure one can see that the airport-railway station (high-speed
intercity connections) has great impact on the access mode share.
8ZO
"4" _N
Fig. 16. Market share of rail Frankfurt Airport 1991
In 1991 the airport of Frankfurt already had one railway station close to
the terminal. So the airport is connected to the Intercity-Network of the
Deutsche Bahn AG. Beside this, the airport is also served by suburb trains.
So using rail to reach flights starting from Frankfurt is quite common, as you
can see in figure 16. The market share of rail to Frankfurt Airport raises up
to a maximum of 75%, according to the distance to the origin of the
passengers trip. A second railway station allowing more high speed trains to
serve the airport of Frankfurt has just come into service in May 1999.
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Another point of view in analysing railway traffic to an airport is to show
the number of people using trains to Frankfurt airport by regions, as we did
that in figure 17. Many of the travellers start their trip in the hinterland of
Frankfurt -- although, there are also a remarkable number of people using
ICE-trains along the high speed link Hamburg - Hanover - Frankfiart -
Karlsruhe - Basel to reach Frankfurt's Rhein-Main-Airport. Even from
Berlin, which is more then 500 km far away, about 100 Tsd. people per year
take a train to Frankfurt Airport.
_INN
Fig. 17. Passengers to Frankfurt Airport by rail 1991
Train operators can also be interested in origin and destination of railway
users to or from an airport. In such a case more detailed information is
needed. As an example therefore, the assignment of railway traffic to and
from the Leipzig Airport, when equipped with an own railway station at the
planned high-speed-link between Erfurt and Leipzig, is shown in the figure
18. Assigning railway traffic to an airport helps to answer questions like
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- Which towns have to be connected to the airport by direct trains?
- On which lines existing trains offer sufficient capacity for the additional
traffic?
- Where have additional trains to be put into action, due to the increasing
number of travellers?
- Which revenues can be expected from serving an airport by rail?
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2015
5.2.3. Scenarios
The last subsection presents some scenarios where the first and the
second example are dealing with a network change of air services and its
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impact on airports. While the first one is very simple and restricted to the
inauguration of a new route at Berlin with the intention of showing the
effects on the major competing airport in this market area, the latter example
is quite complex in the actions considered and will show the effects on both
airports involved. The third and fourth example are focussing on consumers
elasticities due to ceteris paribus fare variations. While the third one presents
the elasticity curves for different markets and trip purposes the last example
displays a pricing strategy based on the elasticities stated in the third
example.
5.2.4. Route inauguration
The German airport that serves the North American market the most is
without doubt the Frankfurt/Main airport. This airport hosts the homebase of
the former national carrier 'Deutsche Lufthansa AG' and is 'the hub' in
Germany. As our scope is on consumers' behaviour in a competitive
environment we want to study the impacts of changes on the supply side.
Therefore the first step is to get an impression of the competitive situation of
this major airport, which is displayed in form of Frankfurt's catchment area
by Figure 19.
As Frankfurt is offering a large number of services to North America and
the earthbound access/egress possibilities are above average, its market
dominance covers a wide area of Germany. The white spots at Frankfurt's
hinterland do not indicate that Frankfurt doesn't play a role in consumer
decision they just reflect on the one hand the good air feeder system to
Frankfurt, which is used as access alternative instead of the landbased
modes, and on the other hand the strong influence of competitors - e.g. non-
stop service at the airport or other routes via competing hubs.
Considering the status quo air network, an additional non-stop air service
from Berlin to North America is installed in this scenario. The point of
interest we want to show is the consumers' reaction to a new competing
alternative which enriches the existing set of possibilities. Here the question
about the demand elasticity plays a key role when arguments between
airlines and airports are exchanged whether the originating market is big
enough to install such a new service or not. Of course the transfer passengers
will also partially use the new service, but for an airport manager it is more
interesting to attract new customers than to shift air passengers from one
flight to another. Obviously airlines will take another point of view. May be
they compete with another airline and want to increase their market share or
they want to enrich their service by another O-D pair without losing the
economic surplus at the already existing service of this market area. To
analyse such effects we refer to the already discussed alternative or hub
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analyses in the second subsection. Anyhow for both groups it is important to
know how the travellers react to service changes.
Although Frankfurt Airport and the Berlin airport system (TXL, THF,
SXF) are already quite far from each other, the catchment areas for
originating/destinating passengers are overlapping with up to 10% Berlin
travellers using earthbound systems to access Frankfurt. The majority of
travellers (90%) are choosing transfer services offered at Berlin via airports
like FRA, AMS, LHR and CDG. Now the question is whether this situation
can be influenced by an airport located at the border lines of Frankfurt's
catchment area.
[] more than 90%
[] 80% to 90%
[] 60% to 80%
r"t140% to 60%
17 20% to 40%
r110% to 20%
[] 1% to 10%
[] below 1%
p
p ZRH"
D INN
SZG
p LNZ
Fig. 19. Market shares of Franl_ft_rt Airport: destination North America
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u
Fig. 20. Market shares changes of Frankfitrt Airport by regions if non-stop
flights to North America are offered at the Berlin airport system
In figure 20 we simulated the consumer reaction, when new non-stop
flights to North America are offered at the Berlin airport system out of the
point of view of Frankfurt Airport. As indicated in figure 20, Frankfurt will
lose market shares in some areas belonging to Berlin's sphere of influence.
The maximum decrease doesn't take place in Berlin directly -- although the
decline is up to 10% points which nearly diminishes Frankfurt's market
share to zero -- but in two counties situated in the south-west of Berlin
where losses reach up to 20%. The reason for this strong reaction can be
found in analysing the consumers' alternatives for reaching a destination in
North America with and without non-stop flights offered at Berlin.
Comparing the alternatives, consumers are making their choice in respect to
their e.g. price and time elasticity which now results in passenger shifts to
the new service at Berlin withdrawing them from Frankfurt.
This reflects the obvious rule that the closer the starting-point of a trip is
to an airport, the more people prefer this airport even if then a transfer on
their trip is needed, especially if the next airport offering non-stop flights to
their final destination is far away. The main area of competition is at the
regions where no airports are located.
So travellers not originating in the vicinity of an airport have to compare
very carefully their impedances to airports which offer non-stop flights to
their final destination and the ones who do not. If e.g. the difference in travel
time is less than or equal to the time it affords to change a plane, they will
choose the new opportunity. So in the case of additional destinations for
non-stop flights being introduced to the market, people react more
sensitively to a new alternative by changing their starting airport. Figure 19
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points out that Frankfurt's market share was up to 40% in such regions as the
south-west of Berlin, although there were other airports closer situated but
without a non-stop service to North America. The introduction of a new
service at Berlin reduced Frankfurt's market shares by half as shown in
figure 20.
It has to be stated that the results differ by trip purpose and final
destination so that the results shown are aggregated. In addition one has to
be aware of the underlying access/egress infrastructure which is also
mirrored by the catchment area of the airports.
5.3. Secondary hub
After the quite simple example a), a bundle of supply changes take place
in the strategic scenario b). We assume that in addition to Frankfurt Airport a
secondary hub in Germany at Munich airport will be established. The
scenario consists of the following changes to the situation of the year 1991:
1. New additional intercontinental destinations are offered at Munich.
2. The feeder network is extended to strengthen Munich's hub potential.
3. Some secondary destinations, offered in Frankfurt, are cancelled due to
capacity constraints in favour of more flights to destinations with higher
demand.
Such supply changes create a new competitive situation between the
airports Frankfurt and Munich where also other international airports are
affected. In the following, we will focus just on the two airports Munich and
Frankfurt. At first the changes in passenger volume at the two airports
should be mentioned. While Frankfurt is losing 0.7 Mio., Munich gains 1.6
Mio. passengers in total and on intercontinental routes Frankfurt loses 0.15
Mio. which nearly can be attracted completely by Munich. Now it is
interesting to know how these passenger shifts can be explained e.g. what
was the consumers behaviour?
How consumers react in respect to the new situation can be summarised
by the following five possibilities:
1. Travellers who used to depart from Frankfurt, now take off at Munich.
2. Travellers who came to Frankfurt by earthbound transport to use a non-
stop or via service, now take a feeder flight to Munich and reach their
destination after a transfer.
3. Some travellers who took a feeder flight to Frankfurt, now use a feeder
flight to Munich.
4. Some other travellers who took a feeder flight to Frankfurt, now go to
Munich by earthbound transport to use a non-stop or via service.
5. Travellers who used earthbound transport to reach Munich airport, now
take a feeder flight to Munich.
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It is important to note that there is no general consumer reaction due to
the complex structure of the bundle of strategic supply changes which in
addition causes synergetic effects. As the five possibilities show, the
behaviour is always oriented to the individual situation reflecting a specific
point of the elasticity curve.
The change of passengers' demand on the flights between Frankfurt and
Munich is also based on their consumer reaction described by possibility 2.
Information about the other kind of consumer reactions is given in figures 21
and 22 which show the changes of the catchment area of Frankfurt and
Munich caused by the new destinations offered at Munich for the market
segments Asia and Africa.
fiE?
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Fig. 21. Market share changes at Frankfurt Airport."
destination Asia and Africa
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For Frankfurt Airport (Figure 21) a decrease of market share up to 4%
points is shown for a number of traffic zones arranged in a wider circle
around the airport location, but no significant change could be measured in
the vicinity of the airport. The highest losses appear in regions situated close
to other airports which are now connected to Munich by feeder flights (i.e.
Saarbruecken (SCN), Nuremberg (NUE), Stuttgart (STR)).
For the Munich Airport (Figure 22) a decrease of market share can be
seen for the areas around the airports of Nuremberg, Hof (HOQ) and
Friedrichshafen (FDH), which seems to be inconsistent with the extended
schedules offered at Munich. The reason for this effect is listed as
consumers' reaction possibility no. 5 where consumers change from
earthbound access to feeder flights. Additional market shares for Munich are
shown especially for the area of Stuttgart and the traffic zones at the border
to Austria. This increase is caused by the new intercontinental destinations
offered at Munich that compete with supplies at other airports.
P
Fig. 22. Market share changes at Franlfurt Airport: destination Asia and
Africa
This short analysis just sheds a light on the possibilities which are
available if one goes more into detail down to the assigned air services by
the different trip purposes. But the focus was not to show losses and gains at
the airports, the aim was to show the variety of the consumers' behaviour in
respect to supply changes and that new competitive situations arise by
complex strategic scenarios which include synergetic effects which can even
be measured ex ante. The demand elasticities in respect to any air service
variable considered in the model specification (e.g. time, fare, frequency,
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service attributes) allows to simulate and optimise strategies as well as to
measure competition in air transport. In context with the system approach
VIA (Last et al 1997) even the role of earthbound feeder systems can be
considered which as we saw in the previous sections cannot be neglected.
Finally it has to be stated again that the results displayed, are aggregated
concerning trip purpose and final destination. The role of the underlying
access/egress infrastructure is mentioned in the consumers reaction
possibilities.
5.3.1. Consumer's elasticity
To demonstrate the practical relevance of the consumers elasticities the
change of the market shares and travel demand of an alternative is computed
in condition to an absolute change of the travel costs of this alternative
whereby all other conditions remain ceteris paribus equal. As example the
alternatives at the Hamburg airport in the year 1991 are used and displayed
for three different market segments, namely domestic, European and
intercontinental. The computed probabilities of the models will differ for
each origin-destination pair as well as they depend on the specific trip
purpose. The curvatures of elasticity are aggregated for each market segment
based on the specific origin-destination (O-D) results.
The following figure 23 displays the change of passengers demand (y-
axis) based on the year 1991 when tariffs change (x-axis). The zero-zero co-
ordinates display the status quo at Hamburg in 1991. It can clearly be seen
that the elasticity of business travellers is the smallest because changes of the
tariffs have the smallest effect on their behaviour. Although increasing the
tariff of domestic flights by DM 100 (- US$ 55) only 28% will skip the
alternatives offered at Hamburg. At the same price change the share of
holiday makers will decrease by 37% and the private travellers by 51%. On
the domestic market segment the air services have to face a strong
competition to the land based modes and in addition there are h lot of other
air alternatives around so that easily instead of Hamburg the airports
Hanover or Bremen can be used.
The results at a DM 100 change of the tariff for European destinations
give roughly the same picture just the losses of market shares are smaller
(business 7%, vacation 25%, private 38%). Surprisingly the results for
intercontinental destinations are different. While the holiday makers react
strongly (24%) followed by the business travellers (19%) the private
travellers show the smallest effect (12%).
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The strong reaction of private travellers has to be seen out of the point of
view that the total length of the trip does not exceed four days and therefore
the ticket takes over a major part of the total trip expenditures. This
argumentation even holds if one has a look on their behaviour if the price
decreases by DM 100. The gain varies from 100% on domestic and 64% on
European to 25% on intercontinental destinations.
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The small reaction of business travellers is consistent with the idea of the
high time sensitivity of these consumers and the fact that the ticket is usually
paid by the company or the visited client.
The idea of price sensitivity of holiday travellers is reflected at least in
the domestic and European cases while on intercontinental trips the change
of the ticket price does only slightly increase the total expenditures of the
trip, so that this is of minor relevance. Anyhow the high competition on the
intercontinental market is ensuring a low price level.
By the way in an air demand forecast study for Hamburg (1996) it was
found that holiday trips to the same destination, same hotel etc] in the same
time period offered by Hamburg tourist offices differed in price by up to DM
1.000 (- US$ 555) to those offered in other. German cities. The major
difference was just the originating airport: instead of Hamburg airport the
journeys started from Frankfurt or Dusseldorf airport.
To see the effects of consumer behaviour on travel demand the following
figure 24 displays the results already explained on the market share level.
The absolute passenger values (y-axis) refer directly to the market shares
stated above so that the interpretation of the results is obvious. One remark
should be made. Some changes of the travel shares seemed to be high or low
but looking at the absolute number of travellers will adjust this objective.
e-
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It should be kept in mind that the losses on the passenger side are not
losses in total for the air market which will be shown later on in the next
subsection in more detail (see passenger shifts). A lot of travellers just
choose another air alternative - intramodality - only on short distance flights
the competing high-speed trains and the car mode - multimodality - will
draw market shares and of course less attractive destinations will be
substituted by other ones due to the generation-distribution approach used.
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Fig. 24. Travel demand depending on cost changes
Generally it has to be stated that changes of tariffs higher than DM 150
are not covered by the database and therefore the precision of the results is
decreasing. The models have to be updated when new observations are
available which catch consumer behaviour due to such large changes.
But despite this fact to the real example of an unrestricted return business
trip between Hamburg and Frankfurt should be referred to because the
comparison of model results and the true observations was encouraging in
the sense that nor large changes of air tariffs are unusual neither the
elasticities found by the models can be neglected.
For example an increase of the tariff of about DM 50 (- US$ 28) within a
year (9.96 to 8.97) or a drop of the price by 30% and more as soon as
another airline offers their service (e.g. FranlLfiart -Berlin, Hamburg -
Munich or Munich - Ruhr area in 1997) or the anti trust office claims
monopolistic behaviour of an airline are normal if one observes the market
in detail. In the light of the ongoing liberalisation, deregulation and
privatisation process and the very elastic pricing strategies of airlines the
question is: How can airports participate at market procedures like airlines
already do for some time? Due to the enlarging capacity constraints the
growing air market is facing and the huge infrastructure investments airports
have to undertake the airlines and respectively the consumers have to face
higher charges and / or fees. It will be a matter of time that airports will be
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forced to turn to a more market oriented pricing strategy like peak & off
peak pricing or the more general approach of slot trading to handle the spare
capacity resources more efficient or say on the leveI of a real market price.
Concerning the elasticities it is referred to the example of the Frankfurt -
Hamburg O-D passenger market which decreased by 4.8% from 1996 to
1997 stated by airport statistics Hamburg. Within this time period not only
the air tariff increased also the service frequency on this O-D was reduced.
Taking into account the average growth rate of about 7.4% in 1997 on the
domestic German market the imaginable losses on this leg were 12.2% for
the O-D traffic. Obviously the growth rates were induced by the additional
competition of airlines on several markets in 1997 where the prices dropped
significantly. Therefore considering all effects the elasticities of the models
tend to be conservative. In this context the question rises: Who can benefit of
consumer elasticity by applying a market oriented pricing strategy,
exclusively airlines? More and more the airports view the travellers directly
as clients and apply aggressive marketing strategies to increase their
attractivity (free or cheap parking and overnight stay, shops, play grounds,
restaurants, high-speed rail access, etc.) to enlarge their catchment area. A
new pricing strategy for the aviation side would be a natural enrichment of
the existing marketing tools. In addition one could use a market oriented
pricing as instrument to impose a price structure to meet political constraints
like environmental benchmarks.
By the way by increasing tariffs on an O-D the total demand on this leg
need not necessarily decrease if one takes into account the transfer
passengers, who usually pay different prices. In the case of the Hamburg -
Frankfurt leg which is dominated by the origin-destination passenger market
the losses on total demand were 1.8% to the demand in 1996 because the
share of transfer passengers increased by ca. 2.3%.
Therefore to compute the effects on the leg level all itineraries on the
total network have to be considered. Of course for each origin-destination
pair as well as for each alternative serving an O&D such elasticit,) curvatures
can be computed. Obviously it is wrong to concentrate on one airport and
single services without considering the synergetic effects of a network and
the competitive situation around. To face such and other complex problems
like the air network or hub optimisation the airport choice models have been
embedded in the system approach.
5.3.2. Local pricing strategy
The last strategic scenario deals with an increase of passenger fares at an
international airport which might happen in order to meet environmental
benchmarks (e.g. noise, pollution) or to manage scarce resources (e.g.
Atrp.ort Choice & Competition - a Strategic Approach 51
parking positions, aircraft movements) efficiently. Again such an action will
change the competitive situation between airports and the question arises
how consumers react to the supply changes. This analyses is based on the
elasticities shown in the previous subsection.
Here we assume that the international airport Hamburg charges an
additional supplement -- to airlines or passengers -- so that the travel
expenses increase by DM 50 per passenger for any flight. The resulting
question will be which kind of effects can be expected? Or the other way
around, if one wants to reach a certain aim / benchmark which amount of
money should be demanded from whom? In both cases the focus is on the
price elasticity of demand.
Figure 25 depicts the simulated market share losses for the airport
Hamburg. The pattern results from passenger shifts to competing airports as
well as travellers using earthbound modes (rail and road) as substitutes. The
highest reductions of Hamburg's market shares can be found inside the
extended area of Hamburg and in regions from where another airport (e.g.
Hanover) is reachable in similar conditions, like the airport of Hamburg.
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Fig. 25. Market share losses of Hamburg Airport 1991" all destinations
As we want to measure the competition we should have a look at the
competitors. Where do consumers go to, which are the alternatives
considered as substitutes, who are the winners or losers of such a scenario?
Figure 26 summarises the passenger shifts between the competing
alternatives.
Airp.ort Choice & Competition - a 3"trategic Approach 52
l scenario: +DM 50,-/passenger on Hamburg Airport 1991 I
HAM: - 835 Tsd
i 1
I
-200 -150
I _ I to other modes: + 638 Tsd I
shifts at the
airport
! FRA_
I
II 1
I
t
, [
I
DUS_
MUC_
HAJ1
I BRE
I --..---
I r--CGN-
I : KEL
r--- _Berlin_
CPH
AMS
FMO
BLL
[winners I
I
I
-- I
I
I
Z
L I
i
i I
I I
l passengerschanging airport
.=
m
-100 -50 0 50
shifts of passengers in Tsd.
100
_J
E
@
Fig. 26. Passengers shifts
As the tariff increase is relatively high for short-haul flights the major
effect is a shift to earthbound modes for domestic destinations. Here air
services are competing with high-speed train services which serve a city-city
pair nearly as fast as airplanes.
Those airports connected with Hamburg by sho_-haul flights, like
Franlcfurt (FRA) and Dusseldorf (DUS) must be characterised as losers. But
the total number of passengers on these airports decreases less than on the O-
D flights because some of the travellers still reach these airports by plane
just using a competitive airport like Hanover (HAJ) or Bremen (BRE).
Others replace their former connecting flight (e.g. Hamburg - Frankfurt by
car or rail trips to Frankfurt) and subsequently enlarge the catchment area-of
these airports.
Airport Choice & Competition -a Strategic Approach 53
Airports situated closer to Hamburg may be considered as winners in that
situation, if they are not connected to Hamburg by plane and, in addition,
provide a comparable number of destinations. Here, HAJ and BRE win more
than 50 Tsd. passengers each, while at Kiel (KEL, in the north of Hamburg),
there is only a little increase in the amount of passengers, due to the very few
destinations offered there. A special kind of winner, although the number of
changing passengers is quite low, is Copenhagen Airport (CPH). Despite
losing passengers on the flights to and from Hamburg, the total number of
people in Copenhagen increases. This result is caused by a combination of
the two effects stated for Frankfurt and Hanover.
Of course one can go even more into detail by analysing the consumer
structure at the Hamburg Airport and how the segments are affected by such
an increase of fares. Obviously business travellers are less price sensitive
than holiday makers. But having a look at the passenger figures
differentiated by trip purpose, figure 27 indicates that although the number
of travellers diminishes by 835 Tsd. (8%) the reaction of holiday makers is
quite low - the total amount of travel expenditures is already quite high so
that the extra charge does not have a tremendous influence on their decision
- while trips belonging to the trip purpose private (non-business trips up to a
total duration of four days) are affected strongly. Due to the high time
elasticity of business travellers this consumer segment is not affected very
much.
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Again it can be stated that the elasticity of demand is dependent on the
location of the traveller, the final destination and the trip purpose as
indicated by the results.
Now further analyses can follow concerning the effects on different
routes, the aircraft movements, the environment or finally concerning the
economic impact of such an action.
When increasing airport fees at an airport, not only passenger's amount
decreases, the number of aircraft movements diminishes, too as figure 28
shows. Here (DM 50 extra charge per passenger), we indicated the differen-
ces by type of aircraft. When regarding the reductions by percentage, the
strongest effects are advised for the class of turbo prop (represented by ATR
72), which come into service on short hauls only. On long hauls, which are a
domain of planes like the Airbus A340, the reduction of aircraft movements,
caused by the lack of passengers, is almost of no account, as that DM 50
extra charge makes intercontinental flights only slightly dearer.
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Fig. 28. Change of aircraft movements Hamburg Airport 1991 (percentages)
When simulating rising passenger charges, the changing economic
situation of an airport is an important point of view. So fig.ure 29 displays the
development of aviation revenues. The actual revenues in 1991 at the airport
of Hamburg were DM 180 Mill. With an amount of 6.5 Mill. passengers,
aviation revenues were DM 27.61 per passenger. When rising up passenger
charges ceteris paribus, by DM 100 (-US$ 55), the aviation revenues will
sum up to more than DM 300 Mill., although the number of passengers
estimated at Hamburg decreases and there are less aircraft movements.
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A Study on the Flight Service Network for Incheon
International Airport to be a Successful Hub Airport
in Northeast Asia
Kwang Eui Yoo and Yeong-heok Lee I
ABSTRACT
Incheon International Airport(IIA) is planned to open in about 18 months. Korean government
has an ambition to make IIA a major hub airport in Northeast Asia. The most essential and
required condition for an airport to be a successful hub airport in a certain region is to have
more efficient flight service network than the other airports in the same region. IIA should
compete with Japanese airports to be a major hub in Northeast Asia because Japanese
government also has a plan to expand greatly the airport capacity in Tokyo area and Kansai
airport in Osaka. It is necessary for both IIA and Korean national air carriers to compose
efficient flight service network considering hub competition with Japanese major airports. As
the liberalization of international air transport industry would give more marketing freedom to
airlines, they would plan the flight service network and flight schedule based on market analysis
instead of governmental regulations. In the economically liberalized environment, it is very
required to analyze air passengers' flight choice behaviour in order to induce other carriers and
passengers through IIA's attractive flight service network. Disaggregate model is more
appropriate than aggregate model to analyze consumers' behaviour. The information derived
from disaggregate choice model of air passengers could be utilized in devising efficient flight
network and schedule plan. Value of travel time or trade off ratio between flight frequency and
travel time which could be estimated from discrete choice model could be utilized for
scheduling an efficient flight plan for airlines and composing efficient flight service network for
IIA.
Both are professors at the department of Air Transportation in Hankuk Aviation University, Korea
I. Introduction
The aviation demand in Asian Pacific region has recorded larger growth rate than in other
regions during last decade. In accordance with the rapid expansion of aviation demand in
Northeast Asia, the construction of Incheon International Airport(IIA) was planned to meet the
growing air transport demand of Korea and to play a role as a major hub airport in Northeast
Asia. They should compose efficient hub-spoke flight network centered at IIA to make it a hub
airport in the area. IIA is required to compete with other big airports in the same region to
become a successful hub. Especially it is inevitable to compete with Japanese airports in Tokyo
and Osaka because Japanese government also has a plan to add greatly airport capacity in those
big cities and Tokyo is already known as a hub in Northeast Asia.
Through the expanding open-sky policy in international air transport industry led by USA,
airlines are predicted to operate to meet market needs. The national barrier will become less
important than consumers' preference in the market when an international airline or an airport
plans a flight service network. Therefore, the study of air passengers' behaviour in the target
market should be treated as an essential base for flight service planning.
The objective of this research is to study the way how to analyze the air passengers' flight
choice behaviour and apply the findings of the analysis to air carrier's(or airport's) planning of
flight service network. The area to study is air transport market in Northeast Asia region. To be
more concrete, we will focus on hubbing competition of IIA with major airports in Japan. As
they compete by flight service network, effective flight service network should be constructed
through the scientific analysis of air passengers' flight choice behaviour. In this study, we will
suggest a method to apply for planning flight service network so that IIA could win a
competition with Japanese airports utilizing air passengers' choice model.
There are several previous researches to utilize passengers' flight choice models in air
transport planning area. Kanafani and Ghobria utilized air passengers' route choice model for
their research concerning hub pricing of airport[7]. Benchemam also utilized discrete choice
model to study air passengers' airport choice behaviour in UK[4]. Alamdari and Black studied
passengers' choice of airline with logit models[l].
Following this introduction, section 2 is to review the air transport market in Korea and Japan.
Section 3 will discuss hubbing strategies in air transport industry. Section 4 will introduce the
method of empirical research and section 5 will be dedicated to main discussion of this study
and section 6 is the concluding remarks of the stud)'.
II. Air TransportIndustryin KoreaandJapan
Thissectionwill introduce the shape of air transport industry in Korea and Japan. However,
this study does not introduce detailed information because it is not very necessary for the
purpose of this study. The following sub-sections are to review it roughly, only mentioning the
basic information related to this research.
2. t The Policy for Air Transport Industry
The policy for domestic air transport in Korea has been somewhat led by government
regulation. Now, there are two scheduled airlines operating as private corporation; Korean
Airlines(KAL) and Asiana Airlines(AAR). Korean government which wants to introduce
deregulation to all industry has changed regulatory form of air transport industry in order to
make it greatly deregulated. It can be expected that domestic air transport is going to be
operated without governmental regulation in near future. For international air transport, Korean
government is seeking different policy case by case. As they accept the suggestion of "open
sky" from USA, the international air transport between US and Korea is operated in
economically liberalized environment. Airlines in this market can decide air fare, service route
and service frequency without government intervention. However, the bilateral air service
agreements with other countries except USA are more restrictive. They usually regulate service
route and frequency.
Japanese policy for air transport industry is a little more restrictive than that of Korea.
Japanese government would like to lead air transport industry to the direction where they intend
to drive. For international air transport, Japanese government also takes more conservative
attitude than Korea, since they feel Japanese airlines are not so competitive, caused mainly by
high cost. They want to keep on regulating air fare even though the degree of regulation is
going to be less severe. However, Japanese government is considering the expansion of the
routes of multiple designation. In general, they also try to adopt themselves to new wave of
international deregulation of the industry.
2.2 Capacities of Major Airlines and Airports in the Market
There are several big scheduled airlines in Korea and Japan. In the aspect of capacity, JAL
ranked the first place beyond compare and ANA ranked the second place by a little more
capacity than KAL which ranked the third place. A.AR ranked the fourth and JAS ranked the
fifth (refer to table-l). _'
Table1.MajorAirlines'CapacityinKoreandJapan(1997)
Rank
1 JAL(Japan)
2 ANA(Japan)
3 KAL(Korea)
4 AAR(Korea)
5 JAS(Japan)
Airline Aircraft owned RPM(millions) World rank
143
137
119
45
88
43,357.4
26,629.4
20,991.9
8,026.5
6,950.9
6
14
18
39
source: "Major Airlines Profiles", Aviation week & space technology, Jan. 1998
There are three major international airports in the market; New Tokyo International Airport in
Narita Tokyo, Kansai International Airport in Osaka, and Kimpo International Airport in Seoul.
New Tokyo International Airport has one runway and has a plan to add two more runways.
Kansai International Airport is also operating one runway and has a plan to add two more
runways. Kimpo International Airport has two runways. However, in January 2001, all of the
international flights will move to new Incheon International Airport which will have one
runway at the opening date and another one in six months. Eventually, Incheon International
Airport will be operated with four runways when they finish final stage of construction.
The air passenger demand in Japan is concentrated in Tokyo area and Osaka area. New Tokyo
International Airport and Kansai International Airport handled a major portion of international
air passengers in Japan. In Korea, Kimpo International Airport handles almost all of the
international air passengers. Table-2 shows the international traffic demand on these three
airports.
Table 2. Intemational Passenger Demand at Each Airport(1996)
City
Tokyo
Seoul
Osaka
Airport
New Tokyo Airport
Kimpo Airport
Kansai Airport
International Passengers
(thousands)
23,372
21,271
8,578
source: 1. "Aviation shown by number(_,_'_' ,9, _ _'_)", Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau,
1997
2. "Aviation Statistics", Korea Aviation Development Association, 1997
III. Hubbing Strategy in Air Transport Industry
3.1 Introduction - Justification of Hub-Spoke Network System
With the deregulation of air transport industry, airlines have altered their route structure to
utilize their resources more efficiently and the hub and spoke flight network is proved to be
effective. Hubbing occurs when airlines concentrate flights at a few airports which they use as
collection-distribution centers for their passengers. Through hubbing, an airline could increase
the number of connecting cities and flight frequencies with limited resources, which can be
explained by fig. 1.
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Fig.l(a) is to serve five cities with complete connection, by direct service only. As shown at
fig.l(a), ten (5C2 = 10) routes are required to supply complete connection with direct service for
these five cities. Fig.l(b) is utilizing hub-and-spoke system, and it can be seen that only four
routes are required to connect five cities by way of the hub city "C". If the city "C" is a big city
generating large traffic demand, the flight frequency between "C" and other cities could be
greater than that of berween small cities. Therefore, the passengers, for example, who want to
travel between "A" and "D", have to transfer at "C", and this will enforce more travel time to
passenger while the passenger can enjoy convenience by more flight frequency with hub-and-
spoke flight service nerwork. The air fare for cormection flight usually cheaper than that of
direct flight because airlines can reduce unit cost through high load factor. In many cases, since
the route between hub city and a certain spoke cir?, is for the purpose of transportation between
hub and that spoke city, it may be considered as an additional revenue for the airline that earned
fromthe passengers who travel between one spoke city and another spoke city by way of hub
city. This will result in low air fare for the passengers who use connection flights. Therefore, the
consequences for the passengers using hub-and-spoke system are the benefits from trading off
longer journey times for more frequent flights, if necessary, and, on certain routes, the benefits
from using cheaper flights.
Even though it is normally accepted that travelers consider flight frequency, travel time and
fare in their decision making procedure of transport choice, it has been proved that high
frequency is usually more attractive to passenger than short travel time. In a competitive
market, frequency seems to be a key variable and the S-curve relationship between frequency
and market share is often cited.
Since hub-and-spoke network systems are utilized in major continents in the world, multiple
hub system serving between continents has been also developed(refer to fig.2).
Fig.2 Multiple Hub System
3.2 Two Kinds of Hub
As Doganis and Dennis(1989) proposed, it is reasonable to classify hubbing function of
airports by two main kinds of hub; hourglass hub and hinterland hub (refer to fig. 3)[5]. As
shown by fig. 3(a), through an hourglass hub, flights operate from one region to points in the
opposite direction. Through a hinterland hub, short haul flights feed connecting traffic to the
longer trunk routes. An hourglass hub usually only caters for connections in _vo directions,
outbound and return. However, a hinterland hub serves as a multi-directional distribution center
for air travel to and from its surrounding catchment area.
fig.3(a) Hourglass Hub fig.3(b) Hinterland Hub
IV. Research Method
4.1 Introduction
It is essential to study air passengers' behaviour for the planning of flight service network in
the greatly deregulated air transport market. Disaggregate model is more appropriate than
aggregate model in analyzing consumers' behaviour. This section will try to find the method
how to apply the information derived from disaggregate choice models to flight service network
planning.
By traditional economic assumption, commodities are finely divisible with a change in price
having an effect on the quantity of the goods demanded. However, this assumption does not
hold for some commodities, transport choice being one of them. For such commodities, a
change in price may result in zero consumption or unaffected consumption. When commodities
are not finely divisible, marginal adjustments of consumption are not feasible consequences.
Thus the individual behaviour of consuming discrete commodities is better represented by an
individual choice function.
4.2 Theory of Individual Choice Behaviour
It is assumed that the individual attempts to choose from the range of alternatives the option
that maximizes overall utility, when the hypothesis of utility maximization is used as the
decision rule of discrete choice. Individual k will select alternative i among a set of J
alternatives if
Uik > Ujk (i_j,j=l, 2, 3,. ..... ,J) (1)
However, in repeated choice experiments, individuals have been observed not to select the
same alternatives in the same situation, and different decision makers have selected different
alternatives in the same situation with the same alternatives. This led to the development of
probabilistic choice theory which attempts to explain these behavioral inconsistencies[3]. This
behavioral inconsistencies could be explained by random utility theory. In this random utility
approach, the observed inconsistencies in choice behaviour are considered to be a result of
observational deficiencies on the part of the analyst. The individual is assumed to select the
alternative with the highest utility. However, the utilities are not known to the observer with
certainty, and hence treated as random variables. Manski (1973) identified four sources of the
randomness of the utilities,
- unobserved attributes
- unobserved taste variations
- measurement errors and imperfect information
- instrumental(or proxy) variables
With random utility approach, the utility of the ith alternative for the kth individual can be
partitioned into two components,
Uik = Vik + Elk (2)
where Vjk represents the observable component, which also can be
expressed as the systematic component or representative utility.
E_kis the unobservable component or random component.
It is assumed that the systematic component is the part of utility contributed by attributes that
can be observed by the analyst. For the random component, the sources of randomness are those
stated in the above paragraph. Since, in consuming commodities, individuals attain utilities by
consuming bundles of attributes which define level of service, a relationship between utility and
level of service can be defined, so that the observable component of total utility in equation(2)
can be expressed as follows if a linear-in-parameters is assumed.
Vik = ao + atX1 + a2X2 + ...... + anX.
where, V_k= systematic component of utility of option i
for individual k
a_ ..... ; an = coefficients
XI, ".... ; Xn = attributes of option i
(3)
The coefficients (ao, al,' ..... , an ) are assumed to be the same for all members of the
population in equation (3). If different socio-economic groups are believed to have entirely
distinct coefficients, then it is possible to develop an entirely distinct model for each subgroup.
This is termed as market segmentation. However, socio-economic characteristics are often
included in the model using an appropriate specification. In such a case the utility function can
be expressed as follows;
Uik = U (El, Sk) (4)
where, Zi = a vector of attributes o/alternative i
Sk = a vector o/socio-economic characteristics o/individual k
4.3 Choice Model of Random Utility
This subsection will introduce the basic theory of the random utility model, as the random
utility approach is more consistent with economic theory. By combining probabilistic choice
theory and random utilty theory, the following equations are obtained;
Pik = Prob. [ Uik > Ujk i:/:j, j = 1, 2," ..... J ] (5)
Pik = Prob. [ Vik+Eik > Yjk+Ejk i:g:j, j=l, 2,- ..... J] (6)
Pik = Prob. [ Eik-Ejk >Vjk-Vik i_j,j=l, 2," ..... J] (7)
where, Pik is the probability of selecting alternative i for individual k facing a set of J
alternatives.
It is important to stress that Vik and Vjk are functions of service attributes and are assumed to
be deterministic. The terms Eik and Ejk may also be functions, but they are random from the
observational perspective of the analyst. It is usually assumed that the means of the random
variable E's are zero, and any non zero means of E's are 'absorbed" into the systematic
component of the utility function, unless noted otherwise.
One of the most difficult arguments of random utility theory is defining a reasonable
functional form for V. Ben-Akiva and Lerman proposed two criteria for selecting functional
form; (1) the function to reflect how the various attributes in the alternative set influence utility
(2) the function that has convenient computational properties that make it easy to estimate their
unknown coefficients[3]. In most case, functions of linear-in-parameters are chosen. As for the
functional form for the distribution of random component E, different assumptions regarding
the distribution of E, lead to different choice models being developed. Although several models
for the multinomial choice situation have been developed, multinomial logit (MNL) is the most
widely used multinomial choice model.
4.4 Application of Stated Preference Techniques
Often it is not easy to calibrate an efficient discrete choice model with revealed preference
data because there is not sufficient variation of all variables of interest, and there are also often
strong correlation between variables or between variables and other invisible factors. Stated
Preference(SP) techniques which allow the researcher to experiment, can offer a solution to
these problems. With clearly defined attributes and attribute levels, SP experiments can give
researchers the chance to have sufficient variation of variables of interest, and an orthogonal
design which ensures that the attributes presented to respondents are varied independently from
one another, avoids multi-collinearity between attributes.
4.4.1 Introduction to Stated Preference Techniques
SP methods which were originally developed in marketing research in the early 1970s have
been applied in the empirical analysis of transport-related choice behaviour since 1979. Though
these techniques were severely discredited at their beginning, by the end of the 1980s, they were
perceived by many researchers to offer a real chance to solve the problem related to transport
demand modeling.
Kroes and Sheldon (1988) described SP methods in transport research as a family of
techniques which use individual respondents' statements about their preferences in a set of
transport options to estimate utility functions[9]. The options are typical descriptions of
transport situations or contexts constructed by the researcher. Generally, SP techniques can be
definedas all the approaches which use people's statements of how they would respond to
hypothetical situations.
4.4.2 Advantages of SP Techniques
Transport planners need to know the likely effect of any planning strategy they consider.
However, the traditional methods using revealed preference data cannot provide good quality
information on travel demand and travel behaviour mainly because there is insufficient
variation in the variables of interest to produce statistically significant models, and further, such
variables are often strongly correlated. Moreover, revealed preference methods cannot be used
to evaluate demand under conditions which do not yet exist. SP techniques, however, allow the
researcher to experiment the consumer behaviour under various conditions, offering an effective
solution to such problems. The advantages of SP techniques over revealed preference (RP)
methods are summarized as follows[ 11]:
(1) RP : Observations may not vary sufficiently for the construction of an accurate statistical
model and the variables may also be correlated making it difficult to estimate model parameters
reflecting the proper trade-off ratios.
SP : SP techniques can ensure data of sufficient quality to construct a good statistical model
because the researcher can control the choices offered to respondents.
(2) RP : The observed behaviour may reflect factors which are not of interest to the policy
maker. In addition, the effects of the variables that are of interest may be "swamped" by these
other factors. This is a particular problem with "secondary" qualitative variables.
SP : Due to the control available to the researcher, the effects of variables of interest can be
isolated from the effects of other factors.
(3) RP : There is no information on how people will respond in situations where a policy is
completely new.
SP : Where a policy is completely new, so that no RP data is available, stated preference
techniques may represent the only practical basis for evaluation and
forecasting.
(4) RP : To obtain adequate observations of behaviour, very large and therefore very expensive
surveys may have to be carried out. !
SP : Since each stated preference interview produces multiple observations per individual,
efficientstatisticalmodelscanbedevelopedfrommuchsmallersamplesizes.
V. A methodon IIA's StrategicFlight ServiceNetwork Planningto Win Hub
CompetitioninNortheastAsia
Thisresearchreviewedair transportindustryandintroducedthehubbingstrategiesin the
industryanddiscretechoicemodeling.In thissection,we will discusshowto utilizethe
informationwhichcouldbederivedfromdiscretechoicemodelfor IIA'sstrategicflightservice
networkplanningtomakeit successfulhubairportinNortheastAsia.
5.1InformationderivedfromDiscreteChoiceModelto be Utilized for Flight Service Network
Planning
This paper will research the method to utilize the information derived from the analysis of air
passengers' flight choice behaviour for flight service network planning of IIA. Discrete choice
model is useful to understand passengers' choice behaviour. Under the assumption that some
utility functions concerning air passengers' flight choice have been calibrated, the methods to
utilize the information derived from the models to IIA flight service network planning will be
presented in this section.
Through the previous studies in the industry, it has been identified that flight frequency, air
fare, and travel time are the major attributes to air passengers' flight choice behaviour[12]. If a
discrete choice model is calibrated using these three attributes and equation (3) of this study, the
results may be presented as follows;
V = ao + a, FARE + at TIME + af FREQUENCY (8)
Even though the magnitude of individual coefficient of equation (8) is important to estimate
the weight of each variable considered in consummers' choice behaviour, this study would try to
utilize relative importance of pair of variables, which can be estimated as the ratio of any two
coefficients. The reasons to utilize relative importance of variables are as follows: (i) The
passengers' flight choice or route choice is decided comparing each variable. That is to say,
relative importance of variables becomes significant factor when he/she decides to choose an air
trip any_vay. (ii) Especially, the model coefficients estimated from SP data are not proved
appropriate to be utilized as absolute value. Instead, the SP model is useful for seeing the
relative importance which can be estimated by comparing the absolute value of coefficients[ 11].
Therecanbethreeratiosestimated by comparing any two variables with each other ifa model
is composed of three variables; air fare, travel time and flight frequency. The three ratios and
their significance could be explained as follows, utilizing the quotation of the coefficients of
equation (8):
(i) RATIO-I; at/a_
where; at is the coefficient of travel time variable
ac is the coefficient of travel cost(air fare) variable
(ii) RATIO-2; area.
where; aI is the coefficient of flight frequency variable
a¢ is the coefficient of travel cost(air fare) variable
(iii) RATIO-3; a_at
where; a/ is the coefficient o/flight frequency variable
at is the coefficient of travel time variable
RATIO-1 is the ratio between travel time value and travel cost value. This ratio is the most
frequently utilized relative importance in transport studies, which is usually mentioned as value
of travel time (VOT). The relative importance of flight frequency to air fare can be calculated
by RATIO-2. RATIO-3 is the ratio between.the coefficients of flight frequency variable and that
of the journey time variable. This ratio is usually considered as a trade off between service
frequency and travel time and can be utilized when they consider the choice between direct
route system and hub-and-spoke system.
5.2 Methods to apply the Information derived to IIA's hubbing strategies
5.2.1 Application to Hinterland Hub Strategies
It is essential factor to have plenty of short-haul flights in catchment area in order to be
successful hinterland hub. In addition, they should try to reduce transfer time required to change
aircraft for the connection between short-haul and long-haul flights. IIA should try to increase
the flight frequency considering the competition with Narita and Kansai Airports. Since the
major airlines in Korea have mt, ch less capacity than Japanese major airlines to have enough
flights to compete with, it is desirable for Korean airlines to utilize the alliance _vith Chinese
airlinesandJapaneser gionalairlines.Withlimitedcapacity, Korean airlines and IIA airport
operator should try to supply more efficient flight service to make IIA a successful
Northeastern Asia hub airport. In order to achieve such an object, this study suggests that the
ratios of coefficients of discrete choice model can be utilized as follows.
They can utilize RATIO-1 to set air fare and to decide aircraft type to introduce. It is basic to
introduce cheap and slow aircraft for the routes which reveals low VOT (value of RATIO-l)
and to introduce expensive and higher speed aircraft for the routes which reveals high value of
VOT. It is required to consider RATIO-2 in order to compromise the level of frequency and air
fare. For the routes which have higher value of RATIO-2, they should try to increase flight
frequency suffering low load factor. Low load factor may lead to high price inevitably if airlines
seek to recover the operation cost. On the other hand, for the routes which have lower value of
RATIO-2, it is effective to reduce flight frequency, which could result in higher load factor and
lower air fare.
It is a normal practice that the routes which have large portion of business passengers would
have higher value of RATIO-2 than the routes mainly composed of leisure passengers. If any
routes are operated for mainly leisure passengers with small amount of demand, and if there is
significant local traffic between cities near each other, then combining destinations on one or
more spoke can be effective (refer to fig.4). In the case of which RATIO-1 is very small, this
kind of routing strategy is desirable.
T
Q P
fig.4 Hub and Combining Spokes Network
( Cities "P" and "Q" are combined spoke in the figure)
It would cost some expenses to improve operational standard to reduce connecting time on
hub airport. The airline and airport operator should decide the level of cost to invest in order to
reduce transfer time and they should set the level of air fare to recover the invested cost. It is
useful to utilize RATIO-1 to optimize these two variables; travel time and travel cost. However,
for the passengers originating from the cities where direct connections to long-distance major
cities are impossible or inconvenient, it may be desirable to introduce low fare and high
frequency service utilizing sixth freedom transportation to strength hubbing concept oflIA.
5.2.2 Application to Long-haul Flight Service Network Planning oflIA
We consider the long-haul flights as flights to serve inter-continents routes and there are
relatively large demand between Korea and North America/Europe. However, the European
routes are significantly regulated by bilateral air service agreements and the demand to Europe
is far less than that of USA. For this reason, this study would discuss the flight network
planning strategies on the routes to North America only as long-haul flights.
Because of the inferiority in the aspect of airline capacity as well as the magnitude of demand,
Korean airlines should utilize effective flight schedule and efficient alliance with the major
airlines in US. Fig.5 shows the current flight service between Seoul and major cities in North
America. IIA and Korean airlines could consider to change current network to new system as
shown on fig.6.
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fig.5 Long-haul flights between Seoul and Major Cities in North America
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fig.6 An Example of Revised Long-haul flights
The new system is the one which impose hubbing concept. The old one which has direct
connection to many cities with low frequency may be suitable for the leisure traveler and for
cargo. However, such low frequency services do not offer the flexibility required by business
community. The new system is to concentrate on high frequency services on the dense routes.
For the other cities, connections are provided either by change of gauge equipment or allied
partner airline's own local service. However, no one can calculate that the new system is better
than old one for the airlines' or air passengers' welfare. It is necessary to estimate RATIOs
defined in this study, and apply it for the decision making.
The discrete choice models should be calibrated for individual route separately. If the RATIOs
estimated from discrete choice model of each route reveal that passengers of each route prefer
evenly direct flight with scarce frequency of flight, which means high value of RATIO-1 and
low value of RATIO-2, the old system is more appropriate than new one. However, if the
RATIOs estimated from discrete choice model of each route are significantly different or they
show that high frequency with longer travel time preferred, then it is justified to introduce new
system.
To introduce new system, they estimate RATIOs from discrete models of each route, for
example, route to Los Angeles, and route to San Francisco. They need to concentrate the flights
on the route of the higher value of RATIO-1 which is selected as trunk route. The reason why
they should utilize RATIO-1 is that RATIO-I is the most seriously damaged one by
intermediate stop. That is to say, the passengers who have higher VOT should be provided with
direct service.
In addition, Korean airlines could utilize codesharing or other alliance techniques With
American airlines to compose efficient flight network. Especially, the connection flight between
foreign hub and spoke cities in USA should be operated by some of US airlines which allied
with Korean airlines. Therefore, an airline which has scheduling power on foreign hub airport
should be pointed as alliance partner. The transfer time between Trans-Pacific long-haul flights
and short-haul flights connecting to some cities in US should be considered utilizing RATIO-1.
This is because there is considerable competition with direct flights.
5.2.3 Application to Hourglass Hubbing Strategies
It is reasonable in the aspect of geographical position for IIA to take a role acting as an
hourglass hub to connect the air passengers traveling between Southeast Asian Cities and Cities
in the West Coast of USA. Actually, significant number of passengers traveling the cities of
these regions are transferred at Kimpo International Airport. This traffic could be handled as the
sixth freedom air transport and low fare could be applied. Anyway, to set the air fare and flight
frequency RATIOs should be utilized. To compete with direct flights between Southeast Asian
Cities and West Coast Cities in USA, IIA should offer low fare and high frequency which can
offset the negative effect caused by longer travel time. RATIO- 1 would be effective is setting air
fare and RATIO-3 would be effective in setting the level of flight frequency.
The results found through the discussions of section 5.2 could be summarized like table-3.
Hinterland Hubbing
Strategies
Long-haul flight
Service network
Strategies
Table 3. Summary oflIA's Efficient services Network Strategies
Major factors of competition Applied RATIOs 1
1,,.. _ ,. .% ,v-_xv-_ : to set air tare andl
lvtmlmum t_onnectmg l_me aircraft type r
Introducing efficient aircraft RATIO-2 : to compromise the
type level of frequency and air fare
Hourglass Hubbing
Strategies
Integration of long-haul flights
to concentrate on competitive
routes
Increasing 6th freedom
transport
Low fare and high frequency
service
RATIO- 1,RATIO-2: to select the
routes which IIA concentrates on
RATIO-I : to set airfare
RATIO-3 : to set the level of
service frequency
gl. Concluding Remark
With the trend towards liberalization in air transport industry, air passengers will have more
options for their travel. In a more flexible planning environment, air transport system planners,
airport operators and airline operators will need to know the consumer's preference. IIA which
has an ambition to be a hub airport in Northeast Asia should study the consumer's behaviour
and utilize the results for flight service network planning. Discrete choice models would be
useful for analyzing air passengers' flight choice behaviour. Section 5 of this study introduced
several ways to apply the information derived from air passengers for llA's hubbing strategy.
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ABSTRACT
Airfreight has gained a significant rise in the market as the need for fast and efficient
transportation has increased over the years. Airfreight is transported either through
pure freighters and trucks or through the belly of the passenger planes. The process
of transporting freight through the belly is rigid through several factors like short
turnaround time, priority issues, ramp congestion at peak hours, aircraft types etc.
Belly's flexibility lies in the frequency of the flights to make it theoretically possible
to deliver the goods on the same day. Pure freighters are not constrained by as many
of the hindering factors as does the belly but not similarly flexible to manage
deliveries on the same day. The strategy of the integrators is purely to deliver the
goods 'overnight' and thus they are rigid in their services and processes. This paper
analyzes the airport processes related to b,elly-airfreight and also the possibility of
utilizing the belly more efficiently. The paper also investigates if a more efficient
utilization of the belly at the daytime can generate a new concept of processing
airfreight by achieving a more significant share of the market. The paper is
empirically based on qualitative and quantitative data generated from the airport
process operators.
1 INTRODUCTION
Airfreight is normally defined as freight with high-speed delivery. Goods originated from the
shipper gets the fastest carriage (as airfreight) on its way to the final receiver. Need for fast and
secured transportation has considerably increased under the last decades as a result of new
layouts in industrial activities, for example, customer-order driven production and centralized
warehousing (Lumsden, 1998). The airfreight market is increasing by 12-15% every year. In
Sweden, for instance, export by air has been increased by 18-20% under 1997 (Transport och
Hantering). In spite of the fast growth of the airfreight market, there is a lot of conservatism in
the branch. Although the growth of airfreight has been more in compare to the growth of the
passengers, airfreight is still considered as a by-product in the line-based traffic (DahllSf 1997).
Earlier, airfreight was never forecasted to be an industry. A proof to this argument is the
architecture of the airports in general, which is not very friendly when it concerns cargo
handling. Faster and secured delivery is a prerequisite for the existence in the market for many
actors. Often airfreight is the only realistic alternative.
1.1 Airfreight actors
Airfreight can be transported in different ways - via pure freighter, via belly of the passenger
planes or via trucks. The customers do not need to know which of the three ways the gods are
transported by. What they are interested to know is that the goods are delivered fast and on time
as promised.
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The airfreight actors can be divided into two kinds. The traditional actors i.e. the airlines and the
latterly emerged integrators. The airlines have in principle three different strategies in their cargo
operations. Cargo could be:
1. a wholly (or partly) owned separate organization within the same brand name; or
2. a separate division within the airline; or
3. a not separated division in the airlines.
The first type of cargo organization is generally independent or tends to be independent of the
passenger unit for their services. They generally plan their operations in such a way so that they
can utilize their own resources as much as possible. They buy specific services from the
passenger unit. The second type of cargo organization do not own resources themselves and pays
to the parent company price for utilizing its resources. Cargo activities in the third type do not
constrain themselves in any organizational boundary. There are companies that do not have any
separate division for cargo. They set price for the freight and whatever is shipped is considered
as a contribution to the business. Airfreight is a by-product for these companies and considered
as 'better than nothing'.
Theintegrators,on theotherhand,haveintegrated freight flow all over the chain. Their strategy
is to deliver the goods overnight. They own all the assets (e.g. different vehicles, information
system, etc.) all the way from the shipper to the final receiver. Consequently, they have a good
control over the flow and can effectively (but in a rigid way) deliver the goods. Their quality
service has made it possible to have a continual increment in their market share. Although their
core business was to make door-to-door delivery of small packages, they are continuously
expanding their operations with additional services of shipping bigger volume of freight.
1.2 The importance of belly capacity
The most economical way to transport the airfreight is through the empty belly of the regular
passenger aircraft in the line-based traffic. This is obvious if seen from the transport provider's
point of view. The cost is then minimum and the income is maximum. There is also an advantage
of the belly utilization and that is - the flights have a very good frequency. The customer service
(for freight) could be increased if the belly is used smartly. The problem although with the
passenger planes is that these are designed to transport people, not freight. Here, a priority list is
maintained where freight, unfortunately, is the last to enter an aircraft. Moreover, there are other
factors that hinder a better belly utilization, e.g. -- departure time, type of aircraft, uncertainty of
the amount of passenger baggage, turnaround time maintenance, congestion at the ramp at peak
hours etc. (Acharjee et al, 1999). In Sweden, for instance, the amount of goods accompanying a
regular domestic flight is very small (<100kglflight) (Larsson 1998). But for international flights
the amount of accompanied goods is larger.
2 AIM OF THE PAPER
The objective of this paper is to find ways to promote the possibility to offer a shorter door-to-
door delivery time through utilizing the empty belly capacity in passenger aircraft. The paper
also investigates if a more efficient utilization of the belly at the daytime can generate a new
'overday' concept of processing airfreight and thus achieve a more significant share of the
market.
3 METHOD
The research approach, to fulfill the objective of this paper, is of a combination character. It is a
combination of systems and analytical approach. For a process investigation (which is the first
part of this study) possible relationship between systems must be understood. In the method of
proceeding towards that goal the actors will be identified and their activities in the different
systems (connected to each other in the whole process of line based air-traffic) will be clarified.
The problem factors will be analyzed and the possible strength of those detected factors will be
point out. In traditional analytical research the test of hypotheses is vital. Analytical approach in
this case is not from a hypotheses testing' perspective but of an explorative nature. The analytical
approach here is the verification of the strength of the detected problems and also, measuring of
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possibilitiesto tackletheproblemsthroughinputsfrommoreactorsin theprocess.Thestepsare
asfollows:
* Identify theactorsin theairfreightflowandunderstandtheiractivitiesin line-basedtraffic
• Understand factors that hinder belly utilization
• Analyze the influence of those factors on goods flow and estimate possible strength of those
factors.
• Verification of the estimated strength through questioning the airfreight actors on the level of
control over the hindering factors. Transform the qualitative data to quantitative data to conclude
how belly could be utilized better and if a better utilization might generate a new concept of
processing airfreight - that is, utilization of the passenger aircraft belly at the daytime.
4 PROCESS IDENTIFICATION
4.1 Actors and activities
A number of actors participate in the process of the airfreight flow in line based traffic. The flow
is a combination of activities taken care of by a few or all of these actors -- customers,
forwarders, terminal handlers, ramp handlers, and air companies. In most of the eases the
forwarders deliver the freight to the airport. The freight can even arrive at the airport directly
from the customers, means that the customers take care of the transportation themselves. The
terminal handlers receive the goods and prepare (palletize or pack) them to be taken by the
ground handlers to the aircraft. The goods can even be trucked from the airport to shorter
geographical territories. In that case the terminal handlers load the goods to the trucks.
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Figure 2: Actors in the process of airfreight flow
4.2 Hindering factors
In order to understand what causes a poor utilization of the belly, a study of the freight process
were made at the Landvetter Airport in GSteborg (the second largest airport in Sweden). In the
first phase, the study looked at the process of how the goods are treated on its way from the
airport terminal to the aircraft. Through interviewing the personnel engaged in operations, factors
that generate a low utilization were noted. It was understood that a poor utilization of the belly is
caused not only by certain operational inefficiencies in the airport but also by various other
factors. In fact, the majority of these factors lie outside the operational inadequacies in the
airport. In the second phase of the study a number of airline operators were interviewed. The
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airline interviews were extended later to the largest airport in Sweden (Arlanda Airport,
Stockholm) to have a better view on the problem as a whole.
Figure 3: Different hindering factor groups and their position in the system
The hindering factors found out in the whole study are divided into three main groups (figure 3).
Each of the groups is further divided into different subgroups of factors (table 1), named as
'Factor Group 1', 'Factor Group 2' and "Factor Group 3" A hindering factor, termed as 'Priority
maintenance', has been placed in "Factor Group 1' under subgroup 'strategic factors' although this
factor concerns the physical handling of goods at the airport. This factor could be argued to be
placed in 'Factor Group 2' under 'operational factors'. The reason why it is placed under 'strategic
factors' is that 'Priority maintenance' is considered more as a strategic than as an operational
issue.
Factor Group 1
Outside the airport
_, • Market-related factors
• Strategic factors
o
_, • Delivery-related factors
Factor Group 2 Factor Group 3
At the airport Aircraft
• Operational factors • Unavailability issues
• Incompatibility issues
Table 1: Factor groups and their subgroups along with tlaeir position (origin) in the system
4.2.1 Factor Group 1
"Factor Group 1' denotes hindering factors that are not caused by any operational inadequacy in
the airport. This can otherwise be expressed as factors not related to the physical handling of
goods in the airport. This group contains three subgroups of factors. These are 'market-related',
'strategic' and 'delivery-related' factors.
4.2.1.1 Market-Related Factors:
The competitive forces in the airfreight market cause this group of hinders. These are:
1. Emergence of integrators: The integrators, although traditionally had been dealing with
documents and small packets, have diversified their service and have achieved a significant
share of the market. This has deteriorated belly utilization.
2. Competition in short destination flights: The short destination flights contain less freight than
the long destination ones since it costs the customers much more to send the freight by ai_
thanby truck. If logistically the freightis to betransportedfastaccordingto thecustomer,
only thentheairlinesareaskedfor theservicein shortdistantflights.Consequently,for the
shortdestinationflights thereusedtobeahugeemptycapacity.
4.2.1.2StrategicFactors:
Different strategiesthat airlineshavein their operationscausethis groupof hinderingfactors.
Theseare:
1. Priority maintenance: There are many activities that take place during the turnaround process
for an aircraft. The passengers get the highest priority to be boarded into the aircraft. Then
comes the baggage of the boarded passengers, the post and then freight with the lowest
priority. This means that if there is not enough time for the freight to get the flight, the freight
is left back at the airport.
2. Smaller capacity aircraft: Type of aircraft is very important for a good capacity in the belly.
Wide-body aircraft is freight friendlier than slim-body aircraft. The demand of the industries
is, generally, shipment of bigger volume freight. For the demanded volume of shipment, for
the distribution and logistics it is very difficult to reach a solution based on capacity in the
slim-body aircraft. Also, if the passenger volume is not much then generally an even smaller
type of airline is used, which is even worse for the huge amount of freight.
3. Use of belly freight only for express delivery: Different airlines have different strategies with
the pricing of the belly airfreight. For some airlines belly is an express freight and should be
paid accordingly, i.e. a higher price. They do not want to ship normal freight through the
belly even if there is empty capacity.
4. Separate organizations: For some airlines the cargo and passenger units are separate
organizations and the cooperation between them is often poor resulting a worse business. The
passenger unit wants the best of the passengers and does not want to think about the benefit
of the cargo unit if that collides with the benefit of the passenger unit. When, for example, it
concerns purchasing of new aircraft they prioritize issues like speed, environmental-
friendliness of the vehicle and even cost for the runway while the weight of the aircraft
exceeds a certain capacity.
5. Fueling: Sometimes the aircraft takes fuel in a place where the price is cheaper. This
increases the weight of the airlines that results less freight in the belly. Also, for longer
destinations the aircraft must contain a huge amount of fuel, which also decreases capacity in
the belly.
6. Capacity problem in HUB: The HUB might have limited capacity and cannot process goods
when it exceeds a certain amount. This might cause the flights not to exceed certain load so
that the ultimate pressure in the hub does not exceed it's capacity.
7. Prioritizing permanent customers: There is often a problem with the permanent customers
that they deliver more (or less) than they are supposed to. The deviation is not informed
earlier to the airline which makes it difficult to plan the load. If the arrived goods are much
more than informed, others' freight is unloaded prioritizing the goods of the permanent
customers. These customers even send less goods than they are supposed to. In that case the
belly utilization is less because by that time they had already refused to take goods from
other customers assuming that the permanent customers would send the promised amount of
goods.
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8. Concentration on pure freighter: As the airfreight market is increasing very fast some of the
airlines using pure freighters to tackle the demand. Thus, dependency on belly goes down
which results in no concentration in planning of a better utilization of it. Passenger
prioritization for these airlines rises even higher, which results in a less belly capacity.
9. Less cooperation with the customers: The forwarders generally do not let the airlines to be
involved in the relation between the forwarders and their customers. Information that could
directly be conveyed to/from the customers goes via forwarders instead and thus it takes
longer time to solve the problem.
10. Deadline to deliver freight at terminal: Deadline of delivering the goods for belly traffic
might vary between airlines. Sometimes the time (demanded by the airlines) for operations
on the goods at the terminal might be more than necessary. If the deadline (for customers) to
deliver the goods at terminal is increased, the airline could get some more customers and thus
process more freight for the belly.
4.2.1.3 Delivery-Related Factors:
This group of hinders are caused by the customers or the forwarders while delivering goods to
the airport. These are:
1. Goods arriving the terminal mostly at the same time: The goods arrive at the airport mostly
in the evening. The airplanes, on the other hand, run all day long. This points out to an
uneven utilization of belly capacity. Moreover, to some destinations it is too late to ship the
goods in the evening since the goods cannot be custom-checked in the destination airport and
thus can not reach the customers in the same evening. (Moreover, the fact that most of the
goods arrive at the same time can mean a quality problem in the handling of the goods.)
2. Late arrival of the goods at the airport: Late arrival of the goods at the airport may cause
planned shipment cancelled.
3. Wrong information about the shape/weight of goods: It might be a problem to load the goods
if incorrect information about its shape or weight is received. Belly has shape and weight
constraints. If the information about the weight or shape is wrong, it may lead the plane to
leave the airport without carrying the goods.
4.2.2 Factor Group 2
'Factor Group 2' represents hindering factors that are caused by operational inadequacies at the
airport, more precisely, at the apron. This group contains a single subgroup of factors. This
subgroup is termed as 'operational' factors.
4.2.2.1 Operational Factors:
This group of hinders are caused by inefficient operation on the goods after the goods are
delivered at the airport until loaded into the aircraft. These are:
1. Congestion at ramp at the peak hours: Sometimes congestion at ramp (caused by different
servicing vehicles at the ramp) at the peak hours constrains the loading possibility.
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. Weight limitations of handling equipment at the ramp: Sometimes the mechanical equipment
cannot handle weights of certain capacity for the belly cargo to be utilized. Even if the source
airport is equipped, the destination airport might have insufficiency to handle certain amount
of weight.
4.2.3 Factor Group 3
Factors described in 'Factor Group 3' are related to problems around the aircraft. Hindering
factors in this group are caused by aircraft unavailability and also incompatibility of aircraft
capacity with the amount of goods to be loaded. This capacity minimization could be due to less
time for loading the goods or due to less physical capacity in the aircraft resulting whole or part
of planned shipment cancelled.
4.2.3.1 Unavailability Issues:
Belly utilization is decreased through unavailability of the aircraft in the terminal. The following
factors can cause aircraft unavailability:
1. Cancellation of the aircraft: Cancellation of flights due to technical or other problems makes
planned shipment often cancelled. It is easier to mange with the passengers rerouting their
journey. Because the transfer time (in a third airport) is much less for the passenger than for
the freight.
2. Non-arrival of scheduled flight: Non-arrival of scheduled flights (because of cancellations in
the source airport) makes planned shipment cancelled.
4.2.3.2 Incompatibility Issues:
Even if the aircraft is available, the aircraft capacity might be incompatible with the amount of
goods to be loaded. Incompatibility might be generated due to less loading time or less physical
capacity in the aircraft. The following factors may cause incompatibility:
1. Late arrival of the aircraft: Late arrival of the aircraft makes the turnaround time shorter. The
aircraft turnaround time is very important to maintain because it plays a vital role for the
image of the airlines. If an incoming flight arrive late at the airport, scheduled loading of
freight might be cancelled or the amount allowed might be less in order to maintain a fast
turnaround. Certain type of goods (big pallets, for example) is hard to load in a shorter
turnaround time.
2. Unexpected amount of passenger baggage: Amount of passenger baggage may vary because
of unanticipated amount of passengers. Even with the same amount of passengers, the
baggage amount may vary. In a slim-body passenger aircraft Generally 1000 to 3000 kg's of
freight is possible to load after loading the baggage of the passengers. But sometimes this
estimation does not work because of uncertain amount of luggage enter the belly leaving a
few or almost no capacity to be used by the freight. Preventive measures could be taken in
order to increase the probability of utilization of the belly.
3. Sztdden change of aircraft: If number of passengers is less than anticipated the planned
aircraft may be changed to a smaller type. This might cancel planned shipment.
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. Weather conditions minimizing lifting capacity: Weather conditions (like headwind) in
specific geographical locations sometimes limit the aircraft to exit certain weight. The belly
gets affected since it has the last priority to get the aircraft.
5 ANALYSES OF FACTORS
In this section, the impact of the hindering factors (that are identified through interviews with the
different actors) on the whole process of belly utilization will be analyzed.
Factor Group Number of hinders contained %oftotal
15 65
2 2 9
3 6 26
Table 2: Share of factor groups causing less belly utilization
The hindering factors in FG 1 (Factor Group 1) minimize the possibility of delivering the freight
to the terminal (figure 3). Which means, the less the strength of the factors in this group the
better it is for the availability of freight at the airport. The hindering factors in FG2 complicate
the chances of the existing freight to be transported to the belly and thus minimize the belly
utilization. Factors in FG3 minimize it even further. The less the strength of the underlying
hindering factors (i.e. the less the possibility that a certain constraining factor will occur) the
more the possibility of a better belly utilization. FG1 (with the underlying factor groups --
market related factors, strategic factors and delivery-related factors) appears to be the strongest
(at least in quantity of hindering factors) among all the groups. FG2 contains the lowest number
of factors. If the goods flow will be much more (that is if influence from FG1 is less) than new
operational hinders and also strengthening of mentioned hinders might occur weakening the
belly utilization. More goods flow might even strengthen the factors belonging to FG3.
Even if more hindering factors might be generated or strengthening of the existing hinders might
occur, these should not prevent more goods flow at the airport. Along with the generation of
hinders, preventive measures should also be taken and implemented.
As we can see in table 2, FG1 contains 65% of the all the hindering factors. FG2 and FG3
contain 9% and 26% of the factors respectively. If we consider that each of all the 23 factors
described above weigh the same, FG1 obviously draws the concentration. The second argument
to concentrate mostly on FG1 is that there must be goods at the terminal in order to process it all
the way to the aircraft.
6 ACTOR VERIFICATION
In this section, the estimated strength of the factor groups analyzed in the previous section will
be verified with the quantitative data collected through a questionnaire survey. The survey
includes three main commercial airports in Sweden, which are Stockholm-Arlanda, GtSteborg-
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Landvetter, and Malmti-Sturup. For each of the airports, main actors (or airlines) utilizing
passenger aircraft belly for freight flow were defined. The different ground-handling companies
operating in the respective airports were contacted in order to know who the main actors were.
After being informed about the main actors, they were contacted and people best suited to the
goal of the survey were searched for. After being convinced that the right person (to answer to
the survey) for each of the airlines was found, the questionnaire was send to the respective
person. The total number of questionnaire sent to the actors was 20. To be mentioned that for a
single airline one individual answered to the survey representing the respective airline's
operations in two airports. Thus, the data received in a single questionnaire represents
experiences of two different airports (i.e. one additional airport). There was also a case where a
single airline was responsible for freight operations for two additional airlines. In this case, the
data received in a single questionnaire represents three airlines. This means that although the
total number of questionnaire sent to the actors was 20, they were responsible for data on more
than 20 operations. 12 of the 20 questionnaire were answered, which denotes a response of 60%.
Taking into account that one person answered for a single airline's operation in different airports
and a single airline answered also for different other airlines, 15 (i.e. 1+2+12) of the 20
questionnaire were answered denoting a response of 75%.
The airlines surveyed were - KI.,M, SAS, British Airways, Air France, Finnair, Thai Airways,
Swissair, Sabena, Austrian, Aeroflot, Premiair, Malmt_ Aviation, Novair, Iberia, and Delta
Airlines.
Two questions were mainly focussed in the survey. The first one was to estimate the degree of
influence each of the hindering factors had on the operations of the actors. The second one was
to estimate how the actors considered the possibility to eliminate the hindering factors. Figure 4
demonstrates the influence of the factors and the possibility to eliminate the factors as received
through the survey.
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Figure 4: The degree of influence of different hindering factors and their possible elimination
To be mentioned that all the respondents answered to the first question and only one of the
received questionnaire did not have any answer on the second question. In order to have a good
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comparison,dataon thesecondquestionneededto beadjustedI. Table3 showssurveydataon
boththequestionsincludingtheadjusteddataforthesecondquestion.
Hindering factors
1. Emergence of integrators
2. Competition in short
destination flights
3. Priority maintenance
4. Smaller capacity aircraft
5. Use of belly freight only for
express deliver),
6. Separate organizations
7. Fuelin_
8. Capacity problem in HUB
9. Pdoritizing permanent
customers
10. Concentration on pure
freighter
11. Less cooperation with the
customers
12, Deadline to deliver freight
at terminal
Degree of
Influence
(A)
32
38
Elimination
Possibility
(original) (B)
29
28
Elimination
Possibility
(adjusted)(C)
32
31
Difference
(A-C)
0
35 26 28 7
47 23 25 22
38 4118
-23
33 27 29 4
19 21 23 -4
24 33 36 -12
37 30 33 4
27 29 35 -8
39 32 35 4
27 31 34 -7
13. Goods arriving the terminal
mostly at the same time 38 19 21 17
14. Late arrival of the goods at
the airport 29 27 29 0
15. Wrong information about
the shape/weight of goods 31 31 37 -6
16. Congestion at ramp at the
26 28 34 -8peak hours
25 28 31 -6
17. Weight limitations of
handling equipment at the ramp
18. Cancellation of the aircraft 33 9 10 23
19. Non-arrival ofscheduled
flight 30 10 11 19
20. Late arrival ofthe aircraft 37 16 17 20
17 1939
35
21. Unexpected amount of
passenger baggage
22. Sudden change of aircraft
20
23. Weather conditions
minimizing lifting capacity
25
13 14 21
12 13 12
Table 3: Surveyed strength of the different hindering factors and their possible elimination
If we accumulate the surveyed strength (table 3) of all the hindering factors according to the
three factor groups, we can analyze the hindering strength that each factor group has in the
operation.
12L C=Bx--
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Factor
Group
(FG)
#of
underlying
factors in
FG
I 15
2 2
3 6
Sub-factors
Market-related factors
Strategic factors
Delivery-related factors
Operational factors
Unavailability issues
Incompatibility issues
Accumulated
strength of
underlying
factors
70
306
98
51
63
136
Accumulated
strength of
FG
474
51
199
Average
strength of
each hinder
31.6
25.5
33.1
Table 4: Hindering strength of each factor group
As we can see in table 4, FG1 has the biggest influence among all the factor groups with an
average strength of 31.6 for each underlying hinders. Although this average is less than the
average hindering strength of hinders in FG3, the superiority in total number hinders (in
comparison to that of FG3) makes the dominance of FG1. On the other hand, if we compare the
hindering strength with the possibility of their elimination, we can see (figure 5) that elimination
of the factors underlying in FG1 is relatively easier than elimination of factors in FG3.
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Figure 5: Differences between hindering strength and eliminating strength
It is obvious that in order to generate a better goods flow at the airport, it is necessary to reduce
the strength of factors in FG 1. Also, according to the data, it is relatively easier to confront this
group of hinders. If, after taking care of strategic or other changes, the strength of FG1 is reduced
creating a better goods flow at the airport, this will increase hindering strength of factors in both
FG2 and FG3 provided the underlying hinders are not reduced. If (in relation to a better freight
flow) the operational inefficiency at the ramp is not increased or the required capacity is not
compatible with the amount of goods, the reduction of hindering strength in FG1 would mean
nothing. This necessitates concentration on FG2 and FG3. According to figure 5, it seems that
the actors are able to have better control on the factors in FG2. When it concerns FG3, the ability
to control the underlying factors seem not to be satisfactory.
7 CONCLUSIONS
As the aircraft-turnaround time is limited the cargo is de-prioritized enters the aircraft latest in
the process. In the study, we have found that for a planned belly shipment to be made, the aircraft
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must stay at the ramp no less than the duration of the planned turnaround time. This necessitates
the aircraft to land on time. The different activities in the turnaround should also be performed
effectively enough so that the time needed to load the cargo is available. Other deviations (e.g.
change of aircraft to a smaller size etc.), that can minimize the capacity for cargo in the aircraft
should not exist. The chances that deviations take place are not rare. Customers, that want to ship
goods by air need fast transportation and pay relatively higher than they would have if
transported by any other mode. In relation to the price that customers pay, the service level must
be satisfactory. But as the different hindering factors worsen the chances of a shipment, this
might make it harder for the operators to motivate themselves to think of making customer
relations based on the empty belly utilization in passenger aircraft. Improved control over the
hindering factors, especially those related to the apron and the aircraft (i.e. FG2 and FG3) can
motivate the actors to make better customer relations and promote possibility to utilizing the
belly more efficiently as chances to more satisfactorily serve the customers are higher. These
factors hinder flow of goods in the airport, i.e. from the goods terminal to the aircraft belly.
Hindering factors that exist outside the airport area (i.e. FG1), hinder goods flow from the
customers to the airport. Before reducing the impact of FG2 and FG3, reduction of the impact of
FG1 would mean more goods at the airport creating more pressure with the limited capacity.
That is why we stress on improvement especially in FG2 and FG3. It is clear from the survey that
the underlying factors in these two groups are not easy to tackle. Factors related to unavailability
issues, like cancellation or non-arrival of scheduled flights are very much problematic since it is
hard to ship the goods through connecting routes (i.e. as done with the passengers). Preventive
measures should be taken for both the unavailability and the incompatibility issues in order to
improve the underlying hinders as much as possible. The improvement will assure more goods to
be shipped, the actors then can concentrate on reducing factors underlying in FG1 in order to
have a better goods flow to for the belly to be utilized.
The aim of this paper was also to analyze if a more efficient utilization of the belly at the daytime
can generate a new 'overday' concept of processing airfreight and thus achieve a more significant
share of the market. Integrators, as we know, have a concept of 'overnight' delivery of goods and
they are quite successful with this concept triggered by the fact that they have the goods
available at the airport in the evening for shipment. They own all the assets (e.g. different
vehicles, information system, etc. that are necessary) in the whole process of their services.
Consequently, they have a good control over the freight flow and can effectively deliver the
goods. Belly's flexibility, on the other hand, lies with the frequency of the flights. But, as most of
the goods arrive at the terminal in the evening, this frequency does not mean a lot for the
operators. The result shows also that the control is not satisfactory over the hinder. In order to
look forward to generating an 'overday' concept, hinders underlying in all the factor groups
should be minimized as much as possible so that more freight flow is generated at the airport and
satisfactory service is provided. The airlines have to realize that their service has contributed to
build up the customers' 'trust'. As day-time is not an appropriate hour for the shippers to deliver
the goods at the terminal, tempting propositions should be made by the airlines so that the
customers are interested to deliver goods all over the day. It needs further research to judge
whether it is possible to generate a 'overday' concept of passenger aircraft belly utilization as it
depends on how much of the hindering impact the airlines are willing to minimize. It depends
also on how closely the actors then (with reduced hindering impact) cooperate with each other
and exploit the advantages and disadvantages through such a process.
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Abstract
This paper puts forward the case for re-examining the feasibility of using
auctions to allocate take-off and landing slots at airports in light of the success of the
US radio spectrum auctions. It discusses how the simultaneous multi-round design of
the spectrum auctions would need to be adapted to accommodate combinatorial and
contingency bidding behaviour, given the synergies inherent in operating particular
combinations of slots and the substitutability of slots within certain time intervals. It
also highlights how broad cooperation would be required to implement such a system
across airports located in many different countries. Finally, it suggests that the right to
provide services also be embodied in the definition of a slot in order to ensure that
auction outcomes are efficient.
Introduction
The past decade has witnessed liberalisation of international air transport
markets. Many countries have substantially deregulated their domestic markets,
privatised their national "flag carriers", and permitted multiple designation of carriers
on international routes. Many have also entered into agreements with other countries
which seek to liberalise markets between themselves and the partner country. The
European Economic Area z (EEA) countries, for example, have established a Common
Aviation Market (CAM) by replacing the bilateral Air Services Agreements (ASAs)
which formally governed trade in air transport services among them with a
multilateral agreement. The US has so far replaced 33 of its ASAs with "open skies"
agreements (liberalised bilateral agreements), and Australia and New Zealand have
established a Single Aviation Market (SAM) across the Tasman.
Despite these moves, significant barriers to trade in air transport services
remain. Foreign investment remains highly restricted, and hence the liberal terms of
the replacement agreements generally only apply to carriers registered in signatory
countries. The provision ofcabotage services also remains prohibited, except for
under the CAM and SAM agreements which permit this by carriers based in signatory
countries only. These restrictions have not only prevented third-country carriers from
providing services in particular markets, but in most cases also carriers from
providing domestic services in a foreign country. They have also restricted carrier
mode of supply to "production" in the country of registration and "export" abroad.
In addition, airport- and ticket-sales-related issues have received little attention
from regulators, with two exceptions. The EEA has issued Council Directive
96/67/EC on access to ground-handling services, which permits EEA carriers to self-
handle land-side at all EEA airports, and self-handle airside at all EEA airports with 1
million passengers and/or 25 000 tonnes of freight or more per annum. Ground-
handling by third parties is also currently being phased in 2. The General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) includes an Annex on Air Transport Services, which
seeks to make aircraft repair and maintenance, travel agent and computer reservation
system (CRS) services consistent with the transparency, non-discrimination and
national treatment rules of the world trading system. However, the majority of GATS
signatory countries were granted exemptions from the three Annex provisions, such
that at present the Annex is virtually ineffective 3.
This paper focuses on the allocation of take-off and landing slots at major
airports, one of the airport-related issues which has received virtually no attention
from regulators. It describes methods currently used to allocate slots, and explains
how these not only make significant competitive new entry difficult, but also prevent
incumbents from operating efficient networks. It also puts forwards the case for re-
The t 5 Member States of the European Union plus Norxvay, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
" This is scheduled to be in place at all EEA airports with 2 million passengers or 50 000 tormes of
freight or more per armum by 1 January 2001 (Official Journal of the European Communities No L
272.25q0_96; 36).
_:\ new round of negotiation_ is scheduled to begin in 2000, at which time these exemptions will
expire.
examiningthefeasibilityof usingauctionsto allocateslots,giventhesuccessof the
USradiospectrumauctionsandthesimilaritiesbetweenthetasksof allocating
spectrumandslots.It alsohighlightshowthedesignof thespectrumallocation
mechanismwouldneedto beadaptedto accommodatecombinatorialandcontingency
bidsgiventhecomplementaritiesamong,andsubstitutabilityof, airportslots,andhow
broadcooperationwouldberequiredtoimplementsuchanallocationsystemacross
theworld'smajorairports,giventhatthesearelocatedinmanydifferentcountries.
Finally,it putsforwardthecasefor embodyingtherighttoprovideservicesaswell as
theability to take-offandlandin aslotasin thecaseof radiospectrum,reducingthe
currentwo-stepprocedureto asinglestepandimprovingefficiency.
SectionI: Methods Used to Allocate Slots at Major Airports
The IATA System
Historically slots were largely allocated on a first-come first-served basis. As
air traffic grew, however, airport congestion grew and so did delays. Airlines
subsequently established scheduling committees at major airports which aimed to
better coordinate take-offs and landings such that delays would be minimised. By
1993 there were over 100 of these committees in operation around the word 4.
Traditionally the committee at each airport consisted of staff on secondment from the
major incumbent airline serving that airport. However, it is now a requirement that at
fully coordinated airports (airports at which demand is greater than supply at most
times of the day) a panel consisting of the carriers which are the largest providers of
services at these airports oversee the process 5. Before each season commences, the
airport authority, on advice from air traffic control, determines the feasible number of
aircraft movements (take-offs and landings) at each hour of the day. Carriers currently
serving or wishing to serve a particular airport submit their slot requests to the
scheduling committee of that airport, and the committee allocates slots among carriers
based on their requests and the feasible number of movements.
At times of the day where demand for slots outstrips supply, committees
allocate slots according to rules set out by the International Air Transport Association
(IATA), the trade association for airlines. These rules give priority to carriers which
request slots they used in a previous equivalent season (summer or winter), then
carriers wishing to change the times of existing services, new entrants, carriers
wanting to extend existing services to year-round operations, and then carriers Whose
schedule will be effective for a longer period of operation in a particular season 6.
Since 1990 IATA rules have required that 50% of unclaimed slots, slots that become
newly available, or those surrendered under the "use-it-or-lose it" rule in each time
Jones, Viehoff and Marks (1993); 40
5The chair of the panel is still generally a former employee of the major incumbent airline: at London/
Heatkrow, for example, the chair is a former British Airways employee.
6 If slots are still available and there are requests for these, secondary criteria are used to allocate them.
These include: the need for a mixture of long-haul and short-haul operations at major airports, the
effect on competition, consideration of curfews at other airports, and requirements of the travelling
public and other users (L_.TA (199S), Schedzding Procedures Grade. TwentT-Third Edition, January;
10).
periodbeallocatedto newentrants,wherenewentrantsaredefinedas those carders
which hold no more than four slots per day at the airport in question. The IATA rules
have basically been accepted into European Union (ELI) law, with the exception that
the definition of new entrant has been extended to airlines seeking to provide
competition on intra-EEA monopoly and duopoly routes which hold fewer than four
slots a day for that service, provided that they are seeking no more than a twice daily
service, under Council Regulation 95/93 adopted in 1993. Any airline with more than
3% of all slots at an airport or more than 2% of slots at an airport system cannot
qualify as a new entrant 7.
Given that each airport scheduling committee makes its decisions
independently, IATA Schedule Coordination Conferences are held bi-annually to
enable airlines to coordinate their schedules worldwide. At these conferences, carders
are able to swap slots with others under antitrust immunity, in order to try to obtain
slots they still require or consistent sets of arrival and departure times. They may trade
slots at different airports and alter the type of aircraft flown, subject to the approval of
the relevant scheduling committees. However, no money may change hands, which
means that often trades need to involve many parties simultaneously, making the task
complex and time-consuming. Trading can also take place after the conference on an
ad hoc basis 8.
The priority given to "grandfathering" means that the majority of slots at
congested airports, particularly during peak periods, are retained each season by
incumbents. The few slots (if any) which are available will tend to at non-peak times
and inconsistent across days of the week. This has severe consequences on
competition and efficiency given the nature of passenger demand and the economics
of providing air transport services. Studies have shown that passengers, particularly
time-sensitive passengers, prefer frequent services on short-haul routes: airline yield
increases more than proportionally the greater the number of daily frequencies a
carrier offers on a particular route as business passenger numbers increase more than
proportionally 9. Passengers also prefer interlined consecutive services, as collecting
baggage and re-checking in is not necessary on these at intermediate stops. They also
show a preference for carriers on whose flights they can accumulate frequent-flyer
points l°. There is also substantial evidence that there are significant economies of
traffic density inherent in the provision of air transport services: an increase in
network traffic, via an increase in flight frequency per route, greater average load
factor, or through consolidating passengers onto larger aircraft will decrease a
carder's average costs t i.
Carriers will thus aim to provide high-frequency, well-interlined services on
which passengers can earn frequent-flyer points in order to satisfy passenger demand
and achieve the maximum cost-savings inherent in the provision of their services.
Under the IATA system of slot allocation, however, both new entrants and
7Official Journal of the European Communities No L 14, 22/1/93.
s Jones, Viehoff and Marks (1993); 41.
This phenomenon is known as the "'origin-point-presence effect" or the "'s-curve effect" (Tretheway
and Oum (1992)).
_'_Momson and Winston (19S9). usin_ 19S3 US data. tbund that on average passengers were willing to
pay an additional USS32 per round trip in order to accumulate frequent flyer points. :
L_Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (19S4).
incumbentsarerestrictedin theirabilityto dothis.Newentrantsareunlikelyto be
allocatedsufficientquantitiesof peak-periodslotsconsistentlytimedacrosstheweek
whichwouldenablethemto providehigh-frequency,well-interlinedservicesand
hencecompete ffectivelywith incumbentcarriers.Experiencein theEEA showsthat
carrierswhichhavebeenallocatedslotsfromthe50%of theslotpool reservedfor
newentrantshavenotsubsequentlybegunprovidingservicesonshort-haulroutesin
competitionwith incumbents;rather,theyhaveeitherhandedthemback,usedthemto
increasefrequencyof serviceonroutestheyalreadyserve,or begunprovidinglong-
haulservices12.
Theprohibitionof slotsalesfurtherhindersnewcarriersfrom entering
markets.Asalreadymentioned,theIATA systemonlypermitsslotswaps,andhence
carriersmustinitially havesomethingto swapinorderto takepart in thisprocess.
Slotsalesallegedlytakeplaceinpost-conferencetrading,disguisedasslotswaps:
carriersexchangeslots,wherethisis accompaniedby anunder-the-tablefinancial
paymentfromtheholderof theslotwith thelowermarketvalueto theholderof the
slotwhichhasahighervalue.Evencarrierswhichhavenotbeenallocatedslotsatthe
airportin questioncantakepartin thisby applyingfor anoff-peakslot,atsay5am
andthen"swapping"this for theslottheydesire.Theslotobtainedby theothercarrier
issubsequentlyreturnedto slotpoolunderthe"use-it-or-lose-it"ruleof theIATA
system.However,it isunlikelythatanewentrantwill beableto acquireeitherthe
numberof thetypeof slotsit wouldrequireto establishviableservicesonshort-haul
routes,especiallywhensomeof thepotentialtradingpartnersarecarrierswhich it
wouldcompetedirectlywith shouldit beableto acquirethem.Evenif slotsallocated
couldbeboughtandsold,however,newentrantswouldbeat adisadvantageasthey
wouldbeforcedtopayfor somethingwhichincumbentswereinitially allocatedfree
of charge.
Obtainingthenecessaryslotsis likely to becomemoreof aproblemovertime
giventheincreasingnumberof airlinesestablishinginter-carrierallianceageements,
asnotonlywill thepoolof sellersshrink,butalsonewentrantswill haveto provide
morefrequenciesinmarketswherethepartnercarriersbothprovideservicesand
coordinatetheirschedules.Newentrantscouldthemselvesenterinto code-sharingor
block-purchasingagreementswithcarriersalreadyservingthemarketsin whichthey
wishto operate.However,thisonlyallowsthemto indirectlyservethesemarkets.In
addition,theirability to dothiswill alsodependon thesuccesstheyhavein findinga
partner,whichin turnwill dependontheextenttowhichincumbentsalreadyhave
suchagreementswith thenewentrant'scompetitors.
A carriermaybeabletobeginprovidingservicesinparticularmarketsif a
secondairportexistsin acity whichcanaccommodatehetypeof servicesalso
operatedoutof thefirst andit itselfisnotslot-constrainedatpeakperiods.However,
theseairportsareoftennotperfectsubstitutesfor oneanother:time-sensitive
passengersinparticularoftenpreferoneairportoveranotherdueto locationalorother
factors.In London,for example,manypassengersshowadistinctpreferencefor
HeathrowAirport comparedtoGatwick,giventheformer'scloserproximityto the
centreof Londonandits greaternumberof connectionpossibilities:3.Theseairports
_-"UKCivilAviatio::Authorit2,'(1998).
_:GIG-',,Inc(1996)statethatyieldson Heathrow services are of the order of 10'!_,htgt:er:than
equivalent Gatwick sen'ices.
will becomeclosersubstitutesthelongertheflight-lengthor thegreatertheprice
differentialbetweenthesameflightoperatingoutof theprimaryandsecondary
airports.Experiencesin theUSandtheUK showthatsecondaryairportsare
extremelyeffectivesubstitutesif thepricedifferentialis largeenough:Southwest
AirlinesandeasyJetoperateoutof Dallas/Lovefield andLondon/Luton
respectively14.Indeed,carrierscanevenviablyprovidelow-frequency,non-interlined
serviceswhichdonotprovidefrequent-flyerbenefitsatnon-peaktimesof thedayif
airfaresaresufficientlylow.
It isnotnecessarilythecasethatnew-entryismorebeneficialthananincrease
in servicesby incumbentcarriers.Indeed,thesmallerthenumberof slotsobtainedby
theentrant,themorelikely it is thatincumbentscouldhaveusedthesemore
effectively.Forexample,anincumbentmayusethemtogetherwith slotsit already
hasto beginprovidingservicesin newmarketsin competitionwith othercarriers,
whichnotonlyleadsto areductionin airfaresin thesemarkets,but alsoimprovesthe
connectivityof its networkandoffersitspassengersmorewaysto camfrequent-flyer
pointsandredeemaccumulatedmileage.Alternatively,it mayusethemtobegin
providingservicesin amarketnotcurrentlyserved,whichmayprovidegreater
benefitsto passengersthanthroughhavinganewcompetitorin amarketalready
served.Evenif thenewentrantusestheslotsin thesameway in whichtheincumbent
wayplanningto usethem,it maybethecasethattheincumbentismoreefficientthan
itsnewentrantcounterpart,andhencethatadditionalinefficienciesarebeing
introducedinto themarket.
Thedifficultiesexperiencedin obtainingslotsbywould-benewentrants
protectsincumbentcarriersfromcompetition,enablingthemto pricetheirservices
abovethelong-runcompetitivelevel.However,thismustbetraded-offagainsthe
factthattheyaresimilarlyunlikelyto beallocatedslotswhichwouldenablethemto
addto theirexistingroutenetworks.Indeed,theymayevenbeunableto obtainthe
necessaryslotsto addfrequenciesto routestheyalreadyservein orderto morefully
captureeconomiesof densitygiventhatif theyapplyfor newslotstheirrequest
receiveslowerpriority thanthoseof newentrants.In orderto beginoperatingnew
routesor increaseflight frequency,incumbentsmustthussacrificeservicesthey
currentlyprovidesuchthattheslotstheyrequirebecomeavailable.This limitsthe
extento whichcarrierscanrespondto passengerdemandandcapturesavingsfrom
economiesof trafficdensity.
An additionalproblemwith theIATA systemis thatit isnot internationally
binding.In practicethismeansthatallocationisproneto interventionby national
governmentsreactingto politicalpressures,andthatthereis little adverselyaffected
carrierscandoaboutit exceptlodgecomplaints.A recentexampleof thisoccurring
wastheallocationof"new" slotsatTokyo/NaritaAirportin thesecondhalfof
1998is.Whenthisoccurs,thesystemis notconsistentwith thenon-discrimination,
nationaltreatmentandtransparencyprinciplesof theworld tradingsystem.
t4Lo;'efieldAirportiswithincloserproximityofthecentreofDallasthanFortWorthAirport;
however,thelatterhasbetterconnectionpossibilities.
_5202"'new"slotsbecameavailableaftertheconclusionfaMemorandumofUnderstandingbetween
JapanandtheUS;theseweresubsequentlymainlyawardedtoJapaneseandUScarriers,mostofwhich
alreadyhavesubstantialpresenceatthisairport.UScarriersclaimthatheseslotsbecameavailable
becauseanumberof(unused)slotsweresurrenderedbyFederalExpressandbecausetheJapaneseair
Finally,governmentsforegorevenuefromcarrierswhichwouldnormally
accruetoasset-holders.Thisrevenuecouldbeusedto improvethebudgetbottomline
orprovidetax-reliefto corporationsor individuals.
The US System
The IATA system cannot be used to allocate slots at US airports 16, as under
US anti-trust laws US carriers cannot meet to discuss flight scheduling. Airlines
simply schedule their flights taking into account expected delays at the busier
airports 17, except at the designated "high-density" airports: Chicago/O'Hare,
Washington/Reagan National, New York/John F Kennedy and New York/La
Guardia. Slots used for domestic services at these four airports have been subject to
different rules since the introduction of the "High Density Traffic Airports Rule" by
the FAA in April 1969. The rule established slot quotas for scheduled air carrier
services, commuter services and general aviation at these airports.
Initially scheduling committees were set up at each of these four airports,
where each consisted of committee staff and carriers serving or wanting to serve the
airport in question. Unlike the situation at fully-coordinated airports which abide by
the IATA rules, however, after all slot requests were received all members of a
scheduling committee would meet together and multilaterally negotiate the
withdrawal of requests for slots until the number sought equaled the number available
at all times of the day. These meetings were granted anti-trust immunity; however,
post-committee meeting gatherings to coordinate schedules across airports were not
permitted. Importantly, any distribution of slots was required to be unanimously
agreed upon by committee members; if agreement was not forthcoming within a
certain time period the responsibility of allocating slots would be handed over to the
FAA. The rules the FAA would use to allocate slots in such a situation, however,
were unknown t8. Grether, Isaac and Plott (1989) used controlled environment
experiments to show that in such circumstances committee decisions will tend to be
substantially governed by the perceived consequences of default. Larger carriers
apparently thought that the FA.A would grant new entrants at least a small number of
slots, and hence "conceded" these in committee meetings in order to avoid default.
Initially the system encouraged new entry because potential entrants knew that
they were almost guaranteed to gain some slots given their ability to cause the
committee to default, but the scale of new entry was generally small. Many of the
traffic controller's union agreed to raise hourly traffic movements. However, many of the slots which
became available were at different times to the surrendered slots. There is industry speculation that
these slots were "found" in order to appease the US given that the new (second) runway is unlikely to
be fully operational for several years, and that the compliance of Japanese carriers was obtained in
return for assurances that they would be looked upon favourably when the slots which become
available prior to the opening of the new runway are allocated. The Europeans subsequently formally
complained and threatened sanctions against Japan (Airline Business, August 1998; 28-29 and October
1998; 26).
_6Agencies (usually the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)) represent US canners in LATA
schedule coordination conferences which involve the trading of slots used for international services at
US airports (Starkie (1992); 27).
i: Starkie (199S); 113
_ Grether, Isaac and Plott (1989)
outcomesof thesystemwere similar to those of the IATA system: new entrants were
not necessarily more efficient than incumbent operators, incumbents were prevented
from expanding their services in line with passenger demand without sacrificing
existing services and hence were preventing from fully capturing economies of traffic
density inherent in the provision of their services. However, in addition, the system
made it difficult for carriers to coordinate system-wide operations given that the
decisions each committee were made independently of allocations at other airports.
Deregulation of US domestic aviation markets in 1978, however, led to
increased demand for slots, making it more difficult for scheduling committees to
reach consensus. The FAA was eventually forced to intervene in 1980 when new
entrant New York Air sought a large number of slots in order to establish low-cost
services between Washington/Reagan National and New York, and it took slots from
incumbents for redistribution among new entrants tg. The system was suspended in
response to the air traffic controllers' strike in 1981, and in 1982 carriers were
permitted to transfer and to buy and sell slots for a six week period 2°. After this time
slot transfers continued, and the FAA used lotteries to allocate any additional slots
becoming available at these airports which contained special provisions for new
entrants. In 1984 scheduling committees were reinstated; however, the same problems
were encountered as before.
Given the increasing difficulties in reaching a consensus among scheduling
committee members and the successful trial of the trading system, the "buy-sell" rule
was implemented on 1 April 1986 at the four high-density airports. Under this rule,
carriers are able to buy, sell, trade or lease their historic entitlements of slots used for
domestic services in a secondary market 2_, where trades can be one-for-one or of
uneven numbers of slots and accompanied by a financial payment. At all times,
however, slots remain the property of the FAA. Slots set aside for commuter services
cannot be bought by larger carriers, and the use of slots is subject to a "use-it-or-lose-
it" rule 22. Surrendered slots and others which become available are put into a pool and
reallocated by lottery. 25% of these are reserved for new entrants 2324
Before the buy-sell rule came into effect, the FAA made 5% of slots at
O'Hare, Reagan National and J'FK airports available for reallocation to new entrants
and incumbents with less than eight slots at these airports in response to criticism that
19It was subsequently challenged (unsuccessfully) in the courts.
.,oDespite the uncertainty over how long the purchased fights would be valid, 194 sales took place
during this period, and at least one firm initiated a slot brokerage program (Starkie (1992); 7).
z_Off-peak slots and those used for fewer than five days/week are allocated by the FAA. Slots
identified by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation as required for Essential Air Services (EAS)
are allocated directly to the carrier providing the service.
z_,Slots not used at least 80% of the time in a two month period must be returned to the FA.A for
reaUocation.
_,3In January 1993 the definition of new entrant was broadened to include also incumbent carriers with
only a few slots at these airports (Starkie (1998); 113).
.,4Each slot is also given a "priorit3' number", assigned by lottery, which determines its priority for
withdrawal. Slots can be withdrawn if the number required for international sen'ices which have been
authorised via ASAs plus the domestic slots allocated for a particular time period exceed High Density
Rule quotas to make a sufficient number available for international the international services. Similarly,
slots can be withdrawn tbr EAS operations if not enough are available.
grandfatheringslotsfavouredincumbentsoverentrants25.It rejectedclaimsthata
greaterproportionof slotsbemadeavailableasit wasconcernedthatservicesto small
andmedium-sizedcommunitieswouldbeaffectedandbecauseincumbentcarriers
hadgivenupslotsin thepasttopermitnewentry.It alsorejectedcallsfor similar
withdrawalsandreallocationsto beheldperiodicallyin thefuturegiventhatnew
entrantscanpurchaseslotsandbeallocatedthemvia lottery.
In practice,however,newentrantshaveexperiencedifficulties in obtaining
slotswhicharetobeusedfor scheduledservices.This isbecauseincumbentshave
tendedto leaseslotsratherthansellingthemoutright,andbecauseboth leasesand
saleshavegenerallyoccurredbetweenincumbentsandcarrierswhichwouldnotbe
expectedto competevigorouslywith them26.Whensaleshaveoccurred,for example,
theyhavegenerallybeenbetweenacquiredcarriersandtheirbuyerszv,incumbents
andtheircommuterpartnersor to all-cargocompanies.Thefewsalesof slotshave
meanthatnewentrantshavehadfewopportunitiesto purchaseslots;the large
amountof leasingactivityamongrelatedcarriershasnotonlymeantthatentrants
havebeenunableto leaseslots,butalsothatincumbentshavebeenableto avoid
havingto surrenderslotsundertheuse-it-or-lose-itrule,andhencethattherehave
beenrelativelyfewslotsavailablein theslotpool.Not surprisinglythefewslots
whichhavebeensurrenderedhavebeennon-peakslots.Theextentto which
incumbentsleaseslotsamongthemselvesi likely to increasein thefuturegiventhe
increasingnumberof allianceagreementsestablishedamongcarriers.
UnliketheIATA systemortheprevioussystemusedtoallocateslotsatthe
high-densityairports,thebuy-sellrulegivesnewentrantstheright to buyandlease
slotsregardlessof whetherornottheyalreadyhaveslots.In addition,it givesthe
mostefficientnewentrantsanupperhand,as,in theabsenceof governmentsubsidies,
themostefficientcarrierswill bethemostprofitableonesandhencebeabletobid
more,whereasundertheothersystemsadministrativediscretiondetermineswhich
carrierswill begrantedslots(IATA)or all carriersareautomaticallygrantedslots
(formersystemusedatUShigh-densityairports).However,ontheotherhand,it
preventsnewentrantsfromsuccessfullycompletingtransactionsbyrequiringthemto
buyandleasefrompotentialcompetitors.Incumbentsareableto determinewhoslots
aresoldandleasedto,andhencecancontrolthelevelof competitiontheyface28.
Giventherelativelysmallnumberof slotsin theslotpoolandthatthesetendtobe
off-peakslots,therulestill requiresnewentrantstopurchasethemajorityof theslots
2_ This was done by withdrawing slots from incumbents using a reverse lottery: the FAA randomly
selected "tickets" for each hour out of a "hat", where the number of tickets each incumbent had was
proportional to slots held. The incumbent carrier holding the ftrst ticket selected had first choice of
which slots to surrender, the carrier holding the second had second choice etc. The withdrawn slots
were allocated via lotteries in March and December 1986, where each new entrants was restricted to
drawing a maximum of eight slots at each airport. Any slots surrendered not subsequently demanded
were returned to carriers in reverse order of slots surrendered.
.,6 Data which distinguishes between trade in air carrier and commuter slots is only available for the
first three years after the introduction of the buy-sell rule; however, during this period approximately
75% of all trading in air carrier slots took place betaveen amines which had some sort of cooperative
arrangement (Starkie (1992)).
-': The introduction of the buy-sell rule coincided with a period when the US domestic airline industry"
was concentrating as a result of mergers and acquisitions.
:s It is interesting to note that in the first tilree years approximately 15% of leased air carrier slots were
leased to regional carriers which operated them using small turboprop commuter planes, preventing
competitors from operating them using jet aircraft (Starkie (1992)).
it requires even though incumbents were allocated theirs free of charge. This also
means that incumbents are initially given something of equal or near value to what
they are after to trade with. Once again it is not necessarily the case that new entrants
are more efficient than incumbent carders; however, the buy-sell rule hinders the
ability of any that are to enter.
Permitting slot leasing allows better utilisation of slots (particularly seasonal
slots) and hence encourages efficiency while at the same time allowing a carrier to
avoid having to surrender slots it is not currently using. It also makes it somewhat
easier for incumbent carriers to expand their networks in response to customer
demand than under the IATA system, as they can use slots leased to affiliated
carriers 29. However, they may only be able to expand their networks up to the point
where they are fully utilising slots they were initially allocated and did not
subsequently sell unless they sacrifice existing services, as they will face the same
difficulties as new entrants in obtaining new slots. This is because all carriers always
have to obtain new slots from other carriers.
The buy-sell rule is relatively immune to political intervention and has greatly
relieved the administrative burden of the FAA, as its role in slot allocation at the four
airports has been reduced to monitoring. However, the fact that all transactions occur
among carriers (rather than the FAA) and that a substantial proportion of these are
among affiliated carriers clouds allocation procedure transparency, and makes it prone
to legal challenges.
Section II: Alternative Slot Allocation Methods
The analysis in Section I suggests that optimally any method of allocating
slots should be non-discriminatory, afford all parties national treatment and be
transparent, and hence be immune to .government intervention and (private) legal
challenges. There are three ways of allocating slots which potentially meet all of these
criteria.
Posted Runway-Use Prices
One way of meeting all of these criteria may be to incorporate slot value into
take-off and landing charges. Heathrow and Gatwick have gone someway towards
doing this, by charging a premium for runway use at peak times of the day and'during
peak season 3°. However, at most airports take-off and landing charges are the same
throughout the year, varying only by aircraft size. If airport authorities were to price
take-off and landing slots at levels which incorporated their average value (as well as
the average social cost of runway use 3t), excess demand for slots would be
eliminated, and slots would be allocated to their most efficient users.
:9 Most leases have tended to be for relatively short periods of time.
30These rates do not vary across aircraft size. and hence encourage the use of larger aircraft at these
airports.
3_Levine (1969) points out that currently take-off and landing charges generally reflect the marginal
rather than the average cost of using air traffic control (ATC) services. In addition, they reflect the
Underthissystemthevalueof take-offandlandingslotswouldbecapturedby
airport-owners32.Regulationswhichcurrentlysetanupperlimit on theprofitmargins
airportsmaymakefromaircraft-relatedbusinesswouldthusneedtoberelaxed.
Regulatoryauthoritiesgenerallyimposetheselimitsonnationalairportsandoften
insistthattheybeimposedon foreignairports 33 to prevent them from taking
advantage of their market power by limiting capacity and extracting monopoly rents
from airport users. Where airports are privately-owned, however, this system may
make airport authorities reluctant to expand airport capacity: despite the increase in
the number of aircraft movements per day, the lower charge per movement plus the
cost of expanding capacity may mean that profits are higher when capacity is
constrained.
The main problem with using posted take-off and landing charges to ration
slot usage, however, is that this relies crucially on airport authorities' ability to
determine market values and the average social cost of runway use at a given airport
at each time of the day. In practice it is likely to be very difficult to perfectly price
discriminate, given the uncertainty about the nature of market demand. Jones, Viehoff
and Marks (1993) state that under such a system prices would be reset periodically on
the basis of observed outcomes. For example, if there was excess demand for slots in
a particular time interval in one period, prices would be adjusted upwards in the next
period. It may take several periods, however, before the "correct" prices are set, such
that scarce resources are wasted (if prices are set too high) or excess demand remains
(if prices are set too low) in the meantime. Indeed, prices which equate demand and
supply in every time interval may never be met, given that demand for different types
of air transport services will grow at different rates over time.
Lottery + After-market
An alternative method of allocating slots which potentially meets the criteria
set out above is to use a lottery to initially randomly allocate slots, and then permit
post-allocation trading among lottery-participants.
There are, however, several disadvantages to using lotteries as a method of
slot allocation. The main disadvantage is that it is highly likely that carriers will be
allocated non-efficient if not non-workable combinations of slots in the initial lottery.
The more inefficient the initial allocation, the geater the extent of trading carriers will
need to undertake in the after-market in order to obtain efficient allocations. When
licences to operate radio spectrum were allocated by lottery in the US, for example, it
took over two years for secondary-market trading of licenses to cease. This not only
imposes costs on participants, but also can delay the implementation of services
(marginal) private cost of runway use, rather than the (average) social cost, as they do not incorporate
the costs of aircraft "footprint" pressure (runway wear-and-tear), noise or pollution.
3,_.Airport-owners would capture an amount equal to the valuation of the second-highest bidder for each
slot; successful bidders would capture the difference between their valuation and the amount they paid
for each slot (the second-highest bid).
3_ This is done by including a clause regarding airport pricing in agreements governing trade in air
transport services. Article 10.3 of the US-UK ASA (Bermuda IIL for example, states that atrport
charges "'... may reflect, but shall not exceed, the full cost.., of providing appropriate aLr'port and air
navigation facilities, and may provide for a reasonable rate of return on assets, after depl'eciation."
(Jones, Viehoff and Marks (1993): 54).
associated with the use of the slots, causing carriers to forego revenue and imposing
huge costs on passengers and communities which rely on the provision of air transport
services. These costs will be even larger if individual lotteries are held for each
airport, each of which only covers the slots available at this airport, and these are
conducted sequentially. The efficiency of the process can be maximised by imposing
eligibility requirements (such as requiring potential lottery participants to register and
show that they are able to operate the slots should they be allocated them) as these
will minimise speculative behaviour34; however, these have to be of form which does
not deter genuine participation.
Carriers will also encounter similar problems in the secondary market as US
carriers currently do under the buy-sell rule, as they must obtain slots from lottery-
winners, many of whom will be potential competitors. Carriers may tend to lease slots
for short periods of time rather than sell them outright, and only lease them to carriers
with whom they have established cooperative agreements. If the lottery is once-off,
carriers may experience difficulties adjusting their slots portfolios or acquiring
additional slots in the future, preventing them from fully responding to changes in
consumer demand. It is thus not necessarily the case that secondary market trading
will ever enable carriers to obtain efficient slot allocations. Trading in the secondary
market will thus be non-transparent and subject to legal challenges.
This process will be unpopular with some incumbent carriers, especially the
less slots which are grand-fathered and the more are allocated by lottery, as it is likely
that they will be forced to engage in secondary market trading in order to obtain the
slots they require, and, if successful, they will be required to pay these slots.
However, it may also be unpopular with the general public, as this method of slot
allocation allows the value of a scarce public resource to be captured entirely by
lottery winners. The government is missing out on a windfall revenue gain which
could be used to improve the budget bottom line and bring relief to tax-payers. In the
radio spectrum lotteries the US Government was severely criticised for giving away
this revenue when it became public knowledge the sums of money licences were
being bought and sold for in secondary markets.
Auctions
A third method of allocating slots is to use an auction process. Carriers would
submit bids to a competition or air transport regulatory authority, and slots would be
allocated to those with the highest bids. Carriers would thus be forced to pay market
prices for all slots they require. Secondary market trading would be permitted to allow
carriers to make minor adjustments to their slot portfolios in response to information
which becomes available after the initial auction.
The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has held auctions on
sixteen occasions since July 1994 to allocate almost 6000 radio spectrum licences for
use in nine different wireless and satellite categories. These auctions have been highly
successful, and the FCC now has a fully computerised Automated Auction System
(AAS) which it uses to determine the revenue-maximising configuration of bids. In
:a In the US radio spectrum lotteries, it took 20 months to screen potential lottery participants; however,
when pre-lottery screening was abandoned the lotteries attracted approximatel.v 400,000 speculative
participants hoping to acquire a license to sell on.
addition,thetaskof allocatingradiospectrumis in manywayssimilarto thetaskof
allocatingtake-offandlandingslots,giventheirsimilarcharacteristics.
As in thecaseof take-offandlandingslots,radiospectrumhadpreviously
beenallocatedviaadministrativedecisions35. This was becoming increasing complex
and time-consuming to all involved, however, as the advent of new communications
technologies and services increased the demand for spectrum. To relieve its
administrative burden the FCC then used lotteries. However, as already mentioned it
took some years before after-market trading resulted in the licences being allocated to
those even capable of and intending to providing telecommunications services, and
the US Government was severely criticised for "throwing away" windfall revenue.
The auction format used was a simultaneous, multi-round sealed-bid auction.
A simultaneous format was used because spectrum licence values are to some extent
interdependent: the value of a particular licence will depend on the value of others.
They thus allow prices of similar items to equalise. Multiple rounds of bidding were
conducted for two reasons. Firstly, it was thought that there was a great deal of
uncertainty among bidders about market demand and hence the underlying value of
the licences, that is, that common value uncertainty was high. A multi-round format
would enable bidders to observe the bidding behaviour of their competitors, and
hence leam more about the true value of licences in successive rounds. This, in turn,
would reduce the risk of the "winner's curse": that the bidder winning the auction for
a particular licence is the one who overestimates common value the most, and hence
is not necessarily the most efficient user. Common value uncertainty also reduces
revenues to the auctioneer, as the optimal bidding strategy for each bidder is to reduce
their bids. Secondly, a multiple-round format enables auction participants to fully
respond to price information obtained in later rounds. If bidding for a particular
licence goes above the constraints of their budget, they can switch to bidding for a
different licence. This type of auction thus reduces the risk that bidders are unable to
respond to price information which becomes available and, given their budget
constraints, miss out on obtaining licences entirely. Bids were required to be sealed to
minimise the risk of collusion among auction participants; auction participants were
assigned bidder numbers. However, after several rounds participants were generally
able to match bidder numbers with names from bidding behaviour given a priori
information about each bidder 36.
Similar auction formats had been used to allocate radio spectrum in other
countries prior to 1994. These have been conducted with varying degrees of success;
however were they have been unsuccessful it is generally due to flaws in the design of
the auction, rather than a failure of the actual auction mechanism itself. In New
Zealand, for example, a series of second-price sealed-bid auctions were used to
allocate radio spectrum in the early 1990s. The auctions successfully allocated
spectrum to those bidders who valued it most; however, the lack of a floor price for
bids together with thin demand and large divergences in valuations among bidders
meant that many winners ended up having to pay only a small proportion of their
_sTh: FCC held quasi-judicial comparative hearings when there were two or more applicants.
3(, Given this and the tact that, in its assessment, the likelihood ofcollusion among auc!ion-participants
is loa. the FCC has decided that bids will be open in furore auctions (Cramton (1995)1.:
willingnessto pay37,whichcreatedmuchpoliticalcontroversy.Establishingreserve
priceswouldhaveachievedthesameallocationof spectrumamongbiddersbut
increasedrevenuesaccruingtotheGovernment.In Australia,a first-pricesealed-bid
auctionwasheldin 1993to allocatetwosatellitetelevisionlicences.Onceagainthe
auctionsuccessfullyallocatedthelicencesefficiently;however,achievingthistook
almostayeardueto thelackof penaltiesfor default38.Implementationof theservices
associatedwith the licenceswasthusdelayedby almostayear.
Take-offandlandingslotsaresimilartoradiospectrumin anumberof ways.
Firstly,slotvaluesarehighly interdependent:thevalueof aparticularslot toacarder
will dependcruciallyonwhatotherslotsthecarrieracquires.Secondly,thereis likely
to beagreatdealof uncertaintyamongcardersaboutmarketdemandandhence
underlyingslotvalue.In addition,uncertaintyaboutaparticularmarketis likely to be
greateramongthosecarrierswhichdonotcurrentlyservethatmarket.Furthermore,
cardersalreadyservingthosemarketswill haveanincentiveto bid for thenecessary
slotsgiventheinvestmentstheyhavemadeindifficult-to-transferassetsassociated
with theprovisionof theseservices.A multi-roundformatwouldrevealeachbidder's
privatevaluationsof slotsthroughsuccessiveroundsof biddingactivity,mitigating
uncertaintyaboutunderlyingmarketdemandandredressingtheimbalancein the
informationsetavailableto incumbentsandnewentrantsrespectively39.It wouldalso
enableauctionparticipantsto fully respondto priceinformationobtainedin later
rounds,reducingtherisk thattheyareleftwith inefficientandunworkable
combinationsof slots.Sealedbiddingis likely tobemorenecessaryin slotauctions
giventheincreasingnumberof cooperativeagreementsamongcarriers.Openbidding
wouldmakeit easierfor carriersto colludewith theirregionalaffiliatesor global
alliancepartners.
Thissuggeststhatsimultaneous,multi-round,sealed-bidauctions(together
with anafter-marketto permitminoradjustments)couldpossiblybeusedto allocate
take-offandlandingslots.However,thereareseveralimportantwaysinwhichthe
slotallocationproblemdiffersfromproblemof howto allocateradiospectrum.
SectionIII: Adapting the Spectrum Allocation Mechanism to Auction Slots
Combinatorial Bids
Firstly, while there is perhaps little synergy value inherent in operating
particular combinations of spectrum licences together, this is not the case for take-off
and landing slots. A certain combination of slots may enable a carrier to operate a
high frequency service on a particular route, for example, such that it is able to
capture economies of traffic density. If carriers can only bid for individual slots, they
37In one case a firm bidding SNZ 7m ended up paying only S5000, while another bidding 5100 000
pa}d only $6.
Fwo bidders with no intention of launching services put in a range of bids which ensured that they
won the auction; they then proceeded to default on successive bids while seeking profitable resale
opportunities.
-_ An activiw rule would need to be imposed which requires auction participants to increase their bids
by a minimum percentage each round (which would he lowered as biddingactivity slows) in order to
prevent carriers from concealing their m_e valuations until the final round.
will haveto decidehow to spreadthissynergyvalueacrosstheirbidsfor the
individualslotswhichmakeupsuchcombinations.Thiscreatestherisk thatacarrier
mayspreadthesynergyvalueinsuchawaythatit isoutbidonaparticularslotand
henceis left with acombinationof slotswhichhasaloweroverallvaluethanwhatit
paidforthem.In addition,thiscombinationof slotsmaybeunworkable.
Onewayto avoidthisproblemis topermitcarrierstosubmitcombinatorial
bids as well as bids for single slots. A combinatorial bid would be successful if the
price offered for a group of slots was more than the sum of the highest bids offered
for each of the slots individually. However, permitting combinatorial bidding may
actually produce some inefficiencies due to free-rider problems. Two bidders each
bidding for a single slot may have a combined valuation for the two slots which is
higher than that of a bidder which submits a single bid for both slots, but the
combinatorial bid may win as each of the bidders after a single slot has the incentive
to let the other raise the bid. In addition, combinatorial auctions are difficult to
conduct in practice, due the complexity of determining the revenue-maximising
configuration of bids, particularly when there are many items being auctioned as
would be the case in slot auctions. However, given that the FCC has been instructed
to experiment with combinatorial bidding and hence that combinatorial bidding may
be permitted in future spectrum auctions, it is possible that sofrware capable of
running such auctions will soon be available.
Contingency Bids
The second way in which the task of allocating slots differs from the problem
of allocating radio spectrum is that slots within a particular time-period are substitutes
for one another. The longer the length of the route a carrier plans to use particular
slots for, the greater this time period will be. Any slot auction will thus also need to
permit contingency bids. These will allow a carrier which wants to obtain a group of
slots sometime within a particular time interval to submit multiple bids for this group
which differ by time or other factors, but only be allocated at most one group of slots.
Allowing carriers to submit contingency bids increases the complexity of
determining the solution to the slot allocation problem. Jones, Viehoff and Marks
(I 993) also question whether carriers would be able to determine all the bids they
could possibly submit, given that each service could potentially vary by departure
time, aircraft size, and so on. The set of all possible bids could be so large that it is too
time-consuming to determine; however, if all the alternatives are not considered and
bid for, they may miss out altogether 4°.
A further problem with combinatorial auctions which permit contingency
bidding is that no set of prices can be determined which will separate bids that are
chosen from those that are not because this is a discrete programming problem. Only
a lower price below which no bids are accepted and an upper price above which all
bids are accepted can be determined. Which of the bids lying in the region between
these two prices (the "core" region) will be accepted and which rejected will be
determined by the exact requirements of each bidding airline. Those carriers whose
services "fit in" will be allowed to operate services at a particular time slot, even
*) Jones, Viehoff and Marks ( 1993); 47
though the bids of others whose services do not fit in may be marginally higher. In
practice, then, some administrative assistance may be required to determine which of
the services whose bids lie in the core region will fit in and hence be allocated the
required slots. The decisions of these administrators will need to be transparent, non-
discriminatory, and consistent with national treatment for the outcome to be efficient.
However, bids lying in the core region comprise a small percentage of all bids and are
known to decrease in relative number as the problem size increases 4t.
Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982) conducted controlled experiments in which
six participants were required to determine and bid for combinations of slots available
at six hypothetical airports. Each experiment consisted of sequence of market periods
conducted within a three hour time limit. In each period bids submitted were entered
into a computer which subsequently determined the revenue-maximising combination
of bids and hence the auction solution. Those participants submitting the bids which
maximised system revenue paid a price equal to the sum of the marginal (shadow)
prices (the lower bound prices) of each of the slots in the combination bid for, and
hence were able to fully capture the synergy value inherent in each slot combination.
This charging system was adopted to encourage demand revelation: the optimal
bidding strategy under such conditions is to bid truthfully 42. Participants could then
trade slots in an after-market of the oral-bid type.
Despite the potential problems associated with the existence of a core region
of bids, the experiments were highly successful: experienced participants achieved
allocative efficiencies of 98-99% of the possible surplus after only a few time periods.
This was achieved despite the fact that inexperienced participants repeatedly tried to
engage in speculative behaviour early on. Efficiency improved over time in each
experiment, suggesting that learning effects were significant. Post-auction trading was
minimal and decreased over time, despite the potential for each participant to engage
in speculative behaviour. Indeed, such behaviour decreased over time due to the
difficulty of obtaining the additional slots required to make-up a particular
combination or off-loading unwanted slots in the secondary market. Furthermore,
auction performance did not seem to deteriorate as the complexity of formulating
combinations increased. The auction thus appears to minimise the extent to which it is
necessary to engage in secondary market trading, which is what we would want it to
do in practice given the difficulties inherent in trading with potential competitors and
the cost involved in such transactions.
International Cooperation
The third way in which the slot allocation problem differs from the task of
allocating radio spectrum is that slots at multiple airports located in many different
countries would need to be auctioned simultaneously. Computer so_vare and
communications technology, however, make this task relatively easy. Carriers and
communities could simultaneously submit bids from all over the world via telephone
or the Internet and monitor auction progress on the Intemet. The FCC's AAS could be
,k Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982): 406
a: If participants were forced to pay' the amount they bid in the auctions, they would have tended to bid
less than their true valuation of the slots. The,,' would do this to nunimise the price the,.' would have to
pay should they be successful while at the same time ensuring that the probability' of success remained
high.
adaptedfor slotallocation,significantlyreducingtheonce-offcostassociatedwith
auctiondesign.However,evenif newsoftwarehadtobedeveloped,itstotalcostis
likely to beequivalento onlyasmallproportionof thetotalrevenuegeneratedfrom
theauctions43.
Decisions would need to be made as to who would fund the costs associated
with the development of the necessary software and the running of the auctions, and
who would actually conduct the auctions. The US may be unwilling to hand over the
sofb, vare it has developed for auctioning radio spectrum, or indeed to adapt this for
slot auctions, without financial compensation; some sort of joint-venture-type
agreement may need to be established, whereby several countries fund the
development of the slot auction software. Auctions would presumably need to be run
by a national competition authority, such as the US Department of Justice (Do J),
under the oversight of competition authorities of other countries.
What is likely to be more difficult is gaining the necessary approval and
funding to implement a slot allocation system based on auctions worldwide. Even
implementing it initially only in the regions providing the majority of the world's air
transport services would require the agreement of many countries. Despite the
benefits inherent in switching to an auction system, it is possible that incumbent
carriers will oppose its introduction given that current ways in which slots are
allocated protect them from significant new entry, provide them with substantial
certainty over their future operations, and do not force them to pay for the majority of
slots they use. Historically incumbents have been extremely effective lobbyists, given
that they are generally large employers and given their importance to the business
community and the travel industry, and hence their importance to the economy as a
whole.
New entrants may also be unsupportive of a system which forces them to pay
for slot usage, despite the fact that it also forces incumbents to pay and requires all
carriers to deal with a neutral seller to obtain slots. Indeed, it is commonly claimed
that new entrants will be unable to compete with larger, more established carriers in
slot auctions, given incumbents' access to large financial reserves. This is somewhat
misleading, however, in two ways. Firstly, in bidding for particular slots it is not just
the absolute amount bid relative to competitors which a carrier takes into account, but
also the difference between the profit it expects to make from operating those slots if
it is allocated them and their cost. For an incumbent to outbid a new entrant it must
thus not only bid a higher amount, but also still be making a profit at this level. Ifa
new entrant has relatively lower costs such that its expected profit margin is greater
than the profit margin the incumbent anticipates, it will have greater bidding leverage
against the incumbent. Secondly, in practice, new entrants tend to be carriers
established by successful entrepreneurs backed up by business empires and/or
financial institutions given the substantial costs involved in setting up an airline 44.
They thus also generally have access to substantial funds and good credit-ratings with
major financial institutions.
_"Tile total cost of all FCC auctions to September 1997, including the costs invoh'ed in running the
auctions, was SUS 74 million, which is equivalent to only 0.62% of total auctioz1revenues raised.
44Examples include Virgin Atlantic Airxvays(the Virgin Group) and Eva Air (Evergreen:shipping).
Bothincumbentandnewentrant-carrierobjectionsto theimplementationof
anauctionsystemmaydecreaseovertime,however,giventhatdemandforair
transportservicesispredictedtocontinuegrowingathighratesandhenceairport
constraintsarelikely toworsen.It mayalsobepossibleto gainsupportfor aslot
auctionsystemin world tradenegotiationsif air transportissuesarenegotiated
togetherwith issuesaffectingothersectors,asanyconcessionsgrantedwhichrelateto
air transportcanbebalancedbybenefitsgainedin otherareas.In addition,
particularlyin theUS,consumersgroupswantinglowerairfaresandcommunities
wantingmoreflights intoparticularregionsregardlessof thenationalityof thecarrier
providingthemarebecomingmorevisibleandhencearehavinggreaterinfluencein
governmentdecisions.
Division of Auction Revenue
The fourth way in which slot auctions would differ from the US radio
spectrum auctions is that auction revenue would need to be divided among many
countries, given that the auction involves slots at airports located all over the world.
Presumably the revenue raised from the auction of slots located at a particular airport
would go to the government of the country in which that airport is located, given that
governments generally hold proprietary rights over the slots available at airports
located within their borders. If carriers are permitted to fully capture the synergy
value inherent in particular combinations of slots as in the Rassenti, Smith and Bulfm
(1982) experiments, governments will only receive an amount equal to the sum of the
marginal prices of each of the slots available at the airports located within their
borders. However, this is not likely to be controversial given that revenue
maximisation is not the primary objective of governments in the slot auctions.
Importantly, governments must announce what they intend to use the revenue
accruing to them from the slot auctions for before the auctions take place, such that
this information can be incorporated into bids. Governments may, for example, decide
to use it to expand airport capacity. If this is the case, the present value of the future
profits of carriers holding slots at those airports will decrease, constraining carriers'
budgets and hence the maximum amount they will bid in the auctions. Alternatively,
they may decide to use it to improve national accounts, and subsequently lower
corporate tax rates. In this case carriers serving airports located in countries where this
occurs will expect their future profits to be higher and adjust their bids upwards.
Slot Validity
The fifth way in which slot auctions would need to differ from the radio
spectrum auctions is in terms of the length of time the rights allocated are valid.
Spectrum licences are allocated for ten years; however, they are typically renewed for
a negligible charge provided certain requirements are met and hence are virtually
valid in perpetuity. If this was also the case for auctioned slots, even if afler-market
trading was permitted, carriers would have difficulty accessing slots after the auctions
as slot suppliers would also be potential competitors. As already discussed, carriers
will thus find it difficult to expand their sen'ices in line with consumer demand.
Slot rights should tlterefore probably be granted for a fixed length of time
only, and the more rapidly air transport markets are changing, the shorter this length
of timeshouldbe.This time-periodshouldbesufficientlylong,however,to give
auctionwinnersthe incentivetomakesunkinvestmentsin theroute.Thismustalso
bedeterminedandannouncedbeforeanyauctionstakeplaceto enableauction-
participantsto incorporatethis informationin theirbids.
Section IV: Incorporating Route Rights in Slot Definition
The final way in which slot auctions would differ from the radio spectrum
auctions is in terms of what is being auctioned. Auctions of radio spectrum embody
the fight to provide services which require spectrum as well as the spectrum itself.
Slot auctions, however, would only provide auction-winners with the ability to take-
offor land at a particular airport at a particular time. The routes carriers can serve
using the slots allocated to them are currently determined by the terms of bilateral
agreements and the decisions of national regulatory authorities responsible for
allocating negotiated increases in capacity.
Under the EEA CAM agreement, carriers registered in any of the signatory
countries have the fights to automatically begin operating new services within the
EEA or increase capacity on routes already served. Similarly, in markets governed by
liberalised bilateral agreements, signatory country carriers can automatically begin
operating new services between the two countries or increase flight frequency on
existing routes. In practice, however, whether or not they will add flights will depend
on whether they can obtain the slots required to provide the service, or, where airports
are severely constrained, whether they are prepared to sacrifice existing services and
use those slots. In markets governed by ASAs, however, any negotiated capacity
increases must be allocated among national carriers.
In countries which have a single flag-carrier allocation is automatic. In
countries which have multiple national carriers providing international services,
however, regulatory authorities must decide how capacity should be allocated among
them. Capacity has been allocated in different ways. Historically Canada had a
"Division of the World" (DOW) policy whereby international capacity was
automatically assigned to the national carrier which had the rights to serve that region.
The fight themselves had been pre-allocated by regulatory authorities. The lack of
overlap of the rights granted to Air Canada and Canadian AMines respectively,
however, limited each carrier's exposure to competition on international routes 45. The
Republic of Korea uses a system based on route traffic thresholds whereby new entry
by a national carrier (Asiana) is permitted on a route if annual traffic levels exceed a
certain level predetermined by national regulatory authorities 46. Given that these
threshold levels are known, the incumbent carder (Korean Air) is able to limit
competition by keeping annual traffic loads just below them. In the US the FAA holds
quasi-judicial hearings to determine which of the competing carriers most closely
satisfies predetermined criteria and hence should be allocated the capacity 47. In the
EEA national regulatory authorities allocate negotiated increases in capacity in non-
"_For details see Oum (1995); 96-97.
_°For further details see Kim (1997).
4- See the US DoT Office of the SecretarT website (hrm:"ww_ .dot.eov,_eneral'ordersj for transcripts
of capacity allocation decisions.
intra-EEAmarketsamongtheir national carriers. In the UK, for example, the UK
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) uses quasi-judicial hearings to allocate increases in
capacity in these markets.
Given that it is not necessarily the case that the carriers which have been
allocated the rights to serve particular markets will be the most efficient providers of
services in those markets, the pool of carriers bidding for particular slots at each
airport will not necessarily be the most efficient users of those slots. Indeed, generally
the lower the number of carriers with rights to serve particular markets, the lower the
probability that any slot auction outcome will be efficient. Allocating route rights
efficiently will also not necessarily ensure that the auction outcome is optimal, as
these routes have been pre-specified by aviation regulatory authorities. It is possible
that rights currently available do not cover all the segment combinations carders
would choose to fly if current foreign investment restrictions (and hence mode of
supply restrictions) were removed.
One way of ensuring that service rights and hence slots are allocated
efficiently is to incorporate the right to provide services in slot definition. Slots would
then embody both the right to provide services and the ability to physically commence
or terminate a service. As well as enabling carriers to determine their own segment
combinations and the level of capacity to provide on each of these, this would turn
what is now a two-step process into a single step.
Consolidating these two steps would require all countries to remove the
restrictions on capacity and foreign investment inherent in agreements they have
concluded which govern trade in air transport services, which would essentially mean
the end of all such agreements. Opposition to such moves is likely to be strong.
However, the conclusion of liberalised bilateral agreements show that it is not
impossible to remove capacity restrictions on a reciprocal basis. Similarly, the
establishment of the EEA CAM shows that restrictions on foreign investment can be
reciprocally removed. The conclusion of the GATS in the Uruguay Round of world
trade negotiations also suggests that air transport services trade may not always be
exempt from the rules of the world trading system.
In theory, such a system would open-up bidding for all slots to all carriers.
However, in practice the number of carriers bidding for particular slots will be
determined by passenger demand and the costs ofprovicling services in particular
markets. While it may be possible for a particular carrier to provide services between
two particular cities, they may not bid for the slots which would enable them to
operate such services as they would be unable to make a profit on these. This may be
because demand for such services is low, or because the service does not connect with
their existing network; studies have shown that economies of scale are negligible or
even negative in the provision of air transport services in the sense that adding a non-
contiguous route to a carrier's ne_vork does not reduce its average costs. It is thus
highly likely that, at least initially, the number of carriers bidding for slots at each
airport will not be much higher than the number which currently apply for slots at
these airports under the IATA system or the buy-sell rule. In the longer-term these
numbers may increase as carriers' networks expand in line with traffic increases and
the financial resources available to each increases.
Summaryand Conclusions
In summary, it may be useful to re-examine the feasibility of using auctions to
allocate take-off and landing slots at the world's major airports in light of the highly
successful auctions of radio spectrum in the US. Given the similarities between the
tasks of allocating spectrum and the slot allocation problem, it is possible that we are
not too far away from developing the software required to handle slot auctions. The
results of the controlled experiments reported in Rassenti, Smith and Bulfin (1982)
show that it is possible to achieve extremely high levels of efficiency in slot auctions
which permit combinatorial and contingency bidding despite the potential problems
associated with the existence of the core region. Such auctions appear to require
secondary market trading only to correct (marginal) misallocations and to permit
adjustments in response to information not available at the time of the auctions, and
hence avoid the problems generally associated with secondary markets such as being
forced to try to obtain slots from potential competitors. However, further
experimentation with combinatorial bidding will be required to determine the effects
of the free-rider problem on auction efficiency.
Perhaps the biggest hurdle to moving to auction-based slot allocation system
and ensuring that its outcomes are fully efficient will be obtaining the approval of the
many countries in which the world's major airports are located. Their approval will be
required to remove the IATA system and the buy-sell rule, as well as the capacity and
foreign investment restrictions contained in the agreements which currently govern
trade in air transport services. Multilateral cooperation will also be required to
develop the necessary software and to run and monitor the auctions. Agreement may
be more forthcoming over time, however, as airports become increasingly
constrained, and as more of air transport services trade becomes governed by
agreements with liberal capacity and foreign investment provisions. Increasing
jurisdiction of the GATS over world services trade will also put pressure on countries
to agree.
Whether or not auction outcomes are efficient in practice will also depend on
the extent to which carriers have competitive access to other facilities essential to the
provision of air transport services, such as airport infrastructure and services and
ticket sales channels. If particular carriers anticipate problems accessing these
facilities at competitive prices in relation to providing services to particular
destinations, they will scale down their bids for slots at the associated airports. It will
thus be useful in future studies to examine ways in which the problem of accessing
these facilities on competitive terms can be addressed. It may also be useful to
examine whether there are complementarities between slots and some of these
facilities, such as terminal gates and ground-handling services, in order to determine
whether or not slots should be auctioned jointly with other facilities.
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Regulation asa driver for intemational airline alliances
HannuSerist6
ABSTRACT
Thereisanapparentstrongneedto consolidateheairlineindustryof theworld.However,
therehavebeenfew mergersandacquisitionsin the industry;particularlyinternational
mergersandacquisitionsarealmostnon-existent.Airlineshaveusedotherwaysthan
mergersandacquisitions,primarilyalliances,in their searchfor morecompetitiveness.
Evidentlymuchdueto governmentcontrolairlinescangoonlysofarin tryingto rationalise
andconsolidatetheindustryandtheyappearratherfrustratedby thefact thatthenatural
evolutiontowardstransnationalcompaniesin theindustryiseffectivelyblocked.
So,theairlineindustryisamajortheatreforalliances.Manyreasonsforalliances have been
suggested, such as the seek for more market presence and lower costs; the role of authority
intervention in the industry restructuring has been often noted, too. However, it appears that
there are no clear frameworks for assessing alliances in the framework of airline strategies -
covering the drivers or motives and objectives of alliances. Consequently, this study will
focus on the international alliances in the airline industry, and sets out to seek answers to the
following questions:
• what are the drivers of international airline alliances?
• what are the objectives of international alliances?
• what is the role of government or other authority regulation in the alliance formation
within the airline industry?
The objective of this study is to present a framework depicting drivers and key variables of
international airline alliances, particularly the authority regulation, in the framework of
airline strategies. The core of the study is a longitudinal analysis of the alliances reported in
the industry, using firms' own and third party material as sources of information. Key
sources of information are annual reports between 1988 to 1998 from thirteen major airlines
from Europe, North America and Asia.
As to the findings, among the three key alliance motivators it appears that it is the pursuit of
stronger market presence that clearly has been more apparent and dominant, the need for
better resource utilisation being clearly secondary and also more of a longer-term nature.
Concerning the role of regulation and the need to circumvent it, the assessment is somewhat
difficult. It seems very often to be a fundamental factor, but very rarely is it expressed as the
primary reason - it could be seen a relevant, compelling factor for nearly all airlines of the
world, as alliances appear the only feasible way to grow and seek presence in a larger market.
There are differences between airlines from North America and Europe, as well as between
large and small carriers, concerning whether they see alliances primarily as offensive or
defensive moves.
The paper presents a framework where drivers, or motives, and objectives for airline
alliances are presented in a corporate strategy setting; special emphasis is on the role of
regulation. Also airlines of different size are positioned along the offensive-defensive
dimension of alliance objectives.
Key ",vords: international airline alliances, motives and objectives, regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The growth of alliances in the 1990's has been rather phenomenal; studies suggest
annual growth rates above 100 per cent in the number of business alliances (see e.g.
Pekar & Allio 1994, Luo 1996). Strategic alliances have been found to be unstable
and they generally speaking have a poor record of success (see e.g. Gant 1995,
Brouthers et al. 1995). Strategic alliances have been studied from various perspectives
- e.g. that of alliances characteristics (Borys and Jemison 1989), complexity of
alliances (Killing 1988), rationale of alliances (Contractor and Lorange 1988),
transaction costs (Parkhe 1993), alliances between competitors (Hamel, Doz and
Prahalad 1989), trust and contractual arrangements in alliances (Gulati 1995), learning
from alliances (Parkhe 1991; Lei et al. 1997; Inkpen 1998), value creation through
alliances (Chan et al. 1997; Doz and Hamel 1998), and the assessment of alliance
performance (Dussauge and Garrette 1995; Gleister and Buckley 1998).
The airline industry is a major theatre for alliances. Airline alliances have been
studied, for example, from the perspective of benefits (see Park and Zhang 1997),
performance enhancement (Park and Cho 1997), corporate value (Park and Zhang
1998), critical success factors (Bissessur 1996) and safety implications (Button 1997).
Many reasons for alliances have been suggested, such as the seek for more market
presence and lower costs. Also the role of authority intervention in the industry
restructuring has been often noted as one contributing factor to the popularity of
alliances recently. However, it appears that there are no clear frameworks for
assessing the relationship between airlines' strategies and the alliances - including the
drivers or motives and objectives of alliances. Consequently, this study will focus on
the international alliances in the airline industry, and sets out to seek answers to the
following questions:
• what are the drivers of international airline alliances?
• what are the objectives of international alliances?
• what is the role of government or other authority regulation in the alliance
formation within the airline industry?
A brief history of airline alliances
The world airline industry has seen very strong growth during the last decades. For
example, the volume of scheduled services, measured in the number of passenger-
kilometres flown, more than doubled from 1980 to 1995. As for the future, most
forecasters see an annual growth rate of traffic volume in the region of 4 - 5 per cent,
meaning that the traffic volumes would again double in about 15 years.
The airline industry, has experienced major changes in the operational environment
during the last two decades. Liberalisation, or deregulation, has changed the rules of
competition drastically in most major markets of the world. The industry experienced
a severe recession in the earl)' 1990's, sparked by the Persian Gulf crisis, but with the
recovery of major economies and the very strong growth in air transport demand it has
improvedperformancesignificantlytowardstheendof thedecade.In fact,in 1997the
100largestairlinesof theworld hada combinedsalesof USD288billion, operating
profit of 18.6billion, andnetprofitof 9.5billion. In 1992,theworstfinancialyearof
theindustryhistory,thecorrespondingnetresultwasalossof USD8billion. Still, the
financialperformanceleavesroomfor improvement- thenetmarginfor thetop-100
carriersin 1997wasonly3.3percent(Gallacher1998).
A greatmajority of theexistingalliancesin theairlineindustryhavebeenformedin
the 1990's,but therearealliancestheoriginsof whichcanbe tracedasfar backasto
the 1940's.For exampleAir Francehashelpedto set up the operationsof many
Africanairlines - suchasAir Afrique,RoyalAir MarocandTunisair - and still have
equity stakes in those carriers. Similarly, Iberia invested already in 1948 in Aviaco in
South America. National interests and governments played a key role in these early
alliances. There was quite little alliance activity until the late-1980's when a number
of equity-based arrangements took place. It was the Scandinavian SAS which really
started to proactively seek alliances, perhaps with a more strategy-level approach than
what had been done until then by other airlines. SAS worked on many equity-based
schemes, and had some success but some failures, too.
In the 1990's the number of alliances has steadily grown each year, and the scene has
become very unstable. For the sake of comparison, in 1990 the industry sources listed
172 alliances, out of which 82 involved equity investment (Airline Business 1990).
The latest survey by Air Transport Intelligence (1998) reported that there were a total
of 502 airline alliances in mid-1998, with an increase of 38 per cent over the year
1997 - these alliances were formed among 196 airlines. Most airline alliances are
between two partners, but recently arrangements of more than two participants have
emerged. World airlines are in the process of forming groups in their preparation for
harder global competition - the largest groups Stai" Alliance and oneworld now have
each about 20 per cent of the world international passenger markets. Most alliances
are between airlines from different countries, but there are alliances between carriers
of the same nationality, too. Most airlines have several alliances, including domestic
and international alliances - the largest number of alliances in 1998 was by Air France
with 28 arrangements, out of which all but one were with foreign partners.
Out of the total of 502 alliances in 1998 only 56 (11%) involved equity; government
authorities play a key role in determining the conditions for equity-based
arrangements. The role of government or other authority regulation, or othertype of
intervention, in the airline partnerships deserves a closer look.
On the nature of airline alliances
There have been very few mergers and acquisitions in the world airline industry as a
whole. There was quite a lot of M&A activity in the United Sates in the 1980's, but
overall, particularly international mergers and acquisitions are almost non-existent.
The reason for this is the prohibitive stand by regulatory attthorities world-wide.
Consequently airlines have been forced to use other ways than mergers and
acquisitions in their search for more competitiveness. There is a strong need to
consolidate the indust_T, but evidently much due to government control airlines can
go only so far in tr3'ing to rationalise and consolidate the industry.
P&oadesand Lush (1997) have suggestedtwo dimensionson which alliance
arrangementsdiffer, namely commitmentof resources and complexity of
arrangement.Partly followingthatdivision,alliancescanbeput into threecategories
basedon theextentof co-operation:simpleoperativeroute-basedalliances,broader
marketingalliances,andequity-basedalliances.Therearevariousreasonswhy an
airline forms allianceswith otherairlines.Usuallythesereasonsare linked to the
strivefor morecompetitivenesson theglobalmarket,for whichairlineshaveuseda
numberof differentco-operativearrangements.Jointgroundhandling,co-ordination
of schedules,joint flight operations,swapof flying personnel,salesandpurchasesof
block spaceon aircraft,code-sharingandequityinvestmentsin anotherairline are
someof theco-operativewaysused.
As mentioned,the airline industryhasbeenvery tightly regulatedfor most of its
history. Liberalisationreally startedonly in 1978with the US airline industry
deregulation.Evenafter theEuropeanUnion reachedthe final stageof its airline
industryliberalisationin 1997therearemanytypes0fregulationsandlimitationsthat
governmentauthoritiessetonairlineoperationsandcompetition.In factthesituation
hasreacheda somewhatschizophrenicpoint: on theonehandauthoritiespressfor
more competitionthroughlessregulation,but on the otherhand, when stronger
airlinestry to rationaliseoperationsin the nameof better competitiveness,then
authoritiesinterveneandsetlimits onorevendenysuchefforts.It seemsthatfairplay
is sought,but not too fair. Consequentlyit is theauthorities,primarily thoseof the
UnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion,thatmaydecidewhethertheairline industry
candevelopintooneof efficientglobalplayers,globalquality serviceand,perhaps,
low faresfor consumers.
Challengesandopen questions
Airline alliances, just like strategic alliances in most other industries, have had a
rather poor record of success. It has been suggested that fewer than 30 per cent of
international alliances in the airline industry have been successful (Lindqvist 1996).
Simply put, airlines seek international competitiveness through alliances. Even if in
general it is the economies - be that of scale, scope or density - that motivate airlines,
it is not necessarily completely clear what are the different types of drivers that are
behind alliance formation. Also, the consequent objectives of alliances are not always
clear. Moreover, the particular role of authority regulation in alliance formation is
often unclear.
As suggested by earlier research, there are drivers of different level for international
airline alliances. Some alliances are driven by mere cost savings in operations, like
through rationalising ground handling at airports operated by both or all partners.
Others are more of a market power issue, for example through code-sharing and
pooled frequent flyer programs. Yet others may be more of a strategic nature, aiming
for example at the mere survival of the amine. Concerning the objectives of
international aMine alliances, the immediate objectives can naturally be drawn from
the drivers; so, the objective of a block seat arrangement with another airline would be
to secure or increase sales. However, the longer-term strategic level objectives of, say,
growth,marketexpansion,imageenhancement,learning,andsoonareseldomcrystal
clear.
The objectiveof this study is to suggest a model which depicts drivers and key
variables of international airline alliances, particularly the authority regulation, in the
framework of airline strategies. The study bases on prior research on competition in
the airline industry and on strategic alliances. The core of the study is a longitudinal
analysis of the alliances reported in the industry, using firms' own and third party
material as sources of information. Key sources of information are annual reports
between 1988 to 1998 from the following airlines: Air Canada, American Airlines,
British Airways, Canadian Airlines (PWA Corp.), Delta Air Lines, Finnair, K.LM,
Lufthansa, Qantas Airways, SAS, Swissair, Thai Airways International, and United
Airlines.
SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The airline industry is in many ways one of the most intemational of service
industries. International traffic forms a major portion of all air traffic, and even
domestic traffic is most often dependent on or at least tightly linked to international
services. Then, do multinational enterprises dominate in this very much international
business, like they do in most other industries?
In this very much international business there are no dominant, truly global players. A
question has often been asked whether there are true multinational companies (MNC)
among airlines. By definition MNCs should conform to the criteria (see Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1995) of, first, having substantial direct investments in foreign countries.
Second, they should be engaged in the active management of the offshore assets,
rather than simply hold them in a passive portfolio. The management criteria would
appear to be fulfilled by most intemationally operating carriers. However, concerning
investments, airlines rarely have significant tangible investment in foreign countries,
but typically hold only rather small marketing subsidiaries abroad. In addition some
larger carriers own partly or wholly smaller carriers that operate in foreign countries.
The investment criteria comes into an interesting light when one considers that the
key production machinery, the aircraft, are in fact assets that move at the speed of
some 800 kilometres per hour from one country to another - so even if each aircraft is
always registered in a certain country the determination of where the production
machinery really is located may be somewhat indefinite. However, as Bartlett and
Ghoshal (1995) define the investments not only as production facilities but also as
financial, legal and contractual relationships with foreign affiliates - in addition they
emphasise the management integration of operations in different countries as the key
differentiating characteristic of an MNC - it is fair to say that many internationally
operating large airlines are MNCs. Then, whether airlines are transnational companies
can be questioned, too. The term transnational has often been used rather loosely, but
tile more specific definition of the term used by Bartlett and Ghoshal refers to firms
being locally responsive in various national markets while retaining their global
efticiency. This definition suggests specialised but dispersed resources and activities,
realised in the tbrm of interdependent network of world-wide operation, producing
both efficiency and flexibility at the same time. Now, whether airlines operate as
suggestedby thetransnationalcriteriaisratherdifficult to determine.Perhapsthebest
answertodayis thatsomedo,mostdonot.
In air transportstherestill ismuchnationalisticthinkingshownthroughprotectionby
legislatorsandbargainingby unions;however,consumersof todayarereallyglobalin
their attitudes.Consumersarerentingcarsfrom Hertzbecauseit offersconvenient
service, reliability and value for money - not primarily becausethe company
originatesfrom a certain country.Evenmore clearly,in the manufacturedgoods
sectorconsumersarebuying, for instance,Nokiamobilephonesbecausetheyoffer
versatilefeatures,goodqualityandhaveaestheticallyappealingdesign- notbecause
theyaremanufacturedmostlyin Finland.
Managementin anyindustryresistthelossof control.It is truethatin airlinebusiness,
just as in manyotherservicebusinesses,the controlof, say,quality aspectsof the
productis essential.However,airlineshavea longtime agogivenup muchof the
controlin oneof thekey functionsasthesalesfunctionis outsourcedto ahighdegree
in mostairlines.It is truethatcomputerisedreservationsystemsareusedby airlinesto
controlthesalesand airlinesactivelytry to haveanimpacton thesalesmanagedby
travelagents.
Therole of governments and unions
Intemational air traffic has been strongly affected by bilateral agreements between
governments. As suggested by many observers, the process towards more liberal
bilaterals, extensive multilateral arrangements, and open-skies agreements is still far
from completed. It has been suggested that bilateral agreements have been a barrier to
organic international growth for many airlines, and they could be considered tools of
protectionism by nation states. The bilateral agreements have been an important
variable when foreign ownership of airlines has been discussed; the system has
historically built on the assumption that an airline based in and operating mainly from
one country is also owned by parties of that country. Hence, if a British firm owned a
US based airline wishing to operate on the Atlantic market between the US and the
UK, the interpretation of the spirit of the bilateral agreement would be complicated. In
fact the US government has limited the share of ownership by foreign parties in US
airlines to 25 per cent.
A complication in the open-skies agreements is the issue of who are the parties to the
agreements in the case of Europe. Namely, the European Commission sees that it
should be the signing partner in the US-Europe open-skies deal. However, many of
the member countries of the European Union would definitely like to have agreements
between the nation states instead of between the Union and the USA.
In general temas, attthorities have eased their regulation of the airline industry since
the late 1970's, but they still play an important role. The liberalisation, or
deregulation, of the industr3' has aimed at bringing competition to the market place,
compelling airlines to better efficiency, and bringing benefits to consumers in the
forna of better offering of seraices at a lower price. The same rationale is seen in
many other indttstries. There, eventual consolidation of the indust_' has often
followed, mostly through mergers and acquisitions. In the airline indusiry, however,
authoritieshavebeenverystrict aboutallowingparticularlytransnationalmergersor
acquisitions,somethingthatputsairlinemanagementin aratherperplexingposition.
It seemsthatgovernmentsareverycarefulandprotectiveof theirnationalairlines- no
matterif thegovernmenthasanequitystakein anairlineor not.To setthisagainsta
broaderpicture,onecouldaskwhyairlinesshouldbetreatedby authoritieswith such
a nationalisticethoswhentheconsumers,theflying passengers,no longerput much
emphasison thenationalityof acarrier.
Thewell-knownargumentfromtheauthorities- andaverymuchunderstandableand
valid one - is that the consolidationof the airlineindustrywould spell dangers
particularlyto the consumers:divisionof marketsbetweenfew very largecarriers,
lesscompetition,lesschoice,higherfaresandpoorerservice.In otherwordsexactly
thoseproblemsthatweretackledthroughthederegulationprocesstartedin theUSin
thelate1970s.While theargumentationby theauthoritiesmakessense,it couldlead
to a re-regulatedairline industry,wherethe competitivepressurewould not drive
airlinesto rationalisedoperationsandefficiency.Theissueis aboutfinding thefine
balance between allowing airlines to rationaliseoperationsthrough industry
restructuringand,on the otherhand,ensuringthat thereis sufficient competition
betweenthe largeairline groupsin mostmarkets.Lookingback at the historyof
industryderegulationit appearsinevitablethattherewill alwaysbe certainmarkets
wherecompetitiondoesnotworkandbringthebenefitstotheconsumer.
It hasbeensometimesexpressedbynationalauthoritiesthatthereasonfor beingstrict
aboutallowingtransnationalmergersor acquisitionsin theairlineindustryis the issue
of nationalsecurity.Thatmaywell bejustified in thelessandlesscommoncaseof
government-ownedcarriers,but in thecaseof at leastpartiallyprivatised,let alone
fully privateairlines,the argumentbecomesomewhatold-fashioned.As notedby
someobservers,when evendefence-relatedmanufacturingindustriesareallowedto
consolidateinternationally,it seems trangetobesocarefulaboutair transports.After
all, acleardistinctionshouldbemadebetweenpublicservicesandbusiness- military
air lift capacityandcommercialairlinesshouldnot beconfused.A perspectiveof a
private- andoftenforeign- shareownerof anairlinemaybethatheor shecouldnot
carelesshow somenationstateorganiseshermilitary air lift capacity.Moreover,in
caseair transportcapacityneedsarisefor military purposes,that capacityis very
likely availablefrom themarket,atmarketprices.
Anotherinterestpartyto theissueof internationalairlineindustryconsolidationis the
labourunions.Interestinglyit is thepilot unionsthatareworkingon transnational
labourmovemento protecttheinterestof theirmembers.It appearsthat unionshave
opposedmergersandacquisitions- andappearto opposelarge-scalealliances,too -
becausetheM&A's andalliancesmightleadto moreefficientorganisationandthus
lowerdemandfor personnel.However,assuggestedearlierby industryobservers,it
appearsthat in the light of theforecastedgrowthof demandfor air transportit is an
unwarrantedfearthatjobs wouldbe lostin the industryasawhole.Perhapsit would
bemorecorrectto speakof onlymoreslowlyincreasingneedfor personnel.
Another reasonfor unionoppositionmaybe the Daredpressureon remuneration,
which in the airline industry is very good across the board, compared to any other
industry.The remunerationpressurewould partly be due to better exposureof
performanceandefficiency;thiswouldvery likely leadto unwantedchangesin the
organisationof inefficientcarriers.However,it wouldbein theinterestof the industry
as a whole and the consumerin particularto have changesdriven through in
inefficientcarriers.
DRIVERS OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES
In general terms earlier research has categorised the reasons for alliances, for example,
as:
• risk sharing
• scale economies
• access to markets
• access to technology
• market convergence.
As to airline alliances, it has been suggested (see e.g. Alamdari and Morrell 1997) that
there are two main drivers: first, search for more market power, and secondly, search
for lower operating costs. These broad categories cover the two basic reasons for
airlines' alliance arrangements, but it appears that there is room to elaborate further.
More of an industry-level research (see Antoniou 1998) has suggested that the
formation of mega-carriers - either through mergers or alliances - would appear to be
a solution to the empty-core problem of the airline industry, pre-empting complete
deregulation.
Studying the airline industry alliances of the past suggests that the role of authority
control is an area which deserves to be brought up as a reason for alliances. The
following factors - suggested in earlier research - can be seen as drivers of alliances in
the industry:
• mergers and acquisitions in general have been tightly controlled in the airline
industry,
• foreign ownership in airlines has been restricted by governments,
• bilateral agreements between countries make foreign ownership of airlines
problematic,
• bilateral agreements have been a way of protecting markets.
As to restrictions on foreign ownership in airlines, it appears to be the control that
worries authorities. The control by a foreign investor in an airline has been restricted
by other means than ownership limitations, too, such as the number of members to be
appointed in the board of the airline.
Considering their need for reaching the assumed economies of scale, scope or density,
airlines have been left with very few options other than slow organic growth or
alliances. In pursuing alliances airlines have due to government control had limited
options, leading mostly to code-sharing anangements.
Objectives of alliances
Earlier research on strategic alliances typically dealing with manufacturing
industries - has pointed to two primary categories of objectives in alliance
arrangements: product objectives and knowledge objectives. In the area of product
objectives there appears to have been tnvo primary goals: either the enhancement of
product offering or the reduction of production costs. As to knowledge objectives, the
goal has typically been to learn some specific new technology or process from a
partner; it appears that the goals as to knowledge transfer have often been rather
specified and particular.
Regulation as a driver for alliances
This study examined the alliance history of the major airlines of the world using
several sources of information such as general news services, industry press, and
airlines' own publications. In order to illustrate the role of government regulation in
the alliance development very brief summaries from a few key airlines are presented;
the summaries are limited to international alliance activities from 1988 to 1998. The
summaries have quotations from only one type of information source - airline annual
reports to enhance the comparability of company views; namely the annual report is a
key media to deliver messages to the investors, authorities and the public, and the
messages need to be informative and truthful. Of course a lot is left unsaid in annual
reports - for instance comments concerning some particular competitors - but that is
likely to apply to any contemporary published material.
SAS started in the 1980's with a strategy of building alliances with airlines that were
either smaller or of the same size as SAS itself. In the 1990's, under new leadership,
the alliance strategy was refocused on partnering with large airlines. Also, SAS
experience had taught that equity-based arrangements are very difficult to manage,
and therefore further alliances would be pursued without ownership. Moreover, the
emphasis in own operations was pulled back from global reach to concentrate on
being a dominant player in the markets of the home region. It appears that the Star
Alliance is seen to produce significant benefits in the short and medium-term in the
area of marketing, and in the longer term additional benefits are expected from
operational cost savings in maintenance, sourcing, handling, and so on. The role of
regulation is seldom brought up by SAS management; however, the CEO Carlzon
wrote in the 1992 annual report:
In the fitture companies which obstinately uphold national interests and
allow them to stand in the way of essential restructuring will have chosen the
route towards elimination.
In its 1989 annual report KLM emphasised the liberalisation of the European aviation
as a motive to strive for co-operative links with other carriers. These links were seen
to provide additional opportunities in both passenger and cargo markets to safeguard
KLM's market position. The criteria for the co-operative links comprised e.g. securing
O1"expanding the position of Schiphol (Amsterdam) airport as the gateway to Europe.
Overall KLM's approach to alliances appears to represent a rather common way of
seeing alliances. First of all, air traffic politics and the regulation by government
attthorities are both a major motivator and a limitation to the pursuit df alliances.
Secondly,it appearsthat the relativesignificanceof marketpresenceand more
efficient resourceutilisation variesby the economicturns:in good timesmarket
expansionappearsas a key driver,but in hardertimesthe needto reducecostsis
emphasised.
It appearsthatLt¢hansa management was not very keen on tying partnership knots
with other airlines until the recession of the early 1990's really hit the company. The
sentiment in the company in the late 1980's and early 1990's was that bilateral air
traffic agreements were not providing fair playing field for the world's airlines. The
significance of regulation as a motivator for alliances by Lufthansa is apparent; on the
other hand, regulation is seen as a hindrance to alliance building. Overall Luflhansa's
participation in alliances appears to be justified through a combination of market
presence and resource utilisation factors. It would appear that Luflhansa has seen
more value than other airlines in the cost reduction possibilities that alliances may
offer.
American Airlines has built its international operations quite slowly, operating first
and foremost within the USA. The strong areas for American outside the USA have
traditionally been the Caribbean and Central and South America. Even in 1990
American operated only to eight countries in Europe, but in the 1990's the
international expansion has been significant. The international growth has been
primarily internal, although American has acquired international routes from other
airlines such as Eastern and TWA. American has been perhaps the most active airline
to participate in the international air politics debate and has demanded more
opportunities to operate internationally on a competitive basis, as illustrated by the
following quotes from the 1990 annual report:
Unfortunately U.S. airlines seeking to spread their wings in international
marketplace face some daunting barriers, most of which - since they are
rooted in the protectionist policies of foreign governments - can be overcome
only by an active partnership between industry and government .... Since they
[bilateral agreements.] assign a higher prority to the welfare of national
airlines than to the health of national economies, they are entirely
inconsistent with today's economic realities.
The full realisation of the alliance with British Airways has been delayed for years. In
1997 American CEO Crandall wrote in the annual report:
Because the airline industry is increasingly global, remaining competitive
requires us to serve the largest possible number of origin-destination
markets world-wide... The American-British Airways alliance is the
centrepiece of a pattern of alliances we have been building as we adjust to
the changing nature of international competition.
The 1998 American annual report wrote:
By granting antitrust immunity to alliances between U.S. and foreign
carriers, the U.S. has made international alliances a virtual necessity.
American has reacted to the changing environment by setting out to create
the indttstp 3' 's premier set of alliances.
Delta Air Lilies purchased nearly all of tlte collapsed Pan Am's transatlantic routes,
shifting its focus t'rom being a predominantly U.S. domestic carrier to tl]at of being a
globalairline.In theearly 1990'sDeltastatedthatapartof its internationalstrategy
wasto usecode-sharingwith otherqualityairlinesto supportDelta's international
service.ThereasoningwasthatthisenabledDeltatoremainin marketsthatwouldbe
unprofitableto fly alone,and to offer servicein newmarketswithoutmajor capital
expenditures.In theannualreport1994it wasreported:
Delta will continue to advocate a more open, market oriented operating
environment...Delta's goal is to serve its customers while increasing
efficiency and expanding market presence by developing a network of
mutually beneficial code-sharing alliances.
By 1995 the international code-sharing arrangements had been made with
Aeromexico, All Nippon Airways, Austrian Airlines, Korean Air, Sabena, Singapore
Airlines, Swissair and Virgin Atlantic Airways. In 1996 there were 13 code-sharing
partners; with three of them Delta received approval of antitrust immunity from the
U.S. Department of Transportation to pursue a global marketing alliance. This
marketing alliance called Atlantic Excellence between Delta, Austrian Airlines,
Sabena and Swissair included - in addition to code-sharing - pricing, scheduling and
other operational co-ordination; joint sales and marketing were still seen as
"opportunities". The 1996 annual report reported:
... The alliance agreements establish a legal framework...to allow the four
carriers to form a seamless transatlantic air transport system while retaining
their unique corporate and national identities...
In 1997 Delta announced code-sharing arrangements with Air France, China Southern
and Transbrasil. Considering Asian operations the 1997 annual report notes:
Delta continues to pursue additional authorities to serve Japan, but is
impeded by the highly restrictive aviation agreement bet_veen the U.S. and
Japan. Delta's limited Japan services will be supplemented by additional
service to Asia through code-sharing arrangements with China Southern and
Korean Air.
In 1998 Delta and United Airlines agreed on a broad marketing relationship; however,
due to opposition from the pilots' union Delta was not able to proceed with a code-
sharing arrangement with United, but had to continue the co-operation through
reciprocal frequent flyer program only. In the annual report for 1998 Delta underlined
the role of strategic alliances:
Delta will proceed aggressively with world-wide alliance discussions in the
fitture, not just because alliances are desirable from a business standpoint -
although they are - but also because we must. Airline alliances are
revolutionising the nature of worM-wide competition, and Delta intends to be
a leader as these changes occur.
In about seven years Delta has grown from a domestic carrier to a significant global
player, much thanks to alliance arrangements particularly in Europe. For example,
Delta has been since 1997 the largest operator on the North Atlantic market, the
largest and most competitive international market in the world. In Delta's history of
international alliances the evasion of regulation and the market power as drivers
appear to stand out, and the resource utilisation improvement seems to be primarily
Delta's internal effort.
Model for international airline alliance dynamics
Based on the study within the airline industry a model (Figure 1) is suggested on the
dynamics of international alliances, depicting factors that have been the drivers of the
alliance efforts. The model is set in a framework where the relevant recent changes in
the airline industry are shown, as well as the consequent basic strategic choices and
the alternative strategies for airlines; the model builds on a strategy framework
presented earlier (Serist6 1993).
(lnsert Figure I about here)
There are numerous factors, many of which have been touched upon in this article,
that effectively limit the basic strategy choices of airlines into three: growth strategy,
focus strategy and lowest cost strategy. Growth can be sought either internally
(organic growth) or externally. As internal growth is often slow, it may be preferable
under the present circumstances for many airlines to seek growth externally; then the
options are mergers and acquisitions or alliances. As there are many limitatiffns to
airline mergers and acquisitions, alliances provide often a less complicated route for
growth. Alliances provide more flexibility than outright mergers and acquisition, and
they are likely to carry less risks than M&A's.
Even if an airline would choose focus as its basic strategy, there are pressures in the
competitive environment suggesting the utilisation of alliances. Whether the airline
bases its strategy on different customer groups (e.g. business travellers) or on certain
geographic area (e.g. traffic between Europe and South America), it is nevertheless
likely to benefit from some sort of partnership with suitable airlines. The simple
rationale is that no matter what the niche or specific geographic market is, an airline is
likely to benefit from a larger catchment area and better connections.
As to the airlines choosing the lowest cost strategy, alliances may be of lesser
importance, at least in the light of today's experiences from the nature of operations
by low-cost carriers. In Europe the low-cost airlines, in practice charter carriers,
typically cater for tourist traffic in and out of holiday destinations, and in this type of
traffic connecting flights provide only limited value added. Elsewhere in the world,
primarily in the U.S.A., low-cost carriers serve the business traveller segment, too, but
so far a major part of the business has been on domestic point-to-point markets Where
the value added provided by good connections is not necessarily essential. Here it is
necessary to make a distinction between low-cost carriers such as Southwest Airlines
and the feeder carriers, such as American Eagle. However, the fact that today alliances
of low-cost carriers are rare should not be interpreted so that there is no potential in
building an international alliance of low-cost carriers for the ever-more important
leisure travel segment; in fact that might provide interesting opportunities in the ever
more global tourist market of the future.
As to the drivers of international alliances, it appears that, first, the changes in the
industry have made it essential for most carriers to seek growth and to secure presence
in a larger market; second, the many types of regulation in the industry make alliances
the only feasible way to grow and seek presence in a larger market; and third, there is
a pressure to utilise resources better, i.e. to reduce the operating costs.
Gettingaroundvariousformsof regulationin theairlineindustryisamajormotivator
for alliances.For onething,thefactthatgovemmentstill arenotableownersin many
internationallyoperatingairlinesmakesacquisitionsof and mergerswith airlines
somewhatproblematicin general- namely,nationalflagcarriersarestill considered
in manycountriespartof nationalpropertyandcountryimage,andthereforeforeign
ownershipis not seenfavourably.Secondly,governmentshaveoften set specific
limitationson the shareof foreignownershipin the airlines of their nationality.
Thirdly, antitrust legislationmakesmergersand acquisitionsproblematicin many
countriesbecausetheseoftenwouldleadto a dominantif not monopolypositionof
theunitedfirm at leastin somemarkets;thebackgroundfor this is that for historic
regulatoryreasonsthereareverymanymarketswherea duopolyexists.Finally,the
fact that bilateral agreements between countries still form much of the basis for
international air transportation causes some problems.
Securing market presence can be seen either as an offensive objective of alliances,
typical for large airlines, or as an defensive objective, typical for medium-sized and
small airlines. Larger airlines seek market power and consequent enhanced value for
customer by pursuing larger network coverage, higher frequencies, more extensive
loyalty programs and dominance of so-called hub airports through alliance
arrangements. Medium-sized and small carriers appear to seek more market coverage
rather than outright market power in order to respond to the challenge by expanding
larger airlines; smaller carriers seem to consider participation in alliances essential in
trying to avoid shrinking into mere regional operators - which, of course, might be the
destiny of small carriers even with alliance arrangements. In the market presence
objective of airline alliances it is necessary to distinguish the global level and the
specific market level, which may require arrangements of conflicting interests. For
example, for many reasons it is valuable for SAS tO co-ordinate closely its operations
on a global level with its Star Alliance partners, but in the specific markets of the
Nordic countries SAS may need to deviate from the ideal Star Alliance strategy
because it needs to respond decisively to the challenges by Finnair, a key rival in the
home market of SAS.
The third motivator for alliances is the need to utilise resources better. This can be
pursued either through higher productivity or simply lower costs. Higher productivity
is sought, for example, through sharing aircraft and air crew capacity, using partner's
ground handling and airport passenger services at foreign stations instead of providing
them by the airline itself, and making better use of possible excess aircraft
maintenance capacity by servicing partner airlines' aircraft. Capacity sharing
arrangements can often be complemented by specialisation; for example, one partner
can specialise in the maintenance of aircraft engines from a certain manufacturer and
another partner in engines from another manufacturer. As to direct cost savings, for
example joint sourcing of fuel, catering (food), aircraft, spare parts, or information
and marketing services may produce significantly lower costs than sourcing alone by
each panner.
As to the relative role of the three alliance motivators it appears that it is the pursuit of
stronger market presence that clearly has been more apparent and dominant, the need
for betterresourceutilisationbeingsecondaryandalsomoreof a longer-termnature.
Concerningthe role of regulationandthe needto circumventit, theassessmentis
somewhatdifficult. It seemsveryoftento beakeyfactorin alliancebuilding,partof
theenvironmentfor nearlyall airlinecooperation.
It appearsthat different drivershavea differentnature,or perhapsjustification,in
differentkindof airlines.In thisrespectairlinescanbegroupedroughlyintolargeand
smallfirms,andtherelevantdimensionsfor thenatureof driverscanbedeterminedas
tactical-vs.-strategicanddefensive-vs.-offensive.Figure2 illustratesthe positioning
of thedriversalongthesedimensionsfor largeairlines,andFigure3 for smallairlines.
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
(Insert Figure 3 about here)
It was found out in the study that the role of learning from partners in airline alliances
is evidently quite insignificant. Very much differently from many manufacturing
industries, where the ability to learn from a more experienced or otherwise better
partner is often given as a reason for building alliances, in this study the factor hardly
ever came up. Even if it is understandable that airlines are not very eager to publicly
shout about their needs to learn from other airlines, thereby indicating their own
possible deficiencies, it still appears that airlines generally speaking do not make
sufficient use of the opportunity to learn better practices.
Tuming competitor airlines partners rather than rivals would appear to be a very valid
motivator in today's airline business. This, however, hardly ever came up specifically
along the study. Certainly it is true that firms are not keen to pinpoint their archrivals
in an industry of such turmoil - where today's rival can be tomorrow's partner and
vice versa - but nevertheless it was somewhat unexpected that something which is
here called competitor taming was _never.really suggested by the airlines. Earlier
research, mainly concerning manufacturing industries, has suggested that making
friends out of foes would be a motivation for many alliances. What is called
competitor taming here is very close to what Doz and Hamel (1998) have termed "co-
option". Again, just like with regulation evasion, the airlines' rush for market
presence and for resource utilisation perhaps just overshadows the competitor taming
as a motivator for alliances, but presumably it is a hidden factor in many alliance
cases.
One outcome of the study is the evidence of the essential role that market presence
plays in airlines' strategic planning for survival and prosperity - having global reach
appears to be a must in most airlines' strategic plan. Also, it appears that resource
utilisation is a factor often acknowledged but quite slowly actively pursued. One
explanation for this slow action is, of course, the rigidity that airline management face
due to both very strong labour unions and regulation by authorities. However, overall
it appears that the firms are rushing so hard to secure positions as to their market reach
that they are paying perhaps too little attention to the longer term factor of learning
from alliances. Maybe the histou of airlines as national icons, at least in Europe, have
created corporate cultures that are not the best environments tbr absorbing new
practices.It wouldseemthatthecrisisof theindustryin theearly 1990'shasbrought
somemore flexibility in manyairlines,but a comparisonto other industrieswould
indicatethatthereisstill quiteawayto go,butawaywithgreatpotential.
Managerial challenges
It appears that alliance building is such a part of evolution in the airline industry that
most airlines need to participate in - the opportunity cost of not participating might
prove too high. Management in airlines face considerable challenges in making the
alliances work: there is the pressure from authorities, demands by unions, perhaps
mixed ownership by government and private parties, and the normal challenges of
different cultures in different countries and firms, differing organisational
arrangements in airlines, and strong personalities as airline executives.
Managing the relationship with the governments and even local authorities would
appear to be a major task for airline management of the future. In addition to the
national interests - country image, employment and balance of payment issues - the
increasing role of ecological aspects (noise, pollution) will add to the importance of
managing all sort of regulation.
Outside regulation issues, it seems that the area where airline management face
hardest challenges and where there appears to be much potential for improvement is
that of learning. Earlier research (Inkpen 1998, 225) has emphasised the role of trust
between the partners as a contributor to successful learning. It is the very notion of
trust that makes airline alliances different from those in many other industries: so far
alliances in the airline industry have been either very short lived or limited in scope,
or both, and therefore the trust has not been developed between the partners.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Changes in the industry have made it essential for most airlines to seek growth and to
secure presence in a larger market. There is again the pressure to reduce operational
costs in airlines through better utilisation of resources. Finally, the many types of
regulation in the industry make alliances the only feasible way to grow and seek
presence in a larger market.
Airlines appear rather frustrated by the fact that the natural evolution towards
transnational companies in this industry is effectively blocked by authorities. This
frustration is echoed in the comment by Paul Moore, spokesman for Virgin Atlantic,
concerning U.S. limitations for foreign airlines on acquiring or setting up a U.S.
subsidiary:
It's blatant protectionism. Alliances are an artificial solution to an artificial
problem. There is no reason why the rules should not be different now.
(Airline Business, October 1998, p. 76)
As to governments' role in regulating the formation of truly transnational airlines, it
appears to be a question of finding the right balance between enough freedom to allow
efficiency in the global airline industry to develop, but enough regulation to make
sure that there is competition between the alliance groups at least in most markets.
Marketpresenceappearsto play anessentialrole in airlines' strategicplanningfor
survivalandprosperity- havingglobalreachappearsto be a must in most airlines'
strategicplan.Thereforetheprimarymotivationfor internationalalliancesso far has
beentheneedto securean extensivecatchmentareaor a largeonwardconnection
network.
It seemsthat resourceutilisation is a factor that is very often acknowledged in
international airline alliance arrangements. However, airlines have in fact been rather
slow in pursuing higher productivity or outright lower costs through concerted efforts
with partners; there seems to be rigidity in airlines in operationalising the changes and
therefore the resource utilisation has so far not been as significant a motivator as
market presence.
Overall it appears that the pursuit of stronger market presence has been more apparent
and dominant, the need for better resource utilisation being clearly secondary and also
more of a longer-term nature. The role of regulation and the need to circumvent it is
rather difficult to assess. It seems very often to be a factor in alliance building, but
very rarely is it expressed as the primary reason. However, the demands from the
airlines to allow more freedom to rationalise and restructure the industry may get
more outspoken in the future.
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1 Introduction
Japanese air transport market developed in a strictly regulated environment. The
Civil Aeronautics Law, which governs the industry, requires that firms should obtain
government licenses to get into the market. Airlines also need government approval for
their fares, and even for their annual business plans.
But a policy stream toward liberalization of air transport since the 1980s has brought
to fruition of substantial deregulation in this market. Now the Ministry of Transport
(MOT) is going to submit a bill to the Diet, which revises operating licensing system, fare
approval system and other regulatory provisions. Moreover, since the MoT relaxed it's
operating standard of administrative process, we can say that now the airline industry is
under competition. As widely reported, newly established carriers entered into markets
and their impacts on market competition were strong although shares of new companies are
quite small.
As for international air transport, liberalization has been also in advance. The
Memorandum of Understanding concluded on March 14 1998 with the U.S. government
was an outcome of negotiation to equalize the right and interests between two countries,
but its essential factors are thought to be giving airlines of both countries with freedom to
conduct in the market place. And strategic alliances among world airlines will make it
more severe to compete in international markets.
Facing with the new stage of competition among air carriers, we have to move on a
new air transport policy, which should pursuit efficiency and fairness in this market.
Needless to say, efficient air transport system is the infrastructure of sound economic
development and globalization of economy. _,_:'--,=_"-'-.-.,._._,'-_---it i_ ......._:---:'*:s:-:t._. '--._.._-..-.__)-
_mFo.,.tnn," .t. ..... _. ^¢,t. .............. 1.... _....... ._ ,'-,u:_. _.__
_::"_ ..... _ ..... -_-'"_, ""r-", ...... - ...... _ 7C--_ .£-'r'z_E_!_-' _"
2 DEREGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC MARKET
2.1 Abolition of Supply-Demand Balance Clause
In Japan, we are now facing a powerful policy trend reconsidering the role of th_
government in economic policy, and there are emerging consensus that deregulation is the
only way to revitalize the economy as a whole, to recover international competitiveness
andtobenefitconsumers.Thetransportfieldisnotanexception.
On December5 1996, the MoT announced that it would abolish supply-demand
balance clauses in every transport business law including the Civil Aeronautics Law in a
couple of years. A supply-demand balance clause provides that a new entry or increase of
supply by existing carriers could be approved if and only if the MoT make a judgement that
the balance of supply and demand in the market would be disturbed. This is a typical
quantitative control of supply and the clause might effectively block new entry.
T. \c _u _¢.,4,
ne_has also given the MOT with wide range of administrative discretion,
because, according to the clause, it is not the company managers but the government
officials that judge whether there is excess demand or not. The abolition of the clause
means that that there could emerge much room for effective competition carriers than in
present situation, since managers become able to make decision on their own judgement
and to take actions timely.
2.2 Industrial Policy in Air Transport: an Old Regime
As noted above, Japanese airlines were fostered in strictly regulated environment.
The governmental intervention in this industry was conducted not only through statutory
actions but also through purely administrative process such as a cabinet meeting resolution
and a notice from the Minister of Transport. Especially, the Cabinet Meeting Resolution
in 1970 and the Notice from the Minister of Transport in 1972 played a role to fix the
market structure in the air transport and some times called "Aviation Constitution". The
Civil Aviation Law and administrative guidance did not allow airlines from competing
rigorously.
This "old regime" was intended to secure and nurture the capacity of all members of
the airline companies by establishing segmented business fields for each firm. The
segmentation of market was also a common feature of Japanese industrial policy in 1950s,
60s and first of 70s. In air transport case, routes licensing regulation could make the
segmentation concrete and trunk routes markets offered a base for operational stability and
became source for cross-subsidization.
The old regime survived until mid-80s, with all three firms growing steadily within an
arranged business base. The air transport market as a whole grew rapidly with a help of
Japanese high economic expansion, and the route network was widened. The role of
governmentalinterventionin theformof protectionof infantindustrycanbesaidto have
functionedadequatelyup to thisstage. Butthemostseriousproblemof sucha cartel-
oriented government policy was that the high cost nature of airlines was bought about by
protection from competition and that it remained even after the situation was changed.
2.3 Policy Change in the Last Decade
The old air transport regime collapsed in mid-80s. The trigger was the conclusion of
the Japan-U.S. Aviation Treaty Interim Agreement of 1985 and the signing of its
Memorandum of Understanding. The strategy of the Japanese government in the 1970s
was to limit international schedule carder to Japan Airlines (JAL), but, the Interim
Agreement admitted the new entry of Nippon Cargo Ainvays (NCA), moreover it allowed
other new carriers of both Japan and the U.S. to start scheduled passenger services.
Naturally, to make this possible, it was necessary for the government to end JAL's
monopoly over scheduled international service. Around this time, calls for the
liberalization of the Japanese domestic air industry was also strengthened, and the Council
for Transport Policy (an official advisory committee to the Minister) announced its opinion
that the Old Regime formed in the first half of 1970s should be abolished, and that more
pro-competitive air transport policy should be pursued. The content of its detailed advice
were as follows:
(1) International routes would be served by multiple carriers;
(2) Competition on domestic routes wouid be promoted by new entry into particular
city pair markets; and
(3) Japan Airlines would be completely privatized.
The government insisted that domestic aviation has moved onto a more competitive
situation, because of the new aviation policy adopted in 1986. However, the system has
met critics that the government's regulation of fare approval and entry licensing has
basically remained unchanged, so even though several carriers compete over the same
routes, these routes are subject to an entirely uniform fare structure.
In response to such critics, the goverlmaent adopted a policy that makes it easier to
offer discounted fares in 1995 and a zone-fare system in 1996. This zone fare system
adopted is similar to that adopted by European Communities (no,,', European Union) before
the third package of common air transport policy was implemented in 1993. The system
involvesestablishinga fixedpricerangeandallowingcarriersto settheirair fareswithin
thatrangeat their owndiscretion.Needlessto say,thisallowscarriersto respondto a
particulardemandperiodwithaflexiblefarestructure.Carrierscanintroduceandsetall
typesof discountfares,includingadvancedpurchasefares,tomeethedemandof different
periods.
Theupperlimit of thepermittedfarezoneis initiallycalculatedbasedontheairlines'
costlevel. Thelowerendof therageis setat25%lessthantheupperlimits fornormal
fare. Thecarriercansetdiscountfaresat a maximumof 50%belowthelowerlimit.
Logically,thedeepestdiscountfarecouldbesetat 62.5%off comparedwith theupper
limit fare.
3 Competition in the Domestic Market
3.1 Demand Structure
The five-year growth rates in the number of air passengers are 9.7% (1975-80), 1.6%
(1980-85), 8.3% (1985-90), and 3.7% (1990-95). Demand is periodically hampered by
the capacity of Haneda Airport, which expanded in July 1988 by the New A runway and
again, in 1998, the New C. Given Japan's geographical size, the air transport market in
Japan is not small. The revenue passenger kilometers (RPK) in the domestic market total
about 65 billions, one-tenth the U.S. figure, and 78 million passengers fly domestic routes,
which is one-sixth the size of the U.S. market (1995 data).
Using time-series data from 1974 to 1995, I estimate the aggregate demand function
as follows:
Ln(RPI<) = 10.157 - 0.741 Ln(RFARE) + 1.292Ln(RGDP), adjusted R2=0.982,
(5.430) (-3.665) (I 2.782)
where RPK = revenue passenger kilometers, RFARE = real airfare (domestic yields per
RPK, deflated by the CPI), RGDP = real GDP. l
Simple aggregate demand function analysis indicates that the long-term price
elasticity of domestic air travel is about -0.74 and the long-term income elasticity is about
+1.29. Compared with Ohta (1981), that suggested comparable figures of-083 and +1.66,
my estimate shows an income elasticit}' decrease owing to the newer data set.
z I estimated several other functional forms, including a dummy variable for fatal accidents, but the simplest
Themostimportantfeatureof thisdemandis theconcentrationonTokyoroutes. As
shownin Figure1, HanedaAirporthandlesabout55%of totalair passenger in Japan,
although the number of routes originating or terminating there only account for 17.9% of
all routes. This is because many dense markets are involved, and revealed in Figure 2.
Annual traffic on the Tokyo - Sapporo route is 7.6 million passengers, which is the largest
in the world, and for Tokyo - Fukuoka route the figure is 6.2 million, which also ranks high
in the world. The only non-Tokyo route ranked in the top ten domestically is Osaka -
Sapporo. 2 These demand features highlight the importance of operating rights at Haneda
Airport, especially in view of the high-cost nature of Japanese air carriers.
3.2 Carriers
Eight scheduled airline companies operate in Japan. JAL, All Nippon Airways
(ANA), and Japan Air System (JAS), these are the three earliest. Japan Asia Airlines
(JAA) and Nippon Cargo Airways (NCA) offer only international service. Japan Trans-
Ocean Airlines (JTA) and Japan Air Commuter (JAC) are solely domestic carriers, and Air
Nippon (ANK) is mainly domestic but recently opened an international route between
Fukuoka and Taipei. Note that JAA and JTA are subsidiary of JAL, NCA and ANK are
of ANA, and JAC is of JAS.
In 1998, newly established two carders entered into the domestic market, which are
Skymark Airlines and Hokkaido International Airlines (Air DO). Skymark operates only
in Tokyo - Fukuoka route and Air DO in Tokyo - Sapporo. These carriers very small and
flights are very few, but since their fare strategy is very aggressive (very cheap), they
succeeded in getting popularity.
The largest is JAL, and in 1995 it carried about 72.4 billion RPK in domestic and
international markets. This is one-half or one-third the figure for U.S. mega-carriers.
The second and third largest are ANA (about 43.8 billion RPK) and JAS (13_7 billion
RPK). When the Japanese economy was booming, the airlines made big profits, but along
with recession have come big deficits. The air transport market is becoming stable, but
the airlines are restructuring.
one fit the best.
2 The top three U.S. markets are bet_veen New York and Los Angeles, Chicago and \\'ashirtgton, D.C., each
_vitl_annual passengers of between 2.5 and 2.7 million.
•' .'2,':"
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As noted earlier, one regulatory objective has been cross-subsidization between trunk
routes and local routes. The extent is unknown because profit and loss accounting by
routes is not reported to the public, but it is said that two-thirds of JAS's routes post losses,
and that is why it objects free entry and exit policy. It is claimed that unprofitable routes
would be abandoned, and passengers without substitute transport modes would suffer.
From an economist's point of view, however, the solution for that would be to maintain
service by general government subsidy. The United States has the Essential Air Service
Program, and the EU's third package of Common Air Transport Policy has similar program.
The Japanese government is now seeking for a new direct subsidy system to be
implemented at the next stage of air transport liberalization)
3.3 Market Structure
Under the old regime, ANA had a major share in domestic market, but Figure 3 shows
a decline form 57.4% to 47.2%. In a sense, this resulted from market liberalization, but it
should be noted that none of ANA's competitors increased it share dramatically. Rather,
each gained a few percentage points, while ANA's subsidiary, ANK, increased its share by
2.5 percentage points. ANA transferred unprofitable routes to ANK to make its financial
position healthier. The government policy adopted in the mid-1980s has not led to radical
change in market structure.
ANA has not lost share dramatically because of a strong sales network and brand
loyalty in domestic the market, which were nurtured under the old regime. Furthermore,
until very recently, fare competition was not allowed, and new entrants had no effective
means to fight incumbents. In a sense, this also is a legacy of the old regulatory
environment.
Another reason shares have not changed is airport limitations. As stated earlier,
Haneda is the biggest profit center for carriers but does not have enough capacity'.
Landing slots have not increased much, although the expansion project is underway. In
such a situation, incumbents have a competitive advantage over new entrants but not other
incumbents.
Structure has changed in terms of city-pair markets with multiple carriers. Figure 4
3 In April 1998, the Council for Transport Policy submit-teda report on further liberalization of the air
transport market, in _hich it wasproposed that a new subsid: program should be established.
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showschangesin thepercentageof passengersbymarketype:single,double,andtriple
truckingroutes. After thepolicychange,passengertrafficonmultipleroutesincreased
steadily,reachingto about72%in 1994. Thismeansthat themajorityof passengers
couldchoosetheircarrier. But,asstatedabove,carriersdid nothaveflexibility insetting
faresandevenpassengerswithchoiceof twoormoreairlinesdidnotenjoythebenefitsof
competition,astherewerenodifferenceinserviceorprices.
3.4 Airfare Trends
The trend in average domestic airfares since the mid-1970s is shown in Figure 5.
The average is calculated by dividing total revenue by total passenger kilometers for all
carriers. Until recently, domestic aiffares were tightly regulated, and the average
remained relatively stable at least in nominal terms during the 1980s, after a hike in 1980
due to the second oil crisis in the previous year. Stability in nominal terms generally
means a decline in real terms.
We can identify the downward trend in airfares since 1990 in nominal as well as real
terms. In this period, fares were still regulated, but carriers could offer travel agents
discount fares for inclusive tour programs, which might be used illegally for seat sales.
So we cannot deny the possibility that the downward fare trend in 1990 reflects entry
relaxation in the mid-1980s with a time lag. But it should be noted that the Japanese
economy was in depression, and the fare decrease could be due to the weak economy. In
any case, air passengers did not realize benefits from competition, and this led to demands
to relax fare regulation.
The zone fare system was introduced in June 1, 1996, and in spring 1997, MOT
reported on a comparison of the average fare with the previous year. As seen in Figure 6,
the average fare declined by 2.3% in nominal terms. Since general consumer prices
remained fairly stable during this period, this can be regarded as a real price decrease.
The reduction is not trivial, considering that the annual rate of decline in U.S. domestic
airfare since deregulation is 2.8% in real terms. 4 It is not clear that this price decline was
mainly due to the new zone system. The average domestic fare had started to decrease
since 1990, and the drop between 1994 and 1995 was 3.5% in both nominal and real terms.
4 According to Air Tra0sport Association data, average U.S. airfare in 1977 _as 13.4 cents per passenger
mile. _hich declined to 8.07 cents in 1995(calculatedin constantdollars based on 19S2).
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Judgingfromaggregatedata,domesticairfaresin Japanhavedeclinedat anontrivial
rate,butconsumersdo notperceivemuchchange.The main reasonfor their feeling
seemsto bethattheabsolutelevelof airfareinJapanishighercomparedwith thatof other
countries,especiallytheUnitedState.
4 REVOLVE OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRASNPORT
The operation of international air transport is based on bilateral agreements, which
reflect reciprocal rights and interests of each country. Owing to protection of fights and
interests, the negotiated traffic level is likely to be lower. The country with less
competitive and less efficient carriers may well try to protect its airlines and to limit the
within which its carriers can compete safely.
A cartel initiated by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), stabilized
international airfares and avoided substantial competition. Although IATA still exists and
the Traffic Conferences of IATA are held regularly to set fares route by route, its ability to
contain competition has been reduced. Its main role has shifted to cooperative functions,
such as a debt and credit-clearing house for airlines. The degree of competition in
international markets depends on the bilateral agreement, especially the capacity control
clause.
The Japanese government was persistently taken a rather traditional stance on
international aviation negotiations, a turning point in 1986 when the Council on Transport
Policy submitted a report that suggested a new direction. The background to this report
was the provisional agreement .with the United States made the previous year, which
allowed more Japanese and U.S. carriers entering the market between two countries. By
this agreement, ANA and JAS became international carriers, and United, American and
Delta obtained access to Japan.
Although this provisional agreement was not a liberal agreement giving carriers
freedom in terms of capacity and price setting, it triggered changes in Japanese air transport
policy. It ,,,,'as the starting point for relaxing entry conditions and expanding capacity
expansion in international air transport markets.
The reason the Japan-U.S. provisional agreement is not more liberal is that the
Japanese government believes that there is an inequality of rights and interests in the
Japan-U.S. bilateral agreement, and that this inequality hampered fair competition in air
transportmarketbetweentwocountries.TheJapanesegovernmentinsiststhatthefollow
inequalitypertain.First, in theoriginalagreement,theUnitedStatehasunlimitedfifth
freedomrightsbeyondJapan,whileJapanhasonlyonepoint of that rightbeyondthe
UnitedState. Second,theUnitedStatehasmorefull right carriersthanJapan. (Full
rightcarrierscanincreaseordecreasecapacitywithoutadvancednoiice.) Third,thereis
an imbalancein thecapacityprovisionsin thenorthPacificmarkets. Forth,asa result,
U.S.carrierscanattainagreatersharethanJapanesecareersin thatmarket.
Not all researchersagreewith theseassertions.It is pointedout thatonecauseof
imbalancesin capacityandmarketshareis thefailureof Japanesecarriersto expandtheir
capacity. It is truethatthereisaninequalityin thebeyondrightsbetweentwocountries,
but it is worthwhilenotingthat theserightsarenotso attractiveto Japanesecarriers
becauseof Japan'sgeographicallocation.
Generallyspeaking,the complaintsfrom foreigncountriesregardingJapanese
internationalaviationpolicyfocuson thedifficultyinenteringtheJapanesemarketandin
increasingtheir capacity.Thesecomplaintsarepartlycausedby Japan'spolicy,largely
stemmedfromairportcongestionproblemsJ
In Marchof 1998,JapanandUSagreeda newmemorandumof understanding.In
thenegotiationprocess,whileUSgovernments ronglyinsistedthatJapanshouldaccepted
theliberalagreement,sinceJapanesegovernmentrefusedit persistently,theMoUwasnot
saidto be liberalagreement.TheofficialreasonwhyJapanopposedliberalagreement
wasthatthereremainedtheinequalityof rightsandinterestsin thebilateralmentioned
above.
However,theessenceof theMoUwastointroducegreatercompetitive nvironment
intotheNorthPacificmarket. Thenewagreementallowsfor full right carriersto chose
anycity pairmarketbetweentwocountriesif thereisno landingslotproblem,to exercise
beyondrightmorefreelythanpresent6,andtotakeuseof codesharingevenbetweensame
country'scarriers. Moreover,theagreementequalizethenumberof full rightcarrierfor
two countries,which couldmeetsJapan'scomplaintaboutinequalityin the original
5 As for the detail discussion on US-Japan bilateral agreemem, see Yamauchi and lto (1996).
6 \\'hile there remained preconditions on using beyond righ: for both countries, these conditions are not
restrictive.
bilateralagreementwhile for thenon-fullright carrier,flight increaseis allowed. The
newagreementwasconcludedwithsubstantialcompromiseof twocountries,but it issure
that competition among carriers will increase and increased competition would benefit
consumers as well as air carriers themselves.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined chang in Japan's air transport policy. Air transport
industry is quickly metamorphosing, so the policy should keep pace with its object. It
should be noticed that competition makes airline more efficient and more competitive, and
that sound air transport system brings huge benefits to consumers and global economy
consequently. So the ultimate purpose of the policy is nothing but enhancing the
competition in this field.
But it is true that there are several problems to be solved in promoting competition in
the air transport market.
First, in order to make the competition fair and workable, we have to make sure of the
equal footing for the market competition. For example, since the congestion in airport
would be main obstacle to new entry and strategic decision making, we have to invent
transparent and efficient procedure to allocating landing slots. In the international context,
the government aids to its flag carrier are the most controversial problem. In the EU case,
they put the judgement on legitimacy of goverm3)ent subsidy into the hands of EU officials,
but the process for judgement was not thought to be clear and persuasive.
Second, the global alliances among carriers put us difficult problems. As noted in
the text, alliances are likely to make competition more active and increase passengers'
benefits. But there is a possibility that it fosters worldwide oligopoly in international
aviation, and if so, we will need someone or some authorities to keep on watching the
behavior of players. It does not seem to be easy for us to agree with each other on the best
regulator in this matter.
v_,..,, r.-_ J t-. r .... _-_-_ - "-'- '_'2'_: ('* :'-'-'_ '--.-'_; __' 5 .-,_ ._*_.._,_. .... ,
4_;>_÷.:: ..... L i ,t ....... _a "m................. ._1.... ta ......... :- __.a.... t."., "^_""
*-.t.nt i k.rd,,,., ............ _ E .........
10
References
Yamauchi, Hirotaka [1997], "Air Transport Policy in Japan: Competition under
Regulation," in Christopher Findlay, Chia Lin Sien and Karmjit Singh eds. Asia
Pacific Air Transport: Challenges and Policy Reforms. Singapore; Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
Yamauchi, Hirotaka, and Takatoshi Ito [1996], "Air Transport Policy in Japan," in Gary C.
Hufbauer and Christopher Findley eds. Flying High: Liberalizing Civil Aviation
in the Asia Pacific. Washington DC; Institute for International Economics.
11
Other than Han,'da and
Itami
24%
Itam
21% Between Hancda and
hami
4%
Hancda
51%
Figure 1. Passenger Shares of Haneda and Itami Airport
140Number of routes
120
I00
80
60
40
20
0
0 - 100,000 100,000-200.000 200.000 - 500.000
.::; ".; - • . '-. ,..a24'__-.:;_
:'[_ :.-.-..-"-.'__!_,::__... _, .. _ ..... :
500,000-1,000,000 1,000,000+
Number of annual passengers
Figure 2. Route Structure of Air Transport in Japan
1934
1994
0% Io% 20.:. 30'/. ,o% so./. eo% 70"/. so./.
[DA,A ,,JAL 0iAS 6_72 ;._,hK DJACl
90%
ANA JAL
1994 47.2%
1984 57.4%
26.7%
23.3%
JAS
19.9%
17.2%
JTA ANK JAC
2.5% 3.2%
1.4%
0.5%
0.7% 0.0%
Figure 3. Changes of Share in the Domestic Market
1oo%
IlJO'_,.
90%
80%
?0%
60%
5O%
40%
30%
20%
I0%
0%
. ---J
//
i
l
" ": I I%
m
86
i
i "
r I I
87 85 89 90 91 92 93
J:lTrl.pl_. Tru_ck Routfs_l Double T[uc.k Routes O Sin.gl;T,n_ck Rou_es
Figure 4. Passenger Share by Market Type
94
a
\
\
3O
25
20
15
l0
,¢n
7.-I 75 76 77 7S 79 80 81 82 $3 84 8_ 8'5 87
nol_lo_[ Ice*in --_ real term
I I "1' 4_"'_ f¶;" ::
8S 8¢) 99 91 9." 93 94 95
Figure 5. Trends in Average Airfares, 1974-1995
Not:.: calcula'ed as total passenger rt_enue di_ idcd b._ to:al rc_cn,_¢ passenger k Io:n,,:t_:r>
Y_fl
Figure 6 Domestic Average Airfare (in nominal term)
_a
6
e_
O
2J
I
.._........,,._,..,_ :_,_, ...... __-_@._......... ._........... ....... ..._
20 .... _-":'_'*,_" ,, . ....,,, . -_.- ........-_," _.._,._ ........... _-:-_- ._ • , _ -.-'_,,,_____ ......
'_ -' :':_"_: :._ "-' 7"'"':" :........-.;7_'._ ''_ ''_ _:;""'-': c_/l_,_
.-!:._'-'_ ']-o-- Avcrag,. Fare ._,.'_,,:'r ;,':>.i, ..... L-; _:,.:_,_r_ ;,..-._., '_-..:_.." , .............
Averase17
• ./" 7: .'_'_:;; ' i.- ." ,: __ ":. , -_ ..... . ' ,",,:: ,:." 7 .... . /
AVIATION INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE AND AIRLINE COST:
A STATISTICAL COST ESTIMATION APPROACH
Mark M. Hansen
David Gillen
Reza Djafarian-Tehrani
Institute of Transportation Studies
National Center of Excellence in Aviation Operations Research (NEXTOR)
University of California at Berkeley
May, 1999
Corresponding Author: Mark Hansen
107B McLaughlin Hall
Berkeley.CA 94805
Phone: 510-642-'2880
Fax: 510-642-1246
e-mail: hansen@ce.berkeley.edu
This research was supported by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and the Intel
Corporation.
AviationInfrastructurePerformanceandAirlineCost:A StatisticalCostEstimation
Approach
-Abstract-
Therelationshipbetweentheperformanceof theU.S.NationalAirspaceSystem(NAS)
andairline costsis examinedby estimatingairline costfunctionswhich includeNAS
performancemetricsasarguments,usingquarterlydatafor 10U.S.domesticairlines.
Performancemetricsthat vary by airline andquarteraredevelopedby applyingfactor
analysisto seven_mderlyingvariables,includingaveragedelay,delayvariance,andthe
proportionof flight_sJwhicharecancelled.Thisanalysisrevealsthatvariationin theseven
variablescanbeadequatelysummarizedby threeor fewerfactors,whichwe termNAS
performancefactors.If threefactorsareused,theycorrespondto ttelay", _ariability",
and ttisruption".Thefirst of thesecapturesaverageflight departureandarrival delay.
The second reflects the variance in delay, while the third is based on the incidence of
situations in which operations become sufficiently irregular to require flight
cancellations. In the two-factor representation, _ariability" and ttisruption" factors are
essentially merged into an irregularity" factor, while the one factor model blends
irregularity" with fdelay". When the NAS performance factors are used as arguments in
an airline cost function, the ttisruption" factor is found to be positive and significant in
the three-factor model, as is the irregularity" factor in the two-factor model. No
significant effect is found in the cost function with one performance factor. Using the
estimated two- and three-factor models, we estimate the cost savings that would result if
the NAS performance levels in each observation were improved to the highest level
found in our data set, and find annual savings to be in the $1.5-2 billion range. The
estimates are fairly consistent with previous estimates of the cost of delay based on
applying delay t_ost factors" to the number of minutes of aggregate delay. On the other
hand, our findings suggest that the main linkages between NAS performance and airline
cost involve irregularity and disruption rather than the quantity of delay minutes.
1. Introduction
The need to understand and quantify the benefits of public and private investments in the
National Airspace System (NAS) has never been greater. On the public side, Executive
Order 12893, published in 1994, requires the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
along with other federal agencies to conduct systematic analysis of benefits and costs of
all infrastructure investments involving annual expenditures in excess of $50 million.
The analysis is to gluantify and monetize benefits and costs to the maximum extent
possible (FAA, 1998)." Moreover, the FAA Acquisition Management System, published
in 1997, mandates an _vestment analysis" prior to the initiation of a new acquisition
program, including, among other things, the identification of alternatives and assessments
of their benefits and costs (FAA, 1998). Such analyses are required for a host of Air
Traffic Management (ATM) and Communications-Navigation-Surveillance (CNS)
programs through which FAA intends to modernize the NAS over the next two decades
(FAA, 1999).
Private investments, particularly those by airlines in advanced avionics for new aircraft,
are also getting closer economic scrutiny. According to Allen et al (1998), the industry
is getting to the point where the achievement of business case maturity may be more
important than technical maturity." Business case maturity includes the ability to
explicitly identify benefit mechanisms triggered by CNS/ATM investments, credible
estimates of the dollar values flowing from these mechanisms, and explicit analysis of
investment risk (Allen et al, 1998). The CNS/ATM Focused Team (C/AFT), whose
membership includes airframe manufacturers, airlines, and the FAA, has been working
since 1997 to develop and apply a methodology for developing such business cases.
While the need for benefit quantification is growing, industry stakeholders are also
recognizing that the performance of the NAS is multi-dimensional, and therefore not
adequately captured by traditional, delay-based, metrics. For example, the C/AFT has
identified six categories of performance, including, in addition to delay, predictability,
flexibility, efficiency, access, and cost of service (Alcabin, 1999). These concepts are
considered to tSefine the elements of value to the scheduled airline business" as well as
'the common criteria for developing economic models needed to predict
benefits-..(Alcabin, 1999)."
Taken together, these trends suggest that NAS investment analyses should consider, and
attempt to monetize, the impacts of a proposed investment on multiple dimensions of
NAS performance. Unfortunately, the state of practice falls far short of this ideal. Almost
without exception, investments analyses and business cases consider only delay and
direct cost savings when evaluating the benefit of a NAS improvement. For example, a
recent business case for advanced data link (ATS Data Link Focus Group, 1999),
considered to be a path-breaking effort within the industry, identifies four benefit
categories. Two involve communication cost savings, one is increased availability of
communication between aircraft and airline operations centers (this was guessed to be
worth anywhere between $16 and $48 per flight), and the last category is delay cost
savings (valued at $25 per minute based on aircraft direct operating cost).
Thus,evenasindustrystakeholdersrecognizethatNASperformancehasmanyaspects,
only delay is routinely monetized.Even here,however,there is ample room for
skepticismaboutthe procedures.Virtually all delaycost calculationsinvolve nothing
morethantheapplicationof acostfactorbasedon reportedvaluesfor theaveragedirect
aircraftoperatingcostperblockhourto quantitiesof delaymeasuredin time units.For
air transportaircraft, the cost factor is in the range of $20-$25 per minute. A few studies
refine this figure by differentiating between delay taken at the gate, on the ground, and in
the air (Odoni, 1995; Geissinger, 1989). Others extend the calculations by disaggregating
expense by functional category, such a fuel, flight personnel, maintenance, and capital,
and estimating how delay, portrayed as changes in the quantity of block hours, affects
each one (Kostiuk et al, 1998).
The approaches to delay cost estimation share some strong assumptions that are rarely
scrutinized or even acknowledged as such. These include that the cost of delay is an
additive function of the cost of individual delay events, and that the cost of each event is
a linear function of the duration of the delay (and perhaps the phase of flight in which it
occurs). Such assumptions ignore the possibility that delay cost is non-linearly related to
duration, is subject to combinatorial effects, and includes sizable indirect components.
It is probable that the cost of a delay varies nonlinearly with the duration of the delay. For
example, one 40-minute delay is more costly than 40 one-minute delays. The 40-minute
delay is far more likely to disrupt ground operations, gate assignments, crew schedules,
and passenger itineraries. Conversely, airlines sometimes add delays to flights to, for
example, avoid having a flight arrive at a hub in the middle of a departure bank. If this is
rational behavior, then the relationship between cost and delay must not only be non-
linear, but also non-monotonic.
Delay costs are also subject to combinatorialeffects. The severity of the impacts noted
above is likely to depend not only on the duration of delay to a specific flight but on the
interaction of delays for many flights. This is particularly evident in a hub-and-spoke
network in which flights are scheduled in connecting banks. If all the flights in an
inbound bank are delayed by the same amount, then the effect may be far less severe than
if half the flights are delayed by a larger (or even the same) amount.
Finally, the prevalence of delays may generate sizable indirect costs through airline
adaptation behaviors. Carriers may take a variety of measures to make their operations
more robust to delay. These include building more padding into scheduled block times,
providing flights with additional fuel, and having extra aircraft, flight crew, and ground
personnel available. While these measures decrease the cost of delays when they occur,
they also increase costs of day-to-day operation. In this way the cost of delay may
permeate throughout the entire cost structure of the airline in ways that are not tied to
individual delays events.
Our limited ability to take these aspects of delay cost into account, combined with the
nearly complete absence of information on how to place an economic value on other
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dimensions of NAS performance, represent critical gaps in "knowledge at a time when
massive investments in the system are being contemplated. One might attempt to fill
these gaps in a variety of ways. Simulation is one possibility. To address the questions
under consideration here, a simulation would have to be highly detailed. It would need to
capture how airlines respond on a real-time basis to operational irregularities and the cost
implications of that response. The problem gets especially complicated when major
adjustments such as rerouting of aircraft and reassigning crews are considered. While
such a simulation may eventually be possible, it is beyond our present capabilities.
A second possibility is to systematically query airline personnel. For example, one might
present dispatchers with different scenarios concerning the operation of their assigned
flights throughout the day or month, and ask them to choose which scenarios are more
desirable. If the scenarios were carefully chosen, this procedure would reveal the
preferences of the participants, and thereby allow the estimation of utility functions
whose arguments would be various dimensions of NAS performance. Such a study might
yield very useful results, but is also subject to a number of objections. First, it is not clear
how such a methodology could allow monetary valuation of NAS performance, since this
would require participants to choose between scenarios that involve money as well as
flight operations. Second, it is not obvious that dispatchers, or any other airline personnel,
have a sufficiently global view of the airline's interest to make the correct choices.
Finally, the results of such a study might be biased by principal/agent effects, with
respondents making choices that are best for them rather than for the airline as a whole.
This paper focuses on a third approach, which is to estimate airline cost functions
including NAS performance measures as arguments. Using published, quarterly, airline-
level data, we estimate relationships between airline operating expense, outputs, factor
prices, and other variables. Included among the latter are a set of variables, which we
term NAS performance factors," that quantify the airline's operational experience in the
NAS during the quarter. By observing how these variables influence airline expense, we
establish a direct empirical basis for translating various dimensions of NAS performance
into monetary terms. Any quantifiable aspect of NAS performance can, in principle, be
accommodated in this framework. Moreover, because relationships are derived from
observed co-variation between performance variables and cost, the results entail a
minimum of assumptions about the mechanisms involved.
This paper presents a first step in using cost estimation to assess the economic value of
NAS performance. It employs a relatively small data set and, accordingly, a limited set of
NAS performance variables and a simple form for the cost function. Nonetheless, it
yields plausible results, including industry-wide estimates of the costs from Tub-
optimal" NAS performance that can be compared with results of more conventional
studies based on delay cost factors. This suggests that statistical cost estimation is a
promising avenue for assessing the economic benefits of NAS improvements.
We proceed as follows. In the next section, we present our analvtical framework In
Section 3. we describe and present results from our procedure for developing airline level
NAS performance variables. Section 4 turns to the specification and estimation of our
cost model,which we then use, in Section5, to estimateairline cost savingsfrom
improvingNASperformance.Conclusionsarepresentedin Section6.
2. Analytical Framework
The cost function of a firm is defined as the lowest cost at which it can produce a given
set of outputs, ]7, given the prices is pays for inputs, P. Equivalently, it represents the
cost of acquiring the optimal set of inputs, X*, given the outputs and prices. Thus we
have:
cos , =p,,.2" = (l)
where the subscript i denotes a particular firm (airline), and t identifies the time period.
The cost function, like the production function, is a way of depicting the technology
available to the firm, i.e. its ability to transform inputs into outputs. Implicit in (1) is that
all airlines have the same technology, an assumption that could be relaxed by adding
airline subscripts to the cost and conditional demand (._*) functions.
Equation (1) can be considered a long-run cost function because it assumes that all inputs
have been adjusted to their optimal levels. Some inputs, particular capital inputs, cannot
be varied instantaneously. A short-rim cost function relaxes the assumption of optimal
capital stock by treating capital as a quasi-fixed factor and removing capital costs from
the dependent variable. This results in capital being an argument in the short-run cost
function. Thus we have:
scosL = .2" (?,,, ,Ki,) = S(g , , X,,) (2)
where capital is excluded from the price and conditional demand vectors.
It has long been recognized that costs depend upon the nature and quality of airline
outputs as well as the quantity. For example, airlines have been shown to have economies
of density, whereby the cost for a given total output increased with the size of the
airline ts network. Several additional variables are included to capture such effects. These
are incorporated into the vector Zit. This yields a short run cost function of the form
O(Y,, Pit, Zit, Kit ). This form, as well as the long-run version in which capital is not an
argument, has been widely studied in the airline economics literature (Caves et al, 1985;
Gillen, Oum and Tretheway, 1990; Windle, 1991; Encaoua, 1991; and Hansen and
Kanafani, 1989), and serves as the point of departure for the present study.
In this study we add one additional vector argument,.Vit, which characterizes airline i's
operational experience in the NAS during time period t. In general, _rit is based on
variables such as average delay, delay variance, and the proportion of cancelled flights. It
can be viewed as the performance of the NAS from the standpoint of an individual
airline. This is not to suggest that /_'it depends only on the performance of public aviation
infrastructure; rather it derives from the interaction between that infrastructure and
operational decisions taken by the airline. Both public and private investments in the
NAS are primarily intended to change _"it for the better.
Thus our analysis revolves around estimating the operating cost function
O(Yit,Pit,Qit,Kit,_[it). The first four arguments are standard ones in the airline cost
estimation literature. The last, which is the focus of our investigation, implies a
relationship between NAS performance, measured at the airline level, and airline
operating cost. In order to quantify that relationship, one must find a develop an
/V'itvector which captures airline-level NAS performance in a compact, yet
comprehensive, way. To this task we now turn.
3. NAS Performance Measurement
Our measures of NAS performance are derived from the operational experience of
airlines using the NAS, as captured by such metrics as average delay, variability of delay,
and flight cancellation rates. As noted previously, these measures do not only reflect the
quality of service provided by the public aviation infrastructure, but also the airlines'
ability to plan and manage their operations. Both of these factors depend on exogenous
events, particularly weather, as well as the competence (and perhaps luck) of service
providers and users. Thus, when we refer to high or low performance levels, we are not
affixing credit or blame to either the FAA or the airlines, but rather assessing operational
outcomes in which both, along with a host of exogenous factors, played a role.
We must quantify NAS performance by airline and quarter. To do so, results for
thousands of flights must be summarized by a much smaller set of metrics. There is no
uniquely valid way of doing this. One might, for example, base metrics on the flight, the
flight complex, the day, or the airport-day. (To illustrate the last possibility, one could
might categorize for a particular airline, airport, and day as gmooth", i'nildly irregular",
or ttighly irregular", count the number of airport-days in each category, and use these as
the performance metrics.) Here, we opted for the more conventional flight-based
approach, reserving the others for subsequent work.
Even while confining ourselves to flight-based metrics, there is a huge number that might
be employed. To keep the analysis tractable, we employed a two step approach. In the
first step, we evaluated seven metrics for each airline and quarter in our data set. Next,
we employed principal component analysis to collapse these metrics into a smaller
number of factors, and calculated the factor scores for each airline and quarter. These
factor scores were used to compose the Nit vector used in the subsequent cost
estimation.
The seven underlying metrics are defined in Table 1. The first two metrics pertain to
delay, and are thus the most closely related to the conventional approach for measuring
NAS performance. The third metric focuses on more extended delays and reflects the
hypothesis that such delays may have qualitatively and quantitatively different impacts
on costs. The next three metrics reflect variability in flight operations. The final metric
reflects the incidence of conditions when operations become sufficiently irregular to
result in tlight cancellations. All of the metrics were evaluated by airline and quartermfor
the 11 quarters extending from the winter of 1995 through the summer of 1997--using the
Airline Service Quality Program (ASQP) data base, which presents scheduled and actual
departure times for every domestic flight of the top 10 U.S. carriers. Thus our data set
includes 110 observations. Since we employ a log-linear cost function specification, and
all metrics were consistently positive, logarithms of these metrics are used in the
subsequent analysis.
As shown in Table 2, the seven performance metrics are highly intercorrelated. All
correlations are greater than 0.4, and the majority are in excess of 0.6. This suggests the
use of principal component analysis as a way of capturing most of the information
contained in the seven performance metrics in a smaller number of variables. Principal
component analysis identifies a set of factors--linear combinations of the original
variables--which together account for as much of the total variation in the original data
as possible. The factors are obtained by finding eigenvectors of the correlation matrix.
The higher the eigenvalue, the greater the explanatory power of the associated
eigenvector. By convention, each factor has zero mean and unit variance. By virtue of
being eigenvectors, the factors are also mutually orthogonal.
The results of the principal component analysis of the NAS performance data are
summarized in Table 3. The first component has high, positive, loadings on all seven
factors and accounts for 72 percent of the total variation. The second factor, which
accounts for about half of the residual variation, has positive loadings on the variance
metrics and negative loadings on delay and unreleliability. Thus airlines which score high
on this factor tend to have unusually high delay variances combined with unusually low
delay averages. The third factor explains 8 percent of the total variation, and has a high
positive loading on flight cancellations and a negative loading on departure delay
variance. Altogether, these factors explain about 94 percent of the variation in the total
data set.
In principal component analysis, the standard procedure is to determine the number of
factors to be extracted from the data, and then rotate these factors so that factor loadings
are close to either 0 or +1, in order to simplify their interpretation. In choosing the
number of factors, one must make a judgment about when the additional variation
explained by a factor is sufficient to justify retaining it. In the present case, we decided to
confine our attention to no more than three factors, since none of the remaining ones
accounted for more than 3 percent of the total variation. The choice between one, two, or
three factors was more difficult. An oft-cited rule-of-thumb is to include only those
factors which account for more than one Nth of the variation, where N is the number of
variables in the data set. Applying this to the present case, we find that only one factor
should be retained. On the other hand, this leaves out nearly 30 percent of the variation in
the original data set, suggesting the possibility of adding a second or third factor. Rather
than fixing on a single alternative, we chose to estimate cost models including one, two,
and three NAS performance factors.
Varimax factor rotation was then performed on the two factor and three factor
representations. The results appear in Table 3. In the two factor case, the first factor
correlates more highly with the delay variables, including the average delays, average
delaysover 15minutes,andunreliability.The second factor has the highest loadings on
the departure and arrival delay variances, the cancellation rate, and, like the first factor,
average delays over 15 minutes. One might summarize this by terming the first factor
tSelay", and the second factor irregularity". When three factors are used, the first one is
virtually identical to that in the two factor case. The second factor is also quite similar,
except that the loading on cancellation rate is considerably lower. The third factor has a
very high loading on cancellation rate, along with some correlation with arrival delay
variance and average delay over 15 minutes. The three factors might be described as
ttelay", _ariability", and tlisruption". A carrier with a high score on the first factor has
flights that depart and arrive later (relative to schedule) than those of the average carder.
If the second factor score is high, than delays fluctuate more widely than average, while a
high score on the third factor means that conditions in which flights must be cancelled are
more prevalent than average.
Figures 1 and 2 present average factor scores for the one-factor analysis, by airline and
quarter respectively. Figure 1 reveals that, using the one-factor analysis, the two carders
experiencing the best NAS performance (i.e. with the lowest factor score) are USAir and
Southwest, while Delta, United, and TWA experience the worst performance. Figure 2
shows that the quarters with the worst NAS performance include the winters of 1996 and
1997, along with the summer and fall of 1996. Good quarters include the springs and
summers of 1995 and 1997. While there is some seasonal pattern in the data, it is not
particularly strong, as evidenced by the fact that two of the three summer quarters are
among the best while the third is among the worst.
Figures 3 and 4 present airline and quarterly averages for the three factor analysis. These
provide a more complete picture of NAS performance trends. We see that Southwest is
the only carrier to be better-than-average for all three factors, while United is the only
one to be below average for all three. A number of carriers feature performance far better
than average for some factors and worse than average for others. For example, Northwest
has relatively low delay (Factor 1), but high variability and disruption (Factors 2 and 3).
In contrast, Delta has low disruption but high variability and delay. Because the factors
are, by construction, orthogonal the lack of a consistent pattem in the airline factor scores
is to be expected.
From Figure 4, we see that just two quarters--the spring and summer of 1995mhave
better than average performance on all three dimensions, while two others--fall, 1996
and winter, 1997--are consistently worse than average. We also see from Figure 4 that
the horrific winter of 1996 was particularly bad from the standpoint of delay and
disruption, but average from the standpoint of variability. A similar, but less pronounced
pattern is seen in the winter of 1997, while in the winter 1995 only disruption was worse
than average. Disruption is consistently less of a problem in the spring and summer
quarters, as is delay except for 1996. Finally, there is some evidence of a secular trend to
worse performance on the variability dimension: four of the first five months are above
average in this respect, while each of the last six months is below average.
4. Cost Model Specification and Estimation
We now consider the relationship between the airline-level NAS performance factors
derived in Section 3 and airline operating cost, using the cost function framework
explained in Section 2. To do this, we use the performance factors to compose the NAS
performance vector, Nit, which in turn is used as an argument for the cost function.
The airline cost estimation literature has evolved sophisticated techniques involving
flexible functional forms combined with simultaneous estimation of cost and input share
equations. Here, we opt for a simpler approach--based on the Cobb-Douglas form--for
several reasons. First, our data set is comparatively small, extending over just 11 quarters
for which ASQP data were readily available at the time of our analysis. This makes it
important to conserve degrees of freedom by using models requiring few parameters.
Second, our aim is not to fully reveal airline cost structure, but simply to assess the
impact of NAS performance on airline costs. Finally, we find that a simple Cobb-Douglas
model fits the data extremely well, suggesting that more complex model would provide
little '4,,alue-added."
The Cobb-Douglas form leads to the log-linear model specification:
ln(TOC it ) = a o + ct i + Y ,Bj ln(Yji t ) + Y. cok ln(Wki t ) + Z ?'t ln( Z tit ) + lc In(Kit ) +
j k g
_" _'m Nmit + £it
m
(2)
where TOCit is
Yjit is
_'Vki t is
Zti t is
t;
Kit is
Nmi t is
_it is
operating expense for airline i in time period t;
the quantity of the output j for airline i in time period t;
the factor price for input k for airline i in time period t;
the value of operating characteristic g for airline i in time period
working capital for airline i in time t;
the value for NAS performance factor m for airline i in time t;
a stochastic error term.
The specific variables included in the model are detailed in Table 4. Two outputs,
revenue passenger miles, and tSther", are considered. The latter combines freight ton-
miles, mail ton-miles and other miscellaneous outputs in a divisia index normalized so
that this output is 1 for American Airlines in the first quarter of 1995. Three production
factors, fuel, labor, and fnaterials", are included. Fuel and labor prices are calculated
using fuel expense per gallon and labor expense per employee respectively. The latter is
somewhat imprecise because it does not take into account hours worked or employee
classification (pilots versus flight attendants for example). As a proxy for fnaterials"
price, we use the producer price index (PPI), which ,,'aries by quarter but not by airline.
The three operational characteristics are average load factor, the number of points served,
,and scheduled departures. These variables capture qualitative features of an airline's
outputthat are likely to influence cost. Our measure of airline capital stock is the sum of
the airline's net asset value, working capital, and accounts receivable, minus accounts
payable. The capital stock variable is subject to some error because of the rather arbitrary
depreciation rules used by airlines. With the exception of the PPI, all of these data are
obtained from the airline balance sheet data published in the Department of
Transportation _ Form 41 database.
As previously noted, we employ NAS performance factor scores to define the Nit vector.
We estimate models in which this vector contains one, two, and three factor scores,
employing the rotated factors. As a result of the rotation, the factors employed in the
three models are all different from one another, as shown in Figure 3. By virtue of being
factor scores, all have zero mean and unit variance. Also, because the factors are linear
combinations of the logarithms of the seven original performance variables, they enter
into the model in linear rather than log-linear form.
The specification of the intercept term, a, is an important issue. As specified in (2), the
model incorporates airline-specific intercepts, or airline fixed effects. Alternatively, one
might assume a single intercept that applies to all airlines by eliminating ct i from (2).
When fixed effects are incorporated, they may absorb variation that is really due to other
factors, particularly when analyzing short time series in which explanatory variables do
not change very much for individual observations for the same airline. On the other hand,
one could argue that individual airlines will tend to have higher or lower costs, all else
equal, due to differences in productivity and other omitted variables. In the present
context, we choose to include airline fixed effects because our focus is on the NAS
performance variables. On the one hand, these variables do exhibit considerable intra-
airline variation, mitigating the absorption problem. On the other hand, consistent inter-
airline differences in these variables may reflect differences in managerial competency
that carry over into other areas, creating the POssibility of spurious results if the dummies
are excluded. We employ American Airlines as the tSaseline" carrier whose fixed effect
is forced to zero.
In order to efficiently estimate the model, it is desirable to account for the expected
correlation between stochastic errors for observations pertaining to particular airlines. We
do this by allowing first order correlation between observations for the same airline. Thus
we have:
_it = P£it-I +Vit (3)
where vit is the component of the error term which is independently and identically
distributed.
The model was estimated using the two-step Prais-Winsten (1954) method, in which p is
estimated by performing regression on the OLS residuals, and the model is then re-
estimated using the transformation l?'it = _t- PITi,-1, where Pit is the vector of
dependent and independent variables for airline i and time period t, to eliminate the
autocorrelation. To maintain degrees of freedom, the first observations in the time series
are included,but multipliedby the factor l_-p2 to maintain homoskedasticity. This
estimation method bas been reported to be as efficient as full maximum likelihood
estimation in simulation experiments (Johnson, 1984).
5. Estimation Results
Table 5 summarizes our estimation results for the cost models with one, two, and three
NAS performance factors. All three models have very good fits, with R2 values in excess
of 0.99. Coefficient estimates are of the expected sign, and most are significant at either
the 5 percent or 10 percent level. The estimates are also, for the most part, quite
consistent across the three models. As anticipated, the airline fixed effects absorb
persistent inter-airline differences, reducing some of the other coefficients. To illustrate,
consider the cost impact of gcaling up" an airline by increasing its outputs, departures,
number of points served, and capital stock by the same proportion. According to the
model a 1 percent scale-up would increase cost by ,Bi + ,6'2 + 71 + Y2 + x percent. On the
basis of the estimates this sum ranges from 0.79 to 0.88 percent, implying fairly strong
returns to scale. On the other hand, there is a fairly strong positive correlation between
the magnitude of an airline's fixed effect and its scale of operation: Alaska, America
West, and TWA have the smallest fixed effects, while American, Delta, and United have
the largest. This suggests that some of the cost impact of scale-up has been shifted from
the scale coefficients themselves to the airline fixed effects.
Similarly, the estimate for the labor factor price coefficient is somewhat less than
expected. This may also be caused by the fixed effects, or error-in-variables for the
reasons explained in Section 4. Nonetheless, the estimated cost function is approximately
homogenous of degree 1 in factor prices (o91 + 602 + o93 _ 1 ) as predicted by economic
theory, with the discrepancies well within the standard errors of the factor price
coefficients. Error-in-variables and the presence of fixed effects can also explain the
small and insignificant (though correctly signed) estimate of the capital stock variable.
Tuming now to the focus of our inquiry, we find that, in the one factor model, the impact
of the NAS performance metric has the expected sign, but is statistically insignificant. In
both the two and three factor models, however, one of the factors has the correct sign an
is highly significant. In the two factor model, it is the second factor, which we termed
_negularity" in the earlier discussion, which has the dominant effect. In the three factor
model, the key factor is disruption. Recall that, in three factor model, the second and third
factors, '0ariability" and tfisruption," are essentially a decomposition of the second
factor, fiTegularity", in the two factor model. Thus the results are quite consistent, and
reveal that it is the tlisruption" component of _regularity" that is the main cost driver.
These effects are apparently lost in the one-factor model because the are subsumed in a
single metric which also contains performance dimensions, such as average delay, that do
not strongly influence cost. It is ironic that conventional investment analyses rely almost
exclusively on these latter, seemingly unimportant, dimensions of NAS performance.
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To assessthemagnitudeof the link betweencostandNASperformanceimpliedbyour
results, recall that the factorsarestandardizedvariables,andthus haveunit variance.
Therefore, a one unit change in a factor corresponds to change by one standard deviation.
From the estimates, we see that such a change in either the fi'regularity" factor in the
two-factor model or the _disruption" factor in the three-factor model will cause a change
in operating cost of roughly 1.5 percent. Put another way, we estimate that, in either of
these cases, a relatively good factor score of one standard deviation below the mean
would results in costs about 3 percent lower than a relatively bad score of one standard
deviation above the mean.
In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that they reflect statistical rather
than accounting relationships. Thus, in the three factor model, the strong impact of the
tlisruption" factor, whose highest correlate is the flight cancellation rate, does not mean
that canceling flights in and of itself is an important cost driver. Rather, the cancellation
rate should be viewed as an indicator for the incidence of highly degraded operating
conditions, in which there are many flights with high delays, heavily corrupted flight
complexes, large numbers of stranded passengers, and so on. It is probably these
conditions, rather than the specific act of canceling a flight, which generate the cost
impact.
6. Potential Benefits from Improved NAS Performance
In this section, we employ the estimation results presented in Section 5 to estimate the
potential gains, in terms of reduced airline operating cost, from improved NAS
performance. The estimates we present are, in a very rough way, comparable to estimates
of the cost of delay to U.S. airlines, such as those reported by Citrenbaum (1998), the
FAA Airline Policy Office (1995), Odoni (1995), Geissinger (1989), and several others.
Our estimates differ from these others in two important ways, however. First, they are not
based on delay but on the broader concept of NAS performance. Second, they are based
on cost comparisons involving a scenario in which performance is substantially
improved, but delay is not eliminated. Thus, whereas the studies cited estimate the cost
savings from the impossible feat of reducing delay to zero, here we estimated the savings
from a conceivable, albeit dramatic, improvement in NAS performance.
To ensure that the hypothetical improvement is realistic, we base it directly on the
performance levels observed within our data set. Specifically, we calculate, for each of
our 110 observations, the quantity _2,nNmit, as defined in (2), which represents the total
m
contribution (which may be positive or negative) of NAS performance to ln(TOCit). Let
i ° and t* be the airline and time period for the obser_'ation, which we term the _'eference
obser_'ation", in which this contribution is the most negative. Then, for any other
observation, we compute the cost savings that would result from changing the
performance vector for that observation, Nit, to F,'i,t.. Since we have about 100
obse_,ations, this procedure in effect considers a scenario in which NAS performance,
measured at the airline, quarterly level, is consistently at the top 1 percent of what is
presently experienced.
I1
We carriedout this procedurefor boththe two-factor and three-factor models. In each
case, the reference observation was found to be Southwest Airlines in the 3 rdquarter of
1995. Table 6 compares the t'aw" performance metrics for this observation with sample
means over all 110 observations, revealing the magnitude of performance change being
hypothesized. The reference cancellation rate and delay variances are more than 50
percent below the corresponding sample means. For the other metrics, the differences are
less pronounced although still considerable. On the whole, the comparison confirms that
_'mo represents a marked improvement over present-day conditions, but not an
unreachable ideal.
Table 7 summarizes the cost savings from the improved performance scenario. Estimated
annual operating cost savings from improving NAS performance are in the $1.5-$2
billion range. The lowest estimate is $1.3 billion in 1995, based on the three-factor
model, while the two-factor model applied to 1997 yields the highest estimate--S2.3
billion. In general, savings estimated using the two-factor model are somewhat greater, as
are those for the more recent years. This reflects the trend toward lower performance
levels shown in Figure 4. The distribution of savings among airlines is naturally
correlated with carrier size, with the largest airlines saving several hundred million per
year, and the smallest ones about a tenth of that. Carrier savings also reflect their baseline
performance levels, since those with poorer performance have more to gain.
For the reasons explained previously, these estimates are only roughly comparable to
previously published ones of the cost of delay. Nonetheless, the latter offer useful
benchmarks. The most recent published estimate, due to Citrenbaum and Juliano (1998),
places the total direct operating cost of delay to air carrier and air taxi operators at $0.8
billion in 1996. However this estimate is derived solely from comparisons between actual
and scheduled gate-to-gate time, and thus does not consider costs of departure delays nor
the phenomenon of schedule padding. Earlier FAA estimates (Aviation Policy Office,
1995 are based on arrival delays instead of gate-to-gate delays, and yield annual figures
of $2.5 billion, in current year dollars, throughout the early 1990s. Geisinger (1989),
disaggregates delay by phase of flight and applies different cost factors for each phase,
and obtained a cost of $1.8 billion in 1986 (using the ATA composite index, this equates
to $2.5 billion in 1997). Odoni (1995), places the cost of delay, non-optimal flight
trajectories, and flight cancellations to airlines in the $2-4 billion range in 1993. Our
figures of $1.5-$2.3 billion clearly fall within the range of these estimates. However it
must be reiterated, unlike the other estimates, ours are based on a comparison with a
realistic performance scenario rather than a perfect one. In that respect, our results
suggest a greater potential saving from attainable performance improvements than the
prior studies.
7. Conclusions
Our results support tile view, suggested by several earlier studies, that improvements in
the perfommnce of the NAS can generate billions of dollars in annual cost savings.
Unlike previous work, hov,'ever, the estimates presented here derive from observed
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covariationbetweenairlineexpendituresandNASperformancelevels.As a result,they
do not reston the strongandimplausibleassumptionsrequiredto calculatecostsfrom
quantitiesof delay,norevenontheassumptionthatdelayis thecritical costdriver. It is
reassuringthat sucha fundamentallydifferentmethodologyyieldspotentialsavingsof a
comparablemagnitude.
Despitethisagreementasto the tSottom line" our study presents a qualitatively different
view of the link between NAS performance and airline cost. Of the performance metrics
considered, we find quantities of delay to be among the least important. Instead, we find
the critical cost drivers to be the levels of irregularity and disruption in the system. If we
had to choose a single metric to track this dimension, it would be the flight cancellation
rate rather than the average delay per flight. This may have significant implications for
how NAS investments should be prioritized. In general, investments that increase the
t'obustness" of the system by preventing _ill hell from breaking loose" appear to be
more promising than those leading to incremental delay reductions in a broader range of
conditions.
Methodologically, this study points to the role of statistical cost modeling as a means of
translating the emerging, multidimensional, view of NAS performance into improved
capability for investment analysis. Any dimension of NAS performance that earl be
measured at the airline level can, in principal, be related to airline cost using the methods
set forth here. The only practical limitation is that the impact be strong enough to be
detectable through the statistical noise. As data accumulates, our detection capability will
improve.
As previously noted, there are other approaches to representing NAS performance that
may more aptly capture cost impacts. One approach would be to categorize days, or
airport days, in terms of their regularity and base performance metrics on the number of
days in each category. Another would "be to categorize total delay minutes according to
type of flight, phase of flight, duration, and other factors and then develop metrics that
summarize how delay is distributed across these categories. Other investigative
approaches, including structured questioning of airline decision-makers and detailed
simulations of airline operations, may also be of value. Such work may ultimately enable
analyses of public and private investments in aviation infrastructure which capture their
true benefits.
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TABLE 1. PERFORMANCE METRIC DEFINITIONS
Variable (in Log form) Definition
Average Arrival Delay
Average Departure Delay
Difference between scheduled and actual
arrival time, averaged over all flights.
Difference between scheduled and actual
departure time, averaged over all flights.
Average > 15 min Arrival Delay Sum of all arrival delays in excess of 15
minutes, divided by total number of flights.
Arrival Delay Variance Variance of the difference between
scheduled and actual arrival time.
Departure Delay Variance Variance of the difference between
scheduled and actual departure time.
Unreliability Proportion of flights with an arrival delay
over 15 minutes.
Cancellation Rate Proportion of flights cancelled.
TABLE 2. RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Variable (in Log form)
Average Arrival Delay
Average Departure Delay
Average > 15 min Arrival Delay
Arrival Delay Variance
Departure Delay Variance
Unreliability
Cancellation Rate
Proportion of Variance Explained
Cumulative Proportion
Factor 1
0.85468
0.86167
0.98444
0.81784
0.77662
0.91327
0.70281
0.7203
0.7203
Factor 2
-0.46316
-0.31608
0.02062
0.51105
0.38233
-0.31949
0.31987
0.1324
0.8527
Factor 3
-0.05345
0.07645
-0.03112
-0.08456
-0.42532
-0.02627
0.61739
0.0828
0.9355
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TABLE 4. COST ESTIMATION VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable Definition
QUARTER Quarter of year ( 1=Winter, 2=Spring, etc.)
TIND Time counter (1 for 1Q 95, 2 for 2Q 95, .-., 11 for 3Q 97)
ALF Average load factor (revenue passenger miles/revenue seat
miles)
IDO Index of output other than passenger miles (cargo, freight,
etc). Normalized to American Airlines in 1Q, 1995.
TOC Total operating cost for quarter ($)
1LPMS Revenue passenger miles (000)
WAV Total labor expense per employee ($)
WFUEL Fuel expense per gallon ($)
WMAT Produce price index (proxy for price for materials and
services) .
WK Working capital ($)
SDEP Number of scheduled flights
BASE Number of points served
CARRIER Carrier code
YY Year
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Abstract
Using data envelopment analysis, efficiency ratios for European airports are determined. It appears
thatmost airports are operating under increasing returns to scale. This is also reflected in the most
productive scale size determined for the airports.
Keywords: airports, most productive scale size, data envelopment analysis
• Also affiliated to the Tinbergen Institute, Keizersgracht 482, 1017 EG Amsterdam.
1 Introduction
Recently, a number studies have been published on the measurement of airport performance; see e.g.
Gillen and Lall (1997, 1998) for a non-parametric approach using data envelopment analysis, Hooper
and Hensher (1997) for an analysis using total factor productivity and Tolofari et al. (1990) for an
estimation of translog cost functions for British airports. This interest is caused by two circumstances:
(i) the deregulation of the aviation market has stimulated the development of reliable performance
measurements, since airlines operate in a highly competitive market and cannot pass the higher
operating costs at inefficient airports onto the passengers (see Gillen and Lall, (1997), and (ii) the
growth in the number of passengers raises the question whether this growth should be accommodated
at existing airports or at new airports. This issue requires insight into the operating characteristics and
performance of airports.
The estimation of cost functions allows for the testing of several hypotheses concerning
economies of scale and the technology concerned (see e.g. Tolofari et. al. (1990)). As input prices are
rather volatile over time, estimation of a longer term cost function becomes rather difficult. Moreover,
input prices, if available, can differ significantly (in the way they are collected and reported) in space.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) does neither require knowledge on the input prices nor assumptions
concerning the production technology or on the behavior of actors (e.g. cost minimization). The only
assumption is that the production possibility set is convex. Using DEA one can get either input or
output oriented efficiency measures for decision-making units (dmu-s)k DEA also allows for a
determination of the most productive scale size (mpss). At mpss, the average productivity is
maximized; it represents the maximum productivity for any given input-output combination. Using the
same technique it is also possible to determine whether a dmu operates under increasing, constant or
decreasing returns to scale.
The DEA approach mentioned above provides a "measurement" of inefficiency (the "Farrell
approach") rather than an "explanation" of inefficiency (the "Leibenstein approach") (Button and
Weyman-Jones, 1994). An airport can be labeled as inefficient for different reasons. First, there are
"indivisibilities". An expansion of the runway system will, in most cases, automatically create an over
-capacity, since the length of a (new) runway is mainly determined by the landing (or take off) weight
and speed of the aircraft using that runway. It may be necessary to construct a new runway, but due to
technical (and safety) requirements, it may not be possible to make its capacity fit the expected
(additional) demand. To a lesser extent the same holds true for terminals. Second, there are
government regulations (e.g. limits to the hours of operations, noise contours) and limiting physical
circumstances (e.g. fog and wind) under which the airports operate. For example, Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol covers a (relatively) large area, also because of the noise contours imposed by the authorities.
Schiphol has 4 runways in use, which, due to various weather conditions and strict regulations, have
only a limited use. These t_vo causes of inefficiency do clearly not fall under the control of the airport
LBy using the term dmu Chames et al. (197S) emphasize that their interest lies in the decisions made
by non-profit organizations rather than the (in theory) profit maximizing f'trms, i
management,buton theotherhandmaynotfullyexplaintheinefficiency;airportscanalsobe
inefficientbecausetheoperatorsdonothaveanincentivetoworkaseffectivelyastheycould,e.g.if
airportsaregovernmentcontrolled.Althought eDEAapproachusedoesnotrequireanyassumption
onthebehaviorf theactorsinvolved,it ispossiblethat,nextothe(puretechnical)inefficiencies
describedabove,X-inefficiencyalsois important:.Inthispaperweareprimarilyconcernedwiththe
measurementof inefficiency.GillenandLall(1997)firstmeasureinefficiencyusingDEA,andthen
explaininefficiencyinaTobit-analysis.Wedonothavesufficient data to explain any differences in
efficiency in this way.
Inefficiency can also be measured using the stochastic production frontier method. This is a
parametric method, and assumptions on the production technology are necessary. Inefficiency can be
measured and explained simultaneously, in contrast to an ad hoc explanation of the DEA inefficiency
measures. However, in contrast to the DEA, specific assumptions concerning the production
technology are necessary.
The purpose of this paper is to measure the relative inefficiency of European airports and to
indicate, given the prevailing input combinations, the maximum productive scale size for each airport.
This scale size is the optimal configuration at the current input mix (i.e. if an airport were to change its
technology, the maximum productive scale size would also change).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 the concept of mpss will be described.
Section 3 contains a short description of DEA and the empirical results are presented in section 4. In
Section 5 the inefficiency measures from section 4 are compared to the inefficiency measures from a
stochastic production frontier analysis. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2 Most Productive Scale Size
In this paragraph we provide a concise description of the concept of most productive scale size. For a
more elaborate exposition the interested reader is referred to e.g. Banker and Thrall (1992) and Banker
(1984). Using a minimum cost mix of inputs one can determine an optimal scale of a firm. This
optimal scale depends on the prevailing input and output prices. Hence knowledge of the prevailing
prices is required. Moreover, prices can be more volatile than the technology used. When one is
interested in the performance of a decision-making unit over a longer period (or when prices are not
available), the (pure) technical relation between inputs and outputs becomes interesting. On(can look
at returns to scale, and, associated with that, at the most productive scale size (mpss) at a given input-
output mix 3. The mpss for a given input-output mix is "the scale size at which the outputs produced
"per unit" of input is maximized" (Banker, 1984). Thus, the idea of mpss is related to average
productivities. If a dmu is operating under increasing returns to scale, it can increase the output "per
unit of input" by increasing its scale. If decreasing returns are prevailing, it can increase the output "per
-" Note that "regulators" do not necessarily have an incentive to reach a social optimum. Hence,
regulations can also be a cause of X-inefficiency.
unitof input" by decreasing its scale. It follows that at mpss, a dmu operates under constant returns to
scale (see Banker (1984), for more details). This is illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1
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Production possibility set and (in)efficient points of production
1) T
X
I=(xtXo,ytYo); I=M,A,B,C.
T= {(X--xXo,Y=yYo)lX>0 can produce Y>0}
At M average productivity (ON/MN) is maximized (i.e. M represents a mpss). Furthermore,
(dy_dxQ(xM/YM) = 1; the dmu at M operates at comtant returns to scale. The efficiency of a
production possibility A can be evaluated against M by taking the ratio hA = (OD/DA)/(ON/MN) =
(y^/xA)/( yM/X._0.This inefficiency measure captures both inefficiency due to technical inefficiency at
the given scale ((y^/xA)/(y),/xs)) and inefficiency due to a divergence from mpss ((YB/X)0/(yM/XM)).Let
k--'-y^/y M.Then hA = k'x(x^/xM) = CD/AC; we can determine the most productive scale size (measured
for inputs) as XM= (he"k)*x^. In order to dotermine .mpss for e.g. A, we need to know hA and k. These
coefficients can be determined using DEA. When the DEA programme has a unique solution, we can
apply the methodology of Banker (1984). This methodology is extended by Banker and Thrall (1992)
to allow for allow for multiple optimal solutions. See also Appa and Yue (1999) for an analysis of
scale efficient targets.
Note that for each input-output mix there is a mpss. An mpss is not necessarily the (an) optimal scale
size; this depends on the input and output prices.
3 Data Envelopment Analysis
In data envelopment analysis (DEA) one uses a series of linear programming problems to draw a
production frontier. The efficiency of each airport (or more general, a dmu) is evaluated against this
frontier. Hence the efficiency of an airport is evaluated relative to the performance of other airports.
More formally, assume we have L airports with m outputs and n inputs. Chames et al. (1978) propose
the following measure of efficiency, which is the maximum of the ratio of weighted outputs to
weighted inputs subject to the condition that for every airport the efficiency measure is smaller than or
equal to 1:
m
Z uiYto
i=1
max--
n
Z_j Xj, o
j=l
m
Z uiYi, t
s.t. _'_ _<1, I=I...L
n
Z vj x j, l
j=l
IIi ,Vj _ 0
(1) Chames et al. (1978) show
that the above fractional programming program has the following linear programming equivalent:
max _, uiYi. o
i=1
s.t. _ uiy u v/xzt <_O, l = 1... L
i=l j=l
/I
ZVjXj, 0 = 1
j-t
ui,v j > 0
(2)
To determine the mpss the dual to this problem is used:
mJn ho
s.t. _21yi. I = Yl.o, i = 1,..,m
_,,g,lXj.i = hoxj.o , j = 1,..,n
,¢,h o >__0
(3)
LBanker (1984) shows that a dmu represents a mpss iff ho --- I. Moreover, by defining ko = _,_, the
I=l
(ho 1 )
input-output mix _ X o ,_ YoJ is a production possibility (i.e. is an element of T in figure 1) and
is mpss. If the sum of weights ko > 1, local decreasing returns to scale are prevailing; if ko < 1, local
increasing returns to scale are prevailing.
The efficiency coefficient can be either input-oriented (as in (3)) or output-oriented. If the
input oriented coefficient ho < l in (3), it is possible to reduce all inputs (by (l-ho)xl00%) keeping the
outputs constant. Likewise, if the output coefficient is larger than I it is possible to increase the outputs
keeping the inputs constant.
4 Determination of efficiency coefficients
The empirical application of this paper is undertaken in two steps. First, the DEA model is used to
determine the efficiency coefficients and mpss. Second, the efficiency coefficients are used as
dependent variables in a censored regression model to explain the differences in efficiency (as was
done by GiUen and Lall (1997) for US airports).
Data on inputs have been obtained from IATA's (1998) Airport Characteristics / Demand
Profiles and from some airports directly. The Airport Characteristics / Demand Profiles does not
contain information on the number of employees. Numbers of employees can be obtained from the
Airport Council International (ACI) (1999). Both the number of people employed by the airport
operator and the total number of employees at the airport are available. The ftrst number of people
does not include people working for sub-contracting fUXnS. For example, the number of people
employed by the operator of FRA (Flughafen Frankfurt Main AG) in 1997 is 12,500. According to the
ACI airport database FRA is the only airport operated by the operator. The British Airport Authority
(BAA) had 8,393 employees and operates, amongst others, Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted (BAA,
1999). The numbers of passengers at these airports in 1997 were 58 million for Heathrow and 40
million for Frankfurt. We may assume that such numerical differences reflect differences in the way
workers have been classified in the various airports. Unfortunately, vital information is lacking on e.g.
subcontracting, the number of people employed for aircraft handling etc. As an alternative we might
use the total number of people employed at the airport, but then we would also include people who
have little to do with the "airport business" and we would include too much heterogeneity 4. Therefore,
labor is not included in the analysis. This means that an efficient dmu may or may not be labor
efficient; but by assuming zero substitutability between labor and other factors of production this
should not be a problem.
4 For example, before the aircraft manufacturer Fokker was closed in 1995, the employment of its
Schiphol manufacturing plant was included in the an-port employment figure.
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Asweonly have data on runway characteristics and characteristics of passenger terminals, we
use two output measures: air transport movements and passenger movements. Data for the period
1995-1997 were obtained from the British Airport Authority.
Like Gillen and Lall (1997), we analyze terminal output (PAX, the number of
passengers) and aircraft movements (ATM, air transport movements) separately. Although the airport
can be seen as a multi-product firm and the two outputs are clearly related, the "production
technology" for the two outputs is quite different. Estimation results for PAX are given in tables 1 and
2. The inputs used were terminal size (square meters), number of aircraft parking positions at the
terminal, number of remote aircraft parking positions, number of check-in desks and number of
baggage claims.
Table 1 Relative Efficiency, APM
City Airport 1995 1996 1997
Table 2 Sum of weights ko, APM
Airport 1995 1996 1997 RSt
Amsterdam AMS 0.583 0.639 0.728 AMS 1.282 1.407 1.600 d
Berlin SXF 0.372 0.355 0,374 SXF 0.106 0.101 0.107 i
Berlin TXL 0.651 0.660 0,686 TXL 1.353 1.372 1.425 d
Brussels BRU 0.791 0.838 1.000 BRU 0.791 0,838 1.000 i
Bucharest OTP 0,207 0.200 0,209 OTP 0. 100 0,096 0.100 i
Copenhagen CPH 0.850 0.926 1.000 CPH 0.850 0,926 1.000 i
Dublin DUB 0.780 0.881 1.000 DUB 0.780 0.881 1.000 i
Faro FAO 0.997 0.998 1.000 FAO 0.997 0.998 1.000 i
Frank_fiart FRA 0.815 0.828 0.857 FRA 1.694 1.720 1.780 d
G6teborg GOT 0.442 0.469 0.496 GOT 0.201 0.213 0.225 i
Hamburg HAM 0.484 0.485 0.510 HAM 0.463 0.464 0.488 i
Hannover HAJ 0.473 0.493 0.535 HAJ 0.260 0.271 0.294 i
Larnaca LCA 0.647 0.655 0.659 LCA 0.155 0.156 0.157 i
Leeds/Bradford LBA 0.466 0.366 0.461 LBA 0.063 0.073 0,084 i
Lisbon LIS 0.795 0.844 0.877 LIS 0.966 1.026 1.066 i/d
London LGW 0.785 0.845 0.940 LGW 0.613 0.660 0.734 i
London LHR 0.936 0.964 1.000 LHR 0.936 0.964 1.000 i
London STN 0.347 0.430 0.479 STN 0.220 0.272 0.304 i
Lyon LYS 0.367 0.411 0_398 LYS 0.254 0.283 0.275 i
Manchester MAN 0.645 0.634 0,687 MAN 0.947 0.930 1,009 i/d
Marseille MRS 0,873 0,956 0,987 MRS 0.314 0.332 0.342 i
Milan LIN 0.744 0.869 1.000 LIN 0,744 0.869 1.000 i
Milan MXP 0.315 0.311 0.325 MXP 0.234 0.231 0.241 i
Munich MUC 0.570 0.602 0.687 MUC 0.982 1.037 1.184 i/d
Nfiremberg NUE 0.424 0.419 0.455 NUE 0.066 0.065 0.071 i
Paris CDG 0.466 0.523 0.584 CDG 1.276 1.433 1.600 d
Paris ORY 0.798 0.821 0.752 ORY 1.688 1.736 1.589 d
Prague PRG 0.290 0.339 0.373 PRG 0.189 0.221 0.243 i
Rome FCO 0.782 0.854 0.927 FCO 1.193 1.303 1.414 d
Stockholm STO 0.777 0.805 0.866 STO 0.801 0.830 0.893 i
Stuttgart STU 0.695 0.870 0.922 STU 0.352 0.440 0.467 i
Turin TRN 0.195 0.217 0.259 TRN 0.104 0.116 0.138 i
Vienna VIE 0.864 0.924 0.990 VIE 0.496 0.531 0.569 i
Zurich ZR.H 0.835 0.884 1.000 ZR.H 0.835 0.884 1.000 i
1 returns to scale characterization;
i = increasing, d = decreasing
Fromtable I it appears that the relative efficiency measure for most airports increases
(slightly) over time. The regional dispersion remains more or less constant over time. There are large
differences in efficiency between airports in given years, and even among cities. For example, the
efficiency coefficient of London Stansted (STN) is much lower than the coefficient for London
Heathrow (LHR). The same observation holds true for Flughafen Berlin-Scht_nefeId (SXF) and
Flughafen Berlin-Tegel (TXL). From table 2 it appears that most airports are operating under local
increasing returns to scale. Some airports (BRU, CPH, DUB, FAO, LHR, LIN and ZR.H) have been
increasing there scale of operation such that they are efficient (and mpss) in 1997 compared to
previous years and other to airports. Other airports (GOT, HAM, HAJ, LCA, LBA, LGW, STN, LYS,
MRS, MUC, MXP, NUE, OTP, PRG, STO, SX.F, TRN, VIE) have been increasing their efficiency
over time, but are still inefficient (are not yet mpss) compared to other airports. These airports could
increase their scale to reach mpss. AMS, TXL, FRA, CDG and ORY are operating under local
decreasing returns to scale. Given their current input combinations, these airports could decrease their
scale to reach mpss. As was explained in section 2, this mpss may not be the optimal scale of
operations for an airport; this depends on the prevailing output and input prices. In fact, changing the
input mix also changes the mpss, and with it, the sign of the returns to scale may change for the years
in which these airports did not yet reach mpss: with a more favorable input mix AMS, TXL, FRA,
CDG and OR.Y could improve their position. As was mentioned in the introduction, DEA only
measures inefficiency and does not explain. Clearly, more research is needed to explain the
unfavorable positions of A_MS, TXL, FRA, CDG and ORY and to investigate whether expansion of
these airports is economically justified. LIS, MAN and MUC are operating near the mpss (ko is just
below 1 or just above 1). The relative inefficiency coefficients appear to be on the low side for airports
so operating so close to the mpss. This suggests that at these three airports technical inefficiency
dominates scale inefficiency.
The inefficiency ratios for ATM are given in table 3. The inputs used are the total
airport area (ha), total length of the nmway system, number of aircraft parking positions at the terminal
and the number of remote parking positions. It appears that, again, over time relative efficiency
increases. It appears there are fewer airports achieving relative efficiency (and mpss) in ATM then
there are airports reaching relative efficiency (and mpss) in PAX. The observations on the Berlin and
London airports made in table 1 also appear in table 3. From table 4, it appears that most airports are,
again, operating under local increasing returns to scale, but apart from CDG, CPH, LGW, LHR, LIN
and STU no airport reaches mpss. AMS, BRU, FCO, FRA, MUC, ORY, STO and ZR_H are operating
under local decreasing returns to scale.
The conclusion so far is that for both outputs, most airports are operating under increasing
returns to scale. This indicates that, to improve relative efficiency, most airports could increase their
scale of operations to reach mpss, or already have done so. Some airports (AMS, FCO, FRA and ORY)
could decrease their scale to achieve the mpss at the current input mix. Finally, BRU, MUC and ZR.H
operate under local increasing returns to scale when looking at PAX, while they are operating under
decreasing retums to scale looking at ATM. The opposite holds true for CDG and TXL.
Table 3 Relative Efficiency, A TM
City Ah'port 1995 1996 1997
Table 4 Sum of weights ko, A TM
Airport 1995 1996 1997 RS_
Amsterdam AMS 0.616 0.682 0.741 AMS
Berlin SXF 0.155 0.160 0.144 SXF
Berlin TXL 0.469 0.488 0.490 TXL
Brussels BRU 0.607 0.661 0.697 BRU
Bucharest OTP 0.154 0.132 0.146 OTP
Copenhagen CPH 0.837 0.937 1.000 CPH
Dublin DUB 0.355 0.353 0.389 DUB
Faro FAO 0.306 0.290 0.297 FAO
Frankfurt FRA 0.905 0.921 0.932 FRA
Grteborg GOT 0.545 0.548 0.564 GOT
Hamburg HAM 0.535 0.542 0.562 HAM
Harmover HAJ 0.438 0.438 0.564 HA.I"
Larnaca LCA 0.262 0.259 0.266 LCA
Leeds/Bradford LBA 0.567 0.549 0.580 LBA
Lisbon LIS 0.424 0.484 0.465 LIS
London LGW 0.837 0.920 1.000 LGW
London LHR 0.976 0.995 1.000 LHR
London STN 0.410 0.481 0.523 STN
Lyon LYS 0.289 0.327 0.361 LYS
Manchester MAN 0.749 0.718 0.746 MAN
Marseille MRS 0.427 0.468 0.491 MRS
Milan LIN 0.802 0.949 1.000 LIN
Milan MXP 0.319 0.285 0.302 MXP
Munich MUC 0.754 0.826 0.957 MUC
Niiremberg NUE 0.473 0.476 0.506 NUE
Paris CDG 0.823 0.912 1.000 CDG
Paris ORY 0.654 0.690 0.666 ORY
Prague PRG 0.323 0.348 0.364 PRG
Rome FCO 0.697 0.788 0'.819 FCO
Stockholm STO 0.791 0.835 0.904 STO
Stuttgart STU 0.727 0.810 1.000 STU
Turin TRN 0.216 0.239 0.280 TRN
Vienna VIE 0.570 0.614 0.618 VIE
Zurich ZRH 0.851 0.914 0.983 ZRH
1.408 1.558 1.692 d
0.165 0.170 0.153 i
0.784 0.816 0.819 i
1.309 1.425 1.503 d
0.191 0.164 0.182 i
0.837 0.937 1.000 i
0.499 0.497 0.547 i
0.142 0.134 0.138 i
2.134 2.170 2.197 d
0.345 0.346 0.357 d
0.502 0.508 0.527 i
0.301 0.301 0.388 i
0.192 0.189 0.194 i
0.189 0.183 0.193 i
0.408 0.466 0.448 i
0.837 0.920 1.000 i
0.976 0.995 1.000 i
0.304 0.356 0.388 i
0.457 0.516 0.570 i
0.540 0.518 0.539 i
0.258 0.283 0.297 i
0.802 0.949 1.000 i
0.242 0.216 0.229 i
1.228 1.344 1.557 d
0.159 0.159 0.170 i
0.823 0.912 1.000 i
1.297 1.367 1.321 d
0.274 0.295 0.309 i
1.151 1.301 1.352 d
1.163 1.227 1.329 d
0.727 0.810 1.000 i
0.152 0.169 0.198 i
0.884 0.952 0.958 i
1.015 1.090 1.173 d
1 returns to scale characterization;
i = increasing, d = decreasing
The question arises whether the conjecture that returns to scale are relatively stronger at
relatively smaller airports is supported by the analysis. There is one airport (TXL) operating under
local decreasing returns to scale which is relatively small, and there are 5 relatively large airports
(FRA, CDG, ORY, AMS, FCO) that also operate under decreasing returns to scale that do not fit this
pattern. Given the different patterns form these 6 airports, we feel the correlation coefficient be_veen
APM and ko reported in table 2 is sufficiently high (0.718) to provide some support for the conjecture
that low values of ko (high returns to scale) coincide with relatively high values of APM. The same
holdstrueforATM,wherethecorrelationcoefficient(betweenATMandko reported in table 4) is even
higher (0.863).
Using the efficiency coefficients and sums of weights reported in tables 1-4, we can determine
the mpss for these airports as indicated in sections 2 and 3. As already mentioned, these are the mpss
given the current input proportions; it might be better for an airport to adjust the input ratio rather than
to change all inputs proportionally. Without data on input prices, however, it is difficult to say anything
about the "optimal mpss". Moreover, given the indivisibilities, interpreting the mpss may be difficult.
This becomes clear in table 6, appendix 2, where, for example, LBA should construct no less than 6
runways with an average length of 1675 meters length to reach the mpss. With an average length of
2930 meters the number reduces to 3, which is more in line with the APM at the mpss.
From table 5 it appears that a number of airports (GOT, HAJ, HAM, LBA, LCA, LGW, LYS,
MRS, MXP, NUE, OTP, PRG, STN, STU, SXF, TRN and VIE) have a large growth potential
compared to the other airports at the current input mix. AMS, CDG, ORY and TXL on the other hand
have no growth potential at the current input mix.
Note that while TXL could decrease its size, the other Berlin airport, SXF, could increase its scale. A
similar observation is made for the London airports, where LGW and STN could increase their scale of
operations and LHR should remain constant.
Changing the input mix changes the results; for example reducing the total length of the
runway system and the number of parking positions at AMS (so that they are proportional to LHR) but
keeping the airport area constant renders AMS efficient in 1997 and changes the sign of the returns to
scale s. From an economic perspective, this may be a better position for AMS than the mpss reported in
table 6. The mpss reported in tables 5 and 6 are technically efficient, but not necessarily cost efficient.
To determine the "true" optimal scale of operations, also cost data are needed. These are not have
available.
A final observation made on the basis of tables 5 and 6 is that the number of aircraft parking
positions at the PAX mpss is, on average, larger than the number of aircraft parking positions at the
ATM mpss; a larger number of parking positions is needed to handle passengers than is needed to
accommodate arriving and departing aircraft. Second, more inputs may be needed. For example, in
this model, the airport which has e.g. the smallest terminal size compared to the number of passengers
is (can be) the most efficient. However, a larger terminal allows for more amenities at the airport,
which may be needed to attract passengers.
5 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
In this section, the results of the previous section will be compared to the results of a stochastic frontier
analysis. Consider the following stochastic production frontier:
' A,IS area: 2200, runway length: 5248, terminal positions: 72, remote positions: 37.
l0
yj., = .x'j., ,8+ Ej.,
E j,, = Zj., - Uj
(5)
where yj., is the output of airportj in period t and xz, are the inputs of airportj in period t. Both y and x
can be defined in terms of the original units of productions or in logarithms. Uj_N(0,cr, 2) and 1133and is
also independent of Vz,, which is distributed according to half normal distribution with variance o_. Uj
is the (stochastic) deviation from the production frontier; for Uj > 0 airport j does not reach the
(efficient) frontier. The technical efficiency of airportj is 7 (see also Battese and Coelli (1988)):
hf = E(yj,, Uj =O, xj,,)
(6)
where the superscript denotes that the efficiency coefficient is obtained from a frontier model. If
equation (5) is specified in logs, them hf= exp(Vj).
Note that the stochastic frontier model in equation (5) can be extended to explain the
inefficiencies Uj. The frontier model and the inefficiency model Uj = _(Zj) are estimated
simultaneously. Unfortunately, we do not have the necessary variables Zj to explain the inefficiencies.
Both the models explaining A TM and APM were specified in logs. Not all variables used in
the DEA could be used to estimate a stochastic production frontier s. For the model explaining APM,
The explanatory variables included are, next to a constant, the number of baggage claim units claims,
the number of parking positions at the terminal (pos) and the number of remote parking positions pos.
The estimates are (standard error between parentheses):
OLS:
ha(APM)= 5.907 + 0.826.ha(claims) + 0.261.1n(pos) + O.165.ba(rem)
(0.297) (0.097) (0.060) . (0.105)
ML:
ln(APM)= 6.471 + 0.771.in(claims) + 0.253.1n(pos) + 0.201.In(rein)
(0.384) (0.099) (0.058) (0.110)
Log(likelihood) = -76.47 y= _/o'v 2= 2.17 (1.15)
The null hypothesis y = 0 is rejected at the 90% confidence level. Note that, as 2, is larger than 2, the
variance of Uj is large compared to the variance of V_.,, indicating there is a substantial inefficiency
effect. The variables explaining ATM are: nmways is the number of runways, pos is the number of
aircraft parking positions at the terminal and rem is the number of remote parking positions.
6There are other distributions for Vpossible, see e.g. Bat'tese and Coelli (1988).
7Note that, again, a technically efficient airport may operate cost inefficiently.
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OLS:
A TM = 1.777 + 0.501.1n(mmways) + 0.343.1n(pos) + 0.435.In(tern)
(0.311) (0.140) (0.059) (0.103)
ML:
A TM-- 2.426 + 0.404.In(runways) + 0.314.1n(pos) + 0.472.1n(rem)
(0.479) (0.134) (0.048) (0.115)
Log(likelihood) = -82.10 r= u,2/a,2= 2.60 (0.08)
Again, the null hypothesis 2" = 0 is rejected at the 90% confidence level and there is a substantial
inefficiency effect.
It is noted that a yearly dummy D may be necessary (as we have pooled time series - cross
section data), but taking this into account in the estimations does not change the results. Moreover, the
estimation results are not really robust. Including additional variables may necessitate a different
specification of the production function. Also, the null hypothesis y -- 0 is rejected at the 90%
confidence level, but is not rejected at 95% confidence.
The efficiency coefficients h/are reported in appendix 3. Despite the fact that there is
somewhat less temporal and regional dispersion of the efficiency coefficients using stochastic frontier
models than they are using DEA (the error term in equation (5) consists of the "inefficiency" Uj and
the "noise" Vz,, which is "filtered out"9), the stochastic efficiency frontier model seems to be able to
reproduce the DEA results quite reasonably. Notable exceptions are OTP and MXP which perform
much better when looking at the stochastic frontier model, and TXL, MXP and ORY which perform
much worse under the stochastic frontier model.
Although the estimations do not seem to be very robust, the stochastic frontier model quite
reasonably reproduces the DEA results. Future research, using more flexible specifications, should
verify this result.
Conclusion
In this paper efficiency indices and most productive scale sizes were determined for European affports.
Most airports seem to be operating under increasing returns to scale. Large differences in relative
efficiency exist, and also large deviations from the mpss are found. It should be kept in mind that the
mpss are determined given the current input-mix. A change in the input mix may lead to different
outcomes.
s A less restrictive assumption on the distribution of Uj would be that Uj_N(fl, o=2), truncated at 0.
Including all variables, the null hypotheses _ = 0 and o=: are, however, not rejected; Uj cannot be
distinguished from 0.
9 It is noted that care should be taken comparing the results of a non-parametric and a parametric
approach. I
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Someairports,likeAMS,areoperating under local decreasing returns to scale. As a result, the
mpss lies well below the current scale of operations. This indicates that a reduction in the scale of
operations (both in inputs and outputs) would be wise, but a change in the input mix could be more
advisable. For example, using the input mix of LHR, but then proportionally to the demand at AMS
(see footnote 8), results in a mpss with a higher out put then the mpss reported in tables 6 (actually, the
mpss for ATM is the same as realized output for 1997). Thus, from this analysis of production
efficiency, we can conclude that i) AMS has probably not an optimal input mix (even at the mpss
reported in table 6) and ii) in any case, the planned construction of a fifth runway is not a good idea,
from a pure economic point of view. But, as already mentioned in the introduction, this analysis was
primarily focused on the measurement on inefficiency. In the case of AMS, the inefficiency is, for a
large part, caused by regulations. This becomes clear from figure 2. The politically instigated noise
contours are "chosen" such that the overlap with population centers is minimized. The expected growth
in the number of air transport movements (ATM) will increase the noise (and safety) problem. Given
the regulation, the expected growth apparently cannot be accommodated at the existing runway system.
Hence a fifth runway is planned. Form a pure economic point of view, this is, as already said, not the
optimal solution.
The stochastic frontier analysis seems to produce reasonable efficiency coefficients and might
be considered more flexible than DEA as it includes a "noise" term; the inefficiency is the distance to
the frontier plus a random error term rather than to the (different) frontier itself as in DEA. The use of a
more flexible functional form of the production function may however be necessary if this method is
used to measure and explain inefficiency.
The research agenda that follows from this paper is the following. First and foremost, more
attention has to be paid to the "explaining" of inefficiency, either using a stochastic frontier model or
DEA output. Second, as the mpss is not necessarily the optimal scale of an airport, an (empirical)
analysis of airport cost functions should shed more light on the "true" optimal scale of an airport; this
is the mpss at the cost minimizing input mix.
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Appendix 1 Airports used in the Analysis
AMS Amsterdam Airport Schiphol LIS
BRU Brussels National LYS
CDG Charles de Gaulle MRS
CPH Copenhagen International Airport MUC
DUB Dublin NUE
FAO Faro ORY
FCO Leonardo da Vinci OTP
FRA Frankfurt Main International PRG
GOT G6teborg-Landvetter Airport STN
HAJ Hannover STU
HAM Hamburg International SXF
LBA Leeds-Bradford International Airport TRN
LCA Lamaca TXL
LGW London Gatwick VIE
LHR London Heathrow ZRH
Lisbon International
Aeroport de Lyon-Satolas
Aeroport International Marseille-Provence
Flughafen Mtinchen
Flughafen Ntiremberg
Orly
Otopeni International
Ruzyne
London Stansted
Fiughafen Stuttgart
Flughafen Berlin-Sch6nefeld
Citta' Di Torino
Flughafen Berlin-Tegel
Vienna International
Ziirich International
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Appendix 2 MPSS and Data, 1997
Table 5 MPSS, PAX
PAX
terminal aircraftparkingpositionscheck-in baggage
size (m s) positions remote desks claims
AMS 19382 168197 30 27 151 9
BRU 15935 125000 32 66 143 5
CDG 21933 161292 23 34 157 9
CPH 16837 97000 49 14 84 7
DUB 10235 37889 50 37 99 5
FAO 3664 4400 6 13 31 5
FCO 17684 114753 16 31 119 8
FRA 22542 338776 24 35 194 16
GOT 15097 97030 18 42 90 7
HAJ 15922 72818 22 33 95 22
HAM 17530 69530 67 37 101 10
LBA 14786 208500 7 119 194 22
LCA 23345 87976 121 121 168 13
LGW 36508 184806 67 38 287 20
LHR 57808 211400 104 53 482 30
LIN 14395 67400 5 31 93 6
LIS 6223 19423 6 24 77 7
LYS 17530 69541 33 72 I01 14
MAN 15574 49932 40 22 140 11
MRS 16280 235757 81 45 178 6
MUC 14891 109755 14 30 91 7
MXP 14609 70971 7 31 93 7
NUE 33981 119050 90 38 269 19
OTP 14674 83235 10 85 92 8
ORY 15748 175757 17 27 98 8
PRG 16755 115726 48 25 84 9
STN 17678 77348 47 33 133 8
STO 16742 123382 97 124 90 7
STU 14446 84750 6 69 93 12
SXF 17537 69234 ' 81 109 102 11
TRN 17232 81343 58 49 94 9
TXL 6049 13062 25 41 44 8
VIE 16867 55694 35 85 146 10
ZRH 17871 56000 24 30 110 12
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Table 6 MPSS, A TM
ATM
Airport Runway aircraft parking positions
Area (ha) Runways Length (m) terminal remote
AMS 207
BRU 169
CDG 396
CPH 284
DUB 222
FAO 186
FCO 182
FRA 177
G OT 170
HAJ 199
HAM 241
LBA 135
LCA 182
LGW 229
LHR 429
LIN 165
LIS 171
LYS 165
MAN 276
MRS 28O
MUC 164
MXP 170
NUE 264
OTP 180
ORY 150
PRG 250
STN 218
STO 194
STU 135
SXF 200
TRN 190
TXL 145
VIE 163
ZRH 206
963 2 5890 28 26
577 1 4559 15 31
3109 2 7800 63 93
1240 3 8665 49 14
768 2 4275 36 26
1084 2 5367 13 28
969 2 6722 15 28
806 1 5090 21 31
1186 2 5219 13 30
896 4 10067 17 26
601 2 7369 68 37
429 6 10050 3 48
397 1 3698 40 40
759 1 3098 52 30
1200 2 7560 104 53
360 2 2440 5 31
522 2 6445 7 30
696 1 4222 15 32
831 1 4224 82 44
991 3 9744 48 26
921 1 4914 15 32
1611 3 9946 7 30
1075 3 8059 42 18
778 2 4728 18 29
617 2 5627 4 33
1062 4 10694 36 19
1293 1 4113 40 28
435 1 3946 68 87
240 1 3345 3 35
598 2 5363 22 29
425 1 4680 44 37
278 1 3256 30 51
645 1 4582 13 32
677 3 7966 20 25
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Table 7 Data, 1997
Airport Runway Terminal Aircraft parking positions Check-in Baggage
PAX ATM Area Runways Length Size terminal remote desks claims
AMS 31021 349.5 2200 4 13450 370000 65
BRU 15935 254.7 1245 3 9833 125000 32
CDG 35103 395.5 3109 2 7800 442200 63
CPH 16837 283.6 1240 3 8665 97000 49
DUB 10235 121.3 1080 3 6010 37889 50
FAO 3664 25.6 503 1 2490 4400 6
FCO 25001 245.7 1600 3 11095 175000 25
FRA 40128 389.6 1900 3 12000 704000 49
GOT 3394 60.8 750 I 3300 44000 8
HAJ 4676 77.1 616 3 6920 40000 12
HAM 8546 127.1 564 2 6910 66500 64
LBA 1247.7 26.1 143 2 3350 28000 I
LCA 3673 35.3 290 1 2700 21000 29
LGW 26795 229.3 759 1 3098 144361 52
LHR 57808 429.2 1200 2 7560 211400 104
Lib/ 14395 165.3 360 2 2440 67400 5
LIS 6631 76.8 503 2 6205 23598 7
LYS 4819 94.1 1100 2 6670 48000 23
MAN 15714 148.5 600 1 3048 73300 59
MRS 5574 83.3 600 2 5900 84750 29
MUC 17626 256 1500 2 8000 189000 24
MXP 3523 38.8 1220 2 7530 52700 5
NUE 2418 44.8 360 1 2700 18600 14
OTP 1470.7 27.3 768 2 7000 40000 5
ORY 25023 237.1 1541 3 9370 371500 36
PRG 4078 77.3 902 3 9085 75500 31
STN 5366.6 84.4 958 1 3048 49000 30
STO 14951 257.4 640 2 5800 127205 100
STU 6745 134.9 240 1 3345 42918 3
SXF 1870 30.7 636 2 5700 19760 23
TRN 2377 37.6 300 1 3300 43300 31
TXL 8622 119.1 465 2 5447 27150 51
VIE 9597 155.9 I000 2 7100 32000 20
ZRH 17871 241.5 807 3 9500 56000 24
60 333 19
66 143 5
93 430 26
14 84 7
37 99 5
13 31 5
47 182 12
73 403 34
19 41 3
18 52 12
35 97 10
16 26 3
29 40 3
30 224 16
53 482 30
31 93 6
29 93 8
50 70 10
32 206 16
16 64 2
52 157 12
23 69 5
6 42 3
41 44 4
58 207 16
16 55 6
21 84 5
128 93 7
35 47 6
31 29 3
26 50 5
86 92 17
49 84 6
30 110 12
1S
Appendix 3 Frontier efficiency measures
Tab/e 8, efficiency coefficients from frontier ana/ysis
A TM APM
95 96 97 95 96 97
Amsterdam AMS 0.600 0.643 0.677 0.633 0.668 0,714
Berlin SXF 0.206 0.211 0.193 0,350 0.337 0.351
Berlin TXI., 0.320 0.332 0.333 0.281 0.285 0.294
Brussels BRU 0,610 0.646 0.668 0.797 0.8 I0 0.843
Bucharest OTP 0.641 0.663 0.648 0.756 0.764 0.738
Copenhagen CPH 0.830 0.851 0.861 0.813 0.830 0.843
Dublin DUB 0.384 0.383 0.416 0.655 0.700 0.741
Faro FAO 0.446 0.425 0.434 0.641 0.642 0.643
Frankfurt FRA 0,747 0.753 0.757 0.638 0.643 0.657
G6teborg GOT 0.668 0.670 0.682 0.663 0.685 0.705
Hamburg HAM 0.458 0.462 0,477 0.433 0.433 0.451
Hannover HAJ 0.447 0.447 0.551 0.351 0.363 0.388
Lamaca LCA 0.265 0.263 0.269 0.570 0.575 0.577
Leeds/Bradford LBA 0.506 0.493 0,516 0.421 0.467 0.533
Lisbon LIS 0,555 0.613 0.596 0.616 0.640 0.654
London LGW 0.796 0.819 0.836 0.715 0.739 0.770
London LHR 0.799 0.804 0.805 0.749 0.758 0.768
London STN 0.521 0,589 0,626 0.467 0.550 0.594
Lyon LYS 0.348 0.387 0.421 0.308 0.337 0.329
Manchester MAN 0.691 0.674 0.689 0.537 0.529 0.562
Marseille MRS 0.500 0.539 0.559 0.821 0.832 0.838
Milan LIN 0.813 0.847 0.856 0.856 0.876 0.891
Milan MXP 0.426 0.386 0.407 0.587 0.582 0.600
Munich MUC 0.720 0.751 0.794 0.673 0.693 0.737
Niiremberg NUE 0,680 0.682 0.706 0.582 0.577 0.611
Paris CDG 0.682 0.721 0.752 0.551 0,598 0,642
Paris ORY 0,247 0.217 0.236 0.313 0.303 0.315
Prague PRG 0.408 0.434 0.452 0.366 0.415 0.449
Rome FCO 0.684 0.730 0.743 0.790 0.810 0,827
Stockholm STO 0.409 0.429 0.459 0.589 0.604 0,633
Stuttgart STU 0.831 0.851 0.881 0.703 0.772 0.787
Turin TR_N 0.232 0.254 0.292 0.236 0.259 0.299
Vienna VIE 0.618 0.649 0.652 0.686 0.709 0.732
Zurich ZR.H 0.763 0.784 0.803 0.719 0.737 0,773
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Noise contoltrs at Schtphol _:Figure 2
proposed
t)
2)
40 Ke
Ke
fiffh runway
source: PMMS (I 996)
1
40 Ke
35 Ke
Ke means "Kosten eenheid", a function of the number of decibels. As a rule, (Ke-10)% oft.he
population living in an area is seriously affected b v aircraft noise.
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Abstract
In the wake of the Australian airline liberalization in 1990 and its forecasted
impact on air traffic, capacity has been expanded at Sydney (Kingsford Smith)
Airport [Sydney KSA] - Australia's busiest commercial airport - with the con-
struction of the third runway in 1994. Coinciding with the approval for this ca-
pacity expansion, the Commonwealth Government amended the Federal Airports
Corporation (FAC) Act to direct the FAC to carry out activities which protect the
environment from the effects of aircraft operations, with the cost to be borne by
the airline industry according to the 'Polluter Pays Principle'. Noise management
plans were part of the conditi6ns for developmental approval for a third runway.
To this end, since 1995, Sydney KSA imposes a noise levy designed to gener-
ate sufficient revenues to fund a noise mitigation scheme. Although the issues of
aircraft noise, in particular its impact on property values and land use planning
around the airport, have been extensively addressed in the literature, no one has
empirically examined the hnpHcations of new environmental policies in conjunc-
tion with airline liberalisation and change in airport infrastructure. Principles and
policy analyses are discussed in this paper. By focusing on the specifics of Sydney
KSA, broader policy issues likely to be relevant for other major airports around
the world are discussed.
Key words: Airline Liberalisation, Airport Capacikv, Environmental Impact,
Aircraft Noise, Noise Levy.
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in Section .5, in which we also examine the properties of this cha.rge against OECD (199l)
criteria and set out potentia.l limitations of the NLC formula used a.t Sydney [(SA.
The impacts of the NLC on a.ircraft operations and on its customers are examined in
Section 6. Specifically, we ta.l,:e a range of demand elasticities and estimate the effects of
differing levels of NLC. Aircraft noise has profound social impacts, especially on those
living near the a.it'port, and runway usage and flight paths determine the spa.tial distribu-
tion of noise. Section 7 examines these distribution consequences - both for the parallel
runway operations and for the current policy of 'sharing ait'cra.ft noise' encapsulated in
AirServices Australia Long Term Operating Pla.n (LTOP) of 1996. Finally, in Section 8
our conclusions are set out.
2 Deregulation and Traffic Growth at Sydney I<SA
A growth in air tra.ffac volume can be induced by a combination of several forces: demand
factors (e.g. increase of GDP), supply factors (e.g. a change in the industry structure
following a rnerger), and institutional factors (e.g. policy changes bringing deregulation
or liberalization). Etlvironmenta[ constraints are likely to arise at any airport experienc-
ing growth in traffic volume. In a related paper Nero and Black (1998) have argued that
the problem of environmenta.l externalities is exacerbated by hub development and that.
to some extent, hubbing contributes to a spatial redis;ribution of externa.lities. Since
the Austra.lian a.irline industry has experienced major changes in competition policy this
last decade, a somewhat detailed structural analysis of the impact of deregula.tion on
Sydney SKA is needed at this point 1. To tb.is end, Table 1 presents a brief summary of
the major historical events that have shaped the Australian airline industry, and that
have influenced, to some extent, Sydney I<SA development. In terms of competition
policy the major event is the deregulation of the domestic market in November 1990.
Insert Table 1 here.
Within the context of the above events, the following analysis shows the extent to
which S}'dney [(SA has retained its role a.nd importance as the primary Ausr.raiian
domestic and international _atewa.v. Table '2 and Table 3 show that Sydnev I<SA is bv
far the largest, airport in Aus;ralia. Througho,tt the 90s Sydnev [(SA passengers marker,
share has been t'_irly stable, alt,!tou_h its share of i_',tetnational _ircraft movements ha_
been recently eroded by Brisbane Airport..
[nse,-.'. r-:., _ o ' Ta.ble ._
_.wL_. _ 0.:_ct "' i_e,,e.
"For a pat"Jar a.ssessmen_ or" Ausr.rai[art ai:'iilte dere_uiat.iOll see BTCZ, [99.5a. and more recent.:,7
F,arsyth, tOOSb.
same general comments apply to the mot'e disa_gregated clara of the second and third
row of Table .5. [t is however import',ant to t;otice that the second group (Sydney Oniy)
has significantly and consistently larger growth rates (except, for lord factors) than the
other group. This result tends to suggest that, since deregulation of the domestic airline
industry, the more than proportional incre_e in traffic on the Sydney routes has been
accommodated by a more than proportional increase in flight frequency and a more than
proportional increase in aircraft size.
Table 6 and Table 7 display the evolution of aircraft movements and passengers at
Sydney ICSA according to the different types of mat'l,:ets, respectively. This enables us _.o
more accurately determine the factors that have driven the sustained growth, in aircraft
movements at Sydney [(SA during the l_t decade. [mplessive growth rates are achieved
for each segment of the marl_et in terms of both p_sengers and, although smaller, aircraft
movements. Table 6 and Table T show that regional traffic h_ experienced a. phenomenal
growth during the l_t decade at Sydney I(SA. In fact, Sydney [(SA has consolidated
its position as the largest, centre for regional traffic in Austz-aIia, with its share of total
Australian regional traffic increasing fi'om 11.9% to 20..5% in terms of p_sengers, and
from 8.6% to 14.0% in terms of aircraft movements dul'ing the 1959-1997 period. This
result suggests that Sydney [(.SA attracted proportionally more regional traffic than
other airports d_iring the 1989-1997 period. Deregulation h_ brought new regional
airline ope_'ators (some of the largest entrants are in ['act. subsidiaries of incumbents
Qantas Air'ways and Ansett Airlines) and these ope_atots have been clearly attracted by
the larger catchment area of the Sydney basin, and 1)v its ability to feed the domestic
and international routes.
Insert Table 6 and Table 7 here.
[n summary, the fundamental changes in comper.ition policy (deregulation) have
stimulated demand through a mix of lower fares and higher ft'equeo_cy (see also. BTCE.
199.5a and Forsyth, 1998b). ..X[ajor Aust, ralian ai,:lines ha.re also inc,'eased the size of
their fleet in order to meet this demancl. Preliminary empirical evidence suggests that
there has been little scope ['or major Australian ait'iines to reshape their networks in
order to gain economic efficiency (see also .Jatmil<a, 1999). \\:ichin this contex:, Sydney
ICSA has been able to strengthen its position as the primary national and interna'tion_i[
gateway, and to continue to expet'ience impressive growth l'ates in aircraft movements
and traffic, wir.hou_ however becoming a [at'ge US-sr.vle ilu}) airpo/t s. Undot_btedlv. this
will have an impact on bor.h airport caq)acir.v m'd _di'c,'aft noise, the primary co[_cerns
of r,his paper. [n fact. Svc[nev [(SA !ins :.he ,.,.o:s_ :ec,)td in t.e:ms of the m_gnitu,/e
of airc_-_fr, noise on sut:o_ii_clil_ col_m_lniri_s'; :'rOT::'_[ _l_j_t" .-\_Lsr.:al[_n airp,)r:.s. Tl',i._
iS. O[" cotl/'se. :_ot s_[:'[)ri.si_;g _:_'_[_ ._.c[l;_"." [,_i_.-\'s _"o'.'. -I, nt,., I :r.._ I)ro-<i/llir._. ' (.io,:at.[ol_ _.,_
the center I)_sit_.ess cJist,_ict. Tal)le _ i)rovi,.ie.s an _s.'.i',_ion of :',he [)op_tlation (prin.a:,_ _
_*'everr.heless. r.here is evidence of some [_I_l)i)i_:_ -_c:.ivi'v .7.- /_},!n,_v [<S.-\ (see ._.[so Section 5.2].
_This is _-_sess_'_i _:.si;:_ ;h,: .-\"st:'_!ian .X'oi._,: Ex:,o_::. [:" :_:.: _; Z._ 2,0.35. :_n,.] "G_
clear tradeoff between cal)aci_,y expansion and negative e×r, ernalit, ies. Although the above
figures suggest that, in this part, icul,xr c_e. tile cost of environmental externalities (based
on present practise of quautit'ying them) is small compared to the projected economic
benefits, transport decision making must be cognisant of principles of sustanabi[ity where
economlc, social and environmeutal factors and t,he mitigation of adverse impacts are
included in the evaluation t'ramework.
4 NIeasures to Address the Externality Problem at
Sydney KSA
Iu order to address the externality problem at Sydney I(SA, an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) was commissionecl by the FAC, which subsequently satisfied Federal
Commonwealth environn:enta[ legislation. Construction of tim third runway was ap-
proved subject to recommendations aimed at finding ways to reduce the unhealthy and
socially disruptive impacts upon the residents and environment of Sydney. These recom-
mendations have been detailed in the Draft Noise Management Plan and the Draft Air
Quality Management Plan (,),[itchell McCotter, t994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1994d). Following
the recommendation of the Draft Noise Ma.uagement Plan, tile Australian Federal Gov-
ernment adopted a Final Noise Management Plau (1996), not released to the public.
which combines: (a) a list, of measures to alleviate the noise problem in line with a tra-
ditional direct regulatory approach ('command-and-control') and, (13) the formulation of
a noise levy on aircraft in order to raise the monev for these measures. In contrast to
the direct approach, the second Wpe 0[" instrument is more market-oriented. We discuss
both approaches in turn.
4.1 Direct Regulatory Approach (:Command-and-Control')
The 'command-anti-control' approach involves the setting of technical and environmen-
tal standards enforced via legislation without the aid of market-based incentives. This
h_ been so far the traditional and pret'errecl approach adopted by airports and regula-
tors when ctealing -vith noise-related issues. For example, prior to the construction of
the third runway at Sydney I(SA. tile Australian (',ove:'ument implemented the gradual
phasing-out of Chapter 2 aircraft to be completed in a seven year period from Jan-
uary 1995 to April 2002. Ii: acldition to this mauctatorv measure towards noise reduc-
tion, the Australian Government determined new measures specific to the Sydney I(SA
capacity expansion and its noise-related prohlem. The principal new resolutions chosen
to be a part of the noise mir.ig,xtion policy can be desc:'ibed as operational measures anti
administrative measures. Th, _ ,?:>_rar.ional measz;,es incl::,:le:
• sl)ec[l:ic::oisea)ate:,,::-u:[):_,:e'.i_trc,s_'-.",_,: i't . ', ,in, ['¢21"3 ;)l)Vl'&[]i.)[lS at:c[ airport _:'Oll[l(l
operar, ious i'e._., pvefer_n:ia[ :uln,,vav :ise s'.sr, em. :Jrefete::r, ia[ _..i_ht track use); o:3-
e,'at.ing rest"ictious a ud sio_ allo,:ar, ions (_'_e:::.iai!','. :_ ::K:li_ on bor, h r.he nu:::be:
and Lvpe of ai,'crafr, for domestic a[:d i:::e:-_.,:_io::al o:)e:'at:o_:s during curfe'.v .:i,-,:e
f::pm-6an:]):
Following the recommendation of the Dra.ft Noise ._[anngement Plan (Mitchell ,\[c-
Cotter, 1994a, 1994b). the Federal Commonwealth Governn_ent h_ adopted user charges
following the Polluter Pays Principle on the aviation industry s. While the main aim of
standard Pigouvian tax is economic e_ciency (i.e., optimal tevels of production and con-
sumption), the main objective of the Potlttter Pays Principle, as formulated by OECD
in 1972, is equity: ':the polluter should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution de-
cided upon by public authorities to ensure that the environment is an acceptable state"
(quoted in Wallart, 1999). Since the empirical estimation of the environmental and
financial impact due to airlines' operations is a far from exact procedure, most govern-
ments, aviation and/or airl)ovt authorities rely on an ad hoc formula to apply tlle Polluter
Pays Principle 'a. In general, regulatory authorities follow the principles recommended by
International Civil Aviation Ot'ganization ([CAO) wheq .setting environmental (mostlY,"
noise- related) levies. ICAO policy on environmental levies recommends that any en-
vironmental levies on +tit" transport which States may introduce should be in the form
of charges rather than taxes, and that the funds collected should be exclusively applied
towards mitigating the environmental impacts associatecl with air transport activity
(':no fiscal aims behind the charges") (ICAO, 1998a).._[ore specifically, with respect to
noise-related charges, [CAO recommends that tile following principles should be applied
(ICAO, Appendix A, 1998b):
Noise-related charges should be levied only at airports experiencing noise prob-
lems ancl should be designed to recover no more than the costs applied to their
alleviation or prevention (charges should relate to costs).
Any noise-related charges sho,tld be associated with the landing fee, possibly by
means of surcharges or rebates, and should t_ke into account the noise certification
provisions of Annex 16 (ICAO, t993) in respect or aircraft noise levels.
Noise-related charges sho,.tld be non-discriminatory between users and not be es-
tablishecl at such levels as to be prohibitively high for tile operation of certain
aircraft. [n addition, the cl!arg,..+s shottld not discriminate against air transport
comparer.l with other modes of r+ranspor,_,.
_[oreover, industry trade associat, ions like International Air Transport Association
(IATA), Association of European Airlines (AEA). and Airpot't Council International
++Legislation to implement the noise charge w,_ introduced early in 199.5. and became effecti,,e .I,tlv
1, 1995 (Aircraft Noise Levy Act. lgg:5). It is importaut to stress'that under the Aircraft Noise Lev)
Collection Act t99.5, Sydney KSA is the only "qualifying airpor:' in Australia. Two conditions are
required to be _ qualifying airport 8t a particvlar time: (a) at t,he _.ime there is a public building within
a 2.5-unit cont.our, or a residence within a 30-unit contour shown on an ANEF previously prepared -or
'_he area around nhe airport for a ,.late aft.e, + "ha_ "i:ne: and (b) .'.!',e Cotnlnonwealth is funding at ,.hat.
time, or has fl_ncled b,J."ore ,hat ,'itne. at [:,)is, + ._,;v.'!ioration proa.r_m for :he .-.i:'nort. Note that ,_nce
an airport hns I_ec.:,m_+ a +,lu:_lil'_.iug ttir',,;rr i:. r.:':'+:;_i::.s -,. quaiii"..,::. G +'.tirpor:. evelt iF it no longer mee_..+
con,Ji::ion (a, (see Art.. 15..5j
:_[Jscr ch:_rges :ue +zstlaiUv :,,+t [O_','et" _han pu,,-' [_ig,)tt_latl :.;.t:.:¢S+_esulthlg in _. agher level of +.x_e.'-
nalit:,, ail etse equ:+,i. \Valla£t (!'.)gt-)) allOWS :ha'+ :_ :>ui,op;.irl'tal t;..:e:" :i:.tt'ge ie'.ei +::.tn result {n t.he optim:i
pollution ie-'et, pr>i,.le,-i ,+hat its rev:tll.l,. + {s :t:..t.+,! :+,):" al};.tt,.qllellr .si_-:.:!,.ii;l_ ' &tlt.i cleat :tie user Charge !c'.e',
iS Set_ adequrtte['...
1998, the LUR was set at, Aus$ 165.18, i.e. a nominal increase of 6.6% throughout the
95-98 periocl tl (see Table It).
Insert Table 11 here.
Table 12 clearly shows that noisier aircraft p%' more, all else being equal. The
difference in the NLC between the B-737-200 and the B-737-400 is quite striking. The
levy for the B-737 Chapter 2 version is t,hree times larger than the levy for the Chapter 3
version. There are also importaat differences on a per p_senger basis and, to a lesser
extent, depending on the seating configuration of aircraft. According to Ta.ble 12, the
difference between a ChN3ter 2 aircraft and a Chapter 3 aircraft in the charge per
passenger is larger for smaller airplanes. Indeed, the charge per passenger for a B-747 or
a DC-10 does not vary noticeably according to its Chapter certification. However, for
aircraft in tile range of 65-165 passengers, the charge per p_senger is significantly larger
for Chapter 2 aircraft. For example, for a similar cN_acity range, a F-2S his a charge
of around Aus$ 8.50 per passenger, in comparison to around Aus$ 9.00 for a BA-146.
Given this result, one could argue that there is a strong economic incentive for airlines
to ph_e-out smaller Chapter 2 aircraft` first and/or to operate those aircraft in other
city-pairs. We Will come back to some of these issues in Section 6.
Insert Table 12 here.
5.1 Properties and Advantages of the NLC Scheme
According to OECD (1991) guidelines for tile application of economic incentive instru-
ments, there are a number of general crit,eria against which the various economic instru-
ments can be normally evaluated. These criteria are: the environmental effectiveness
principle; the equit 9 principle; the (static and dgnamic) economic efficiency principle:
the administrative cost-effectiveness principle; and tile acceptability principle. We exam-
ine them crit,ically with respects to t,he NLC at Sydney I(SA. In practice, these principles
often conflict with each other, forcing the adopt,ion of compromises and/or of innovative
solutions.
Table 12 for details on the noise metrics). The total number of NU corresponds to (10,000 - 6.44) -4-.'
(90,000 • t.96) = 2.t0,800. If the to_.al fumls t.o be generated for a particular year is Aus$ 40 million.
the LUR (i.e.t.h(: $ value of one noise ,,nit) wo,id be equal to Aus$ ifi6.[0, so that a Boeing 737-200
would pay a NLC equal t.o Ans_ I(ITU.UIJ,whit:. ;, Boeing 737--1l)(Jaircraft would pay a NLC equal r.o
AusSJ 326.t)0 per l;mding.
:tThe .-\ircr:d't Noise Le-y Act 19!)5 l,,)_id,', r!,a,,, fcJr Ilw. fin:mciat :.ear et:ding June 1996. the L[.'P.
should I)e less than AusS IS0.00. with a nlaxit,,tl im:r,_a.-:eof l(J% for the following year.
it)
the equity principle seemsobservedsince the 3,'LCdoesnot confer a disproportionate
burden on tile least well-off aircraft operators and/or aircraft users (passengers) (see
Table 12). Whether the current NLC is (s_lfficiently) eJeficie,t in providing continuous
incentives for noise nuisance reductions is rather clif:ficltlt, to answer given, inter ali_
financial, technological and operational constraints (see also Section 6 ancl Sect, ion 7).
5.2 Potential Limitations of the NLC Scheme
We see h.owever several limitations with the current NLC scheme:
1. The most significant issue is that the level of the noise levy is set by the sum needed
to fund compensation and not by the marginal cost that noise nuisances impose on
society l"t. However, from an economic efficiency point of view, a noise levy shoulcl
reflect the true marginal costs created by the externality, ,xs well _ the marginal
abat;ernent costs (with:l, ch.-.l_e.tldou the technology _wailalale for, e.g., engine hushk-
its, windows insulation, etc.). Be.causetlleslim needed t.o fund compensation is set
to vary each year (and eventually it is set to tend towards zero after a period of 10
years), while the true marginal costs are likely to be naore steady, the divergence
fi'om margip.al cost pricing could be substantial in tile rnedium/long run.
2. Tile 26:3 (EPNdB) ANL threshold level is arbitrary, and does not imply that only
aircraft with an ANL greater than 2(3:3induce noise environmental damages. Noise
levy exempt aircraft like the MD-90-30 (with an ANL equivalent to 260), the Saab
2000, the Fokker-50, and soltle versions of the BAe14(5, are not exactly 'silent'
aircraft, and therefore also induce negative externalities. Similarly, the NLC does
not apply to prol)eller aircraft or to helicopters. [u designing the formula there
w_ a strong desh'e to "achieve a degree of compat'ability between the total funds
raised from international and domestic/commuter operations" (FAG, 17.9.6, 1990).
Indeed, because domestic operations at Sydney KSA strongly outweigh interna-
tional operations is, and because domestic and regional operations use smaller air-
craft than international operations, there was a concern that the burden of the
noise levv would proportionally be more impoctant on domestic markets, unless
small jet aircraft wottld be less heavily taxed: of completely exempt. Cleartv,
from an economic el:ficiellcy Imint of vh,.w it. is fail" r.t_at q11iet.er aircraft should
be taxed less. Whether i¢ is desirable from an e,l,_itv point of view ,,hat larger
noisier aircraft are Ite_Lvilv taxe,[ (s,urc l_ rge) while the smaller q|lieter aircraft are
noise levv exempt (some sort. of rebate) is debatable. One can argue that this
scheme provides some intent, ire for airctaft substir.|ttio/i. However. we believe ,.hat
this substitution is rather limited, becattse the more noise-efficient, aircraft can
have very different ope.rational charact, e,isr.ics (i.e. size. range, etc.) than the less
noise-efficieq:, aircraft, l';
"lit {s therefore llot. a sr.&nd&l'd Pi_,J,_'.i;,n _:,::
18_07,',)U0 do,lies,it. :-).t.000 t'egioual llight.-, i,i,ts 2'..v:_,,.; g-ene.:'al :p. iar.iou :rod miii_ary flights, versus
4:],000 int<'nationzd Illovelm.-nI._, for ;h,e ' itJtd;-!9!)7.
subsidies "o r,dar.,-,t '4:,'>!* ,)_" _,t,_,!,lc;i,;_ ;,_,..,.:.s.,,, : ..... ".\ij!,._,: !-:. '.'.):.'-,
. Sydney [',[SA is, so ['at', the only airport in Australia to face the NLC. Because
airlines operate on a. _patial m_tworl.:, there is a need for cooperation among tile
different airports ill the country, and maybe hartnonization of the tax (at the
nat, iona.I and som<:tim<:s interna.tiotla.l h3ve[). Otherwise, there is a potential for
introducing discrinlit_a.t, ory mea.s,ires that distort competitiou and resource allo-
cation. In fact, one potential opetatioual effect of a locMly-ba.sed NLC is for an
airline to divert its noisiest a.it'craft to other routes of its net,.vork where the noise
restrictions are less stringent a.tld/or where tile finatlCia[ penalty is more accom-
modating. Note that froul an econot'nic point of view such an outcome could be
acceptable if the external costs related to aircra.ft operations are lower elsewhere,
a situation that could potentially arise in AustrMia (see Table 8).
6 Impacts on Aircraft Operators and on its Cus-
tomers
Major Australian airlines (Qantas and Ansett) have upgraded and have expanded their
fleets during tile 90s, and today their fleets, by and large, comply with the highest
noise standards (although Ansett still ol)erated three (Cb.apter 2) F-28 in .June 1998, see
Table ta). The mandatory l)h_e-ottt of (.:hapter 2 aircraft COul)led , to a lesser extent.
with a higher NLC for Chapter 2 aircraft, h_ induced Australian airlines to rapidly
withdraw Chapter ') aircraft fl'om Sydney. Because the NLC per passenger is significantly
larger for smaller Chapter :_ aircraft, tnMnly I:'-:28 and B-T:27, there has certainly been a
stronger incentive to phase-trot tlmese partic,lla.r type_ofMrcraft. However, we strongly"
believe that the main fo,'ce driving the withdrawal of some Chapter :2 aircraft is _he
compliance with federal aud internationM la.ws and tile t:ompletiou of the aircraft life
cycle, rather than the additional NLC. [m.lltstry sources suggest tile effect has beeq the
withdrawa.l on one aircraft type, namely tile [:'.--:28.
Insert Figure 1.3 about here.
For aircraft opet'ators, the direct effect of tile NLC is an increase in airport-feb.ted
charges (part of the operating costs), and therefore a monetary transfer to the airport or
the government attthot'ities. Beta tse both domestic and interrta.tionM Australian airline
markets are highly duopolistir., and demand t'o," air transpottation is fairly inelastic, air
lines are more likely to (directly} pass a. s,tbstautial fraction of tile NLC on passengers.
In fact, a noise charge of Atts$ :1.40 per passenger is alttomaticallv being imposed by' in-
dividual airlines at their discretion to recove," tile costs they incttr in paying the .YLC a_
Sydney [(SA ([:'AC. 199(5). This charge applies to evety domestic/regional and interna-
tional passenge',' landing at S,.'dnev KSA. \\"ith n!ote tha't I0 tnilliou passengers inbo,tn,L
new standat',ls mttsr !,e .i,:vis,.:i ;tat.i hl_ph*tr,:nt.,e-i np.or,ter r,) curb total noise levels. $o far. ho',vev._:
[CAO au,I tls r',)l,tlni:-c,. ,)u .-\.ta_ri,-m Euviro_,ll,.t_r:d P:',.-,te.:r.iotl (CAEP), alt.hougi_ recognizing :i::'.:
ne,,v nois,' c..'.'r.itb:;ttio!_ .aa._[ar_l- _lm-,.It,) h,-",{,.,.,.top,+,! rhar prop,-H':' Dtke &CCOttllr.Of teCh!lO[OgiT&i
I)FO;gI'I.'S. ",,. _ll'e =lll:lJ+;_:" _.d, i','ilt']l ,I ",,ll?..,'ll_. Is .'.,11 ;lit'-." "q,,'t'i',iC pl"_)F_O_;li _G illr.l'Odllce a flew lloise $_0;;,i-,.7,1
{[CAO, i tJ'_,._,.).
havethat M_out 48 to [93 internationM flights, and al)o,lt 274 to 2,10.5 domestic/regional
flights might not be ann,,Mly sched,lled at Sydney KSA as a result of the NLC. [n the
total, around 322 to 2,298 flight, movements could be annuMly diverted from Sydney
KSA (between 0.132-0.943¢28 of act,|al movements). Although these effects are small, an[t
other factors like exchange rates, avgas price, and c[omestic and international economic
growth are more likely to infl_muce the future t,rend of" the air transport demand ,at
Sydney KSA, our analysis indicates that, depending on the price eh_ticities estimates.
and on the amount of the NLC, the t.otal n,tmber of aircra['t movements may be curbed
at Sydney KSA under a regime of NLC.
Table I4 summarizes the likely impacts on demand and on aircraft movements, had
airlines imposed a per passenger noise charge o[" AusS 6.80 or Aus$ 10.20 instead of
Aus$ :3.40. Such an incremse in the noise charge would have occurred had the actual
LUR been set higher, as suggested by some local community .,sadvocates- . The results of
Table 14 suggest that, when the price elasticity is valued at its high range, a reduction of
around 3% of alltlllal aircraft ITIO'celnellts could arise ,ltlder a per passenger noise charge
of Aus$ 10.20. All in MI, these results sl,ow that tile airline industry indirectly bears
some of tile socia.I costs as.sociat.ed with this lllOde' o[" transpc_,'tation in tile form of a loss
of potential passenger rew-m,u_s. Similarly, some airpolt-rel_tted charges are forgone for
Sydney KSA.
Insert Table 14 here.
7 Impacts and Distributional Consequences of Air-
craft Noise
7.1 Before the Long Term Operating Plan of NIarch 1996
Given aircraft types and aircraft noise charac:eristics, r,he allocation of aircraft to fligh_
paths "2Gultimately determines tile noise exposure of residents s_trrounding the airport.
Wit, h the opening of tile tllird runLway [l(iI.-341R.] air traffic control had more fligh_ p`ar.h
options (diversification arg,tment) availalfle with Sydnet."s airspace. However, tile Labor
Government in its det.ermina.t.ion Oil t.he thiM ['IIIIWII.V _[S imposed an operational re-
striction that there Wo_Lld hc m_ t.ake-oJ[_s r.,) [.ht" Ilot'_,h ['1"()111 lilt-' II_.'W runway beca, tse ..);
noise iml)at:ts oil resideltt.s to tl,e tLtJtl.lt, fit eitt'[v [.995. ;he tttllw&V:s available at Svr.lnev
[(SA were as follows (see [vigttre [):
• Ar"ivals: 0T-25. I6R-.,-,L, an,t tCiL-3-'.-R.
" [ndeed, Llte,:' arguecl cllat a hi:4her LUR wo,,hl have :'aised additional revenue/or the noise midg.-t;.;c::
scheme, as ,.v,dl _s ',)ro,,'iciing a su'on_er incentiv,_ :o o|_erate more noise-eh_cient aircraft.
"-S'¢v'hich is the resl)onsil)ility o_" air traific conrroller_ of .-kir.q.'ervices .-\usr.rali:l.
r, .'
airport. (Marrickvilie, Leichhardt. Ashrield. Dr_ztnmoyne, Hunters Hill, Lane Cove, and
Ryde). Parts of those SI.II),II'[)8 to Lhe east; alld WeSt. Of tile airport. - Botany, Randwick.
Rockdale, I(ogarah, and [[,trstvilh_ - obtained a tlet gain in value of some Aus$ 200
million from aircraft, noise reductions ([(iuhill Engineers, Table 23.1.3, p.23-31, 1990).
[n February 1,995, soon M'ter operations on the third runway brought home the redis-
tribution of aircraft noise and after cons_titation with co,ntmtnity groups, the Australian
Democrats (the third major politic.a[ party' in Australia) decided to push for a. Senate
[nqt.tiry int:o Sydrtey's aircraft: noise prol)lems. Tim press re[ea.se by New South Wales
Senator Vicki 13ourne (:2,'3.'F'ebruary 1995) said a public iuq,miry was essential given the
"anger and distress" caused by the opening of the third (parallel) runway. The Select
Committee on Aircraft Noise in Sydney inquired, ,xmong other matters, into: the human
impact of noise caused by aircraft movements following the opening of the third runway;
reasons for discrepancies between the predicted and actual noise impacts (and proposals
to prevent any such discrepancies occurring in the future); the likely effectiveness of the
environmental management plans ['or Sydney [(SA (and whether there are other poten-
tially, effective meas_u'es, which could be imph:mented); and the potential for operations
at the future Sydney \,Vest Airport, (SWA.) at Badgerys Creek to alleviate the impact of
aircraft noise oft "'Sydney basin communities" (Cornmonwealth of Australia, p:3, 1995).
The Select Committee on Air('rah: Noise in Sydney mad(. _ comments critical of the
environnmntal assessment of the third runway, and rnade recommendations on th.e op-
erational meas,tres irnl)lemented to reduce noise at Sydney KSA. One of the main rec-
ommendations was the introt[_u:t, ioil of ,'t legislal:ive cap on annua.[ movements at Sydney
I(SA, and 80 aircraft, movements per ho,lr is now C,overnn'teut policy.
7.2 Since the Long-Term Operating Plan of 1996
On March 2, 1996, ..;he Liberat/Natiunal (.'oalitioll won the Federal election (defeating
the Labor Part.,,') with a laudslide yictory in the House of R.eprese,ltatives '-'9. The Sydne 9
4remind Herald, on the day o[" the election, summec[ up wha.t each l)ar_y had to offer on
Sydney I(SA and on the h.tt,ure S\VA at Badgerys Creek. The interning government's
election policy is reproduced in Table t7.
Insert Tabte 17 here.
conducted for Sydney KSA. The most ciaed st.udi,.s (Ahelson. tgTT, and the Draft EIS, 1990) used a
hedonic l)t'icing met.hod r.,9idenr.if:,' "h,-.hul)licil, pric, +.a;.t.ached to dilrer,mt variables l)y the house buyer.
The Draft EIS study (t99{J) :_;uu!)l,-'d ;].14 hOIl:-;t+:,,:in gOi'.;lll)', Xl;m'ickvill,, and R.ockdale and compared
prices in noise-a.lfect.ed areas '.'.'i:i: .:;:,lup;ir:t!)ie prices that. we,'e not. iloise affecr.ed. The most recent
study by .J[..W R.ese:wch _nd Cottsu[r.:ulcy P:v i.'d (Nli:.ch,.ll ._[,:Cotler. !.!)9-i1+.Appendix .I). s,',.mpi-..i
7.50 oro)e,-t,:' '+ralt.sactiotts il: ['.J!J' • • _ i'.)!)2 . ,....• : .... '_iona .I,,+ n,?r'.h-sottt!l lligitt, pa'h and ,:ornpared prices ;vi:.;:
nearby non-noise affec;ed i_rol,,+rt.i,..-,...xi_;:tt.i...+ pr,+t:_iutlis (d,:pr,'¢ia.t.ion rat,,s) in _l+lese tatter _v.'o st.t,di-.s
of t.l',e northern suburbs :_.re .Sl_mt.:uize,i in Tabl,-" lli.
""[n r.he .q.'enat,: ( ['pp,:'r [louse_. :'.:,.* D,-':uoc;'.'trs. '.'.'ieh S seats c,:mtiuu,ed r.o ltotd r.he balance of :),>vet
West runway m,>nthlv comptailtt.s ctiinbed steeply to 6,5000 in .JIily [996 (Stage I of
tile LTOP). Departures for the first, tame. of r,inw_tv :]412. (see F'ig,lre [) prompted 8,000
complaints for the month of Novep, ll)er LDgO. Conlplaints fell rapidly, and by November
1997 about 2,500 monthly cotnplaint, s were received. [mplenlentation of Stage II of the
LTOP in December 1997 Imshed tnonthly COml)laints past 9,000. Finally, the most re-
cent data (October 1998) indicate that the nilml)er of mont, hly complaints stabilized at
about 3,400 complaints (from 612 complainants). Table 18 iIlttstrates the distribution of
aircraft movements according to the cardiual points: (I) before the construction of the
third runway (Pre-Parallels, [9.93); ('2) after tile construction of the third runway under
the Labour Government (Parallels, 1995); (3) after the construction of the third runway
under the Coalition Governnlent (St,,.oc [ of the LTOP, end of 1996); (4) Stage II of the
LTOP (Oct. 1998), and finally; (.5) uncler the long-term Coalition Government's target
for the LTOP.
Insert Table t8 here.
Although it. is too tanIv to prtwi_le _t ccmipreheusive ecoliomic, operational and en-
vironmental ,'t.ssessment of the LT()I:L the concept o[ noise sll_u'ing through a safe and
efficient use o[" differe,at Ulcerating xnude.s of all rull',va.vs i:s t.lteoretically appealing. In
fact, uncler specific circum.'stances l),Iblic choice theory has a .strong argument in favour
of 'externality distribution'. Assuming that the marginal external cost (MEC) associ-
ated with aircraft noise is increasing 3:3 in the number of aircraft rnovements per runway
(N), it is easy to show that total external costs are lower when aircraft movements are
distribut, ed over a larger ,lumber of runways. Let us consider the following graphical
example. Figure 2 displays a linear (iucreasiug) rela.tionship between the number of
aircraft movernents per runway and the marginal external cos_, i.e., MEC=a+b.N, with
a>0, and a'_ b>0. Nit'st, ass,line tha.t all the rltLtwavs have identical charact, eristics, and
that a total of t20 ait'cta[t nlovenwnts (p_:r time unit) are e, lually shared among two
runways (a situation which would depict the 'Parallels" regime in 199.5). Since total
external costs correspond to twice tile area utlder the ._[EC of Figure 2, it is easy to
show that total external costs correspond to ;],600-b. Now, le_ us assume that the same
total of L20 movements are equally shared among the three runways (a situation which
would rather represent the LTOP's target). A straightforward computation shows that,
total external <,)st,s are t'<+,liu+'ed to 2.40U-b, all else equal. In other worcIs, when the
margina.l externa.[ cost /;tr rlltlwav is risilig. Silftl'ill_ tl_e tra ffic over more rl.lnways carl be
a survey of 3,.37") Australian t',,sid,_nls (ll,:'de :utd i3ull,.,n. 1!)_57). [?,-'a,' of aircraft cr_shing, personality,
SOCiO-eCOIIOllliC 5l;tl. LlS itlld illl',ti;_. [C, Cll.- ill'I' [';tCt...)l':,. t. hltl iNflu,._tc,, ',vh,.i I,,:t- ,'lllllOyltllC_* from aircraft, is
reported.
aaThis 1._,:.t standard a.._.iltlq,li,)l: i;i ,eil','ic',)lilili'i;Ial ecoll,_,Iill,.':-. :tit.i il. ::-: Ili,.),_r. ',ik,.qv '-o apply in ti'_,e
case at. h;.uid. ;.tltii,;,ugh it. is uleiin,:tl,.lx, :.ui ,:lil,:)iric:.tl ,lil,-St.ion. "[[te .ir:llli:tr{c surge ii'l the nun-iber o;
noise ¢ornl)i,_inL-; n.l'_.er t.he o!_enin _ ,>f t.h,, r.llit'd rliiiw;tv o-'rtainl- .qtl'lporfs tile .-3r..,Ttlld,-trd a.ssumpt.ion ,Dr
increasing n'targii'_ai external c,._.-.t.-..
34 [:'or Siml>licit.',"_ sake. and .vit.houi ' of g,:u,er:_lir.v. _'.e cau -,et. _.=:3. as in Figure _
_,tj
from tile noise Levy, if t.her_ is ,'t desire h) t'_llly apply tile Pollltter Pays Principle a_.
[n an ideal world, one wo,dd aim at comprehensively addressing (i.e. internalizing)
the full environmental costs ,xs well _s benefits ,'l._sociated with aircraft operations. Such
an economic 'first best' wo,,id be rather difficult to achieve given the complexity of the
problem at hand (uncertainties, rnuldple constraints, etc.). The Polluter Pays Principle
applied in Sydney I(SA can be described as a "n-all best" given the different constraints.
To the best of our knowledge, whether s,tfficient static and @nantic e_ciency (i.e.,
incentive to reduce airci'a.['t noise externalities) is achiew_.d under the current scheme is
dimcult to assess. Similarly, even i[ efficiency is achieved under the current scheme,
local/regiona.l econonlic optimality does not necessary imply global optimality. The
fact that the scheme chosen at Sydney [(SA combines "user charges' (i.e., Polluter Pays
Principle) and some degree, of _internalization" seems to ,is al_pealing in the case at hand
(i.e. in the very contentimLs and complex context o[ an airport).
The main ¢ontribudoll and originality of this paper is the integration of the various
aspects and dynamics driving tile economics o[ air transport in relation to airport infras-
tructure and operations and tile associated environmental externalities. For a number of
re,'ksons (e.g.a.vailal)ilitv o[ data, t,ransl)arency , Originality o[ the scheme, etc.) Sydney
KSA provides a unique framework lot" analyzing t!xis comphex issue. On the other hand,
by focusing on tlle specifics of Sydney [<SA, we ,e able to discuss broader principles
and policy issues likely to be relevant fl_rother m% r airports around the world.
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I0 Appendix
Table 1: Recent I(ey Dates and Event, s for tile Aust, r,'diaa Airline Industry
Date Events
1952
195T
Late 1989
Nov. 1990
Feb. 1992
Mar. 1993
Nov. 1994
2a.n. 1995
Jul. 1995
Oct. 96
Nov. 96
Jul. 1997
Jun. 1998
Introduction of the Two-Airline Policy: This is a legislation to limit 'u,_econolrfic' (i.e., destructive)
competition betwee,_ the two domestic airlines, the publicly owned TraiLs Australia Airlines (TAA),
and tile private Aust,-aliaa National Airways (ANA).
Private Ansett (then a regional airline) takes over ANA and forms a new airline Ansett-ANA,
which was later renamed Assert Airlines.
Pilots' dispute afl'ectlag the Australiau domestic market. Traffic decli,le by approx. 20_ in 1990.
End of the Two-Airline Policy. The At,stralla,_ domestic market is co,.ph:tely deregulated.
Merger between publicly owned Qant.xs alld Australian Airlines (AA) {ex-TAA renamed in 1986).
The new Qalltas becomes the only major operator at that time with both a domestic and an
international network.
Government adopts the pri,tciple of muhiple designation ia izttezatatioaal air services agreements.
This enables Ansett Australia to lunch its iateraatio.al operatioz,s in Sept. 1993. while Qantas
looses its status as sole designated flag-c,'u'rier.
Government sells to British Airways a 25% stake in Qantas. Subsequently. both airlines form a
strategic alliance.
Inauguratiotl of the third runway at Sydney IqSA.
Mandatory phase-out of Chapter 2 aircraft to be completed by April 2002.
Government sells to the public its remai_fiug 75% of equhy in Qallta.s, thereby becoming fully
pri vatlzed.
Private Air New Zealand purchases a 50% stake in Ansett Australia from TNT Co,'poration.
Creatiol_ of a SiIL_Ie (T,'ans-T.-.sman) Aviation ,Market between Australia az,cl New Zealand.
Government sells 'Phase [' airports (Brisbane. Melbourne, and Pe,'th} for lo,g term lease.
Government sells 15 'Phase [i' airports (Adelaide, Ca,_berra, Coolaagatta. and Hobart are among
the largest airports} for Io.g term lease.
So,Lrce: Various including,inter alia, Fi,ldlay (1991_), Hooper and Findlay (1997) and. Forsyth (1998a).
2_3
Table 4: Top 20 Austl"ali,'tn Airline City-Pa.ir Mat'ket, s for" Fiscal Years 1991 and 1998
(Ending ot_ .]une 30)
City-pall' L,,nl Mvt.s 9I _Lvt.s 9,'_ L_a× 9L Pax 98 beats 91 5ea._s 9_
1,393.025
1,193,525
1,062,$64
1,322,573
Melbourbe-Syd,ley 706 23j._65 3.1,4.10 2,725,931 .I ,$96.3,_`3 3,913,.$27 6,652,70l
Bri'tbane-Sychley 753 16,391 "2,1,1,I.$ I,,.360,103 3,0,15,136 2-,5.3.$,579 4,252,983
B rlsbane-_Ielbot*rne 1,381 6,601 1-5,728 630,15-1 1,6.$ 7,91_I ,$I.q,742 2.060,396
A delaide- _[e[bo u.t-tLe 6,13 9,049 13,752 890,66S t.300,129 1.214,190 1,768,883
Coolaalgat_a-Sy(hley 680 8,760 [ 1,379 710,7'2.7 I ,'27 $ ,S,'.; I 942,497 1,656,988
Adelalde-Sydiley 1,167 ,$,633 II,470 5.28,$36 1,076,516 707,038 1,460,673
Bx'b*bane-Cahnls 1,391 4,677 9,037 408,567 9S`3..101 552,592
Perth-Sydney 3,28.I 3,185 7,164 33.5,695 9 t 6,G27 49"2. ,759
Melbottr]_e-Perth .'2,706 4,771 6,91-1 ,$16,096 8,19,22S 704,116
Canberra-Sydney 236 9,727 22,16,S ,562.651 `330,376 953,665
Hobart-Melbourt_e 618 5,SI 7 6,621 47,3,377 748,129 660,030 910,133
Canberr:x-Melbourtte ,170 7,10`3 9,,I$6 443,'.)71 69.$,5S0 743,748 1,080,093
Calrn.:-S ych_ey 1.971 I, I "].5 4 ,,357 13 I, 49-5 6-1,1 ,,S.e, I 166,951 940,060
Melb o u:'ne- Co o[a.ng:,t t a 1,33U 2,72_ -I ,,10,$ 258,497 5.15,722 33,$,026 699,644
Brisbane-To_vlt._ville l ,I I"2. 4,352 4.760 337,8"2.9 ,I.I,S,111 483,465 .$89,620
Lau ces r.oil-,'v[e[ bo u,-t_e 471._ 6,312 5,`390 325,16`3 4-I-I,1._5 ? 470,495 548,276
Adel-',ide-Pert],t 2,190 2,723 4,31_; 2.18,777 .10.$,876 339,490 555,234
B rlsba1_e-Roc "Idtamp to_ .$18 '.),907 5,593 176,91.$ 2-13,64,1 273,468 402.0.53
B rlsba_e-_lackay 797 1,713 3,9,e,3 91."2.87 223,G19 14'2..407 332,272
[(algoovlie- Pe,'t h 538 1,4.$3 4,030 89,490 190,527 106,107 318,607
To_al 129,107 219,01_I 11,7.$0,474 21,307,5,_,I 16.605.89'2 29,200,601
S.,,r_._.: BTCE, 1995a, azld DTRD, 1998a.
Table 5: Summal-v S_at, ist, ics for Top 20 Cit, y-Pait's 1991-98, \Veight.ecl Average by Group
of City-Pairs
_Jl:y-p,_.lt" (.;L'OLt D .SL(knL) .'vlvts 91-98 Pax 9t-98 Sea,._ OL-gS LF LF AS AS
1995 c;/., Gro_h _ (]rowth % Growth 19Vl 1998 1991 1998
Total Top 20 1,039 +7.5.-5% +93.'2.% +91.`35% 70.`3'70 73.0% 13.$ 152
Sydi_ey Only (7) 96_ +79.1% -I'-96.3% +96.0% 70.2_ 7"2.6_ 147 167
Ochers Except Sydney (13) 1.155 +71.1% +8.$.7% +,$5.6_7_ 71.5% 73.6_ 117 129
S_,,r_.': BTCE, 199.$a. and DTRD, 199,$a,
,V_,(.-_: SL=S_.a_e Lenw_¢.h, Mvt.s:Movemez_s. P.'xx=P_set_get-s, LF=LoA, I Fa_:t.or. AS=Aircraft. Size.
fj
Table 8: Approximate Pop,fLat, ions (Private Dwellings) Exposed to Aircraft. Noise as
Measured by AustraLian Noise Exposure Index lANE[], 1990/gL
ANEI
City 20-25 25-30 30+
"Sydney" 45,U00 1.5,000 9,000
Adelaide 14,500 7,400 4,100
Melbourne 14,900 1,700 300
Source: Federal Airports Corporation. personal conuuunicatlon; AirServices Australia, 1997, p.100.
Not_.._e: "In 1995 the con'espondhlg Imnnben3 for Sydney are: 68,400; '-*0,300; and I 1,000.
Table 9: Annual Practical Capacity versus Actual Movements (including General Avia-
tion) at Sydney I(SA (100s)
1990 1991 199'2 1993 1994 1995 1996 199T 1998 2003
Practical Capacity 2620 2,_so 22s0 ".'sso 26s0 3530 3530 3530 3530 3530
Actual Movements t520 1250 2030 2220 2270 24"20 2560 2640 2640 3300
Source: Various, including DTRD, 199Sa, BTCE, 199-I. Mitchell Cotter, Table 2.1, p.2.9, f994b. Projections for the
year 2003 frOIIt _hc LTOP {1996) a_,st|ntit|g 4.1_ htcn'ease per year.
Table 10: Evolution of Revenue Collected h'oln Aircraft Operators and Expenditure for
Noise Mitigation Scheme (in million of Aus$). Fiscal Year Ending in June.
Expenditure Revenue
1994-95 Aus$ 24.2 ---
1995-96 Aus$ 62.3 Aus$ 22. l
1996-97 Aus$ "[-9.0 Aus$ 3,..
1997-98 Aus$ 68.4 Aus$ 39.4
So,tee..: Personal communficadoa with senior olticer (Harry Carroll} at AirServlces .'.kusr.ralia and DTRD, 1998b.
:'0
Table 13: Major Australian Airline Fleets(Including RegionalSubsidiaries),June 98
Aircraft Type Qanta.s Ansett
B-747" 31 3
B-767" 26 i:l
B-737" :38 '2"2
A-300" 4 -
A-320" - 19
BAe146" 14 11
F-28" - :3
DHC-S" 16 -
DHC-6" ,5 -
BA-JS31 4 -
Sho,-tsSD360 7 -
Cessua C404 Than 2 -
Total 147 7 [
So_rc¢: Airliues annual reports, 1998.
NoJ.A: "All types hlcluded.
Table 14: Effects on Demand and on Aircraft Movements fi'om Different Noise Charges
Type of
market
Reduction in demand
fi'om a per pax charge of:
Aus$ 3.40 Aus$ 6.80 Aus$ 10.20
International 7,500-30,300 I $,210-60,770 22,780-91,120
Domestic
+ Regional 28,soo-2_9.ooo 5ra_.0-,,ar,92o s`5,_so-a_.sso
Total 36,000-249,300 72,330-.198,690 108,-160-745,000
Reduction in aircraft movement
from a per pax charge of:
Aus$3.40 Aus$ 6.80 Aus$ 10.20
48-193 97-3S7 145-580
2":4-2. I05 549-4.211 824- 6.316
3 °')-')..,._98 596-4,598 969-6,896
Not___...£:Calculat, ious are ba._ed oJt price el_sr.lchies ranging from 0.5-2.0 and from 0.3-2.3. and on a 'representative'
round-trip alr fare of Aus$ 1500 and Aus$ ,5001 for hlternar.ional and domestic markets respecr, Jve[y.
Table 15: Number of Occupied Private Dwelling Types in the 20 ANEF anc[ Above Con-
tours for the Base C_e (1985) and the Long Term (2010) Parallel Runway Operations
Location ReLative L988 2010 % Change
to Airport
North 23,1,58 33.398 +44.2
Sout, h 1,071 1,236 +15.4
East 2:_.384 1,44.5 -9:3.8
West 24.326 1,683 -93. l
I-o_a[ 71.9:J9 37,762 -47.6
5o,,re¢: Based oa [<inhill Euginee,'$. Table 23.9, p.'13-22. 1990.
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Figure I: Sydney I<SA Runw,xys System
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